JUDGMENT : PREM NARAYAN SINGH, J. 1. With consent of both the parties, the appeal is heard at motion stage at admission. 2. This Second appeal under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code (for brevity, CPC) has been filed by the appellant against the impugned judgment and decree dated 11.12.2019 passed by the First Additional District Judge, Ratlam in Civil Appeal No.55/2019 confirming the Judgment and decree dated 02.07.2019 passed by Second Civil Judge, Class-II, Sailana, District Ratlam in Civil Suit No.26-A/2018. 3. The facts necessary for disposal of the present appeal in brief are that the appeal arises out of the suit filed by the respondent/plaintiffs for eviction in respect of the "suit house" which is situated at Karnataka Chouhara, Village Bajna, District Ratlam. It is pertinent to mention that the provisions of M.P. Accommodation Control Act are not applicable in village Bajna and therefore, the eviction was sought by taking recourse to the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The suit was filed by the respondent on the averment that the suit house was purchased by the respondent by a registered sale deed dated 05.03.2014. It was averred that the appellant was a tenant in three rooms situated on the ground floor of the suit house @ Rs.15/- per month from the time of plaintiff's predecessors in title. The plaintiff sought eviction on the grounds (i) that the appellant was changing the nature of the suit house, (ii) that he was denying the title of plaintiff, (iii) that he was not paying the rent and (iv) that the suit house was required by the plaintiff for himself and his family members. 4. The suit was contested by the appellant/defendant by filing his written statement wherein the plaint averment were denied. The relations of landlord-tenant was denied by the appellant. It was averred, inter-alia, that the sale deed relied upon by the plaintiff was a sham document which did not confer any title on the plaintiff. On the basis of said pleadings, the trial Court framed the issues, recorded the evidence of the parties and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff/respondent on 02.07.2019. Being aggrieved, the appellant has preferred an appeal under Section 96 of CPC, but the same was dismissed by learned first appellate Court, Hence, the present appeal. 5. On the basis of said pleadings, the trial Court framed the issues, recorded the evidence of the parties and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff/respondent on 02.07.2019. Being aggrieved, the appellant has preferred an appeal under Section 96 of CPC, but the same was dismissed by learned first appellate Court, Hence, the present appeal. 5. Challenging the judgment and decrees passed by the Courts below, it is submitted by the Counsel for the appellant that the learned Courts below have committed error of law in passing the impugned judgment and decree in favour of the respondent. The judgment and decree passed by learned Courts below are perverse and based upon no evidence. During the course of arguments, learned Senior counsel for the appellant has contended that the relationship between the landlord and the tenant has not been established. The agreement was executed between the firm regarding tenancy and the said landlord/respondent is only the purchaser of the suit property from the owner of the partner who is already expired earlier. It is further submitted that Section 116 of the Evidence Act is not applicable in the present eviction suit filed by firm/plaintiff is already dismissed vide Ex.D/18 passed in SA No.20/1993 on 18.02.1992. Hence counsel prayed that the appeal be admitted and impugned orders be set aside. 6. Per contra, it is submitted by counsel for respondents that both the Courts below after considering the evidence and material on record in toto have given concurrent findings of fact that the appellants has failed to prove their case. In this case, as no perverse finding was given by the Courts below and no substantial question of law is involved in this appeal, the appeal may be dismissed in limine. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. The Second Appeal is filed under the provisions of Section 100 of CPC which provides that Second Appeal is entertainable by the High Court if it is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. Section 101 of CPC provides that no second appeal shall lie except on the ground mentioned in section 100 of CPC. 9. 8. The Second Appeal is filed under the provisions of Section 100 of CPC which provides that Second Appeal is entertainable by the High Court if it is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. Section 101 of CPC provides that no second appeal shall lie except on the ground mentioned in section 100 of CPC. 9. In the present Second appeal, the appellant has proposed following substantial question of law for admission of this Appeal: (a) Whether the affirmative findings recorded by the Courts below in respect of existence of landlord- tenant relationship between the plaintiff and defendant are perverse and illegal on account of failure to consider the clinching admission of PW/1. (b) Whether the Courts below have committed an illegality in passing a decree for eviction in favour of the plaintiff by illegally assuming his title in respect of the suit house, despite his failure to prove the validity of the sale deed Ex.P/1. (c) Whether the Courts below have committed an illegality in mis-interpretating and misapplying the provisions of Section 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872 when on admitted facts the defendant had not been put into possession of the suit house by the plaintiff? (d) Whether in the absence of existence of landlord-tenant relationship the suit for eviction filed by the plaintiff-respondent was legally untenable? (e) Whether the findings recorded by the Courts below in respect of the document Ex.D/1 and Ex.D/9 are illegal on account of misreading of the evidence? 10. With regard to framing of substantial questions of law, I have gone through the judgment of learned Courts below as well as the record. 11. In view of the evidence available on record, the learned trial Court after appreciating the evidence adduced by the parties, relied upon the registered sale deed Ex.P/1 and also relied upon Ex.D/1(c) and Ex.D/9 and adjudicated that the appellant/defendant is the tenant of plaintiff/respondent. He is also liable to pay monthly rent @ Rs.15/- per month and as per the contract, the respondent/plaintiff is entitled to get the possession of suit accommodation. The learned appellate Court has also discussed, appreciated and the evidence available on record and on that basis, affirmed the finding of learned trial Court. Now, the question is whether any substantial question of law is made out or not for consideration by this Court? 12. The learned appellate Court has also discussed, appreciated and the evidence available on record and on that basis, affirmed the finding of learned trial Court. Now, the question is whether any substantial question of law is made out or not for consideration by this Court? 12. On this aspect, the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Laxmidevamma v. Ranganath, (2015) 4 SCC 264 , again the Apex court has held as under:- "16. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that the plain-tiffs have established their right in A schedule property. In the light of the concurrent findings of fact, no substantial questions of law arose in the High Court and there was no substantial ground for reappreciation of evidence. While so, the High Court proceeded to observe that the first plaintiff has earmarked the A schedule property for road and that she could not have full-fledged right and on that premise proceeded to hold that declaration to the plaintiffs' right cannot be granted. In exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. In our considered view, the High Court did not keep in view that the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below, are based on oral and documentary evidence and the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained." 13. The Apex Court in case of Adiveppa & Others Vs. Bhimappa & Others, (2017) 9 SCC 586 has held as under:- "17. Here is a case where two Courts below, on appreciating the entire evidence, have come to a conclusion that the Plaintiffs failed to prove their case in relation to both the suit properties. The concurrent findings of facts recorded by the two Courts, which do not involve any question of law much less substantial question of law, are binding on this Court. 18. It is more so when these findings are neither against the pleadings nor against the evidence and nor contrary to any provision of law. They are also not perverse to the extent that no such findings could ever be recorded by any judicial person. 18. It is more so when these findings are neither against the pleadings nor against the evidence and nor contrary to any provision of law. They are also not perverse to the extent that no such findings could ever be recorded by any judicial person. In other words, unless the findings of facts, though concurrent, are found to be extremely perverse so as to affect the judicial conscious of a judge, they would be binding on the Appellate Court." 14. Even otherwise, on this aspect, the Apex Court in the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722 , has held as under:- "5. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence. 6. If the question of law termed as a substantial question stands already decided by a larger Bench of the High Court concerned or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or by the Supreme Court, its merely wrong application on the facts of the case would not be termed to be a substantial question of law. 6. If the question of law termed as a substantial question stands already decided by a larger Bench of the High Court concerned or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or by the Supreme Court, its merely wrong application on the facts of the case would not be termed to be a substantial question of law. Where a point of law has not been pleaded or is found to be arising between the parties in the absence of any factual format, a litigant should not be allowed to raise that question as a substantial question of law in second appeal. The mere appreciation of the facts, the documentary evidence or the meaning of entries and the contents of the document cannot be held to be raising a substantial question of law. But where it is found that the first appellate court has assumed jurisdiction which did not vest in it, the same can be adjudicated in the second appeal, treating it as a substantial question of law. Where the first appellate court is shown to have exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, it cannot be termed to be an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in second appeal. This Court in Reserve Bank of India v. Ramkrishna Govind Morey, AIR 1976 SC 830 held that whether the trial court should not have exercised its jurisdiction differently is not a question of law justifying interference" 15. In view of the aforesaid law, matter has been considered under the purview of law and facts of the case. learned Senior counsel has emphasized on the fact that the finding of learned Courts below which is only based on a document Ex.D/1(c) and D/9 is incorrect in the eyes of law. Having gone through the said documents, it reveals that Ex.D/1(c) is a document which endorsed the fact that the appellant is residing as tenant at the suit property. On this aspect, the following excerpt of the said document is worth mentioning here as under: 16. So far as the document Ex.D/9 is concerned, this is compromise decree which has attained finality and similarly, the document Ex.P/1 is also worth mentioning here as under: 17. This documents clearly indicated that the appellant would be tenant of the purchaser of this property. 18. As per the evidence available on record, the land was purchased by respondent. So far as the document Ex.D/9 is concerned, this is compromise decree which has attained finality and similarly, the document Ex.P/1 is also worth mentioning here as under: 17. This documents clearly indicated that the appellant would be tenant of the purchaser of this property. 18. As per the evidence available on record, the land was purchased by respondent. So far as the contention with regard to ownership of firm is concerned, the learned Senior counsel has placed reliance over the judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vinay Eknath Lad vs. Chiu Mao Chen, 2019 INSC 1398 and Sachin Jaiswal vs. M/s Hotel Alka Raje and Others, 2025 INSC 275 , but in both the cases, the owner of the property was a partnership firm whereas in this case, the respondent has purchased the property from the firm. Hence, the appellant cannot be afforded any benefit from the aforesaid judgments. 19. So far as the contention of learned Senior counsel that earlier the firm has filed a civil suit for eviction against the present appellant and the learned trial Court has decreed the eviction suit in favour of the firm, but the learned appellate Court has allowed the appeal and reversed the finding of eviction decree. However, only on the basis of that order of appellate Court, it cannot be assumed that the present appellant cannot be tenant of respondent. The arguments regarding non-applicability of provisions of Section 116 of Indian Evidence Act, has also having no force and is not tenable in the regard since the appellant has admitted that the firm is the owner in the earlier suit. 20. In view of the aforesaid as well as the oral and documentary evidence available on record, itself shows that the appellant is a tenant of said premises and premises was owned by respondent through the Bechnama Ex.P/1. Hence, the concurrent findings of both the learned Courts below does not warrant any interference and therefore, no substantial question of law can be framed. Accordingly, the admission is declined. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed.