JUDGMENT : MURALI PURUSHOTHAMAN, J. This original petition is filed challenging Ext.P6 order dated 04.10.2017 passed by the Court of the Principal Munsiff, Neyyattinkara, to the extent of rejecting the prayer of the petitioner for impleading the 5 th respondent herein as the additional 5 th defendant in O.S.No.1126 of 2014. 2. The suit is filed by the petitioner seeking a decree declaring her right, title and possession over the plaint schedule property, permitting completion of the western boundary wall in accordance with the permit, and restraining respondents 1 to 4/defendants from interfering with the construction or encroaching upon the plaint schedule property. Respondents 1 to 4 entered appearance and filed written statement contending that Kottukal Panchayat is a necessary party to the suit as the road which runs through the western side of the plaint schedule property belongs to them. Paragraph 7 of the written statement reads thus: “7) The averments in Paras 7,8,9 and 10 in the plaint are incorrect hence denied. Plaintiff is not entitled to get her title declared, as the intention of the plaintiff is to use the Court of law as a shield to protect her unlawful acts. Plaintiff is not entitled to put up boundary including the pond and runnel. Plaintiff is not entitled to get any relief as stated in the plaint. The suit is not supported by a cause of action. Moreover Kottukal Panchayath is a necessary party to the suit, as the western road belongs to the Panchayath and plaintiff is trying to construct a compound wall in the western side touching the road. Hence the suit is bad for non jointer of necessary party.” 3. On the basis of the said contention, the petitioner filed I.A.No.5773 of 2015 (Ext.P4) seeking to include Kottukal Panchayat as the additional 5 th defendant in the suit. The petitioner also filed I.A.No.5774 of 2015 for appointment of an Advocate Commissioner to have local inspection of the plaint schedule property. After the filing of the applications, the petitioner issued notice under Section 249 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (‘KPR Act’ for short) to the Secretary of the Panchayat. 4. The petitioner also filed I.A.No.5774 of 2015 for appointment of an Advocate Commissioner to have local inspection of the plaint schedule property. After the filing of the applications, the petitioner issued notice under Section 249 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (‘KPR Act’ for short) to the Secretary of the Panchayat. 4. The proposed additional 5 th defendant Panchayat (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Panchayat’ for brevity) filed Ext.P5 objection to the application for impleading contending that a notice prior to the institution of the suit, as contemplated under Section 249 of the KPR Act is required to be issued to the Panchayat and the same statutory restriction is applicable to impleading application also and therefore, the impleading application filed without prior notice to the Panchayat cannot be sustained. The relevant portion of Ext.P5 reads as follows. “3) Section 249 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act mandates issuance of notice prior to the filing of the suit against the Panchayat. There is statutory interdiction for filing a suit against the Panchayat without complying with the mandate under Section 249 . The same statutory embargo is applicable to impleading application also. 4) Thus the impleading application filed by the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed with cost to the proposed additional defendant.” 5. The learned Munsiff heard both interlocutory applications together and by Ext.P6 common order, dismissed I.A.No.5773 of 2015 for impleading and allowed I.A.No.5774 of 2015 filed for appointment of Advocate Commissioner. In Ext.P6, the learned Munsiff observed that the petitioner has not complied with the mandatory condition of issuance of prior notice to the Panchayat under Section 249 of the KPR Act. It is stated that, if the impleading petition is allowed, the proposed additional 5 th defendant will become the 5 th defendant in the suit, and without the issuance of a mandatory notice under Section 249 of the KPR Act, the 5 th respondent cannot be arrayed as a defendant in the suit. 6. It is contended by the petitioner that the subject matter of the suit is outside the ambit of suit against the Panchayat as contemplated under Section 249 of the KPR Act as no relief is claimed against the Panchayat and no action of the Panchayat or its officers is impugned in the suit. 6. It is contended by the petitioner that the subject matter of the suit is outside the ambit of suit against the Panchayat as contemplated under Section 249 of the KPR Act as no relief is claimed against the Panchayat and no action of the Panchayat or its officers is impugned in the suit. It is also contended that the Panchayat is only an eo nomine party in the suit, and that no notice is required as contemplated under Section 249 of the KPR Act. 7. Heard Sri. R.T.Pradeep, the learned counsel for the petitioner. Though service of notice is complete, there is no appearance for the respondents. 8. Section 249 of the KPR Act reads as follows: “249. Institutions of suits against authorities of Panchayats, their officers etc. - (1) No suit or other civil proceedings against a Panchayat or against the President, the Vice President or any other member, or employee thereof or against any other person acting under the direction of the Panchayat or any member or employee thereof for anything done or purporting to be done under this Act in its or his official capacity, - (a) shall be instituted until the expiration of one month after notice in writing, stating the cause of action, the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and the nature of the relief which he claims, has been, in the case of a Panchayat delivered or left at the office of the Panchayat and in the case of a member, employee or person as aforesaid delivered to him or left at his office or at his usual place of abode and the plaint shall in each such case contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left; or (b) shall be instituted unless it is a suit for the recovery of immovable property or for the declaration of title thereto, otherwise than within six months next after the accrual of the alleged cause of action. (2) The notice referred to in sub-section (1), when it is intended for a Panchayat shall be addressed to the Secretary. (2) The notice referred to in sub-section (1), when it is intended for a Panchayat shall be addressed to the Secretary. (3) If any panchayat or person to whom notice is given under sub-section (1) tenders to plaintiff before the proceeding is commenced and if the plaintiff does not in such proceedings require more than the amounts so tendered he shall not recover any costs incurred by him after such tender; and the plaintiff shall also pay all cost incurred by the panchayat after such tender.” Section 249 of the KPR Act provides that no civil suit or proceeding shall be instituted against a Panchayat, its President, Vice-President, members, employees, or any person acting under its authority for acts done in official capacity unless a written notice of one month stating the cause of action, the plaintiff’s name and address, and the relief claimed is given to the Secretary or the concerned authority/officer. It further provides that, except in the case of suit relating to recovery of immovable property or declaration of title, no such suit can be filed after six months from the date when the cause of action arose. 9. In Mammadhan Kutty v. Pallivasal Grama Panchayat [2004 KHC 120: 2004 (1) KLT 751 ], this Court held that ultra vires actions are not protected by the exclusionary clause in Section 249 of the KPR Act. This court in Subhadra v. Secretary, Thrikkakara Grama Panchayat [ 2017 (1) KHC 928 : 2017(2) KLT 888 ], held that Section 249 (1) of the KPR Act protects the Panchayat, its President, Vice-President, members, and employees only for acts done under the Act and in their official capacity. This protection does not extend to acts done beyond the scope of the Act or outside their official authority and in such cases, the Panchayat or its officers cannot claim immunity under Section 249 . 10. Section 249 of the KPR Act is almost analogous to Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). This protection does not extend to acts done beyond the scope of the Act or outside their official authority and in such cases, the Panchayat or its officers cannot claim immunity under Section 249 . 10. Section 249 of the KPR Act is almost analogous to Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). However, two dissimilarities between Section 80 CPC and Section 249 of the KPR Act are that, (i) Section 80 (1) CPC mandates two months’ notice of the judicial proceedings intended to be initiated, whereas Section 249 of the KPR Act requires one month’s notice and (ii) Section 80 (2) CPC empowers the court to permit the institution of a suit without serving notice under sub-section (1) thereof where the suit seeks urgent or immediate relief against the Government or a public officer, whereas Section 249 contains no such express urgency exception. The object of Section 80 CPC has been explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of A.P v. Pioneer Builders [ (2006) 12 SCC 119 ] as follows: “The service of notice under Section 80 is, thus, a condition precedent for the institution of a suit against the Government or a public officer. The legislative intent of the section is to give the Government sufficient notice of the suit, which is proposed to be filed against it so that it may reconsider the decision and decide for itself whether the claim made could be accepted or not. As observed in Bihari Chowdhary (supra), the object of the section is the advancement of justice and the securing of public good by avoidance of unnecessary litigation”. Service of notice under Section 80 (1) CPC is thus mandatory for the institution of a suit against the Government or a public officer. 11. The object, mechanism and scheme of Section 249 of the KPR Act has been explained by this Court in Ayisha K. V. and Others v. State of Kerala and Others [ 2015 (4) KHC 296 : 2015 (3) KLT SN 113] as follows: “52. S.249 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act is analogous to S.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure ('CPC'). S.249 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act is analogous to S.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure ('CPC'). The provision mandates that no suit or other civil proceedings against a Panchayat or against the President, the Vice - President or any other member, or employee thereof, etc., for anything done or purporting to be done under this Act in its or his official capacity, be instituted until the expiration of one month after notice in writing. The said notice shall state the cause of action, the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and the nature of the relief which he claims. Notwithstanding the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, S.249 also provides a limitation of six months for instituting civil proceedings against the Grama Panchayat in all cases, other than those for the recovery of immovable property or for the declaration of title thereto. 53. The mechanism under S.249 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, which is, like S.80 of CPC, mandatory in character, is put in place to give the Grama Panchayat sufficient notice of judicial proceedings intended to be initiated against it by any person. On service of notice, the Panchayat may decide for itself whether the claim of the person is to be met or not. Law, however, does not compel the Panchayat to respond to the said notice; much less accept the demand of the person who has issued the notice under S.249. 54. It is further pertinent to notice that sub- section (3) of S.249 specifies the consequences flowing from the notice. If any Panchayat or person to whom notice is given under sub-section (1) tenders to the plaintiff before the proceedings is commenced and if the plaintiff does not in such proceedings require more than the amounts so tendered, he shall not recover any costs incurred by him after such tender, and the plaintiff shall also pay all costs incurred by the Panchayat after such tender. 55. From the above statutory scheme it clearly manifests that, in the first place, the pre - litigation notice under S.249 is required to be issued to the Grama Panchayat or its officials as have been specified therein. Secondly, they may choose to act on it, so that they could avoid the legal consequences flowing from the judicial proceedings to be initiated by the person, more particularly the costs of the proceedings. Secondly, they may choose to act on it, so that they could avoid the legal consequences flowing from the judicial proceedings to be initiated by the person, more particularly the costs of the proceedings. The provision by no means compels the Grama Panchayat to act on the demand contained in the notice. A fortiori, it does not mandate that the Grama Panchayat, on its part, postpone any of its actions intended to be taken against the person in question.” 12. A plaintiff is dominus litis having right to choose his adversaries against whom he seeks relief and cannot be compelled to implead persons against whom he does not seek relief. The petitioner herein has not sought any relief against the Panchayat. However, on the basis of the stand taken by respondents 1 to 4 in their written statement that the Panchayat is a necessary party to the suit, the petitioner filed I.A.No.5773 of 2015 seeking to implead the Panchayat as additional 5 th defendant in the suit. The learned Munsiff dismissed the application stating that the petitioner has not complied with the mandatory condition of issuance of prior notice to the Panchayat under Section 249 of the KPR Act. 13.The question to be considered is whether notice under Section 249 of the KPR Act is mandatory when no relief is claimed against the Panchayat and no action of the Panchayat or its officers is impugned in the suit. 14. In Ram Kumar and another v. State of Rajasthan and others [2008 KHC 5222: (2008) 10 SCC 73 : AIR 2009 SC 4 ] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that when the plaintiff does not challenge any act or omission done or purported to be done by the Government or a public officer in the discharge of official duties, no notice under Section 80 CPC is necessary before instituting the suit against them. The Court held thus: “10. Before we proceed further, we may keep it on record that the respondent No. 3 is a public officer within the meaning of S.2 (17) and S.80 of the CPC. Therefore, let us consider whether the respondent No. 3 had acted, in the facts and circumstances of this case, in his official capacity or not. The Court held thus: “10. Before we proceed further, we may keep it on record that the respondent No. 3 is a public officer within the meaning of S.2 (17) and S.80 of the CPC. Therefore, let us consider whether the respondent No. 3 had acted, in the facts and circumstances of this case, in his official capacity or not. In our view, High Court had committed an error in holding that the respondent No. 3 in the facts as alleged in the plaint could be said to have acted as a public officer in his official capacity. It was respondent No. 2 who had passed the aforesaid two orders dated 20th of November, 1968 and 20th of April, 1974 and in fact, who had passed the order of exchange of lands and also the order recalling the earlier order of 1968 in his official capacity. In that view of the matter, in our view, notice served on the District Collector, Sriganganagar was sufficient and complete notice to the Government Middle School, Daulatpura which was represented through the Education Officer (Students Institutions), Hanumangarh. Therefore, in our view, the High Court had misdirected itself in deciding the issue regarding requirement of separate service of notice under S.80 of the CPC. Looking into the allegations made in the plaint and the reliefs claimed, we do not find any reason to disagree with the view expressed by the Trial Court when it had held that no act was performed by the respondent No. 3 in his official capacity. If we look at the plaint in the present case, it would be clear that in the plaint, no act of respondent No.3 is being challenged. The appellants do not seek to set aside any order of the respondent No.3 or to declare illegal any of the acts of respondent No.3, it merely seeks a decree for recovery of possession in the suit to hand over possession of the suit land to the appellants. The suit which is not in respect of any act done by the respondent No.3, as a public officer, and in which no act of respondent No.3 is either challenged or sought to be set aside is not a suit to which S.80 of the CPC can very well apply. The suit which is not in respect of any act done by the respondent No.3, as a public officer, and in which no act of respondent No.3 is either challenged or sought to be set aside is not a suit to which S.80 of the CPC can very well apply. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the respondent No.3 had not acted in his official capacity for which service of notice under S.80 of the CPC was necessary. That apart, it is not in dispute that the respondent No. 2 was Administrator and overall in - charge including the Government Middle Schools (Students Institutions) in the District and the notice served on the State Government through District Collector of the District was sufficient compliance with the requirements of S.80 of the CPC. In view of the aforesaid fact, it was not necessary to separately serve a notice to respondent No.3 as we find that no order was passed by the District Education Officer, which was under challenge in the suit itself. 11. In view of our discussions made hereinabove, we are therefore of the view that the High Court had fallen in error in reversing the order of the Trial Court holding that service of notice on respondent No. 3 under S.80 of the CPC was not necessary to be served to maintain the suit. In State of Maharashtra and Another v. Shri Chander Kant, AIR 1977 SC 148 , this Court laid down the principle as to when service of notice on the State/defendants under S.80 of the CPC was necessary. In the said decision, this Court observed as follows : "The language of S.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is that a notice is to be given against not only the Government but also against the Public Office in respect of any act purporting to be done in his official capacity. The Registrar is a Public Officer. The order is an act purporting to be done in his official capacity. In the present case, the suit is to be set aside the order made by a Public Officer in respect of an act done in the discharge of his official duties. Therefore, notice under S.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was required." 12. The order is an act purporting to be done in his official capacity. In the present case, the suit is to be set aside the order made by a Public Officer in respect of an act done in the discharge of his official duties. Therefore, notice under S.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was required." 12. From the aforesaid, it would be evident that this Court held that service under S.80 of the CPC was necessary as in that case, the suit was filed for setting aside an order passed by a public officer in respect of an act done in the discharge of his official duties. In that view of the matter, in that decision, it was held that service of notice under S.80 of the CPC was necessary and in the absence of that service, the suit must be dismissed. This is not the factual position in this case. We have already held that Respondent No. 3 had not passed any order as a public officer nor the appellants had asked for setting aside any order passed by the respondent No. 3 as a public officer in respect of any act done in the discharge of his official duties. As noted herein earlier, the appellants have made the respondent No. 3 as a party although he was a public officer only on the ground that possession was delivered to him by the respondent No. 2 in the exercise of his official capacity. For the purpose of possession to be delivered back to the appellants, the respondent No. 3 was made a party by which, in our view, he had not at all acted in discharge of his official capacity. A look at the reliefs claimed in the plaint would clearly show that only a consequential relief was claimed in the suit to the extent that possession of the suit land should be restored in favour of the appellants by the respondent No. 3. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid discussion made hereinabove, we hold that even in the absence of service of notice on the respondent No.3 under S.80 of the CPC, the suit was maintainable in law.” 15. Notice under Section 249 of KPR Act is required when the act complained of was done or purported to be done by the Panchayat or its officers under the Act in official capacity. Notice under Section 249 of KPR Act is required when the act complained of was done or purported to be done by the Panchayat or its officers under the Act in official capacity. Notice under Section 80 of the CPC or Section 249 of the KPR Act, as the case may be, shall state the nature of the relief claimed. Here, in the case at hand, no act of the Panchayat or its officers is under challenge in the suit. No order of the Panchayat is sought to be declared illegal. No relief whatsoever is claimed against the Panchayat or its officers. Once impleaded, the Panchayat will be on the array of parties in the suit as proforma defendant. When no relief is claimed against the Panchayat or its officers and no action of the Panchayat or its officers is challenged in the suit, and they are made only proforma parties, no notice under Section 249 of KPR Act is required. Therefore, I find that Ext.P6 order to the extent of rejecting the prayer of the petitioner for impleading is vitiated by error apparent on the face of the record and is set aside and Ext. P4 application is allowed. Since the suit is of the year 2014, the learned Munsiff shall endeavor to dispose of the same expeditiously. The original petition is disposed of.