JUDGMENT AND ORDER : SOUMITRA SAIKIA, J. Heard Mr. M. Kato, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. S. Tapin, learned Senior Government Advocate for the State respondents. 2. The petitioner in WP(C) No.612(AP)/2024 namely Shri. Gumluk Karbak is a resident of village Dubi Karbak, Aalo in the district of West Siang in the State of Arunachal Pradesh and the petitioner in WP(C) No.25(AP)/2025 namely Shri. Dejo Karga is a resident of village Kamki, Aalo, West Siang District in the State of Arunachal Pradesh. By the recruitment notice No.APSSB-13/6/2023 dated 03.05.2023 issued by the Government of Arunachal Pradesh through Arunachal Pradesh Staff Selection Board invited applications for filling up of various posts indicated in the recruitment notice. The petitioners applied for selection and appointment to the post of Constable-AAPBn/Civil Police/IRBn. The petitioners underwent the recruitment process and after successfully completing the same, they were recruited to the post of Constable (Civil Police) in the Arunachal Pradesh Police Department. The police headquarters offered the appointment No. PHQ/PER-213/2024 dated 16.02.2024, whereby the petitioners were directed to report to the Police Training Centre, Banderdewa, on 05.03.2024 at 09:30 hours for joining basic training. Thereafter, the petitioners having accepted the offer of appointment, subsequently they joined and reported to the Police Training Centre and successfully completed their basic training. While the petitioners were undergoing their basic training, they were surprised to receive the impugned termination order No.PHQ/PER-128/2016(PART-I) dated 23.07.2024, issued by the respondent No. 3. In the said order, it was mentioned that a case was registered against the petitioners at Police Station Kamba vide KMB Police Station Case No. 27/13, under Sections 279/338/304(a) IPC dated 06.12.2013 and their pending trail vide charge sheet No. 12/15 under Section 279/338/304(a) IPC dated 24.06.2015. No show cause notice was issued affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. The petitioners were thereafter, released from the police training centre and was handed over to their father. 3. On 16.12.2023 the petitioner in WP(C) No.612(AP)/2024 and one late Polar Romine and petitioner in WP(C) No. 25(AP) of 2024, while they were travelling from the Lebok Resort in a motorcycle at around 14:00 hours near the dairy farm in Kamba, they met with an accident and they all fell down on the rough road and went unconscious. 3. On 16.12.2023 the petitioner in WP(C) No.612(AP)/2024 and one late Polar Romine and petitioner in WP(C) No. 25(AP) of 2024, while they were travelling from the Lebok Resort in a motorcycle at around 14:00 hours near the dairy farm in Kamba, they met with an accident and they all fell down on the rough road and went unconscious. Later in the evening, when the petitioner in WP(C) No.612(AP)/2024 regained consciousness, he was informed that one of his friends, namely late Polar Romine succumbed to his injuries at the Community Health Centre, Kamba. Thereafter, the petitioner and his other friend, Shri. Dejo Karga {petitioner in WP(C) No.25(AP)/2024} were brought to the Police Station, Kamba and their statements were recorded. Thereafter, the petitioner in WP(C) No.612(AP)/2024 did not receive any summons either from the Police Station, Kamba, or from the competent Court of law. 4. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the progress of the criminal investigation and the filing of charge sheet, etc., were never informed to the petitioner in WP(C) No.612(AP)/2024 and he was completely unaware. It is submitted that both the petitioners were minors at the time when the incident occurred. It is submitted that subsequently, when they procured a copy of the charge sheet dated 24.06.2015, it is seen that the petitioner in WP(C) No.612(AP)/2024 was placed as prosecution witness and the Investigating Officer recommended the petitioner to be freed from the charge. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that without considering this materials, the respondent authority had terminated the petitioner in WP(C) No.612(AP)/2024 from service and released him from service. It is therefore submitted that this impugned order should be interfered with, set aside, be directed to be reinstated. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that since they were minors at the time of the accident, the case was endorsed to the Juvenile Justice Board for adjudication and the Juvenile Justice Board (JJB) West Siang District, Aalo vide order dated 20.01.2018 imposed a fine of Rs.5,000/- only to the parents of Shri. Dejo Karga, namely the petitioner in WP(C) No.25(AP)/2025 under Section 18(1)(d) of the Juvenile Justice Care and Protection Act, 2015. It is submitted that from the perusal of the order dated 20.01.2018 it is clearly mentioned that conviction and other records against the juvenile in conflict with law will not be treated as a disqualification against the juvenile in conflict with law for his future career as provided under Section 24 of the Juvenile Justice Care and Protection Act, 2015. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the order dated 20.01.2018 passed by the Juvenile Justice Board, West Siang District, Aalo in Aalo (J) No.01.18 (KMB PS Case No.27/2013 clearly reveals that the petitioner in WP(C) No.612(AP)/2024 was never accused of any offence or charged with any other offence. Therefore, the termination of the petitioner by the respondent authority vide the impugned order dated 23.07.2024 calls for interference and suitable consequential orders are required to be passed, directing reinstatement of the petitioners into their services. The learned counsel for the petitioners also submits that after his termination, the petitioners went to the Office of the Officer-in-Charge, Police Station Kamba, West Siang District as well as the Office of the CJM-cum-Civil Judge Senior Division, Aalo, West Siang District seeking information regarding any pending criminal cases against the petitioners. However, the Office of the Officer-in- Charge, Police Station Kamba, Office of the SSP, Aalo and the Office of the CJM- cum-Civil Judge Senior Division, Aalo, West Siang District, both issued a “No Case Pending Certificate” against the petitioners. Upon receipt of the “No Pending Case Certificate” the petitioners approached the Inspector General of Police and submitted a detailed representation for reconsideration recall of the impugned termination order. However, the same evoked no response and therefore, the present writ petitions have been filed praying for setting aside the impugned termination order and for reinstatement of the petitioners in their service as Constable (Civil Police). 6. It is further submitted by the petitioner in WP(C) No.612(AP)/2025 that in any event of the matter he was not an accused person but only arrayed as prosecution witness. Therefore, there cannot be any allegation or statement made against the petitioner that he was an accused person and who was charged with an offence. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners refers to and rely on the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in Lokesh Kumar versus State of Chhattisgarh & Anr. Therefore, there cannot be any allegation or statement made against the petitioner that he was an accused person and who was charged with an offence. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners refers to and rely on the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in Lokesh Kumar versus State of Chhattisgarh & Anr. in Criminal Appeal No.819/2025 pressing the judgment into service, the learned counsel for the petitioners submits that in terms of Section 24 of the JJ Act, 2015 any conviction will not result into disqualification for a minor as provided. It is therefore submitted that these writ petitions be allowed, the impugned termination order be interfered with and the petitioners directed to be reinstated in service. 8. The Senior Government Advocate representing the State strongly disputes the case projected by the writ petitioners. He referring to the affidavits filed submits that in the form which the petitioners were required to fill up, they have to disclose whether they were involved in any particular case or if any such cases are pending against the writ petitioners. However, the petitioners failed to furnish concrete information. Referring to the said form it is submitted that the form which was submitted by the petitioners contained a specific clause which required disclosure as to whether the petitioners were arrested, prosecuted or kept under retention or bound down or fined or convicted by Court of law for any offences or debarred or disqualified by the Public Service Commission from appearing in the examination or selections or debarred from taking any examination restricted by any university or any other education authority, institution, etc. to which the petitioners submitted their reply in a categorical “NO”. The learned Government Counsel therefore, submits that this particular declaration clearly reveals that the petitioners deliberately withheld information which was required to be disclosed in the forms, which were submitted at the time of recruitment and consequently when this was subsequently discovered that there was a case pending against the petitioners, the authorities were duty bound to reject the candidature of the petitioners and consequently the termination order was issued therefore, there is no infirmity of the respondents in issuing the impugned termination order in view of the fact that the petitioners deliberately withheld correct information which they were required to furnish under law and truthfully. In support of his contentions the respondents has referred to the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in Avatar Singh v. Union of India & Ors. v. Shishupal @Shivpal reported in (2016). Referring to this the learned Senior Government Advocate representing the respondents strongly urges that there is no infirmity in the termination order issued by the respondent authorities as the information required to be furnished by the petitioners were deliberately furnished incorrectly. The petitioners were required to disclose the pendency of any criminal matters pending to which they answered in negative in the forms, where such declarations are to be made and which forms they have submitted at the time of recruitment. Under such circumstances no interference is called for the termination orders. The respondent authorities have correctly terminated the petitioners and therefore, there will be no merit in the writ petition and the same should be dismissed. 9. It is also necessary to extract the order passed by the Juvenile Justice Board by order dated 20.01.2018: Assam Schedule VIII, High Court Criminal Order FORM NO (M) 30 BEFORE THE JUVENILE JUSTICE BOARD, WEST SIANG DISTRICT, ARUNACHAL PRADESH, AALO AALO (J) NO: 01/18 KMB PS CASE NO: 27/13 UNDER SECTION(S): 304 IPC STATE OF A.P. VRS DEJO KARGA PRINCIPAL MAGISTRATE:: HIRENDRA KASHYAP, APJS 10. The learned counsel for the parties have been heard and the pleadings available on record have been carefully perused. At the outset it is necessary to refer to Section 24 of the JJ Act which reads as under: “24. Removal of disqualification on the findings of an offence. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, a child who has committed an offence and has been dealt with under the provisions of this Act shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attached to a conviction of an offence under such law: Provided that in case of a child who has completed or is above the age of sixteen years and is found to be in conflict with law by the Children’s Court under clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 19, the provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply. (2) The Board shall make an order directing the Police, or, by the Children’s Court to its own registry that the relevant records of such conviction shall be destroyed after the expiry of the period of appeal or, as the case may be, a reasonable period as may be prescribed: Provided that in case of a heinous offence where the child is found to be in conflict with law under clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 19, the relevant records of conviction of such child shall be retained by the Children’s Court.” 11. Upon perusal of the order reveals that the Principal Magistrate has passed an order only in respect of the juvenile in conflict with law namely Dejo Karga. No such order has been passed in respect of the present writ petitioner in WP(C) No. 612(AP)/2025 namely Gumluk Karbak. Going by the order passed by the Principal Magistrate, it is seen that the Principal Magistrate had found the juvenile Dejo Karga to be juvenile in conflict with law and guilty under section 279/338/304(a) IPC. However, the Board concluded that it is the parent of the juvenile who has to be fined as provided under section 18(1)(d) of the Juvenile Justice Care and Protection Act, 2015 an amount of Rs.5,000/- was ordered to be paid in fine by the parent or guardian of the juvenile in conflict with law, namely Dejo Karga. The order itself clearly provided that the conviction or other orders against the juvenile in conflict with law will not be treated as disqualification against the juvenile in conflict with law in his future career as provided under section 24 of the Juvenile Care and Protection Act, 2015. The records of the case were also directed to be destroyed after one year from the date of the order. The bail bond standing if any, on behalf of the juvenile in conflict with law was to be given force for six months from the date of the order. Therefore, what is clear is that the Principal Magistrate while passing the order dated 20.01.2018 in respect of Dejo Karga clearly held that this order will not come in the way of as a disqualification in the future career of the juvenile in conflict with law namely Dejo Karga. Therefore, what is clear is that the Principal Magistrate while passing the order dated 20.01.2018 in respect of Dejo Karga clearly held that this order will not come in the way of as a disqualification in the future career of the juvenile in conflict with law namely Dejo Karga. This is clearly in tune with the mandate of section 24 of the J. J. Act, 2015 which provides that there shall be no disqualification on the juvenile on finding of an offence except in cases of heinous crimes where the records are to be preserved. The mandate of this section is to put into practice the principle of a fresh start as prescribed under section 3(xiv). Under section 3 (xiv) of the J. J. Act, 2015 it is prescribed that all past records of any child under the juvenile justice system shall be erased except in special circumstances. Therefore, a perusal of the relevant provisions of the Juvenile Justice Care and Protection Act, 2015, clearly brings out the intention of the legislature that notwithstanding any adverse order passed by the Juvenile Justice Board in respect of a juvenile in conflict with law, all efforts and attempts will be made to ensure that the juvenile in conflict with law gets every opportunity of a fresh start and in order to facilitate that, any orders passed under this Act by any prescribed authority will not be treated to be a disqualification for future careers or opportunities in respect of the said juvenile in conflict with law. Therefore, notwithstanding any orders that may have been passed against any juvenile in conflict with law, the same shall not be used to disqualify the juvenile from future careers or opportunities. 12. In Lokesh Kumar (supra), the similar issue was dealt with by the Apex Court. The Apex Court referring to the provisions of the J. J. Act, 2015 as also the earlier precedent rendered in Union of lndia vs. Ramesh Bishnoi, reported in (2019) 19 SCC 710 held that the intention of the legislature under the J. J. Act of 2015 is to protect juveniles from suffering the ongoing disqualification in their adulthood. Therefore, the provisions of Section 24 of the J. J. Act, have to be applied to its fullest extent in order to ensure that the legislative intent of offering protection to juveniles in conflict with law are given the full effect. Therefore, the provisions of Section 24 of the J. J. Act, have to be applied to its fullest extent in order to ensure that the legislative intent of offering protection to juveniles in conflict with law are given the full effect. The protective mandate of Section 24 of the J. J. Act of 2015 is to ensure that the juvenile's past record does not impede his adult life prospects in career or other further opportunities. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are extracted below: “8. The principal question that arises for our determination is whether the disclosure of the Appellant’s juvenile conviction in an official character certificate, and the resulting disqualification, runs contrary to Section 24 of the JJ Act, 2015 and, if so, whether the High Court erred in refusing to grant relief under its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 9. At the outset, Section 24 of the JJ Act, 2015 is reproduced hereunder: “24. Removal of disqualification on the findings of an offence. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, a child who has committed an offence and has been dealt with under the provisions of this Act shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attached to a conviction of an offence under such law: Provided that in case of a child who has completed or is above the age of sixteen years and is found to be in conflict with law by the Children’s Court under clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 19, the provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply. (2) The Board shall make an order directing the Police, or, by the Children’s Court to its own registry that the relevant records of such conviction shall be destroyed after the expiry of the period of appeal or, as the case may be, a reasonable period as may be prescribed: Provided that in case of a heinous offence where the child is found to be in conflict with law under clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 19, the relevant records of conviction of such child shall be retained by the Children’s Court.” Moreover, in Chapter II of the JJ Act, 2015 which details the general principle for the protection of the children, Section 3(xiv) reads as follows: “Section 3(xiv) Principle of Fresh Start: All past records of any child under the Juvenile Justice system shall be erased, except in special circumstances.” 10. A bare perusal of the statute reveals that the legislative design of Section 24 is emphatically protective in nature. By expressly stating that “a child ... shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attached to a conviction,” the provision carves out a unique sphere of immunity for individuals whose offences are adjudicated under the juvenile justice framework. This principle is rooted in the broader humanitarian object of the JJ Act, 2015- to rehabilitate and reintegrate juveniles into society, free from the stigma of their past conflicts with law. 11. The Appellant’s grievance is specifically directed against the practical effect of his juvenile record being disclosed in a character certificate, thereby disqualifying him from employment. He does not dispute the validity of the conviction order itself, nor does he assail the procedure adopted by the Juvenile Justice Board. Instead, his core argument highlights the conflict between disqualification arising from a juvenile conviction and the protective mandate of Section 24 of the JJ Act, 2015. 12. It needs to be emphasised that Section 24(2) of the JJ Act, 2015 also contemplates the destruction of relevant conviction records after a certain period, underscoring the Legislature’s intent to ensure that a juvenile’s past transgression does not perpetually hinder his future. By its very nature, the statute aims to accord a fresh start to juveniles who have served whatever rehabilitative or corrective measure was deemed appropriate by the Board. By its very nature, the statute aims to accord a fresh start to juveniles who have served whatever rehabilitative or corrective measure was deemed appropriate by the Board. Where such conviction details continue to appear in public or official documents, especially those bearing upon future employment prospects, the underlying legislative safeguard is manifestly undermined. 13. Furthermore, the JJ Act, 2015 emphasis on a childcentric approach is reinforced by Section 3(xiv) thereof, which encapsulates the “principle of fresh start,” making it clear that “all past records of any child under the Juvenile Justice system should be erased except in special circumstances.” Here, the offence in question; misbehaviour, verbal abuse, and physical assault under Sections 294, 506, and 323 read with Section 34 of the IPC, cannot be described as heinous. Nor is there any indication that the Appellant poses a continuing threat to public safety or security. Hence, continuing to reflect the Appellant’s juvenile record in an official certificate directly conflicts with the rehabilitative policy that underpins the Act. This principle has been reiterated by this Court in Union of India v. Ramesh Bishnoi4 , in the following portion: “8. From the facts, it is clear that at the time when the charges were framed against the respondent, on 30-6-2009, the respondent was well under the age of 18 years as his date of birth is 5-9-1991. Firstly, it was not disputed that the charges were never proved against the respondent as the girl and her parents did not depose against the respondent, resulting in his acquittal on 24-11-2011. Even if the allegations were found to be true, then too, the respondent could not have been deprived of getting a job on the basis of such charges as the same had been committed while the respondent was juvenile. The thrust of the legislation i.e. the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 as well as the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is that even if a juvenile is convicted, the same should be obliterated, so that there is no stigma with regard to any crime committed by such person as a juvenile. This is with the clear object to reintegrate such juvenile back in the society as a normal person, without any stigma. This is with the clear object to reintegrate such juvenile back in the society as a normal person, without any stigma. Section 3 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 lays down guidelines for the Central Government, State Governments, the Board and other agencies while implementing the provisions of the said Act. In clause (xiv) of Section 3, it is clearly provided as follows: “3. (xiv) Principle of fresh start: All past records of any child under the juvenile justice system should be erased except in special circumstances.”” 14. The High Court, in dismissing the Appellant’s writ petition, emphasized the availability of a statutory remedy to challenge the conviction itself. While it may be true that the Appellant can pursue an appeal or revision on the merits of the conviction, that reasoning overlooks his core complaint regarding the enduring disqualifying effect of such conviction, a consequence that the JJ Act, 2015 expressly seeks to nullify. Irrespective of whether the conviction is left intact, Section 24 of the JJ Act, 2015 protects juveniles from suffering ongoing disqualification in adulthood. Thus, relegating the Appellant solely to a remedy for quashing the conviction does not adequately address the injury caused by the continued disclosure of his juvenile record. 15. In sum, although the Appellant indeed sought to quash his conviction before the High Court, his principal grievance is the persisting stigma and prejudice caused by reflecting his juvenile record in official documents. Restricting his recourse only to an appeal or revision on the conviction itself does not resolve the question of whether the attendant disqualification should stand. Judicial intervention is therefore warranted, not to consider the validity of the conviction, but to ensure that the protective mandate of Section 24 of the JJ Act, 2015, prohibiting a juvenile record from hampering future prospects, is upheld in letter and spirit. 16. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the Impugned Order fails to recognize the proper scope and operation of Section 24 of the JJ Act, 2015. By dismissing the Appellant’s challenge on grounds of an alternative remedy, the High Court inadvertently frustrates the Legislature’s mandate that protects a rehabilitated juvenile’s adult life prospects from the part conflict in law. 17. By dismissing the Appellant’s challenge on grounds of an alternative remedy, the High Court inadvertently frustrates the Legislature’s mandate that protects a rehabilitated juvenile’s adult life prospects from the part conflict in law. 17. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court erred in dismissing the Appellant’s writ petition on the ground of alternate remedy. The protective mandate of Section 24 of the JJ Act, 2015 must be honoured so that a juvenile’s past record does not impede his adult life prospects. 18. The appeal is, accordingly allowed. 19. The Impugned Order dated 27.08.2024 is hereby set aside. The character certificate dated 09.07.2024, insofar as it discloses or relies upon the Appellant’s juvenile conviction, is quashed. All concerned authorities are directed not to treat or disclose the said juvenile conviction in any future verification, screening, or certification process relating to the Appellant’s education, employment, or any other opportunity. 20. It is further directed that the record of the Appellant’s juvenile conviction, except as permitted in the limited circumstances contemplated by the JJ Act, 2015, shall be treated in accordance with Section 24 of the said Act, so that it does not operate as a disqualification or hinder his prospects in any manner. This direction shall be strictly complied with by all authorities, including the police and other public bodies, who may be required to issue character certificates or conduct background checks on the Appellant.” 13. Coming to the facts of the present cases, it is seen that the incident which relates to the writ petitioners was at the time when the writ petitioner (the petitioner in WP(C) No.612(AP)/2024) was a minor. There is no dispute on the facts. Insofar as the writ petitioner in WP(C) No.612(AP)/2024 is concerned, he was put up as a prosecution witness and not even as an accused. Therefore, there is no scope for the respondent authorities to conclude that there was any wrong information furnished to the queries required to be answered in regard clause No.11 in the form. The clause No.11 reads as under: “11) (a) have you ever been arrested, prosecuted, kept under detention or bound down/fined, convicted by a Court of law for any offences or debarred/disqualified by any public service commission from appearing at its examinations/selections or debarred from taking any examination restricted by any University or any other Education authority/Institution?” 14. The clause No.11 reads as under: “11) (a) have you ever been arrested, prosecuted, kept under detention or bound down/fined, convicted by a Court of law for any offences or debarred/disqualified by any public service commission from appearing at its examinations/selections or debarred from taking any examination restricted by any University or any other Education authority/Institution?” 14. The clause No.11 is clear that disclosure of information is with regard to the applicant being arrested, prosecuted, kept under retention or bound down or fined or convicted by a Court of law for any offence or debarred or qualified by the Public Service Commission from appearing in his examination, etc. The petitioner in WP(C) No.612(AP)/2024 had not been put up as an accused by the charge sheet No.12/15 dated 14.06.2015 filed in connection with Kamba P.S. Case No.27/13 under Sections 279/338/304(a) IPC, there is no occasion for the petitioner to state before the authorities that he was a prosecution witness as the query to clause 11 has to be very specific being as to whether he was arrested, prosecuted, kept under detention or bound down, fined or convicted, etc. 15. The answer to this clause 11 by the petitioner in WP(C) No.612(AP)/2024 was in negative and therefore, this Court holds that there was no suppression or mis-declaration or withholding of any material information by the petitioner in WP(C) No.612(AP)/2024. In so far as the petitioner in WP(C) No.612(AP)/2024 is concerned the action taken against him was on completely irrelevant grounds and no case is made out against the petitioner in WP(C) No.612(AP)/2024 that he had withheld or suppressed material information in connection with clause No. 11 of the form which they are required to fill up and submit. 16. In so far as the petitioner in WP(C) No.25(AP)/2024 is concerned, the Principal Magistrate recorded the confession of the juvenile in conflict with law that he was guilty for the offences. However, the Principal Magistrate imposed fine on the guardian or parent of the said juvenile. It was further directed and specifically mentioned in the order that this shall not be a disqualification for future opportunities or career as provided under section 24 of the Juvenile Justice Case and Protection Act, 2015 and the records were required to be destroyed after a period of one year. 17. It was further directed and specifically mentioned in the order that this shall not be a disqualification for future opportunities or career as provided under section 24 of the Juvenile Justice Case and Protection Act, 2015 and the records were required to be destroyed after a period of one year. 17. No materials have been placed before the Court by the respondents to say that the order passed by the Principal Magistrate was interfered with or that the petitioner in WP(C) No.25(AP)/2024 was subsequently tried or convicted before a competent Court of law under Indian Penal Code, while it is true that the petitioner did not disclose the information and answered in negative in respect to the query raised in clause 11 of the form which he submitted to the authority concerned, the same cannot be treated to be suppression of material facts or non-disclosure of material facts as the order dated 20.01.2018 passed by the Principal Magistrate cannot be used against the petitioner in WP(C) No.25(AP)/2024 as a disqualification for future employment in his adult stage of life. This is the mandate of section 24 of the Juvenile Justice Care and Protection Act, 2015 and the same is unequivocally mentioned in the order dated 20.01.2018 passed by the Principal Magistrate. Therefore, the order passed by the Principal Magistrate will have no application to be used as a disqualification for the petitioner in WP(C) No.25(AP)/2024 in his future career opportunities and non-disclosure of the same cannot be treated to be suppression of material facts as it will have no effect even if disclosed in the future career opportunities of the petitioner. In view of the mandate of the Act the respondent authorities could not have used this piece of information to the detriment of the writ petitioner. As a consequence this Court is of the view that non-disclosure of such an information cannot be treated as material so as to be used as a ground of retribution against the petitioner in WP(C) No.25(AP)/2024 by the respondent authorities. This has been clearly held by the Apex Court in Lokesh Kumar (supra) to be contrary to the mandate of section 24 and the intention and the legislative intent of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. 18. This has been clearly held by the Apex Court in Lokesh Kumar (supra) to be contrary to the mandate of section 24 and the intention and the legislative intent of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. 18. Under such circumstances, this Court has come to a definitive conclusion that the impugned termination orders of the petitioners are contrary to the provisions of law and therefore, needs to be interfered with, set aside and quashed. The impugned orders dated 23.07.2024 in so far as petitioners in WP(C) No.612(A)/2024 and WP(C) No.25(AP)/2024 are concerned therefore, interfered with, set aside and quashed. The respondents are directed to forthwith reinstate the petitioners to the services to which they were appointed vide their appointment orders dated 23.07.2024 and to put them through regular training, if required, and thereafter assign them their regular duties. The period during which they did not serve pursuant to the termination orders shall not entitle them to back wages; however, the said period shall be counted for all service benefits and other consequential financial benefits, so as to ensure that there is no break in service insofar as the writ petitioners are concerned. 19. The writ petitions, accordingly, stand allowed and disposed of. 20. No order as to cost.