JUDGMENT : HARISANKAR V. MENON, J. The petitioner, stated to be engaged in the manufacture of HDPE bottles, contends that pursuant to Ext.P1 tender notification floated by the respondent herein, for the supply of HDPE bottles on a regular basis, it participated in the tender process, turning out to be the successful bidder. An agreement is also stated to have been executed between the petitioner and the respondent. It is further stated that on the basis of the agreement, various purchase orders were being issued by the respondent seeking the supply of various quantities of bottles, which were also supplied. The petitioner further states that pursuant to Ext.P2 purchase order dated 18.12.1996, the respondent required the petitioner to make supply of the quantity of HDPE bottles to the extent mentioned therein. It is further pointed out that the petitioner started production straight away on receipt of the purchase Order at Ext.P2, however, adding that Ext.P3 communication dated 02.01.1997 was issued by the respondent to the petitioner informing that since they were having an excess quantity of stock, no production is to be carried out against the purchase order at Ext.P2. The petitioner states that on the very same date - 02.01.1997 - the petitioner submitted Ext.P4 letter to the respondent informing that insofar as manufacturing pursuant to the purchase order has already begun, the petitioner would be put to irreparable damages if the production is stopped. This is followed by Ext.P5 letter dated 30.01.1997 addressed to the petitioner seeking to cancel the purchase order at Ext.P2. In the afore circumstances, the petitioner approached the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Thiruvananthapuram, under the provisions of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act’ for short) and by Ext.P6 award dated 20.03.2010, the Arbitrator awarded an amount of Rs.11,00,000/- as realizable from the respondent herein. The respondent sought to file an appeal before the Tribunal and in the appeal filed as above, raised a contention regarding the fact that there is some discrepancy as regards the bottles which were manufactured by the petitioner herein, with reference to the report of the Advocate Commissioner dated 26.11.2005, which was filed before the Arbitrator originally. The respondent sought to file an appeal before the Tribunal and in the appeal filed as above, raised a contention regarding the fact that there is some discrepancy as regards the bottles which were manufactured by the petitioner herein, with reference to the report of the Advocate Commissioner dated 26.11.2005, which was filed before the Arbitrator originally. The appeal stood disposed of by Ext.P10 order issued by the Tribunal, holding that the petitioner herein (the respondent before the Tribunal) had no right or authority to substitute the colour choice for the bottles from the side of the respondent herein – the applicant before the Tribunal and hence seeking to allow the appeal. The petitioner filed a Writ petition against Ext.P10 order before this Court, and by Ext.P11 judgment dated 09.08.2017, this Court noticed the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that the disparity in colour was raised for the first time before the appellate authority, there being no pleadings to that effect in the written statement filed before the original authority, and setting aside the appellate order as under: “6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that, since various findings are rendered in favour of the petitioner and since there is no challenge made by the respondent against the findings in favour of the petitioner, if the matter is remanded, the Tribunal may be directed to confine itself to the challenge made by the petitioner in the writ petition with respect to the findings contained under Ext.P10 judgment. I find force in the said contention. Therefore, I set aside Ext.P10 to the extent the same is adversely passed against the petitioner and direct the Tribunal to re-consider the issue also looking into Ext.P8 written statement as to whether the pleadings with respect to the non-compliance of the specification of the bottles was raised by the respondent. A finality shall be attained to the appeal within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment, after providing an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner as well as the respondent.” Thus, the matter was remitted back to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. A finality shall be attained to the appeal within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment, after providing an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner as well as the respondent.” Thus, the matter was remitted back to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. In the second round, the Tribunal issued Ext.P12 judgment finding that the commission report for the first time found that the bottles were blue in colour and were not violet in colour and therefore, the absence of the pleadings in the written statement is not going to help the petitioner herein in any manner. Hence, it was found by the Tribunal that since the manufacture of bottles by the petitioner was not in accordance with the purchase order, it was of no use. Therefore, the Tribunal, in the second round, also chose to allow the appeal filed by the respondent herein. It is in such circumstances that the captioned writ petition is filed by the petitioner seeking to challenge Ext.P12 judgment of the Tribunal. 2. I have heard Sri.P.Sanjay, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri.Manu Govind, the learned counsel for the respondent herein. 3. Sri.Sanjay, the learned counsel for the petitioner would contend with reference to the judgment of this Court at Ext.P11 that the remit to the Tribunal was a restricted one and the Tribunal in the second round need only to have verified as to whether the contention regarding the discrepancy in colour was raised in the written statement from the side of the respondent herein. According to him, the Tribunal exceeded the directions contained in the judgment at Ext.P11, when it issued the final order at Ext.P12. 4. Per contra, Sri.Manu Govind, the learned counsel for the respondent, would contend that the Tribunal was justified in considering whether the discrepancy in colour pointed out was of any significance, without restricting the question to the pleadings in the written statement alone. 5. I have considered the rival submissions and the connected records. 6. The first issue arising for consideration is as to whether Sri.Sanjay is justified in contending that the Tribunal, while issuing the order at Ext.P12, exceeded the scope of the remit pursuant to the judgment of this Court at Ext.P11. 5. I have considered the rival submissions and the connected records. 6. The first issue arising for consideration is as to whether Sri.Sanjay is justified in contending that the Tribunal, while issuing the order at Ext.P12, exceeded the scope of the remit pursuant to the judgment of this Court at Ext.P11. As already noticed, the petitioner was before the Arbitrator, contending that, on the basis of the purchase order at Ext.P2, it had carried out manufacture of the bottles and hence the letter at Ext.P3 informing that no production needs to be carried out or the cancellation at Ext.P5 would have no effect at all. Before the Arbitrator, noticing that the respondent had a case in Ext.P3 that it had excess stock, an Advocate Commissioner was appointed to verify the stock of the petitioner. The report of the Advocate Commissioner is the one produced along with the writ petition as Ext.P9. The advocate Commissioner, in his report, stated that the bottles were “blue in colour”, however, they had the emblem and label of the respondent herein. With respect to the afore finding in the report of the Advocate Commissioner, the respondent took up a contention that in the original agreement, the colour prescribed was – violet, not blue. True, this Court in the first round of litigation directed the matter to be reconsidered with reference to the pleadings in the written statement filed by the respondent herein. However, I am of the opinion that even in the second round of litigation before the Tribunal, the respondent is justified in raising a contention to the effect that if there is a difference in colour of the product manufactured by the petitioner going by the contents of the Advocate Commissioner’s report, the petitioner is not entitled to any reliefs. True, on the basis of the report of the Advocate Commissioner, the respondent has not chosen to amend the pleadings in the written statement. However, that would not interdict the respondent from raising such contention in the appeal, since the difference in the product manufactured would go to the root of the claim made by the petitioner before the Arbitrator. In that view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the petitioner is not justified in contending that the scope of consideration in the second round before the Tribunal was limited. 7. In that view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the petitioner is not justified in contending that the scope of consideration in the second round before the Tribunal was limited. 7. The second issue arising for consideration would be as regards the issue as to whether, in reality, the bottles were blue in colour. Along with the Advocate Commissioner’s report, certain photographs have also been produced. The afore photographs are available in the records of the trial court. A perusal of the afore photographs shows that the colour of the cartons wherein the bottles were kept is “violet”. Therefore, it can only be a misconception with respect to the colour from the side of the advocate commissioner, which led to the confusion, as pointed out by the respondent herein. 8. Even on the face of the afore, the larger issue which arises for consideration in this writ petition would be as to whether the petitioner was entitled to maintain a claim in the nature of the one considered in Ext.P6 award. A reading of the plaint, presented before the Registrar of Co-operative Societies under the provisions of Section 69(1)(f) of the Act would show that the petitioner herein had contended that on account of cancellation of the purchase order as noticed above, it could not effect the supply of the bottles and the value thereof was to the extent of Rs.11,47,000/-. Therefore, the petitioner herein sought for an award for Rs.11,00,000/- representing the “value of bottles manufactured, including articles stored for the same” as well as another Rs.40,000/- towards godown rent. 9. Sri.Manu Govind, the learned counsel for the respondent, would contend with reference to the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act , 1930, that a plaint in the nature of the one noticed above would not lie. According to him, the plaint ought to have been with reference to the provisions of Section 56 of the Sale of Goods Act for “damages” and not with reference to Section 55 of the Sale of Goods Act for “price”. 10. Sri.Sanjay, on the other hand, would contend that damages were in fact claimed, as noticed in Ext.P6 award by the Arbitrator. 10. Sri.Sanjay, on the other hand, would contend that damages were in fact claimed, as noticed in Ext.P6 award by the Arbitrator. As regards the afore issue, this Court notices the provisions of Sections 55 and 56 of the Sale of Goods Act , 1930, which read as under:- “ Section 55 - Suit for price (1) Where under a contract of sale the property in the goods has passed to the buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses to pay for the goods according to the terms of the contract, the seller may sue him for the price of the goods. (2) Where under a contract of sale the price is payable on a day certain irrespective of delivery and the buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses to pay such price, the seller may sue him for the price although the property in the goods has not passed and the goods have not been appropriated to the contract. Section 56 -Damages for non-acceptance Where the buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses to accept and pay for the goods, the seller may sue him for damages for non-acceptance.” The afore Sections fall under Chapter VI of the Act, which provides for “suits for breach of the contract”. The suit maintainable under Section 55 is with reference to goods which have already been sold and delivered to the buyer, and when the buyer neglects/refuses to pay for the goods according to the terms of the contract. As against the above, Section 56 provides for a suit for “damages for non-acceptance" when a buyer neglects or refuses to accept. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the petitioner was not entitled to maintain a suit in the nature of the one disposed of by Ext.P6 award with reference to the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act . 11. In this connection, this Court also notices that Ext.P2 relied on by the petitioner has certain annexures which have been relied on by the respondent along with its counter affidavit. In the annexures forming part of the purchase order at Ext.P2, a delivery schedule has been specifically provided. 11. In this connection, this Court also notices that Ext.P2 relied on by the petitioner has certain annexures which have been relied on by the respondent along with its counter affidavit. In the annexures forming part of the purchase order at Ext.P2, a delivery schedule has been specifically provided. The said delivery schedule provided that on the basis of the purchase order, the petitioner was to send only “one truck load” immediately on a “trial basis,” and as regards the subsequent loads, the delivery schedule specifically provides for dispatch only after getting confirmation as regards the acceptance of the first load as above. When that be so, it is very difficult to digest the contention raised by the petitioner that it started production on the date of receipt of the purchase order and produced the entire quantity. When the petitioner seeks to rely on the purchase order, the same in its entirety has to be noticed and acted upon. When that be so, the petitioner cannot plead ignorance regarding the contents of clause (4) of the annexure to the purchase order produced along with the counter affidavit by the respondent as Ext.R1(a). Therefore, I am of the opinion that the pleadings contained in the plaint presented before the Arbitrator, as regards the manufacture of the entire quantity ordered by the respondent, cannot be swallowed without a pinch of salt. 12. This Court also notices the requirement for confirmation of the order placed by the petitioner, assuming the same to have been validly placed on 18.12.1996, within a period of seven days, and the right to cancel the order, if not so confirmed. A perusal of Ext.R1(a) would show that the order confirmation as above has taken place only on 31.12.1996. Therefore, the petitioner may not be justified in contending that, on the basis of the order which was confirmed on 31.12.1996 as above, it had begun production and completed the production of the entire quantity by 02.01.1997, when Ext.P3 communication was issued by the respondent. This also shows that the petitioner was only trying to utilize the purchase order at Ext.P2 by contending that it had already acted on that basis, prior to the issuance of Ext.P3. On the whole, I am of the opinion that the petitioner is not entitled for the reliefs as prayed for in this writ petition. This also shows that the petitioner was only trying to utilize the purchase order at Ext.P2 by contending that it had already acted on that basis, prior to the issuance of Ext.P3. On the whole, I am of the opinion that the petitioner is not entitled for the reliefs as prayed for in this writ petition. The findings in the order of the Tribunal at Ext.P12 can only be upheld for multifarious reasons, as noticed earlier. Therefore, this writ petition would stand dismissed.