JUDGMENT : Jobin Sebastian, J. The petitioner herein is the wife of one Prabhajith @Chandu ('detenu' for the sake of brevity) and her challenge in this Writ Petition is directed against Ext.P1 order of detention dated 23.05.2025 passed by the 2nd respondent under Section 3 (1) r/w 13(2)(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (‘KAA(P) Act’ for brevity). The said order of detention was confirmed by the Government vide order dated 25.07.2025, and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of six months, from the date of detention. 2. The records reveal that, considering the recurrent involvement of the detenu in criminal activities, a proposal was submitted by the District Police Chief, Alappuzha, on 12.05.2025, seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under Section 3 (1) of the KAA(P) Act before the jurisdictional authority, the 2nd respondent. For the purpose of initiation of the said proceedings, the detenu was classified as a 'known rowdy' as defined under Section 2p(iii) of the KAA(P) Act. 3. Altogether, seven cases in which the detenu got involved were considered by the detaining authority for issuing Ext.P1 order of detention. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.211/2025 of Poochakkal Police Station alleging the commission of offences punishable under Sections 115 (2), 137(2), 127(2), 296(b), 118(1), 118(2), 351(2), 324(4), 110, 49, 249(C), 3(5) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (for short “ BNS ”). 4. We heard Sri. M.H.Hanis, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri.K.A.Anas , the learned Government Pleader. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that Ext.P1 order is illegal, arbitrary, and was passed without proper application of mind. According to the learned counsel, there is an inordinate delay in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the order of detention, and hence, the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention is snapped. The learned counsel further submitted that there is a time gap of more than 2 years and 2 months between the last prejudicial activity and the last but one case registered against the detenu, and therefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority is vitiated. The learned counsel further submitted that there is a time gap of more than 2 years and 2 months between the last prejudicial activity and the last but one case registered against the detenu, and therefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority is vitiated. Relying on the decision in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and another , [ 1991 (1) SCC 128 ] , the learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that in cases wherein the detenu is in judicial custody, in connection with the last prejudicial activity, a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed only on satisfaction of the triple test mentioned in the said decision by the Supreme Court. According to the counsel, as the impugned order was passed while the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, it was incumbent upon the authority to satisfy itself that it has reason to believe, on the basis of reliable material placed before it that, there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity. According to the learned counsel, though in Ext.P1 order, it is mentioned that the detenu was undergoing judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, it is nowhere mentioned that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail in connection with the last prejudicial activity. The counsel further submits that, though a representation dated 31.05.2025 was forwarded to the Government, the said representation was not considered within a reasonable time, and the fate of the representation was not communicated to the detenu in time. 6. In response, the learned Government Pleader asserted that there is no delay either in mooting the proposal or in passing Ext.P1 detention order, particularly when viewed in the background that the proposal was mooted and the order was passed while the detenu was under judicial custody. According to the counsel, as there is no unreasonable delay, the petitioner could not be heard to say that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the order of detention was snapped. According to the counsel, as there is no unreasonable delay, the petitioner could not be heard to say that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the order of detention was snapped. According to the Government Pleader, the impugned order of detention was passed by the jurisdictional authority after being satisfied that a detention order under Section 3 (1) of KAA(P) Act is the only way to deter the detenu from repeating criminal activities. It was further contended that the jurisdictional authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenu was under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, and it was on being satisfied that there is every chance that the detenu be released on bail, and if so released, he would in all probability indulge in criminal activities further, the order of detenion was passed. According to him, therefore, the order of detention will legally sustain irrespective of the fact that the detenu was under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity while the impugned order was passed. The learned Government Pleader further submitted that the representation submitted by the detenu through jail to the Government was duly considered, and its fate was communicated to the detenu promptly without much delay. 7. The records reveal that the impugned order of detention was passed by the jurisdictional authority after considering the recurrent involvement of the detenu in criminal activities. As already stated, seven cases in which the detenu got involved were considered by the detaining authority while passing the detention order, and the detenu was classified as a ‘known rowdy’ for the purpose of initiation of proceedings under KAA(P) Act. 8. While considering the contention of the petitioner based on the delay in passing the impugned order, it could not be ignored that an order under Section 3 (1) of KAA(P) Act is having a significant impact on the personal as well as the fundamental rights of an individual. Therefore, such an order could not be passed in a casual manner, instead, it can only be passed on credible materials and after arriving at the requisite objective and subjective satisfaction. Furthermore, there exists no inflexible rule requiring a detention order to be issued within a specific time frame following the last prejudicial act. Therefore, such an order could not be passed in a casual manner, instead, it can only be passed on credible materials and after arriving at the requisite objective and subjective satisfaction. Furthermore, there exists no inflexible rule requiring a detention order to be issued within a specific time frame following the last prejudicial act. However, when there is an unreasonable delay in making the proposal and passing the detention order, the same would undermine its validity, particularly when no convincing or plausible explanation is offered for the delay. 9. Keeping in mind the above, while coming to the facts in the present case, it can be seen that the last prejudicial activity was committed by the detenu on 21.03.2025. The detenu who was arrayed as the 1st accused in the said case was arrested on 29.03.2025. From the date of arrest onwards, the detenu was under judicial custody. The proposal for the initiation of proceedings under KAA(P) Act was mooted by the District Police Chief, Alappuzha, on 12.05.2025. However, as already stated, seven cases in which the detenu got involved formed the basis for passing the impugned order. Therefore, some minimum time would have been required for collecting the details of the said cases and for verification of records. Therefore, the short delay in mooting the proposal is only justifiable. After the proposal, Ext. P1 order was passed on 23.05.2025 without much delay. The sequence of events narrated above clearly shows that there is no inordinate delay either in mooting the proposal or in passing the impugned order of detention. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that from the date of arrest onwards, the detenu was under judicial custody, and it was while he was under judicial custody, the proposal was mooted and the detention order was passed. As the detenu was under judicial custody, there was no basis for any immediate apprehension regarding the commission of any criminal activities by him, and if at all there occurred any delay in mooting the proposal and passing the order, the same is liable to be discarded. 10. The learned counsel further submitted that there is a gap of more than 2 years and 2 months between the date of last prejudicial activity and the date of last but one case registered against the detenu, and therefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority is vitiated. 10. The learned counsel further submitted that there is a gap of more than 2 years and 2 months between the date of last prejudicial activity and the date of last but one case registered against the detenu, and therefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority is vitiated. It is true that the last prejudicial activity was committed by the detenu on 21.03.2025, and the date of occurrence of the last but one case registered against the detenu as crime No. 814/2022 of Aroor Police Station is on 29.12.2022. In short, there is a gap of around 2 years and 2 months between the date of commission of the last prejudicial activity and the date of occurrence of the last but one case. However, the said gap alone is not a reason to enter into a conclusion that the satisfaction arrived on by the authority to pass the impugned order is vitiated. Evidently, the acts done by the detenu within seven years prior to the date of the order alone formed the basis for passing Ext.P1 order of detention. All the cases are qualified to be considered for passing the said order and to classify the detenu as a known rowdy under KAA(P) Act. Therefore, the gap of around 2 years and 2 months between the last prejudicial activity and the last but one case registered against the detenu is of little consequence as far as the subjective satisfaction arrived on by the authority is concerned. In this regard, we are fortified by the decision in Ammini v. State of Kerala and others ( 2016(3) KHC 456 ) , wherein it was held that cumulative effect of the nature of crime in which the detenu is involved during the previous seven years and the activities of the detenu in recent time would give the necessary factual foundation for detaining authority to arrive at subjective satisfaction. The fact that no crimes were registered against the detenu for a considerable length of time is not a ground to hold that the subjective satisfaction arrived at is vitiated. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the time gap between the two crimes highlighted by the counsel for the petitioner has no significance. 11. The fact that no crimes were registered against the detenu for a considerable length of time is not a ground to hold that the subjective satisfaction arrived at is vitiated. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the time gap between the two crimes highlighted by the counsel for the petitioner has no significance. 11. From the rival contentions raised, it can be seen that one of the main questions that arises for consideration in this petition is whether an order of detention under Section 3 (1) of KAA(P) Act can be validly passed against a person who is under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. While answering the said question, it is to be noted that, through a series of judicial pronouncements rendered by the Apex Court as well as by this Court, it is well settled that there is no legal impediment in passing an order of detention against a person who is under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. However, an order of detention against a person who is in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity cannot be passed in a mechanical manner. Undisputedly, an order of detention under KAA(P) Act is a drastic measure against a citizen as it heavily impacts his personal as well as his fundamental rights. When an effective and alternative remedy exists to prevent a person from repeating criminal activities, resorting to preventive detention is neither warranted nor permissible. When the detenu is in jail in connection with the last prejudicial activity, obviously, there is no imminent possibility of involving in criminal activities. Therefore, before passing a detention order in respect of a person who is in jail, the detaining authority must satisfy himself that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail, and further, if released on bail, the material on record reveals that he will indulge in prejudicial activity if not detained. The circumstances that necessitate the passing of such an order must be reflected in the order itself. 12. The circumstances that necessitate the passing of such an order must be reflected in the order itself. 12. In Kamarunnissa ’s case (cited supra), the Supreme Court made it clear that a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed even in the case of a person in custody (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable materials placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail and (b) that on being so released he would in probability indulged in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is essential to detain him to prevent him from doing so. If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this regard, such an order would be valid. 13. A similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Veeramani v. The State of Tamil Nadu [ 1994 (2) SCC 337 ] and in Union of India v. Paul Manickam [ 2003 (8) SCC 342 ] . 14. In view of the said decisions, in cases wherein the detenu is in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed only on satisfaction of the triple test mentioned in the said decisions by the Supreme Court. 15. Keeping in mind the above proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court, while reverting to the facts in the present case, it can be seen that the case registered against the detenu with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.211/2025 of Poochakkal Police Station, alleging the commission of offences punishable under Sections 115 (2), 137(2), 127(2), 296(b), 118(1), 118(2), 351(2), 324(4), 110, 49, 249(C), 3(5) of BNS . The detenu was arrayed as the 1st accused in the said case, and he was arrested on 29.03.2025. The impugned order was passed on 23.05.2025, while the detenu was under custody. 16. In Ext.P1 impugned order, the fact that at the time of passing the said order, the detenu was under custody in connection with the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is specifically adverted to. The impugned order was passed on 23.05.2025, while the detenu was under custody. 16. In Ext.P1 impugned order, the fact that at the time of passing the said order, the detenu was under custody in connection with the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is specifically adverted to. Similarly, in the impugned order, it is mentioned that if the detenu is released on bail, there is every possibility of his engaging in criminal activities again. We do agree that the detaining authority has not specifically recorded that “detenu is likely to be released”. However, the mere absence of those words in the order will not vitiate the detention order so long as we find that the detaining authority had material before him that would justify the formation of a belief that the detenue was likely to be released on bail. 17. Dealing with a similar situation, the Supreme Court in Union of India and another vs. Dimple Happy Dhakad (2019 KHC 6662), after considering the dictum laid down in Kamarunissa (cited supra) in paragraph 35 of the judgment, observed as follows; “In the light of the well settled principles, we have to see, in the present case, whether there was awareness in the mind of the detaining authority that detenu is in custody and he had reason to believe that detenu is likely to be released on bail and if so released, he would continue to indulge in prejudicial activities. In the present case, the detention orders dated 17.05.2019 record the awareness of the detaining authority that (i) if the detenu is in custody, (ii) that the bail application filed by the detenus have been rejected by the court. Of course, in the detention order, the detaining authority has not specifically recorded that the “detenu is likely to be released. It cannot be said that the detaining authority has not applied its mind merely on the ground that in the detention orders, it is not expressly stated as to the “detenu’s likelihood of being released on bail” and if so released, he is likely to indulge in the same prejudicial activities. But the detaining authority has clearly recorded the antecedents of the detenu and its satisfaction that the detenus, Happy Dhakad and Nisar Aliyar, have the high propensity to commit such offences in the future.” (emphasis supplied) 18. But the detaining authority has clearly recorded the antecedents of the detenu and its satisfaction that the detenus, Happy Dhakad and Nisar Aliyar, have the high propensity to commit such offences in the future.” (emphasis supplied) 18. Keeping in mind the above principles laid down by the Supreme Court while reverting to the case at hand, it can be seen that in the case at hand also, although it is not specifically recorded that the detenu is likely to be released, the detaining authority acted on material before him to find that the detenue had repeatedly violated bail conditions in the past and that if the detenu is released on bail, there is every possibility of him indulging in criminal activities again. The satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenu is already in custody and he is likely to be released on bail, and on being so released, he is likely to indulge in prejudicial activity, is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, and normally, the subjective satisfaction is not to be interfered with. The impugned order reflects that there is a proper application of mind, based on the materials available on record, and that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority was properly arrived at. Therefore, merely for the reason that the detaining authority has not specifically recorded that the ‘detenu is likely to be released’, it cannot be said that the impugned order lacks legitimacy or legal validity. 19. We find that the order of detention was passed by the jurisdictional authority after being satisfied that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that, on being so released, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities, and a perusal of the records further reveals that all the procedural formalities before and after passing an order of detention have been fully complied with in this case. 20. While considering the contention in the writ petition that the representation submitted by the detenu was not considered by the Government within a reasonable time, and the fate of the communication was not timely communicated to him, it is to be noted that the right of a detenu to get his representation considered by the Government is a constitutional as well statutory right. However, the records reveal that the contention of the petitioner that the representation of the detenu was not considered by the Government within a reasonable time appears to be baseless. The copy of the said representation (Ext.P2), which is appended with the writ petition, reveals that the same is dated 31.05.2025. A perusal of the records in this case reveals that the said representation reached the hands of the Government on 12.06.2025. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that the detention order was passed on 23.05.2025. As evident from the records, the matter was referred to the Advisory Board by the Government on 09.05.2025 as mandated under Section 9 of the KAA(P) Act. Therefore, it is demonstrably clear that prior to the receipt of Ext.P2 representation, the matter was referred by the Government to the Advisory Board. Thereafter, the Government confirmed the detention order on 25.07.2025 after considering the opinion of the Advisory Board. A perusal of the confirmation order clearly shows that the representation submitted by the detenu before the Government is read as item No.5 in the confirmation order. Similarly, the confirmation order reveals that the representation submitted by the detenu was duly considered by the Government. The fate of the representation was subsequently communicated to the detenu on 31.07.2025. 21. While considering the contention regarding the delay in considering Ext.P2 representation, it is worthwhile to refer the decision of the Supreme Court in K.M.Abdulla Kunhi v. Union of India ( 1991 (1) SCC 476 ) . In the said case in paragraph 16 the Supreme Court observed as follows; “the time imperative for consideration of representation can never be absolute or obsessive. It depends upon the necessities and the time at which the representation is made. The representation may be received before the case is referred to the advisory board, but there may not be time to dispose of the representation before referring the case to the advisory board. In that situation, the representation must also be forwarded to the advisory board along with the case of the detenu. The representation may be received after the case of the detenu is referred to the board. Even in this situation, the representation should be forwarded to the advisory board, provided the board has not concluded the proceedings. In that situation, the representation must also be forwarded to the advisory board along with the case of the detenu. The representation may be received after the case of the detenu is referred to the board. Even in this situation, the representation should be forwarded to the advisory board, provided the board has not concluded the proceedings. In both the situations, there is no question of consideration of the representation before the date of receipt of the report of the advisory board. Nor it could not be said that the Government had delayed the consideration of the representation, unnecessarily awaiting the report of the board. It is proper for the Government in such situation to await the report of the board.” 22. A similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Golam Biswas v. Union of India and another (reported in 2015 KHC 5588). 23. Keeping in mind the above principle, while reverting to the case at hand, it can be seen that Ext.P2 representation was received by the Government only on 12.06.2025. The matter had been referred to the Advisory Board on 09.05.2025, i.e. prior to the receipt of the representation. Therefore, the action of the Government in forwarding the said representation to the Advisory Board without taking an immediate decision thereon cannot be considered improper. As the matter was already seized of by the Advisory Board, the Government is justified in not considering the representation immediately and in forwarding the same to the Advisory Board. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Government had delayed consideration of the representation.