JUDGMENT : EASWARAN S., J. The defendant in a suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale, non-suited concurrently, has come up in the present appeal. 2. The brief facts necessary for disposal of this appeal is as follows: The original defendant had title over the plaint schedule property as per proceedings in L.R.A.I.-20519/82 of the District Collector, Palakkad. On 16.05.2008, he entered into an agreement of sale with the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 8,750/- per cent. Rs. 40,000/- was paid in advance. The Sale Deed ought to have been executed on or before 15.04.2009. There was a stipulation that the original deed will be handed over after the measurement of the property was conducted. In default, it was agreed as per the agreement that the plaintiff was entitled to sue for specific performance. On 06.01.2009, the plaintiff caused to issue a lawyers notice. Though the lawyers notice was received, the defendant did not reply. The defendant entered appearance and contested the suit and denied the execution of the sale agreement dated 16.05.2008 and contended that he had only availed a sum of Rs. 40,000/- as loan without any written instruments. Since he was not able to pay the amount, the plaintiff insisted on executing documents in evidence of borrower and hence he obtained thumb impression on blank white papers. The defendant had not affixed any thumb impression on the stamp paper. In fact, according to the defendant, the value of the property would come around to Rs. 25,000/- to Rs. 30,000/- per cent and, therefore, it is highly improbable that he would have executed the sale agreement for Rs. 8,750/- per cent. On behalf of the plaintiff, Exts. A1 to A3 documents were produced and PW1 and PW2 were examined. On behalf of the defendant, no documentary evidence was produced and DW1 was examined. The Trial Court, on appreciation of the rival pleadings and documentary evidence decreed the suit allowing the plaintiff to get the Sale Deed executed on deposit of balance sale consideration of Rs. 47,500/- together with 12% quarterly compound interest from 15.04.2009 till date of payment. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree, the defendant preferred A.S. No. 70 of 2011 which was dismissed by the Additional District Court - IV, Palakkad vide judgment dated 26.07.2017 and, hence the appeal. 3. 47,500/- together with 12% quarterly compound interest from 15.04.2009 till date of payment. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree, the defendant preferred A.S. No. 70 of 2011 which was dismissed by the Additional District Court - IV, Palakkad vide judgment dated 26.07.2017 and, hence the appeal. 3. While the appeal was admitted to the file on 06.01.2020, this Court framed following substantial questions of law: i. Have not the courts below gone wrong in exercising the discretion under Section 20 of the Special Relief Act in as much as the hardship caused to the appellant would outweigh the benefit that would be derived by Respondent in the event of decreeing specific performance? ii. Have not the courts below erred in finding Exhibit A-1 agreement for sale to be proved, in the face of the denial of execution and the failure to discharge the initial burden of proof by the Respondent to prove due execution of Exhibit A-1? 4. Heard Sri. Rajesh Sivaramankutty, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants and Sri. Jacob Sebastian, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent. 5. The learned Counsel appearing for the appellants pointed out that when the execution of the agreement has been denied by the defendant, then it was the duty of the plaintiff to prove the execution of the agreement. Having failed to prove the execution of the agreement, the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court could not have decreed the suit. Still further, it is pointed out that a cursory glance at the agreement of sale would itself disprove the case of the plaintiff. Admittedly, the thumb impression varied from each page of the agreement of sale. Therse crucial aspects have not been considered by the Courts below. In support of his contentions, he has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Jayakantham and Others v. Abaykumar [ (2017) 5 SCC 178 ]. The learned Counsel for the appellants would thus pray that this Court be pleased to modify the judgment and decree of the Courts below and order the return of advance money with due interest. 6. Per contra, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent would content that the normal rule is that the specific performance should be granted if the agreement of sale is proved. It is true that the defendant had denied the existence of execution of the agreement of sale. 6. Per contra, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent would content that the normal rule is that the specific performance should be granted if the agreement of sale is proved. It is true that the defendant had denied the existence of execution of the agreement of sale. The evidence of PW2 would clearly dispel any doubt surrounding the execution of the agreement of sale. Therefore, it is the specific case of the learned Counsel for the plaintiff that both the Courts below have correctly appreciated the evidence and have come to the right conclusion. In support of his contentions, he has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Prakash Chandra v. Angadlal and Others [1979 KHC 697]. 7. I have considered the rival submissions raised across the Bar and I have perused the judgments of the Courts below and the records of the appeal. 8. In order to answer the substantial questions of law raised in the appeal, this Court must consider the crucial question as to whether the plaintiff had succeeded in proving the agreement of sale?. In the written statement, the defendant had taken a specific denial as regards the execution of the sale agreement. Therefore, the plaintiff examined PW2 who is the witness to the agreement of sale. Therefore, the initial burden on the plaintiff is discharged. Having discharged the initial burden, then it was incumbent upon the defendant to prove as to how the execution of the sale agreement was vitiated. Unfortunately, in the present case, apart from the oral testimony of the defendant, DW1, no independent evidence; either oral or documentary has been adduced by the defendant. Therefore, the irresistible conclusion is that the agreement of sale stands unequivocally proved. Therefore, answering the question of law raised by this Court, it is held that the plaintiff has discharged the burden of proving the execution of the sale agreement. Accordingly, the second question of law is answered in against the appellant. 9. Coming to the first substantial question of law, this Court needs to address two issues in order to arrive at a conclusion as regards the aforesaid question. Accordingly, the second question of law is answered in against the appellant. 9. Coming to the first substantial question of law, this Court needs to address two issues in order to arrive at a conclusion as regards the aforesaid question. The primary issue being, whether the Courts below had gone wrong in exercising the discretion under Section 20 Specific Relief Act, 1963 inasmuch as the hardship caused to the appellant outweighing the benefits that would be derived by the respondent in the event of decreeing the suit. Secondly, if the comparative hardship is more to the plaintiff than the appellant then whether the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree of specific performance at this distance of time. 10. The plea of comparative hardship is always a valid defence to resist a decree for specific performance. However, this Court cannot remain oblivious of the fact that when the plaintiff succeeds in proving the existence of a valid agreement of sale, then despite the agreement of sale, can the Court take a sympathetic view and find that comparative hardship would be much more to the defendant than that of the plaintiff. 11. In this context, this Court cannot sit over the wisdom of the parties when the terms of bargain are reduced into writing by the parties. However, it may be possible for the Courts to exercise its discretion in a more considerate manner even if the plaintiff has been successful in the execution of a valid sale agreement. Perhaps, the defendant, by virtue of a continued litigation would certainly stand to benefit out of the prolonged civil litigation. The Courts cannot remain silent and be a mute spectator to the time consumed for the completion of civil litigation. 12. Be that as it may, the fact remains that, at this distance of time, it may not be possible for the Court to uphold the agreement of sale for the value or the consideration fixed by the parties therein. Normally, when the plaintiff is successful in establishing that he is entitled for a decree of specific performance, the Appellate Court should be slow to interfere with the findings. Normally, when the plaintiff is successful in establishing that he is entitled for a decree of specific performance, the Appellate Court should be slow to interfere with the findings. But then, the power under Section 20 C of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 being discretionary in nature, it is not open to the plaintiff in the suit for specific performance to plead that in the event the agreement of sale stands proved, the Court should necessarily decree the suit for specific performance. 13. In K.Prakash Vs B.R. Sampath Kuma [ (2015) 1 SCC 597 ] the Supreme Court held that the court may take notice of the fact that there has been an increase in the price of the property and considering the other facts and circumstances of the case, while granting decree of specific performance can impose conditions which may to some extent compensate the owner of the property. 14. It is pointed out across the Bar that the original defendant is no more and that the legal heirs are contesting the case. It will not be appropriate for this Court to deny the benefit of the decree to the plaintiff and by virtue of lapse of time alone, the legal heirs of the defendant cannot be permitted to take shelter of the plea of comparative hardship due to rise in price of the property. Therefore, this Court must balance the rights of the respective parties. Admittedly, an extent of 10 cents of land has been agreed to be sold for Rs. 8,750/- way back in the year 2008. The specific case of the appellant is that the property would have fetched Rs. 25,000/- to Rs. 35,000/- at that time. Considering the fact that 17 years have passed, this Court finds that it would be only appropriate that the plaintiff be directed to pay a sum of Rs. 17,500/- per cent. Therefore, to that extent, the appellant is entitled to succeed. Accordingly, the appeal is party allowed. The judgment and decree in O.S. No. 317 of 2009 on the files of the Additional Munsiff Court, Palakkad stands modified as follows; (a) The respondent/plaintiff is granted a decree of specific performance for a value of Rs. 17,500/- on Ext. A1 agreement. (b) The respondent/plaintiff is directed to deposit the balance sale consideration with 10% quarterly compound interest from 15.04.2009 till payment. 17,500/- on Ext. A1 agreement. (b) The respondent/plaintiff is directed to deposit the balance sale consideration with 10% quarterly compound interest from 15.04.2009 till payment. (c) The 2 nd appellant/legal heir of the defendant shall execute a Sale Deed in respect of plaint schedule property on receipt of balance sale consideration. (d) The failure of the 2 nd appellant to execute the conveyance as directed above would entitle the plaintiff to deposit the balance sale consideration with interest as mentioned above before the Court and get the sale deed executed through the process of law. (e) Parties shall suffer respective costs. With the above observations and directions, this appeal is allowed.