JUDGMENT : Anil K. Narendran, J. 1. The respondents in W.P.(C)No.24969 of 2025 have filed this writ appeal, invoking the provisions under Section 5 (i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958 , challenging the order dated 08.07.2025 of the learned Single Judge in that writ petition, which is one filed by the respondent herein-petitioner, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P16 notice dated 21.06.2025 issued by the Advocate Commissioner appointed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Thiruvananthapuram in M.C.No.755 of 2023, in a proceedings initiated by the 1 st appellant Bank, invoking the provisions under Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act). The petitioner has also sought for a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to grant installment facility to clear the arrears in the loan account and regularise the loan account on such terms as may be fixed by this Court. 2. On 08.07.2025, when W.P.(C)No.24969 of 2024 came up for admission, the learned counsel for Union Bank entered appearance, who took notice before admission. The interim order dated 08.07.2025 of the learned Single Judge reads thus: “Notice before admission. The learned Standing Counsel takes notice for the respondents and seeks time to file a statement. To consider the prayers sought in the writ petition seeking instalment facility and to defer further coercive steps against the petitioner, as an interim measure, there will be a direction to the petitioner to remit an amount of Rs.10 lakhs (Rupees ten lakhs only) within one month. It is made clear that if the above payment is not made, the respondents will be at liberty to proceed further, in accordance with law.” 3. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants-respondents and the learned counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner. 4. The learned counsel for the appellants-respondents would point out that even before issuing notice on admission, the respondents have filed a counter affidavit dated 07.07.2025 in W.P.(C)24969 of 2025, which was placed on record on 07.07.2025 itself, producing therewith Annexures R1A to R1C documents. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants-respondents and the learned counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner. 4. The learned counsel for the appellants-respondents would point out that even before issuing notice on admission, the respondents have filed a counter affidavit dated 07.07.2025 in W.P.(C)24969 of 2025, which was placed on record on 07.07.2025 itself, producing therewith Annexures R1A to R1C documents. In the counter affidavit it was pointed out that the writ petitioner, who had availed the statutory remedy by approaching the Debts Recovery Tribunal by filing S.A.No.614 of 2023, who had earlier invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and also the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India seeking interference on the SARFAESI proceedings initiated by the Bank, cannot file another writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, invoking the discretionary jurisdiction. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner would contend that the interim relief granted by the learned Single Judge, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, warrants no interference in this writ appeal. 5. On the question of maintainability of a writ appeal under Section 5 (i) of the Kerala High Court Act, against an interim order passed by a learned Single Judge during the pendency of the writ petition, the Larger Bench in K. S. Das v. State of Kerala [ 1992 (2) KLT 358 ] held that the word ‘order’ in Section 5 (i) of the Kerala High Court Act includes, apart from other orders, orders passed by the High Court in miscellaneous petitions filed in the writ petitions provided the orders are to be in force pending the writ petition. An appeal would lie against such orders only if the orders substantially affect or touch upon the substantial rights or liabilities of the parties or are matters of moment and cause substantial prejudice to the parties. The nature of the ‘order’ appealable belongs to the category of ‘intermediate orders’ referred to by the Apex Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [ (1977) 4 SCC 551 ] . The word ‘order’ is not confined to ‘final order’ which disposes of the writ petition. The ‘orders’ should not however, be ad-interim orders in force pending the miscellaneous petition or orders merely of a procedural nature. 6. The word ‘order’ is not confined to ‘final order’ which disposes of the writ petition. The ‘orders’ should not however, be ad-interim orders in force pending the miscellaneous petition or orders merely of a procedural nature. 6. In Thomas P. T. and another v. Bijo Thomas and others [ 2021 (6) KLT 196 ] , a Division Bench of this Court noticed that the view that was upheld by the Larger Bench in K.S. Das [ 1992 (2) KLT 358 ] was that even though an appeal could be filed against an interlocutory order passed in a writ petition, in order to be qualified for challenge in an appeal, the order shall be either substantially affecting or touching upon the substantial rights or liabilities of the parties or which are matters of moment and cause substantial prejudice to the parties. According to the Larger Bench, the nature of the order appealable belongs to the category of intermediate orders referred to by the Apex Court in Madhu Limaye [ (1977) 4 SCC 551 ] . It was, however, clarified by the Larger Bench that such orders should not, however, be ad interim orders or orders merely of a procedural nature. 7. The proceedings initiated by the appellants under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act on account of the loan availed by the respondent-writ petitioner along with his wife, was under challenge in various proceedings before this Court as well as the Debts Recovery Tribunal-2, Ernakulam. The borrowers filed S.A.No.614 of 2023 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, invoking the provisions under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The said securitisation application ended in dismissal by Ext.P11 order dated 27.05.2025. During the pendency of that securitisation application, the borrowers approached this Court in O.P.(DRT) No.18 of 2024. That original petition was disposed of by Ext.P8 judgment dated 15.01.2024, extending the time for payment of the second instalment till 31.01.2024. In the said judgment, it was made clear that securitisation proceedings will be subject to further orders to be passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal in S.A.No.614 of 2023. 8. Seeking extension of the time limit stipulated in Ext.P8 judgment dated 15.01.2024 in O.P.(DRT)No.18 of 2024, the respondent herein filed I.A.No.1 of 2024, which ended in dismissal by Ext.R1A order dated 16.02.2024. 8. Seeking extension of the time limit stipulated in Ext.P8 judgment dated 15.01.2024 in O.P.(DRT)No.18 of 2024, the respondent herein filed I.A.No.1 of 2024, which ended in dismissal by Ext.R1A order dated 16.02.2024. The said order reads thus: “By judgment dated 15.01.2024 in OP(DRT) No.18 of 2024, this Court enlarged time for repayment of second instalment till 31.01.2024. Enlargement was granted by this Court to the time allotted to the petitioner by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The petitioner could not pay the amount as directed by the Tribunal even on 31.01.2024. In the circumstances, I am not inclined to grant further time. I.A is therefore dismissed.” 9. The respondent herein had approached this Court in W.P.(C)No.7285 of 2024, invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which was disposed of by Ext.P10 judgment dated 05.03.2024. Paragraphs 10 and 11 of that judgment read thus: “10. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I am inclined to dispose of the writ petition giving a short and reasonable time to the petitioner to clear off his liability. 11. The writ petition is therefore disposed of with the following directions: (i) The petitioner shall remit the overdue amount of Rs. 75,000/- in three equal and consecutive monthly instalments along with accruing interest and other Bank charges, if any. First of such instalments shall be paid on or before 25.03.2024. (ii) If the petitioner commits single default in making payments as directed above, the respondents will be at liberty to continue with coercive proceedings against the petitioner in accordance with law. (iii) The petitioner shall also pay current EMIs along with the aforesaid payments. (iv) If the petitioner pays the instalments as directed above, any coercive proceedings against the petitioner shall stand deferred.” 10. Seeking extension of the time limit fixed in Ext.P10 judgment dated 05.03.2024, the respondent herein filed I.A.No.1 of 2024 in W.P.(C)No.7285 of 2024, which ended in dismissal by Ext.R1B order dated 16.12.2024. The said order reads thus; “In spite of lapse of more than eight months, the petitioner could not pay the overdue arrears as directed by this Court. In the circumstances, I find no reason to enlarge the time further. I.A.No.1 of 2024 is dismissed. The petitioner may, however, approach the Bank for any further adjustment in the matter.” 11. The said order reads thus; “In spite of lapse of more than eight months, the petitioner could not pay the overdue arrears as directed by this Court. In the circumstances, I find no reason to enlarge the time further. I.A.No.1 of 2024 is dismissed. The petitioner may, however, approach the Bank for any further adjustment in the matter.” 11. It is thereafter that the respondent herein invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court again, by raising a challenge against Ext.P16 notice dated 21.06.2025 issued by the Advocate Commissioner appointed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate Court in M.C.No.775 of 2023, a proceedings initiated by the Bank under the provisions of Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act. 12. During the course of arguments, the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner is that for reasons beyond the control of the borrowers, they could not remit the monthly installments in time, which had resulted in the account being classified as NPA by the appellants. The borrowers are taking efforts to clear the dues, by way of private sale of the mortgaged property. 13. In South Indian Bank Ltd. v. Naveen Mathew Philip [ (2023) 17 SCC 311 ] , in the context of the challenge made against the notices issued under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, the Apex Court reiterated the settled position of law on the interference of the High Court invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India in commercial matters, where an effective and efficacious alternative forum has been constituted through a statute. In the said decision, the Apex Court took judicial notice of the fact that certain High Courts continue to interfere in such matters, leading to a regular supply of cases before the Apex Court. The Apex Court reiterated that a writ of certiorari is to be issued over a decision when the court finds that the process does not conform to the law or the statute. In other words, courts are not expected to substitute themselves with the decision-making authority while finding fault with the process along with the reasons assigned. Such a writ is not expected to be issued to remedy all violations. When a Tribunal is constituted, it is expected to go into the issues of fact and law, including a statutory violation. In other words, courts are not expected to substitute themselves with the decision-making authority while finding fault with the process along with the reasons assigned. Such a writ is not expected to be issued to remedy all violations. When a Tribunal is constituted, it is expected to go into the issues of fact and law, including a statutory violation. A question as to whether such a violation would be over a mandatory prescription as against a discretionary one is primarily within the domain of the Tribunal. The issues governing waiver, acquiescence and estoppel are also primarily within the domain of the Tribunal. The object and reasons behind the SARFAESI Act are very clear as observed in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India [(2004) 4 SCC 311] . While it facilitates a faster and smoother mode of recovery sans any interference from the court, it does provide a fair mechanism in the form of the Tribunal being manned by a legally trained mind. The Tribunal is clothed with a wide range of powers to set aside an illegal order, and thereafter, grant consequential reliefs, including repossession and payment of compensation and costs. Section 17 (1) of the SARFAESI Act gives an expansive meaning to the expression ‘any person’, who could approach the Tribunal. 14. In Naveen Mathew Philip [ (2023) 17 SCC 311 ] the Apex Court noticed that, in matters under the SARFAESI Act, approaching the High Court for the consideration of an offer by the borrower is also frowned upon by the Apex Court. A writ of mandamus is a prerogative writ. The court cannot exercise the said power in the absence of any legal right. More circumspection is required in a financial transaction, particularly when one of the parties would not come within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. When a statute prescribes a particular mode, an attempt to circumvent that mode shall not be encouraged by a writ court. A litigant cannot avoid the non-compliance of approaching the Tribunal, which requires the prescription of fees, and use the constitutional remedy as an alternative. When a statute prescribes a particular mode, an attempt to circumvent that mode shall not be encouraged by a writ court. A litigant cannot avoid the non-compliance of approaching the Tribunal, which requires the prescription of fees, and use the constitutional remedy as an alternative. In paragraph 17 of the decision, the Apex Court reiterated the position of law regarding the interference of the High Courts in matters pertaining to the SARFAESI Act by quoting its earlier decisions in Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas [ (2003) 10 SCC 733 ] , United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon [ (2010) 8 SCC 110 ] , State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C. [ (2018) 3 SCC 85 ] , Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir [ (2022) 5 SCC 345 ] and Varimadugu Obi Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu [(2023) 2 SCC 168] wherein the said practice has been deprecated while requesting the High Courts not to entertain such cases. In paragraph 18 of the said decision, the Apex Court observed that the powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are rather wide, but are required to be exercised only in extraordinary circumstances in matters pertaining to proceedings and adjudicatory scheme qua a statute, more so in commercial matters involving a lender and a borrower, when the legislature has provided for a specific mechanism for appropriate redressal. 15. In LIC Housing Finance Ltd. v. Nagson and Company [ 2025 KHC OnLine 7506 ] , a decision relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants-respondents, the Apex Court noticed that despite the said Court in a series of judgments – United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110] being one among them – having cautioned the High Courts to exercise writ jurisdiction judicially while entertaining challenges to the actions by secured creditors under Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 to enforce their security interest in view of the scheme, purpose and object of the enactment, some of the High Courts took the other way and grant interim relief on the mere asking. The Apex Court still come across cases where, without just and sufficient reason being recorded, proceedings taken by secured creditors have been interdicted by the High Courts, with or without imposition of conditions, amounting to great disservice of institutional credibility. 16. The Apex Court still come across cases where, without just and sufficient reason being recorded, proceedings taken by secured creditors have been interdicted by the High Courts, with or without imposition of conditions, amounting to great disservice of institutional credibility. 16. In the instant case, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants-respondents, the counter affidavit dated 07.07.2025 of the respondents was placed on record in W.P.(C)No.24969 of 2025 on 07.07.2025. It is thereafter that on 08.07.2025, the learned Single Judge passed the impugned order dated 08.07.2025. 17. Considering the facts and circumstances borne out from the orders passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal and also the judgments of this Court, which are placed on record as Exts.P2, P8, P10, P11, P12, R1(a) and R1(b), in the light of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, we find no reason to sustain the interim order dated 08.07.2025 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.24969 of 2025. In the result, this writ appeal is allowed by setting aside the interim order dated 08.07.2025 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.24969 of 2025.