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2025 DIGILAW 22 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Vanrajsinh Bahadursinh Parmar

2025-01-17

S.V.PINTO

body2025
JUDGMENT : 1. Criminal Appeal No. 1483 of 2008 has been filed by the appellant - State against the respondents - original accused nos. 1 and 2 of Sessions Case No. 62 of 2006 and Criminal Appeal No. 1484 of 2008 has been filed by the appellant - State against the respondents - original accused nos. 1 and 2 of Sessions Case No. 63 of 2006 under Section 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, against the common judgement and order of acquittal passed on 16.02.2008 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No. 7, Gondal, Camp at Dhoraji, (hereinafter referred to as “the learned Trial Court”). 1.1 Both the Sessions Cases arose out of the same FIR registered with PatanVav Police Station I – C.R. No. 43 of 2004 under Sections 306 and 114 of the IPC, wherein, the respondents of Criminal Appeal No. 1483 of 2008 were shown as accused nos. 1 and 2 and the respondents of Criminal Appeal No. 1484 of 2008 were shown as original accused nos. 3 and 4. 1.2 As both the Sessions Cases had risen out of the same FIR and separate chargesheets were filed, both the cases were consolidated by the learned Trial Court and the accused were referred to in the rank and file as they stood in the FIR and the cases were disposed off by a common judgement and order. 1.3 The same judgment and order is under challenge in both the appeals and hence they are disposed off by a common judgment. The respondents of Criminal Appeal No. 1483/2008 and respondents of Criminal Appeal No. 1484/2008 are referred to as the accused in the rank and file as they stood in the FIR and common judgement for the sake of convenience, clarity and brevity. 2. The brief facts that emerge from the record of the case are as under: 2.1 The accused no. 1 - Vanrajsinh Bahudursinh Parmar was married to Prakashba on 07.05.1999 and the accused nos. 2 and 4 - Jayshreeba Bahadursinh Parmar and Gitaba Bahdursinh Parmar respectively were the sisters-in-law and accused no. 3 - Kanchanba Bahadursinh Parmar was the mother-in-law of Prakashba. 1 - Vanrajsinh Bahudursinh Parmar was married to Prakashba on 07.05.1999 and the accused nos. 2 and 4 - Jayshreeba Bahadursinh Parmar and Gitaba Bahdursinh Parmar respectively were the sisters-in-law and accused no. 3 - Kanchanba Bahadursinh Parmar was the mother-in-law of Prakashba. During the marriage span of five years, Prakashbhai could not bear a child, and all the accused used to mentally and physically harass Prakashba and call her barren and Prakashba left her matrimonial house and came to her parental house. On 14.09.2004, the brother-in-law - N. J. Chudasama came to the parental house of Prakashba and a conversation of compromise and sending her back to her matrimonial house had taken place which was heard by Prakashba. She felt that they would send her back to the matrimonial house and as she was afraid that her in-laws would physically assault her or kill her, on 16.06.2004 before 3:30 am, she sprinkled kerosene on her body and set herself ablaze and expired. A complaint was filed by her brother - Dashrathsinh Nanbha Jadeja which was registered at PatanVav Police Station I – C.R. No.43 of 2004 under Sections 306, 114 of the IPC. 2.2 The Investigating Officer recorded the statements of the connected witnesses and seized the necessary documents and after completion of investigation, the police filed the chargesheet before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dhoraji and as the said offences against the accused were exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Sessions Court, Gondal Camp at Dhoraji as per the provisions of Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and case was registered Sessions Case No. 62/2006 and Sessions Case no.63/2006. 2.3 The accused were duly served with the summons and the accused appeared before the learned Trial Court, and it was verified whether the copies of all the police papers were provided to the accused as per the provisions of Section 207 of the Code and a charge at Exh. 23 was framed against the accused and the statement of the accused were recorded at Exhs. 24 to 27, wherein, all the accused denied all the contents of the charge and the entire evidence of the prosecution was taken on record. 23 was framed against the accused and the statement of the accused were recorded at Exhs. 24 to 27, wherein, all the accused denied all the contents of the charge and the entire evidence of the prosecution was taken on record. 2.4 The prosecution has produced 6 oral evidences and 13 documentary evidences to bring home the charge against the accused and after the learned Additional Public Prosecutor filed the closing pursis at Exh. 53, the further statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 were recorded, wherein, the accused denied the evidence of the prosecution on record and refused to step into the witness box or lead evidence and stated that a false case has been filed against them. After the arguments of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor and the learned advocate for the accused were heard, the learned trial Court by the impugned judgment and order was pleased to acquit all the accused from all the charges leveled against him. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said judgement and order of acquittal, the appellant - State has filed the present appeal mainly stating that the impugned judgement and order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court is contrary to law and evidence on record and the learned Trial Court has not appreciated the fact that all the witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution and during cross-examination, nothing adverse has been elicited in favour of the respondent. The case has been proved beyond reasonable doubts and the prosecution has successfully established the case against the respondents and the judgement and order of acquittal is unwarranted, illegal and without any basis in the eyes of law and the reasons stated while acquitting the respondent are improper, perverse and bad in law. Hence the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4. Heard learned APP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri for the appellant State and learned advocate Mr. Parth S. Tolia for the respondents. Perused the impugned judgement and order of acquittal and have reappreciated the entire evidence of the prosecution on record of the case. 5. Learned APP Ms. 4. Heard learned APP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri for the appellant State and learned advocate Mr. Parth S. Tolia for the respondents. Perused the impugned judgement and order of acquittal and have reappreciated the entire evidence of the prosecution on record of the case. 5. Learned APP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri has taken this Court through the entire evidence of the prosecution on record of the case and has submitted that the prosecution has produced the evidence of 6 witnesses and 13 documentary evidences, including the wedding invitation card of the deceased and the accused no. 1 at exhibit 45 and it is proved that the marriage had taken place on 07.05.1999. It is an admitted fact that due to the disputes between the deceased and the accused during the marital life, a complaint was filed at Muli Police Station under Sections 498(A), 323, 324 and 114 of the IPC and Section 135 of the B.P. Act which was registered at Muli Police Station II-C.R. No. 14 of 2004 and all the accused were charged for the said offence before the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Muli. Criminal Case No. 207 of 2004 was tried and in that matter a compromise had taken place and the accused had taken deceased Prakashba back to her matrimonial house. That even after this, the mental and physical cruelty did not end and once again, Prakashba had come to her parental house and she had the fear that once she goes back to her matrimonial home, the accused would physically beat her and would kill her. That she did not want to go back to the matrimonial house and she committed suicide at her parental house. The witness examined by the prosecution has supported the case of the prosecution and the panchnamas produced on record clearly proves that the offence has taken place. The learned Trial Court has not appreciated the evidence in proper perspective and has passed the impugned judgement and order of acquittal. Learned APP has urged this court to allow the appeal and set aside the judgement and order of acquittal. 6. Learned advocate Mr. Parth S. Tolia for the respondent has submitted that in the entire evidence of the prosecution, there is no iota of evidence that the accused has committed any offence. Learned APP has urged this court to allow the appeal and set aside the judgement and order of acquittal. 6. Learned advocate Mr. Parth S. Tolia for the respondent has submitted that in the entire evidence of the prosecution, there is no iota of evidence that the accused has committed any offence. The learned Trial Court has appreciated all the evidences and passed the judgement and order of acquittal which is just and proper and no interference is required in the same and learned Advocate for the respondents has urged this court to reject the appeal of the appellant. 7. At the outset, before discussing the facts of the present case, it would be appropriate to refer to the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Chandrappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka reported in 2007 (4) SCC415, wherein, the Apex Court has observed as under: Recently, in Kallu Vs. State of M.P. (2006) 10 SCC 313 , this Court stated: "While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial court". The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial court". From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. 7.1 The Apex Court in yet another recent decision in case of Sri Dattatraya Vs. Sharanappa arising out of Criminal Appeal No. 3257 of 2024 (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 13179 of 2023)observed as under: 31. 7.1 The Apex Court in yet another recent decision in case of Sri Dattatraya Vs. Sharanappa arising out of Criminal Appeal No. 3257 of 2024 (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 13179 of 2023)observed as under: 31. The instant case pertains to challenge against concurrent findings of fact favouring the acquittal of the respondent, it would be cogent to delve into an analysis of the principles underlining the exercise of power to adjudicate a challenge against acquittal bolstered by concurrent findings. The following broad principles can be culled out after a comprehensive analysis of judicial pronouncements: i) Criminal jurisprudence emphasises on the fundamental essence of liberty and presumption of innocence unless proven guilty. This presumption gets emboldened by virtue of concurrent findings of acquittal. Therefore, this court must be extracautious while dealing with a challenge against acquittal as the said presumption gets reinforced by virtue of a well-reasoned favourable outcome. Consequently, the onus on the prosecution side becomes more burdensome pursuant to the said double presumption. ii) In case of concurrent findings of acquittal, this Court would ordinarily not interfere with such view considering the principle of liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India 1950, unless perversity is blatantly forthcoming and there are compelling reasons. iii) Where two views are possible, then this Court would not ordinarily interfere and reverse the concurrent findings of acquittal. However, where the situation is such that the only conclusion which could be arrived at from a comprehensive appraisal of evidence, shows that there has been a grave miscarriage of justice, then, notwithstanding such concurrent view, this Court would not restrict itself to adopt an oppugnant view. [Vide State of Uttar Pradesh v. Dan Singh] iv) To adjudge whether the concurrent findings of acquittal are ‘perverse’ it is to be seen whether there has been failure of justice. This Court in Babu v. State of Kerala clarified the ambit of the term ‘perversity’ as “if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/admissible material. This Court in Babu v. State of Kerala clarified the ambit of the term ‘perversity’ as “if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/admissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is ‘against the weight of evidence’, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality.” v) In situations of concurrent findings favoring accused, interference is required where the trial court adopted an incorrect approach in framing of an issue of fact and the appellate court whilst affirming the view of the trial court, lacked in appreciating the evidence produced by the accused in rebutting a legal presumption. [Vide Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh] vi) Furthermore, such interference is necessitated to safeguard interests of justice when the acquittal is based on some irrelevant grounds or fallacies in re-appreciation of any fundamental evidentiary material or a manifest error of law or in cases of non-adherence to the principles of natural justice or the decision is manifestly unjust or where an acquittal which is fundamentally based on an exaggerated adherence to the principle of granting benefit of doubt to the accused, is liable to be set aside. Say in cases where the court severed the connection between accused and criminality committed by him upon a cursory examination of evidences. [Vide State of Punjab v.Gurpreet Singh and Others and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar.] 8. The law with regard to acquittal appeals is well crystallized and in acquittal appeals, there is presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and it has finally culminated when a case ends in an acquittal. That the learned Trial Court has appreciated all the evidence and when the learned Trial Court has come to a conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the case beyond reasonable doubts, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused gets strengthened. That there is no inhibition to re appreciate the evidence by the Appellate Court but if after re appreciation, the view taken by the learned Trial Court was a possible view, there is no reason for the Appellate Court to interfere in the same. 9. With regard to Section 306 of the IPC it would be fit to reproduce the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Prakash and Ors. Vs. 9. With regard to Section 306 of the IPC it would be fit to reproduce the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Prakash and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra in the order passed in Criminal Appeal No. 5543 of 2024 (Arising out of SLP (Cri.)No. 1073 of 2023) decided on 20.12.2024 in paras 12 to 22 which are as under: 12. The relevant provisions of the IPC that fall for consideration are as under: “306. Abetment of suicide.- If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. 107. Abetment of a thing—A person abets the doing of a thing, who— First.— Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly.— Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.— Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 1.— A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing. Explanation 2.— Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.” 13. Section 306 of the IPC has two basic ingredients-first, an act of suicide by one person and second, the abetment to the said act by another person(s). In order to sustain a charge under Section 306 of the IPC, it must necessarily be proved that the accused person has contributed to the suicide by the deceased by some direct or indirect act. To prove such contribution or involvement, one of the three conditions outlined in Section 107 of the IPC has to be satisfied. 14. Section 306 read with Section 107 of IPC, has been interpreted, time and again, and its principles are well- established. To prove such contribution or involvement, one of the three conditions outlined in Section 107 of the IPC has to be satisfied. 14. Section 306 read with Section 107 of IPC, has been interpreted, time and again, and its principles are well- established. To attract the offence of abetment to suicide, it is important to establish proof of direct or indirect acts of instigation or incitement of suicide by the accused, which must be in close proximity to the commission of suicide by the deceased. Such instigation or incitement should reveal a clear mens rea to abet the commission of suicide and should put the victim in such a position that he/she would have no other option but to commit suicide. 15. The law on abetment has been crystallised by a plethora of decisions of this Court. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating or intentionally aiding another person to do a particular thing. To bring a charge under Section 306 of the IPC, the act of abetment would require the positive act of instigating or intentionally aiding another person to commit suicide. Without such mens rea on the part of the accused person being apparent from the face of the record, a charge under the aforesaid Section cannot be sustained. Abetment also requires an active act, direct or indirect, on the part of the accused person which left the deceased with no other option but to commit suicide. 16. This Court in the case of S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan and Another, had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 306 of the IPC and the ingredients which are essential for abetment, as set out in Section 107 of the IPC. It observed as follows: “16. The word “suicide” in itself is nowhere defined in the Penal Code, however its meaning and import is well known and requires no explanation. “Sui” means “self” and “cide” means “killing”, thus implying an act of self-killing. In short, a person committing suicide must commit it by himself, irrespective of the means employed by him in achieving his object of killing himself. ……….. 18. In our country, while suicide in itself is not an offence, considering that the successful offender is beyond the reach of law, attempt to suicide is an offence under Section 309 IPC. ………. 21. ……….. 18. In our country, while suicide in itself is not an offence, considering that the successful offender is beyond the reach of law, attempt to suicide is an offence under Section 309 IPC. ………. 21. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Mahendra Singh v. State of M.P. [1995 Supp (3) SCC 731 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1157] In Mahendra Singh [1995 Supp (3) SCC 731 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1157] the allegations levelled were as under: (SCC p. 731, para 1) “1. … My mother-in-law and husband and sister-in-law (husband's elder brother's wife) harassed me. They beat me and abused me. My husband Mahendra wants to marry a second time. He has illicit connections with my sister-in-law. Because of these reasons and being harassed I want to die by burning.” The Court on the aforementioned allegations came to a definite conclusion that by no stretch the ingredients of abetment are attracted on the statement of the deceased. According to the appellant, the conviction of the appellant under Section 306 IPC merely on the basis of the aforementioned allegation of harassment of the deceased is unsustainable in law. ……….. 23. In State of W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal [ (1994) 1 SCC 73 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 107] this Court has cautioned that: (SCC p. 90, para 17) “17. … The court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it [appears] to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty.” 24. This Court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [ (2009) 16 SCC 605 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 367] had an occasion to deal with this aspect of abetment. This Court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [ (2009) 16 SCC 605 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 367] had an occasion to deal with this aspect of abetment. The Court dealt with the dictionary meaning of the words “instigation” and “goading”. The Court opined that there should be intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter. Each person's suicidability pattern is different from the other. Each person has his own idea of self-esteem and self-respect. Therefore, it is impossible to lay down any straitjacket formula in dealing with such cases. Each case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts and circumstances. 25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide.” 17. This Court held that abetment involves the mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Therefore, without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid a person in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. This Court further observed that the intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 of IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. Abetment also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no other option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide. Abetment also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no other option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide. However, this Court has cautioned that since each person reacts differently to the same provocation depending on a variety of factors, it is impossible to lay down a straightjacket formula to deal with such cases. Therefore, every such case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts and circumstances. 18. More recently, in the case of Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda and Others v. State of Gujarat13, this Court has relied on S.S. Chheena (supra) to hold that the element of mens rea cannot simply be presumed or inferred, instead it must be evident and explicitly discernible. Without this, the foundational requirement for establishing abetment under the law, that is deliberate and conspicuous intention to provoke or contribute to the act of suicide, would remain unfulfilled. This Court observed as follows: “18. For a conviction under Section 306 of the IPC, it is a well-established legal principle that the presence of clear mens rea—the intention to abet the act—is essential. Mere harassment, by itself, is not sufficient to find an accused guilty of abetting suicide. The prosecution must demonstrate an active or direct action by the accused that led the deceased to take his/her own life. The element of mens rea cannot simply be presumed or inferred; it must be evident and explicitly discernible. Without this, the foundational requirement for establishing abetment under the law is not satisfied, underscoring the necessity of a deliberate and conspicuous intent to provoke or contribute to the act of suicide.” 19. It is, therefore, evident that the positive act of instigation is a crucial element of abetment. While dealing with an issue of a similar nature, this Court in the case of Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh,14 laid down the parameters of what would be constituted to be an act of instigation. This Court observed as follows:- “20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an act”. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. This Court observed as follows:- “20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an act”. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation.” 20. It could thus be seen that this Court observed that instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an act”. It has been held that in order to satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence, however, a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. Applying the law to the facts of the case, this Court went on to hold that a word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. 21. Relying on the decision in the case of Ramesh Kumar (supra), this Court in the case of Ude Singh and Others v. State of Haryana observed as follows: “16. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be a proof of direct or indirect act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. It could hardly be disputed that the question of cause of a suicide, particularly in the context of an offence of abetment of suicide, remains a vexed one, involving multifaceted and complex attributes of human behaviour and responses/reactions. In the case of accusation for abetment of suicide, the court would be looking for cogent and convincing proof of the act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. In the case of accusation for abetment of suicide, the court would be looking for cogent and convincing proof of the act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. In the case of suicide, mere allegation of harassment of the deceased by another person would not suffice unless there be such action on the part of the accused which compels the person to commit suicide; and such an offending action ought to be proximate to the time of occurrence. Whether a person has abetted in the commission of suicide by another or not, could only be gathered from the facts and circumstances of each case. 16.1. For the purpose of finding out if a person has abetted commission of suicide by another, the consideration would be if the accused is guilty of the act of instigation of the act of suicide. As explained and reiterated by this Court in the decisions above referred, instigation means to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do an act. If the persons who committed suicide had been hypersensitive and the action of the accused is otherwise not ordinarily expected to induce a similarly circumstanced person to commit suicide, it may not be safe to hold the accused guilty of abetment of suicide. But, on the other hand, if the accused by his acts and by his continuous course of conduct creates a situation which leads the deceased perceiving no other option except to commit suicide, the case may fall within the four corners of Section 306 IPC. If the accused plays an active role in tarnishing the self-esteem and self-respect of the victim, which eventually draws the victim to commit suicide, the accused may be held guilty of abetment of suicide. The question of mens rea on the part of the accused in such cases would be examined with reference to the actual acts and deeds of the accused and if the acts and deeds are only of such nature where the accused intended nothing more than harassment or snap show of anger, a particular case may fall short of the offence of abetment of suicide. However, if the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words or deeds until the deceased reacted or was provoked, a particular case may be that of abetment of suicide. However, if the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words or deeds until the deceased reacted or was provoked, a particular case may be that of abetment of suicide. Such being the matter of delicate analysis of human behaviour, each case is required to be examined on its own facts, while taking note of all the surrounding factors having bearing on the actions and psyche of the accused and the deceased. 16.2. We may also observe that human mind could be affected and could react in myriad ways; and impact of one's action on the mind of another carries several imponderables. Similar actions are dealt with differently by different persons; and so far a particular person's reaction to any other human's action is concerned, there is no specific theorem or yardstick to estimate or assess the same. Even in regard to the factors related with the question of harassment of a girl, many factors are to be considered like age, personality, upbringing, rural or urban set-ups, education, etc. Even the response to the ill action of eve teasing and its impact on a young girl could also vary for a variety of factors, including those of background, self-confidence and upbringing. Hence, each case is required to be dealt with on its own facts and circumstances.” 22. It could thus be seen that this Court observed that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be a proof of direct or indirect act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. It has been held that since the cause of suicide particularly in the context of the offence of abetment of suicide involves multifaceted and complex attributes of human behaviour, the court would be looking for cogent and convincing proof of the act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. This Court further observed that a mere allegation of harassment of the deceased by another person would not suffice unless there is such action on the part of the accused which compels the person to commit suicide. This Court also emphasised that such an offending action ought to be proximate to the time of occurrence. It was further clarified that the question of mens rea on the part of the accused in such cases would be examined with reference to the actual acts and deeds of the accused. This Court also emphasised that such an offending action ought to be proximate to the time of occurrence. It was further clarified that the question of mens rea on the part of the accused in such cases would be examined with reference to the actual acts and deeds of the accused. It was further held that if the acts and deeds are only of such nature where the accused intended nothing more than harassment or a snap-show of anger, a particular case may fall short of the offence of abetment of suicide, however, if the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words or deeds until the deceased reacted or was provoked, a particular case may be that of abetment of suicide. This Court held that owing to the fact that the human mind could be affected and could react in myriad ways and that similar actions are dealt with differently by different persons, each case is required to be dealt with its own facts and circumstances. 10. In light on the above settled principles of law and considering the evidence of the prosecution, to bring home the charge against the accused, the prosecution has examined PW1 – Dashrathsinh Nanbha Jadeja at Exh. 43 and the witness is the brother of the deceased Prakashba and the complainant who has filed the complaint which is produced at Exh. 44. The witness has stated that the deceased was residing in joint family with all the accused and all the accused used to mentally harass the deceased and a case was conducted in Muli Court. That he does not know what has taken place in that case and as there was a quarrel in the house, Dilvarba Natubha brought the deceased to her marital home. The father-in-law of Prakashba expired in an accident and she was sent back to her marital home and as there was intolerable harassment to Prakashba, she was brought to Surendranagar for treatment and thereafter they brought her home. That some relatives came and there was a conversation for a compromise which was heard by Prakashba and she told Mamta – the wife of the complainant and his brother Chandrasinh that she would be killed if she was sent to her matrimonial house. That some relatives came and there was a conversation for a compromise which was heard by Prakashba and she told Mamta – the wife of the complainant and his brother Chandrasinh that she would be killed if she was sent to her matrimonial house. That on the same night, Prakashba went into the kitchen and burnt herself and after the cremation, he had filed the complaint at PatanVav Police Station which is produced at Exh. 44. During the cross- examination, the witness has stated that from 23.03.2004 till the date of the incident, he did not go to the house of the accused and during this time, the accused did not visit his house. That his brother Chandrasinh is working as a driver of Police Inspector - Natwarsinh Jilubha of Prohibition Branch for last six years and Chandrasinh had told him on 14.09.2004 that the accused wanted to compromise and take Prakashba back to the matrimonial home. On 16.09.2004, his mother woke him up at 3:30 am and he saw Prakashba lying burnt on the floor and they informed the police at around 7:00 - 7:30 am. That at that time, he informed the police that Prakashba had committed suicide for some unknown reason. 10.1 The prosecution has examined PW2 - Popatba Nanbha Jaedja at Exh. 46 and the witness is the mother of deceased Prakashba. The witness has fully supported the case of the prosecution and during the cross-examination she has stated that Prakashba was at her house from six months prior to the incident and during this time, the accused did not come to their house and they did not go to the house of the accused. 10.2 The prosecution has examined PW3 - Mamtaba Dashrathsinh at Exh. 47 and the witness is the sister-in- law who has fully supported the case of the prosecution and has stated the same facts as mentioned in the complaint by the complainant. During the cross- examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that the accused did not ill treat the deceased in her presence and she did not go to Muli. Whatever she has stated in the examination-in-chief was hearsay and the accused nos. 2 and 4 who are the sisters- in-law of the deceased were residing at Rajkot and they were married in the year 2003. Whatever she has stated in the examination-in-chief was hearsay and the accused nos. 2 and 4 who are the sisters- in-law of the deceased were residing at Rajkot and they were married in the year 2003. 10.4 The prosecution has examined PW4 - Ilaba Ashwinsinh Parmar Exh. 48 and the witness has denied that she knew the deceased or the accused. The witness has stated that she does not know anything about the incident and the police had not recorded her statement. 10.5 The prosecution has examined PW5 - Chandrasinh Nanbha Jadeja at Exh. 49 and the witness is the brother of the deceased Prakashba who has stated that his sister was married to the accused no. 1 in the year 1998 and one year after her marriage, she had come back to her parental house and thereafter, as her father-in-law had expired, she had returned to the matrimonial home. That she was ill treated by her mother-in-law and prior to the incident, talks of compromise had taken place but his sister came to know about the compromise and she had stated that she would be killed if she had gone to the matrimonial home and thereafter, she committed suicide at around 3:00 am. His sister had sprinkled kerosene on herself and committed suicide. During the cross-examination, the witness has stated that a complaint was filed at Muli Police Station on 23.03.2004 and the trial was conducted where he had deposed as a witness. Prakashba resided with her family from 23.03.2004 to 16.09.2004 and during this time, she did not go to Muli and the accused did not come to their place. They did not inform the accused that Prakashba expired and he was present when the talks of compromise had taken place. 10.6 The prosecution has examined PW6 - Atulkumar Bhikhabhai Vanand at Exh. 50 and the witness is the Investigating Officer who has narrated in detail all the procedure that was undertaken by him during investigation. During the cross-examination, the witness stated that he did not record the statements of Yograjsinh Zala and Manharsinh Zala who had the conversation regarding the compromise between the parties. 50 and the witness is the Investigating Officer who has narrated in detail all the procedure that was undertaken by him during investigation. During the cross-examination, the witness stated that he did not record the statements of Yograjsinh Zala and Manharsinh Zala who had the conversation regarding the compromise between the parties. During the investigation, it was not found that Prakashba had stated that she did not want to go to Muli and during investigation, all the witnesses had stated that the deceased might have heard the conversation and she might have thought that she would be tortured if she would go to Muli. The muddamal seized during investigation was not sent to the FSL. 11. On minute dissection of the entire evidence of the prosecution, the infirmities in the evidence have come on record and there is no iota of evidence that the accused committed any act to abet the commission of suicide of the deceased. The evidence on record such that the deceased Prakashba was residing at her parental home from 23.03.2004 to 16.09.2004 and during this time, she did not meet the accused and did not go to her matrimonial house and the accused did not come to her parental home. That in fact, the accused were trying for the compromise to take her back to the matrimonial home and there is no clear evidence as to who were the mediators sent by the accused for the compromise as the investigating officer has not recorded the statements of any such persons. The only evidence on record is the bald statements of the complainant and the witnesses who are the mother, brother and sister-in-law of the deceased who have stated that the deceased might have heard the conversation about the compromise and she might have thought that she will be killed if she was sent to her matrimonial home. The entire evidence does not suggest that the accused met the deceased immediately prior to the unfortunate incident and there is no evidence that there was any active act or direct act on the part of the accused which led the deceased to commit suicide. There is no established mens rea - the intention to abet the commission of suicide by the accused and there is no iota of evidence that the deceased was subjected to any harassment by the accused. There is no established mens rea - the intention to abet the commission of suicide by the accused and there is no iota of evidence that the deceased was subjected to any harassment by the accused. In the evidence of the prosecution, the judgement of Criminal Case No. 207 of 2004 is produced where in the case registered by the deceased under Sections 498(A), 323, 324 and 114 of the IPC and Section 135 of the B.P. Act at Muli Police Station II – C.R. No. 14 of 2004 and at the conclusion of trial, the accused were acquitted for the offence. The learned Trial Court has discussed the entire evidence produced by the prosecution including the ingredients of Section 107 of the IPC and has concluded that there is evidence that the deceased Prakashba did not meet the accused for six months prior to the incident and the ingredients of Section 306 are not attracted. 12. On minute re-appreciation of the entire evidence of the prosecution and the impugned judgment and order, it appears that the learned Trial Court has thoroughly appreciated all the evidence on record and has given due consideration to all the material pieces of evidence. The learned Trial Court has discussed all the oral as well as documentary evidences and if the evidence produced by the prosecution, it appears that the learned Trial Court has arrived at findings which are legal and proper and there are no errors of law or facts. Moreover, the view taken by the learned Trial Court in acquitting the accused is fairly possible and there is no illegality and perversity in the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. 13. In view of the settled position of law in the decisions of Prakash (supra), the learned trial Court has appreciated the entire evidence in proper perspective and there does not appear to be any infirmity and illegality in the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. The learned Trial Court has appreciated all the evidence and this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Trial Court was completely justified in acquitting the accused of the charges leveled against them. The learned Trial Court has appreciated all the evidence and this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Trial Court was completely justified in acquitting the accused of the charges leveled against them. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are absolutely just and proper and no illegality or infirmity has been committed by the learned trial Court and this Court is in complete agreement with the findings, ultimate conclusion and the resultant order of acquittal recorded by the learned Trial Court. This Court finds no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order and the present appeal is devoid of merits and resultantly, the same is dismissed. 14. The impugned judgement and order of acquittal passed on 16.02.2008 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No. 7, Gondal, Camp at Dhoraji, is hereby confirmed. 15. Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.