ORDER : P. V. BALAKRISHNAN, J. Under challenge in this revision petition is the conviction and sentence rendered against the revision petitioner under Section 138 of the N.I.Act. 2. The revision petitioner is the accused in S.T.No.794 of 2011 on the files of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Ponnani. 3. The case of the complainant is that the accused who is acquainted with her, during 2004-05, approached the complainant and promised that she will give shares in Ushus English Medium School and collected Rs.10 lakhs. Later, the shares were not issued as promised and the complainant demanded back the amount paid by her. Then, towards the discharge of the above liability, the accused issued Ext.P1 cheque dated 05.03.2010 for Rs.1,00,000/-. When the complainant presented the cheque for encashment, it got dishonoured stating that 'funds are insufficient' and the lawyer's notice issued did not evoke any response, except a false reply notice. Hence, the complainant approached the trial court by filing the afore complaint. 4. In the trial court, from the side of the complainant, PW1 was examined and Exts.P1 to P7 documents were marked. When examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C, the accused denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against her in evidence and contended that she is innocent. The accused stated that she has not received any amount from the complainant and has not issued the cheque to her. According to her, the father-in-law of the complainant had advanced Rs.4,00,000/- to the husband of the accused for construction of the school and after the death of the father-in-law of the complainant and the husband of the accused, the brother-in-law of the complainant, by name, Mufeed Rahman came to her house and quarrelled with her. At that time, the accused was forced to issue blank cheques. Even though an opportunity was granted, no evidence was adduced from the side of the accused. The trial court, on an appreciation of the evidence on record, found the accused guilty and convicted her under Section 138 of the N.I.Act. The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months under Section 138 of the N.I.Act. The accused was also ordered to pay a compensation of Rs.1,00,000/ to the complainant under Section 357 (3) of Cr.P.C, with a default clause. 5. The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months under Section 138 of the N.I.Act. The accused was also ordered to pay a compensation of Rs.1,00,000/ to the complainant under Section 357 (3) of Cr.P.C, with a default clause. 5. The accused carried the matter in appeal by filing Crl.A.No.228 of 2014 before the Special Court for SC/ST (PoA) Act Cases/Additional Sessions Court, Manjeri. The said court, by judgment dated 29.02.2016, allowed the appeal in part and while confirming the conviction, the sentence was modified and reduced to one of simple imprisonment till the rising of court and to pay a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- under Section 138 of N.I.Act. The accused was also ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months in case of committing default in payment of the fine and the fine amount was ordered to be paid to the complainant as compensation under Section 357 (1)(b) of Cr.P.C. 6. Heard Sri.Albin A.Joseph, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner and Sri.Istinal Abdullah, the learned counsel for the second respondent. Perused the records. 7. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that both the trial court as well as the appellate court, failed to appreciate the evidence in a proper perspective and has arrived at a wrong conclusion of guilt against the accused. He, by relying on the decision in Hari P.C v. Shine Varghese [2025 KHC 805] , contended that if the debt is created by a cash transaction above Rs.20,000/- in violation of the provisions of the IT Act, the same cannot be considered as a legally enforceable debt, unless there is a valid explanation for the same. He argued that the complainant has not proved the financial capacity to advance the money and both the trial court and the appellate court have wrongly placed reliance on Ext.P7, which is not proved as required by law. He, by relying on the decision in Ashok Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2025 KHC 6294], contended that the accused has been able to demonstrate through the cross-examination of PW1 that PW1 did not have the capacity to source the money. Hence, he prayed that this revision petition may be allowed. 8. Per contra, the learned counsel for the 2 nd respondent supported the impugned judgments and contended that there are no grounds to interfere with the same. Hence, he prayed that this revision petition may be allowed. 8. Per contra, the learned counsel for the 2 nd respondent supported the impugned judgments and contended that there are no grounds to interfere with the same. He argued that the evidence of PW1 regarding the transaction and the issuance of the cheque, is credible and cogent and nothing has been brought out in her cross-examination to disbelieve her. He further submitted that PW1 has given a vivid description of the manner in which she had sourced the money for advancing it to the accused and there is nothing to disbelieve her on this aspect. He contended that the accused has not adduced any evidence to prove her version that the cheque has been forcefully taken from her and hence, has failed in rebutting the statutory presumptions available in favour of the complaiant. He also submitted that the decision in Hari P.C' s case (cited supra) is not applicable to this case since, the said decision applies only prospectively and the point has not been specifically raised during the trial. 9. The materials on record show that the complainant has got herself examined as PW1 and has marked Exts.P1 to P7 documents to prove her case. PW1 has filed a proof affidavit in tune with the averments in the complainant. She deposed that the accused has approached her by promising shares in the school by name 'Ushus English Medium School' during 2004-05 and has collected from her Rs.10,00,000/- on various occasions. Thereafter, the accused did not issue the shares as promised and when she sought to return the money, the accused signed and issued Ext.P1 cheque dated 05.03.2010 for Rs.1 lakh. When the cheque was presented for collection, it got returned stating that the 'funds are insufficient'. Thereafter, when she issued a statutory notice to the accused demanding the payment of amount covered by the cheque, Ext.P6 reply was sent taking false and untenable contentions. 10. The evidence of PW1 coupled with Ext.P1 is sufficient to hold that the complainant has discharged the initial onus cast upon her in proving the execution of the cheque and in establishing the basis for drawing the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I.Act. Now it is for the accused to rebut the said presumptions at least by preponderance of probabilities. Now it is for the accused to rebut the said presumptions at least by preponderance of probabilities. She can rebut the presumptions either by adducing evidence or by cross-examining PW1 thereby, bringing in probabilities in her favour and improbabilities against the complainant. 11. In the present case, the specific case of the accused is that the father-in-law of the complainant had advanced Rs.4 lakhs to the husband of the accused for the construction of Ushus English Medium School. Later, when the father-in-law of the complainant and the husband of the accused died, the brother-in-law of the complainant by name Mufeed Rahman came to her house and quarrelled with her. At that time, she was forced to issue signed blank cheques and one among the cheques has been misused in this case. It is true that a suggestion in the very same lines has been made to PW1 during cross- examination. But PW1 has stoutly denied the said suggestion. Apart from the said suggestion, nothing has been brought out in the cross-examination which would probabilise the said version. At this juncture, I will also take note of the fact that the accused had no such case initially while issuing Ext.P6 reply notice to the complainant. On the other hand, the stand taken in the reply notice is one of total denial and it was also stated that the complainant has without any authority, misused the cheques. 12. Be that as it may, it is further to be seen that the version thus taken by the accused is very vague, sans details. The accused has not even stated the date, month or year in which the said Mufeed Rahman has forcefully taken the cheques from her. She also does not say as to how many cheques she has thus given to the said Mufeed Rahman. Most importantly, it is to be seen that even though such a serious contention has been taken, the accused has, till date, not taken any steps against the said Mufeed Rahman or the complainant for misusing her cheques. The said conduct of the accused does not stand the test of a prudent man's mind set and cannot find support from the court. 13. Coming to the contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner regarding the source to advance the money, I find no merit in it. The said conduct of the accused does not stand the test of a prudent man's mind set and cannot find support from the court. 13. Coming to the contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner regarding the source to advance the money, I find no merit in it. In the decision of the Apex Court in Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat & Another (AIR 2019 SC 1876) , the Apex Court has categorically held that once a presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act are drawn, the factors relating to want of documentary evidence in the form of receipts or accounts or want of evidence as regards the source of funds are not at all relevant consideration while examining, if the accused has been able to rebut the presumption or not. It is only in cases where the accused discharges the onus placed upon him by bringing on record such facts and circumstances as to show the preponderance of probabilities tilting in his favour, any doubt on the complainant's case could have been raised for want of evidence regarding the source of funds for advancing the loan to the accused. In the present case, as stated earlier, the version, as projected by the accused, regarding the cheque coming into the possession of the complainant is not believable and probable and if so, there is no burden upon the complainant to prove the source to advance, the money. Now even if it is assumed to be otherwise so, it can be seen that the evidence of PW1 clearly shows that she has raised Rs.10 lakhs from her father-in-law and father, and also by selling her gold ornaments. Even though, PW1 has been cross- examined in extenso, nothing has been brought out to disbelieve her on these aspects. At this juncture, it is also to be kept in mind that the father-in-law and father of PW1 were not alive at the time of taking evidence. 14. As far as the contention raised by the revision petitioner by relying on Hari P.C' s case (cited supra) is concerned, I am of the view that the said dictum is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 14. As far as the contention raised by the revision petitioner by relying on Hari P.C' s case (cited supra) is concerned, I am of the view that the said dictum is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the said decision, it is specifically stated that the same is applicable only prospectively and the dictum will be applicable in a concluded case only if such a point is specifically raised and there is no explanation for the complainant in tune with Section 273B of the Income Tax Act. On a perusal of the entire records including the evidence adduced, I have no hesitation to find that no such contention has been raised by the accused at any point of time and no explanation is sought for from the complainant/PW1 during cross- examination. In such circumstances, I find that the afore contention of the revision petitioner has no legs to stand. In the light of the afore discussions, I find that both the trial court and appellate court have properly appreciated the evidence on record and has arrived at a correct conclusion of guilt against the accused. Therefore, the challenge raised on merit fails. Now coming to sentence, considering the facts and circumstances of this case, I am of the view that the sentence imposed by the appellate court cannot be considered as unjust or excessive. Ergo, I find no merit in this criminal revision petition and the same is accordingly dismissed.