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2025 DIGILAW 22 (KAR)

Mayura Sreeram W/o Late Dr. Sree Ramasetty v. Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore

2025-05-02

N.S.SANJAY GOWDA

body2025
ORDER : 1. For ease of reference, this order has been indexed as follows: S. No. Particulars Page I. Facts in the Instant Petitions & Details of the Grant(s) 8 II. Issues for Consideration 10 III. Interpretation of the Mysore Land Revenue Code, 1988 & Rules 11 IV. Interpretation of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 & the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969 20 V. Interpretation of The Karnataka Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands), Act, 1978 26 VI. Citations Produced and Considered 49 VII. Application of the Above Interpretation to the Present Case & Conclusion 62 I. Facts in the Instant Petitions & Details of the Grant(s): 2. The facts necessary for disposal of these petitions are as follows. 3. These cases involve grant of land to persons belonging to scheduled caste which were granted prior to the enactment of Act No.1 of 1979 and also after Act No.1 of 1979 was enacted. 4. In all these cases, alienations had been done beyond the period of alienation prescribed under the terms of the grant. However, these alienations were made after Act No.1 of 1979 was brought into force without securing permission from the Government as contemplated under Section 4(2) of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (for brevity “ the PTCL Act ”). As a consequence, the authorities have passed orders of resumption on the ground that there is contravention of Section 4(2) of the PTCL Act, and have declared the alienations as null and void. 5. The details of the date of grant, the period of alienation prescribed at the time of grant, and the date of alienation are narrated in a tabular column as under: Sy. No. & Extent Date of grant Period of non- alienation Date of alienation 8 (New Sy. No. 8/P2) 35 guntas 31.10.1978 (Saaguvali chit, Darkhast) 15 years 18.08.1995 (Sale Deed) Sy. No. 130 (New Sy. No. 408) measuring 2 acres 38 guntas 10.06.1994 (Saaguvali chit, Darkhast) 15 years 26.02.2010 (Sale deed) Sy. No. 39/1 B measuring 3 acre 37 guntas 15.01.1957 (Darkhast) Alleged as 10 yrs (Saaguvali chit untraceable & not produced) 11.11.1986 (Sale deed) 6. Insofar as the facts relating to W.P. No. 21212/2023 are concerned, they are separately dealt with at the end of this order. II. Issues for Consideration: 7. No. 39/1 B measuring 3 acre 37 guntas 15.01.1957 (Darkhast) Alleged as 10 yrs (Saaguvali chit untraceable & not produced) 11.11.1986 (Sale deed) 6. Insofar as the facts relating to W.P. No. 21212/2023 are concerned, they are separately dealt with at the end of this order. II. Issues for Consideration: 7. The questions that arise for consideration in these writ petitions are: i. Whether the permission of the Government required for an alienation as provided under the provisions of Section 4(2) of the PTCL Act would still be required even after the period of non-alienation has expired; and ii. Whether the permission so required under Section 4(2) of the PTCL Act is independent of the original terms of the grant and amounts to imposition of a new condition. III. Interpretation of the Mysore Land Revenue Code, 1888 and the Rules Formulated Thereunder: 8. In order to appreciate the controversy that has arisen in these writ petitions, an overview of the law relating to the grants made by the Government would be necessary—both under the Mysore Land Revenue Code, 1888 as well as the present Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964. 9. The State is empowered to grant land to various persons for various reasons in the manner prescribed. Rules have been framed to facilitate the grants by the Government—prior to coming into force of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964— under the Rules framed under the Mysore Land Revenue Code, 1888. 10. The Rules relating to grant of land were amended in1958 and were subsisting till the Land Grant Ruleswere framed under the Karnataka Land Revenue Act was enacted. Thus, a consideration of these Rules which subsisted as on the day the Rules were framed under the Land Revenue Act will suffice for the purpose of deciding this writ petition. 11. Rule 43-C [ Ordinary grants of lands - (1) Lands under the control of the Revenue Department may be granted to an individual who.-(i) is poor; and (ii) has attained majority; and (iii) is either a bona fide agriculturist cultivating land personally or bona fide intents to cultivate the land personally. 11. Rule 43-C [ Ordinary grants of lands - (1) Lands under the control of the Revenue Department may be granted to an individual who.-(i) is poor; and (ii) has attained majority; and (iii) is either a bona fide agriculturist cultivating land personally or bona fide intents to cultivate the land personally. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1) any individual holding land may be granted for an upset price, land near to the land so held, if such nearby land is, in the opinion of the authority granting the land, required for the better enjoyment or better cultivation of the land so held. (3) In respect of land granted under this rule.-(i) The occupancy price payable for dry land and rain-fed wet land shall ordinarily be not less than ten and not more than twenty times the assessment of the said land; (ii) The occupancy price payable for wet land with assured irrigation facilities from tanks or channels shall be at such rates as may be fixed by Government from time to time; (iii) The occupancy price for garden land shall be the market value of such land; (iv) The occupancy price of any other land shall ordinarily be not less than six times and not more than twenty times the assessment of the said land. (4) As a rule land shall be granted on payment of occupancy price In special cases where the land is very valuable or where there is no demand for the land from persons eligible for the grant under Rule 43c (l) and (2), the Deputy Commissioner, or other Officer authorised by him in this behalf, may sell such land by public auction] of the 1888 Rules framed under the Land Revenue Code provided for ‘ordinary grants’. Rule 43-D dealt with grant of lands to certain categories of persons and institutions. 12. Rule 43-E provided for reservation of lands and stipulated that if the lands available for grant in a village was less than 10 acres, the entire land was required to be reserved for Schedule Caste and Tribes residents of the village and if it was more than 10 acres, 50% of the lands were to be reserved for Schedule Caste and Tribe residents of the village. If there was still land remaining after grant of the residents of SC and ST in the village, the remaining lands were to be given to the residents of SC/ST of the neighboring villages. Thus, the thrust of the Rules was to ensure that at least 50% of the lands were granted to persons belonging to SC and ST. 13. Rule 43-F [Order of priority and extent of land to be granted - (1) The lands available for disposal in a village, after reservation of the extents specified in Rule [43-E] for grant to members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Political Sufferers, may be granted in the order of preference as indicated below.-- (i) Educational Institutions; (ii) Poor and landless persons ordinarily resident in the village; (iii) Ex-Servicemen; (iv) Toddy tappers and displaced goldsmiths; (v) Poor and landless persons ordinarily residing in neighbouring or nearby villages; (vi) Insufficient holders ordinarily residing in neighbouring or nearby villages. (2) Subject to provisions of the preceding rules, every applicant, may be granted two acres of garden land or wet land with assured irrigation facilities from tanks or channels or four acres of other kinds of wet land or ten acres of dry land. Land in excess of the aforesaid extent may be granted, if more land is available. Explanation.-- For purposes of this rule "displaced goldsmith" means a goldsmith who has lost his job or who has given up his profession consequent on the coming into force the Gold Control Order, 1963] stipulated the order of priority and the extent of land that could be granted after the extent of lands reserved for SC/ST had been granted. 14. Rule 43-G provided for the conditions that were to be applied for grant of lands under the preceding Rules namely Rule 43-C and 43-D and the same reads as follows: “ 43-G. Grant of lands under the preceding rules shall be subject to the following conditions.— (1) In the case of grant of lands to applicants belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and to other applicants, who are unable to pay the occupancy price on account of poverty, the occupancy price may be waived up to rupees two hundred and the balance recovered in three annual instalments. (2) In the case of grant of land to applicants who are ex-servicemen the occupancy price shall be waived up to the extent awarded by Government under the Military Concession Rules. (3) In the case of grant of land free of occupancy price, the grant shall be subject to the condition that the grantee shall pay contribution or betterment levy in respect of the land and the value of trees standing on the land. (4) Where the grant is made free of cost, or is made at a price which is less than the full market value, the grant shall be subject to the condition that the land shall not be alienated for a period of fifteen years from the date of the grantee taking possession of the land, after the grant: Provided that such land may be alienated with the previous sanction of the Government and subject to such conditions as the Government may specify, if the Government is of the opinion that in the circumstances of any case, it is just and reasonable to permit such alienation either for purposes of acquiring some other land or for any other purpose: Provided further that nothing in this clause shall apply to: xxxxx (b) the leasing of any land by a person who is a widow, a minor or who is subject to physical or mental disability or who is a serving member of the armed forces. (5) the grantee shall cultivate the land personally. (6) the land shall be brought under cultivation within two years from the date of the grantee taking possession of the land. (7) the grant is liable to be terminated by the Divisional Commissioner or the State Government the land resumed if any of the aforesaid conditions is not fulfilled, and on such resumption the land shall vest in Government free from all encumbrances: Provided that no land shall be resumed under this clause except after giving an opportunity to the grantee or his successor in interest to show cause why the grant should not be terminated and the land resumed,”. 15. Rule 43-G(1) of the Rules waived the requirement of payment of occupancy price for the granted land in case the grantees belong to SC and ST. 15. Rule 43-G(1) of the Rules waived the requirement of payment of occupancy price for the granted land in case the grantees belong to SC and ST. Rule 43-G(4) stipulated that where the grants were made free of cost or at a price which was less than the market value, the grant would be subject to the condition that the land would not be alienated for a period of 15 years from the date of grantee taking possession of the land after the grant. 16. This sub-rule was made subject to two provisos—the first proviso created an exception to the bar that had been stipulated for alienation. It stated that alienation was permissible if it was with the prior sanction of the Government and permission could be granted, subject to imposing such conditions as the Government thought it fit, just and reasonable, it permits such alienation. The just and reasonable reasons mentioned in the Rule was to enable the grantee to acquire some other land or for any other purpose. 17. The second proviso stated that the alienation of land in favour of the State Government or a Co-operative Society for the purpose of furnishing security to the loans obtained by the grantee and for the purposes of leasing any land by a grantee—say, a widow, a minor or who was subject to physical or mental disability—was permitted. 18. It is therefore clear that even under the 1888 Code, there was no absolute bar for alienation of granted land, and a grantee of the land could alienate the property granted to them subject to them obtaining previous permission. 19. Obviously, by necessary implication, after the period of alienation prescribed under the Rules had expired, there was no need to secure any permission for alienating the land. This is because the Government, which was granting the land to a person because of his poverty or his social status, was of the view that if a person who is granted the land retains the land for the specified number of years, he would have been in a position to come out of backwardness or financial weakness, and was therefore entitled to deal with the land in any manner that he thought fit. 20. It may be pertinent to state here that the period of non-alienation prescribed under the Rules kept varying. 20. It may be pertinent to state here that the period of non-alienation prescribed under the Rules kept varying. The period of non-alienation prescribed during various periods are mentioned herein so as to have a better understanding of the period of non-alienation: S. No. Mysore Land Revenue Amendment Notification number Lands sanctioned during this period as per the notification Period of non- alienation 01 264 R-122 Date:10.07.1901 10.07.1801 to 05.08.1932 10 years 02 R 172-LR-8-31-2 Date:06.08.1932 06.08.1932 to 12.12.1938 20 years 03 2828- LR-89-38 10, Date:13.12.1938 12.12.1938 to 04.08.1953 Continually 04 R75594-604-LR-266- 52-2; Date:04.08.1953 05.08.1953 to 06.07.1955 20 years 21. As could be seen from the above tabular column, except for the period from 12.12.1938 to 04.08.1953, for all other periods, the period of non-alienation was ranging from 10 to 20 years. IV. Interpretation of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 & the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969 22. The 1888 Code, along with other laws relating to Land Revenue, was repealed on the enactment of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964. Under the powers conferred under this Act, the Land GrantRules were framed in the year 1969. These Rules repealed the Mysore Land Grant Rules and the amendment made to the Land Revenue Rules, 1967. 23. These Land Grant Rules which were enacted in 1969 also provided for a similar provision as under the erstwhile Rules that were framed under the 1898 Code relating to the conditions to be imposed while granting the land. 24. The Land Grant Rules of the year 1969, just as in the case of the Rules framed under the 1888 Code, mandated reservation of 50% of land to persons belonging to SC and ST, and such persons belonging to SC and ST were to be given second priority in granting the land after Ex-servicemen and Soldiers. 25. 24. The Land Grant Rules of the year 1969, just as in the case of the Rules framed under the 1888 Code, mandated reservation of 50% of land to persons belonging to SC and ST, and such persons belonging to SC and ST were to be given second priority in granting the land after Ex-servicemen and Soldiers. 25. Rule 9 [ Conditions of grant - (1) The grant of lands under these rules for agricultural purposes shall be jointly in the name of husband and wife and shall be subject to the following conditions namely: (i) the grantee shall not alienate the land for a period of twenty-five years from the date of taking possession: Provided that he may, after a period of five years, with the previous permission of, and subject to the provisions of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (Karnataka Act 2 of 1979), and such conditions as may be specified by the Deputy Commissioner, alienate the whole or any portion of such land. But however, the Deputy Commissioner shall not grant such permission unless he is satisfied that the alienation is for the purpose of acquiring other land or for improving the remaining land and the grantee credits to Government an amount equal to fifty per cent of the market value of such land as on the date of sanction of such alienation as determined by the Deputy Commissioner: Provided that no person who has obtained permission to alienate land under the rule shall, notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 4 be eligible for grant of any Government Land] of the Land Grant Rules stipulated the conditions that would apply to a grant. The first condition was that the grantee should not alienate the land for a period of 15 years, which has been subsequently amended and enlarged to 25 years with effect from 23.04.2005. 26. This period of non-alienation prescribed under Rule 9(1)(i) is subject to a proviso which states that after a period of five years from the grant, the granted land could be alienated with the previous permission of the Deputy Commissioner in accordance with the conditions that he may specify. 26. This period of non-alienation prescribed under Rule 9(1)(i) is subject to a proviso which states that after a period of five years from the grant, the granted land could be alienated with the previous permission of the Deputy Commissioner in accordance with the conditions that he may specify. The Deputy Commissioner was, however, not permitted to grant such permission unless he was satisfied that the alienation was for the purpose of acquiring other land or for improving the remaining land and on the condition that the grantee credited to the Government an amount equal to 50% of the market value of such land as on the date of sanction of such alienation as directed by the Deputy Commissioner. 27. Thus, from 1969, there was a slight change in the manner permitting alienation within the specified period of non-alienation. As against the 1888 Rules, which permitted alienation with the permission of the Government immediately after the grant, under the 1969 Rules, a grantee who had been granted a land could secure permission to sell the granted land only after holding the land for 5 years. Thus, under the 1969 Rules, the grantee was constrained to hold the land for the first five years. 28. If the grantee intended to sell the same thereafter, he could do so by securing the permission of the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner was required to satisfy himself that alienation was for the purpose of either acquiring other land or for improving the remaining land and it was also subject to the condition that credited to the Government an amount equal to 50% of the market value. It may be pertinent to state here that the proviso did not make any exemption for grantees belonging to SC and ST and was applicable to every grantee. 29. It may also be important to notice that if the permission was to be granted, the grantee was required to credit 50% of the market value to the Government thereby meaning that the Government would recover a partial cost of the land and the grantee in order to exercise his ownership rights was required to pay a certain consideration of the land. This would also indicate that the Government never intended to retain ownership of the land forever and its intent was only to prefer a grantee to misuse the discretion exercised by the Government in granting the land due to his poverty or social status. 30. In other words, when the Rule was enacted in the year 1969, the Rule enabled the grantee to secure permission after five years from the date of grant from the Deputy Commissioner and alienate the land and this was subject to the condition that he deposited 50% of the market value to the Government. 31. It may also be pertinent to notice here that under the Rules framed under the 1888 Code, the Government was to grant permission for the alienation within the specified period of non-alienation, whereas under the 1969 Rules, it was the Deputy Commissioner who could grant permission for the alienation within the specified period of non-alienation. V. Interpretation of The Karnataka Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978: 32. In the year 1979, the PTCL Act was enacted. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act states as follows: “The non-alienation clause contained in the existing Land Grant Rules and the provision for cancellation of grants where the land is alienated in contravention of the above said provision are found not sufficient to help the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes grantees whose ignorance and poverty have been exploited by persons belonging to the affluent and powerful sections to obtain sales or mortgages either for a nominal consideration or for no consideration at all and they have become the victims of circumstances. To fulfil the purposes of the grant, the land even if it has been alienated, should be restored to the original grantee or his heirs. The Government of India has also been urging the State Government for enacting a legislation to prevent alienation of lands granted to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes by Government on the lines of the model legislation prepared by it and circulated to the State Government.” 33. The Government of India has also been urging the State Government for enacting a legislation to prevent alienation of lands granted to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes by Government on the lines of the model legislation prepared by it and circulated to the State Government.” 33. A reading of statement of objects and reasons of the PTCL Act would indicate that the Legislature was concerned with the alienations that had already been made in contravention of the terms of the grant and the Legislature was not concerned with the alienations which had been made in accordance with the terms of the grant. In other words, essentially, the PTCL Act sought to deal with a situation which had arisen whereby the granted lands had been alienated in contravention of the terms of the grant. 34. It may be pertinent to state here that even after the PTCL Act was enacted with effect from 01.01.1979, the Land Grant Rules of 1969 was not amended to create a new or a supplementary Rule in relation to the grants made to the persons belonging to SC and ST categories. The Rules which permitted alienation after a period of five years, subject to securing sanction of the Deputy Commissioner and crediting 50% of the market value, was not amended and continued to apply to lands granted to persons belonging to SC/ST categories. 35. In the year 1993, by a notification bearing No. GSR 169 dated 26.08.1993, and with effect from 06.09.1993, to the proviso to Rule 9(1)(i), the following statement was inserted: “the provisions of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (Karnataka Act 2 of 1979)” 36. As a result, Rule 9(1)(i) now read as follows: “ 9. As a result, Rule 9(1)(i) now read as follows: “ 9. Conditions of grant.- (1) The grant of lands under these rules [for agricultural purposes] , [Inserted by GSR 300, dated 1-9-1972, w.e.f. 7-9-1972.] shall be subject to the following conditions namely.- (i) the grantee shall not alienate the land for a period of fifteen years from the date of taking possession: Provided that he may, after a period of five years, with the previous permission of, and subject to the provisions of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) , [Inserted by GSR 169, dated 26-8-1993, w.e.f. 6-9-1993.] Act, 1978 (Karnataka Act 2 of 1979), and such conditions as may be specified by the Deputy Commissioner, alienate the whole or any portion of such land. But however, the Deputy Commissioner shall not grant such permission unless he is satisfied that the alienation is for the purpose of acquiring other land or for improving the remaining land and the grantee credits to Government an amount equal to fifty per cent of the market value of such land as on the date of sanction of such alienation as determined by the Deputy Commissioner: Provided that no person who has obtained permission to alienate land under the rule shall, notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 4 be eligible for grant of any Government Land.” 37. It is to be noticed here that PTCL Act was enacted in the year 1979, and for a period of 14 years i.e., till 1993, Rule 9 was not amended and the only amendment made after 14 years was that as against securing permission of just the Deputy Commissioner under Rule 9(1), there was an additional requirement of complying with the provisions of the PTCL Act. 38. At this stage, it would be necessary to have an overview of the provisions of the PTCL Act. The PTCL Act was enacted with effect from 01.01.1979 and contains 12 Sections. 39. Section 3 of PTCL Act contains the definition of the words used in the statute and seeks to define “granted land” and also “transfer”. 40. Section 4 of the PTCL Act declares that there would be a prohibition of transfer of grant lands and reads as follows: “ 4. 39. Section 3 of PTCL Act contains the definition of the words used in the statute and seeks to define “granted land” and also “transfer”. 40. Section 4 of the PTCL Act declares that there would be a prohibition of transfer of grant lands and reads as follows: “ 4. Prohibition of transfer of granted lands.- (1) Notwithstanding anything in any law, agreement, contract or instrument, any transfer of granted land made either before or after the commencement of this Act, in contravention of the terms of the grant of such land or the law providing for such grant, or sub-section (2) shall be null and void and no right, title or interest in such land shall be conveyed or be deemed ever to have conveyed by such transfer. (2) No person shall, after the commencement of this Act, transfer or acquire by transfer any granted land without the previous permission of the Government. (3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply also to the sale of any land in execution of a decree or order of a civil court or of any award or order of any other authority.” 41. Section 4(1) of said Act starts with a non-obstante clause and states that any transfer of granted land, whether it is made before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be null and void if the following three conditions are violated, namely: a. If it is in contravention of the terms of grant of such land; or b. law providing for such grant; or c. conditions stipulated in Section 4(2). 42. Thus, basically, if the transfer of a granted land was made in contravention of terms of the grant or the law providing for such grant, the same would be null and void. The corresponding clear and unmistakable intent of the legislature that can be gathered from the wording of this provision would be that if the lands were sold as per the terms of the grant, the alienation would be valid. Thus, if the granted land was sold after the restrictions imposed under the grant had stood lifted i.e., after the period of non- alienation had expired, said alienation was legal and valid and, consequently, the provisions of the PTCL Act could not be invoked by the grantee. 43. Thus, if the granted land was sold after the restrictions imposed under the grant had stood lifted i.e., after the period of non- alienation had expired, said alienation was legal and valid and, consequently, the provisions of the PTCL Act could not be invoked by the grantee. 43. However, the true meaning of the third condition i.e., a transfer made in contravention of Section 4(2) without obtaining the previous permission of the Government, would have to be ascertained. 44. A plain reading of first two conditions leaves no room for doubt that if there is a violation of either the terms of the grant or the law relating to the grant, the same would be non est. 45. The third condition—violation of Section 4(2) i.e., the non-obtaining of permission of the Government for transfer of the land after Act No.1 of 1979 was enacted, will have to be examined with reference to the context of the PTCL Act itself to arrive at its true meaning and intent. 46. A plain reading would indicate that every transfer of granted land made after the commencement of the Act would be null and void if it is made without the prior permission of the Government. However, on a closer reading, such an interpretation could not have been the intent of the legislature and if that was indeed the intent, it would lead to anomalous results, and this would be clear from a reading of the other provisions of the PTCL Act. 47. Section 5 provides with the procedure for resuming the granted lands which had been transferred in contravention of the terms referred to in Section 4(1). Section 5A provides for an appeal against such order of resumption. 48. Section 6 of the Act would be relevant for the purpose of construing the true meaning of Section4(2) and the same reads as follows: “ 6. Prohibition of registration of transfer of granted lands.- Notwithstanding anything in the Registration Act, 1908 on or after the commencement of this Act, no registering officer shall accept for registration any document relating to the transfer of, or to the creation of any interest in, any granted land included in a list of granted lands furnished to the registering officer except where such transfer is in accordance with this Act or the terms of the grant of such land or the law providing for such grant ”. 49. 49. As could be seen from Section 6, this provision deals with transfer of granted lands, specifically after the commencement of the Act No.1 of 1979 and would therefore be key to understanding the true meaning of Section 4(2). 50. Section 4(2) specifically bars the Registering Officer from accepting the registration of any document relating to transfer of or the creation of any interest on any granted land. It, however, stipulates that those lands included in a list which is furnished to the Registering Officer should not be accepted for registration. Thus, firstly, a list of granted lands should be furnished to the registering officer and only when instruments seeking to convey the lands in this list were presented to him for registration, he was statutorily obliged to refuse registration notwithstanding what was stated in the Indian Registration Act. 51. It should be noticed here that Section 6 does not use the expression all the granted lands but specifically uses the expression list of granted lands furnished to the registering officers. This would therefore mean that only those lands which are identified as granted lands—the terms of which prohibit alienation—would be coming within the meaning of granted lands being sold after the commencement of Act No. 1 of 1979. 52. The second part of Section 6 would clarify the true meaning behind Section 4(2). This part of Section 6 which says “except” makes it absolutely clear that the proposed alienation of a land could be in respect of the lands other that those included in the list of granted lands furnished to the Registering Officer, if it satisfied the requirement of the further expressions used in Section 6. 53. The use of words “except where such transfer is in accordance with this Act or the terms of the grant of such land or the law providing for such grant” in Section 6 would clearly indicate that the legislature did not bar the registering officer from accepting documents for registration if the alienations were permissible, either under the terms of the grant or the law relating to the grant. This would, thus, mean that if the terms of the grant did not bar alienation, the registering officer could accept the document for registration and alienation of such a granted land was being permitted by the legislature. 54. This would, thus, mean that if the terms of the grant did not bar alienation, the registering officer could accept the document for registration and alienation of such a granted land was being permitted by the legislature. 54. If it was the intent of the law that all alienations of all granted lands made prior to the commencement of Act 1 of 1979 was barred, Section 6 would not have used the expression “except where such transfer was in accordance with the terms of the grant or the law relating to the grant”, but, it would have merely stated that the registering officer shall not accept registration of any document relating to a granted land unless the grantee or the purchaser had secured the permission of the Government. 55. It is to be noticed here that Section 6 also uses the expression “except where such transfer is in accordance with the provisions of this Act” meaning that wherever permission was required for alienation and the same had been obtained, alienation was permissible. 56. Thus, the use of the words “except where such transfer is in accordance with this Act” or “in accordance with the terms of the grant or law providing such grant” can only mean that the legislature did not intend to bar the transfer of granted land if it was permissible under the terms of the grant or the law relating to the grant. 57. The true meaning of Section 6 would therefore be that if the land that was purported to be transferred was being transferred after the period of non- alienation, then, there was no bar for accepting said document for registration. This would therefore imply that the legislature never intended to bar the transfer of the granted land if the transfer was made after the period of non-alienation prescribed under the grant had expired i.e., in accordance with the terms of the grant. 58. The matter can be looked at from another angle to test this proposition. 59. The requirement of obtaining permission from any authority would arise when the act which is sought to be done, would be illegal unless permission for it was granted. If the particular act was, by itself, permissible and not contrary to the law, then the question of obtaining permission for the permissible act would not arise. 59. The requirement of obtaining permission from any authority would arise when the act which is sought to be done, would be illegal unless permission for it was granted. If the particular act was, by itself, permissible and not contrary to the law, then the question of obtaining permission for the permissible act would not arise. In other words, if an act was permissible, the question of securing permission for that permissible act would never arise. 60. As noticed above, under the Land Grant Rules, it has always been permissible for the grantee to secure permission to alienate the granted land, even before the period of alienation had expired by securing permission for the alienation. On the expiry of the non-alienation period, the question of taking permission would not arise, fundamentally, because the grantee would have the absolute liberty to deal with the granted land in any manner that he thought fit. 61. To put it differently, the right of the grantee to enjoy the property was conditional only up to a specified number of years. On the expiry of the specified term, the condition that had been imposed would stand extinguished and the grantee would have acquired an absolute right to deal with it in any manner that he thought fit. As a consequence, the question of securing permission by the granting authority or by the Government would not arise. 62. The permission that is contemplated under Section 4(2) would have to be read in the context of the Rule relating to the grant and also the provisions of the PTCL Act and if it so read, it becomes clear that the permission contemplated under Section 4(2) would be the permission that was necessary to alienate the granted land during the specified period of non-alienation (i.e., the term of the grant). 63. It must be noted here that under the proviso to Rule 9, permission to alienate the granted land within the prescribed period was permissible only if the Deputy Commissioner were to grant permission. 64. As can be noticed from the Rules, a grant could have been made by the Tahsildar or the Assistant Commissioner, depending on the extent of the land being granted. However, in the event of a grantee seeking to alienate, irrespective of who had granted the land, he had to secure permission from the highest officer of the district, namely the Deputy Commissioner. However, in the event of a grantee seeking to alienate, irrespective of who had granted the land, he had to secure permission from the highest officer of the district, namely the Deputy Commissioner. This, obviously, was to act as a check over the possibility of any lower ranked officers granting permission for the alienation of the land mechanically. 65. However, it is to be noticed that the permission contemplated under Section 4(2) is of an even higher authority than that of the Deputy Commissioner. The permission that is required under Section 4(2) is that of the Government. Thus, even if the grantee wanted to sell the property as provided under the terms of the grant, he has to secure not only the permission of the Deputy Commissioner as contemplated under the provisions to Rule 9, but also by the State Government under Section 4(2), which is indisputably the highest authority in the State and the owner of the granted land. 66. This, basically, indicates that whenever the period of non-alienation was subsisting, permission—not only from the Deputy Commissioner but also from the State Government—was required to be secured. To put it differently, even if the Deputy Commissioner had granted permission as contemplated under the proviso of Rule 9 (which was the law relating to the grant), the grantee or the purchaser would still have to approach the Government and the Government had to accord permission for the transfer. 67. This only means that there was a double safeguard brought into place after the PTCL Act was enacted. In fact, the Land Grant Rules, as observed above, was only amended in 1993 which inserted the requirement of the applicability of the PTCL Act for alienating the land. Thus, technically speaking, from the year 1979 to 1993 there was a vacuum. 68. As per the terms of the grant, the Deputy Commissioner could have granted permission and the property could have been transferred, but since Section 4(2) contemplated obtaining permission from the Government, the proviso to Rule 9 was amended and it was also made subject to the provisions of the PTCL Act. This therefore necessitated the Government’s approval prior to the approval of the Deputy Commissioner. It is for this reason that ‘permission to alienate’ is considered and granted by the Government only after a recommendation is made by the Deputy Commissioner. 69. This therefore necessitated the Government’s approval prior to the approval of the Deputy Commissioner. It is for this reason that ‘permission to alienate’ is considered and granted by the Government only after a recommendation is made by the Deputy Commissioner. 69. Since the original term of the grant permitted alienation even within the period of non-alienation and the Rules that were in existence as on the date of Act were continued and were not amended enlarging the period of non-alienation for lands granted to SC/ST, the obvious implication is that the permission contemplated under Section 4(2) would only have to be obtained when the period of the non- alienation would still be subsisting as on the date of the proposed transfer. 70. The PTCL Act was enacted in the year 1979 and, as observed above, was dealing with the transgressions already made to the terms of the grant and the alienations made prior to the Act coming into force. The underlying objective of the Act was to prevent alienations in contravention of the terms of the grant and was never to bar the alienation for all time to come. 71. If it was the intent of legislature that no land granted to Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe persons should be made without the permission of the Government, as contemplated under Section 4(2), necessarily, the corresponding Land Grant Rules would have been suitably amended making a separate Rule for alienation of land in respect of the lands granted to Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe categories. The fact that the Rules were never changed and have continued to be in existence for nearly 40 years since the PTCL Act was enacted, by itself, indicates that it was never the intention of the legislature to impose an additional condition that the lands granted to SC/ST categories could never be sold, unless permission was obtained by the Government, by enacting Act No.1 of 1979. 72. To give an illustration, suppose a land is granted to a person belonging to a Scheduled Caste in the year 1990 i.e., 11 years after the PTCL Act was enacted, and it contained a condition that the land should not be alienated for the period of 15 years as per the Rules framed under the Land Grant Rules, obviously, the grantee would only have the right to alienate the property after the year 2005. If the period of non- alienation was limited to 15 years, the provisions of PTCL Act cannot be understood to mean that there was an imposition of an additional condition that the granted land could not be alienated even after 15 years, unless permission had been secured from the Government. The permission contemplated under Section 4(2), as indicated above, was only a further safeguard to the already existing condition in the terms of the grant and not for securing permission when the period of non-alienation had expired. 73. In other words, not only was the permission of the highest officer of the district required, but the permission of the highest authority in the State was also required before the Deputy Commissioner could grant permission for the alienation which was proposed to be made within the period of non-alienation. 74. The anomaly that would be created—if an interpretation that permission under Section 4(2) was necessary for all time to come and for all granted lands—will also have to be noticed here. 75. Suppose a land was granted in 1990 with the condition that the land should not be alienated after 15 years, then this land cannot even be sold in 2090 i.e., 100 years after the grant had been made. This would basically mean that the State, while granting the land, was enslaving the grantee forever and he would not be able to ever enjoy the benefits of the land unconditionally. Such an interpretation would defeat the objective of the grant being made to a poor, landless person belonging to the SC/ST category and would amount to forcing him to stay tied to the land forever. With the passage of time, the grantee, who had used the land to uplift himself, should also be at liberty to deal with the granted land and he should not be forced to be tied down to this land forever. 76. To summarize, the requirement of obtaining the permission under Section 4(2) would arise only if there was an existing bar for alienation. If there was no bar for alienating the land, the question of seeking permission would never arise. Viewed from this context, the permission contemplated under Section 4(2) can only mean that it is only when a granted land is sought to be alienated within the specified period of non-alienation would it require the permission of the Government. 77. If there was no bar for alienating the land, the question of seeking permission would never arise. Viewed from this context, the permission contemplated under Section 4(2) can only mean that it is only when a granted land is sought to be alienated within the specified period of non-alienation would it require the permission of the Government. 77. In fact, if the contrary argument is to be accepted, it would render the phrase “except where such transfer is in accordance with this Act” or “the terms of the grant of the law of such land or the law providing for such grant” used in Section 6 redundant and otiose. 78. It is settled law that no word or expression used in a statue can ever be considered superfluous or as a surplusage and every word in the provision would have a distinct intent, meaning and purpose behind it. In short, no word or a phrase in a provision can be ignored. The use of the expressions “except where such transfer is in accordance with this Act” or “in accordance with the terms of the grant or law providing such grant” used in Section 6 would have to be given it’s importance and cannot be ignores. Section 6 basically conveys the unmistakable intent of the legislature and that it had recognized the fact that the grantee had a right to deal with the property granted to him after the limitations on the grant had spent itself. VI. Citations Produced and Considered: 79. The interpretation to the PTCL Act made way back in the year 1984 by the Apex Court would be highly relevant. 80. A Bench of three judges of the Supreme Court, in Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka, (1984) 3 SCC 301 while considering the validity of the PTCL Act. Though the Supreme Court was dealing with the validity of the Act insofar as it related to the imposition of prohibition on transfer granted land made before the commencement of the Act and specifically stated that it was not considering the validity of the grant insofar as imposed the prohibition of transfer of granted land after the commencement of the Act, nevertheless, the Supreme Court while interpreting the provisions of the Act has stated as follows: “ 24. Though we have come to the conclusion that the Act is valid, yet, in our opinion, we have to make certain aspects clear. Granted lands which had been transferred after expiry of the period of prohibition do not come within the purview of the Act, and cannot be proceeded against under the provisions of this Act. The provisions of the Act make this position clear, as Sections 4 and 5 become applicable only when granted lands are transferred in breach of the condition relating to prohibition on transfer of such granted lands. Granted lands transferred before the commencement of the Act and not in contravention of prohibition on transfer are clearly beyond the scope and purview of the present Act. Also in case where granted lands have been transferred before the commencement of the Act in violation of the condition regarding prohibition on such transfer and the transferee who had initially acquired only a voidable title in such granted lands had perfected his title in the granted lands by prescription by long and continuous enjoyment thereof in accordance with law before the commencement of the Act, such granted lands would also not come within the purview of the present Act, as the title of such transferees to the granted lands has been perfected before the commencement of the Act. Since at the date of the commencement of the Act the title of such transferees had ceased to be voidable by reason of acquisition of prescriptive rights on account of long and continued user for the requisite period, the title of such transferees could not be rendered void by virtue of the provisions of the Act without violating the constitutional guarantee. We must, therefore, read down the provisions of the Act by holding that the Act will apply to transfers of granted lands made in breach of the condition imposing prohibition on transfer of granted lands only in those cases where the title acquired by the transferee was still voidable at the date of the commencement of the Act and had not lost its defeasible character at the date when the Act came into force. Transferees of granted lands having a perfected and not a voidable title at the commencement of the Act must be held to be outside the pale of the provisions of the Act. Transferees of granted lands having a perfected and not a voidable title at the commencement of the Act must be held to be outside the pale of the provisions of the Act. Section 4 of the Act must be so construed as not to have the effect of rendering void the title of any transferee which was not voidable at the date of the commencement of the Act.” (Emphasis supplied) 81. As could be seen from the above, the Apex Court categorically declared that the provisions of the Act were being read down to hold that the Act would apply to transfer of the granted land only if they are made in breach of the condition imposed while granting the land. If the lands were transferred after the period of non-alienation, the Supreme Court has held that it must be outside the purview of the Act. The Supreme Court has stated that only because the transfers are voidable, the law enabled those transactions to be declared as null and void. As a corollary, if the transactions are not voidable, the question of using the provisions of the Act to declare it as non est would not arise. 82. It has to be kept in mind that while interpreting a statute, the golden rule that the intent of the statute must be gathered by taking into account the mischief that the Legislature wanted to remedy by enacting the law (i.e., the ‘mischief rule’ doctrine). In the case of the PTCL Act, the stated and also the obvious intention of the law was to ensure that the terms under which a land had been granted are adhered to scrupulously and if they are indeed contravened, that breach had to be remedied by restoring the land to the grantee who belonged to an oppressed section of the society. The law was not enacted to enlarge the restrictive period of non-alienation or prevent the person belonging to SC/ST to enjoy the property granted to him with an additional restrictive condition after he had adhered to the earlier restrictive condition. 83. There would be yet another anomaly which would arise if it were held that permission under Section 4(2) is required to be secured even in respect of granted lands wherein the specified period of non- alienation had expired. 83. There would be yet another anomaly which would arise if it were held that permission under Section 4(2) is required to be secured even in respect of granted lands wherein the specified period of non- alienation had expired. As could be seen from the above extraction of the judgment in Manchegowda ’s case (supra), the transfer of a granted land after the specified period of non- alienation before Act 1 of 1979 was enacted cannot be questioned or brought within the purview of the PTCL Act. 84. Thus, for instance, if a land is granted in 1950 with a specified term of 20 years as the non-alienation period, then that land could be validly transferred between the period 1970 to 1979 (i.e., before the PTCL Act was enacted). But, for the very same land, if the grantee wanted to alienate the land after 1979, it would require the permission of the Government under Section 4(2). This would be clearly irrational, if not absurd. 85. If a land could be legally transferred before the Act was brought into force, it has to logically follow that it can also be validly sold even after Act No. 1 of 1979 was brought into force. If a contrary view is to be taken, it would basically mean that an additional restrictive condition was being imposed at a point in time much, much later than the date of the grant. It cannot be beyond dispute that the granting authority possesses the right to impose any conditions at the time of the grant. If there are statutory rules in place, the conditions can be only as per the statutory rules. The granting authority or the State cannot possess a right to impose any restrictive conditions decades after the grant has been made and, that too, when the period of operation of the restrictive condition has elapsed. 86. Learned counsels appearing for the parties, however, sought to place reliance on the following judgments to contend that a granted land would remain a granted land even after the period of non-alienation had expired and, therefore, the bar under Section 4 (2) would continue to operate for alienations made after Act 1 of 1979 was enacted: a. K.A. Haridas v. The Deputy Commissioner, Kolar District & Ors. ILR 2014 KAR 5943 b. Bhemanna v. Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District & Ors. ILR 2014 KAR 5943 b. Bhemanna v. Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District & Ors. ILR 2010 KAR 5011 c. Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi v. State of Karnataka, 2018 (1) Kar LR 5 SC d. Narsimhappa v. State of Karnataka & Ors., MANU/KA/1572/2020 e. B.K. Muniraju v. State of Karnataka & Ors. 2008 (33) KCCR 1289 f. Shankreppa v. State of Karnataka, W.P. No. 202527 of 2017 g. Satyan v. Deputy Commissioner & Ors. 2020 (14) SCC 210 87. The decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi , while upholding the constitutional validity of Section 4 of the PTCL Act, does not directly address the substantive issue involved in the present case. The Apex Court expressly declined to examine whether the requirement of obtaining prior permission under Section 4(2) continues to apply even after the expiry of the original non-alienation period stipulated in the grant, or whether such a requirement constitutes an imposition of a new condition independent of the terms of the original grant. The dismissal of the resumption application in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi was solely on the ground of inordinate delay of 25 years, and the Court's observations were confined to the principle of laches. Therefore, this judgment is of no avail in the present case. 88. It must be stated here that in Bhemanna ’s case (which has been followed in Haridas ), the decision rendered by the 3-judge bench judgment in Manche Gowda ’s case was not considered. In light of the clear dicta of the Supreme Court that the provisions of the Act would not be attracted if the alienations were made after the expiry of the period of non alienation, these decisions would be of no avail. It must be noticed here that the Division Bench has no doubt held that a granted land would remain a granted land even after the period of non alienation had expired but that would not mean that the period of non alienation prescribed at the time the land was granted land would stand enlarged. 89. It is also imperative to note that Bhemanna primarily focused on the definitional aspects of "granted land" and the literal interpretation of Section 4(2), without delving into the broader legislative intent and purpose underlying the PTCL Act. 90. 89. It is also imperative to note that Bhemanna primarily focused on the definitional aspects of "granted land" and the literal interpretation of Section 4(2), without delving into the broader legislative intent and purpose underlying the PTCL Act. 90. It must not be lost sight of that the PTCL Act was enacted as a remedial measure to protect the interests of marginalized communities by preventing the alienation of lands granted to them during the specified non-alienation period. Once this period lapses and the grantee has adhered to the conditions of the grant, imposing an additional restriction through Section 4(2) without explicit legislative intent may not align with the purpose of the Act. 91. Furthermore, Bhemanna did not consider the potential anomalies that could arise from an interpretation requiring government permission for transfers made after the non-alienation period has expired. For instance, a grantee who has fulfilled all conditions of the grant and seeks to transfer the land decades later would still be subject to restrictions not originally contemplated—which is not only absurd but is also beyond the scope and intent of the PTCL Act. 92. In that view of the matter, the decision of Bhemanna ’s case and the decision rendered in Haridas’ case which has relied upon Bhemanna ’s case would be of no avail. 93. Reliance was also placed on the decision rendered in Shankreppa . However, in this case, the question as to whether permission was required for alienation after the period of non alienation had expired and the alienation made after the Act had come into force was not involved or considered in that case, and the only question involved in that case was whether a land granted because it was surplus land would be a granted land. Hence that decision would be of no avail. 94. Similarly, in the decision rendered in Narsimhappa also, the above question as to whether the alienation made after the Act had come into force and after the period of non alienation had expired was not really the subject matter of consideration of the Division Bench, and it was essentially a case in which the question as to whether a delay in seeking resumption had vitiated the resumption proceedings. 95. Similarly, in B.K. Muniraju , the land was originally allotted under the "Grow More Food" Scheme, which was not specifically targeted at Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. 95. Similarly, in B.K. Muniraju , the land was originally allotted under the "Grow More Food" Scheme, which was not specifically targeted at Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. The Court determined that the land was not granted based on the grantee's caste status and thus did not attract the provisions of the PTCL Act. The Court also noted the significant delay in initiating proceedings under the Act. 96. In the present case, the issue is not whether the land qualifies as "granted land" but rather whether the requirement of obtaining prior government permission under Section 4(2) of the PTCL Act continues to apply even after the expiry of the original non-alienation period. Therefore, the aforementioned judgments, which primarily address the applicability of the PTCL Act based on the nature of the land grant, are not directly relevant to the current matter. 97. Reliance placed on Satyan ’s decision would also be of no avail because in that case, though Manche Gowda ’s case was considered, the effect of Section 6—which permitted alienations in terms of the grant or the law provided under the grant after the commencement of the PTCL Act—was neither argued not considered by the Apex Court. It is no doubt true that the Apex Court has observed that even after the period of alienation had expired, permission was required for alienation. However, as observed above, Section 6 of the Act has not been considered by the Apex Court and hence, said decision would be of no avail to consider the question as to whether permission was required after the period of non alienation had expired and Section 6 permitted such alienation. VII. Application of the Above Interpretation to the Present Case & Conclusion 98. It is well-settled that while interpreting a welfare statute, particularly one enacted to remedy historical injustice, courts must give effect to the mischief sought to be redressed and the object of the enactment. The PTCL Act was intended to undo transfers made in breach of the specific conditions of the grant—during the currency of the non-alienation period—and not to indefinitely fetter the rights of the grantee or their successors even after the restrictive condition stood exhausted. 99. In light of the above discussion, the answer to the proposition of law that emerges from the above is as follows. 100. 99. In light of the above discussion, the answer to the proposition of law that emerges from the above is as follows. 100. The requirement of securing permission of the Government under Section 4(2) of the PTCL Act would arise only if the period of non-alienation is subsisting as on the date of the proposed transfer. If the period of non-alienation has already expired, the question of applying for permission under Section 4(2) would not arise. Consequently, any alienation made—without obtaining the permission of the Government, after the period of non-alienation had expired—would not amount to a transfer as defined under the provisions of the PTCL Act, and the provisions of the PTCL Act cannot thus be invoked to resume and restore such granted land. 101. In light of the above declaration, since the impugned orders basically ordered for resumption on the ground that it violated Section 4(2) even though the period of non-alienation had expired, the same cannot be sustained and is accordingly quashed. 102. Hence, the Writ petitions 3093 of 2022 & 6053 of 2024 filed by the purchasers—who had purchased the lands after Act 1 of 1979 was enacted and after the period of non-alienation had expired, yet, the authorities had ordered for resumption—would have to be allowed as the resumption proceedings would be non est and are accordingly allowed IN W.P.NO.8207/2024: 103. It has been found that the grant was of the year1957 and the alienation was made on 11.11.1986. The Assistant Commissioner has refused resumption on the ground that the Saaguvali Chit was untraceable and that the period of non-alienation was stated to be 10 years. This order of the Assistant Commissioner has been confirmed in appeal by the Deputy Commissioner. Hence, the grantee is before this Court challenging the order by which his request for resumption has been rejected. 104. In light of the fact that the Rule relating to the grant in the year 1957 provided for a period of non- alienation for a period of 15 years (if it was a free grant), and prescribed a period of 10 years (if it was for an upset price), the alienation made in the year 1986 was obviously beyond the period of non- alienation but, however, after the Act had come into force. 105. 105. In light of the declaration made above, since the period of alienation had expired, the application made for resumption cannot be granted and, though not for the reasons mentioned by the Authorities but for the reasons stated in this writ petition, the application for resumption is rejected. 106. In W.P.No.21212 of 2023 , the above proposition of law is not involved directly, though a claim is sought to be made on the basis of an unregistered partition deed of 1997 executed in favour of one N. H. Gangaram who claimed to be the son of the grantee. 107. The facts in this case are as follows: 108. Hucchurangaiah, son of Kivuduhuchaiah filed an application for resumption contending that he had been granted 2 acres of land in Sy.No.58 on 31.10.1977 and his name was entered in the revenue records vide MR 19/80-81 but N. H. Gangaram, son of Huchurangaiah had got his name entered in the revenue records on the basis of an unregistered partition deed dated 11.08.1997 in respect of the 2 acres of land that was granted to him and hence the an enquiry into the change of Khata was necessary. 109. N. H. Gangaram entered appearance and contended that his father Huchurangaiah was in unauthorised possession of 2 acres in Sy. No. 58/P2 and the committee for regularization of unauthorised cultivation, had granted the land to his father on 31.10.1997 and the revenue entries were mutated in his father’s favor vide MR 16/98-99 and he had in fact mortgaged the said land and had developed it considerably and had not alienated the said land to anyone and consequently the invocation of the provisions of the PTCL could not have been invoked. 110. The Assistant Commissioner, after examining the records, concluded that an extent of 2 acres had been granted to Huchurangaiah son of Kivudu Huchaiah on 31.10.1977 and the revenue entries were also mutated in his favour vide MR 19/80-81 and he had not conveyed the said granted land to anyone. 110. The Assistant Commissioner, after examining the records, concluded that an extent of 2 acres had been granted to Huchurangaiah son of Kivudu Huchaiah on 31.10.1977 and the revenue entries were also mutated in his favour vide MR 19/80-81 and he had not conveyed the said granted land to anyone. He also recorded a finding that Huchurangaiah son of Kare Huchaiah (father of the 1 st respondent before the Assistant Commissioner and the petitioner herein) had been granted 0-26 guntas of land in Sy.No.58 but he had got the revenue entries mutated in his favor in respect of 2 acres which had been granted in favor of the applicant Huchurangaiah son of Kivudu Huchaiah and the Thasildar had committed an error in mutating the name of N. H. Gangaram vide MR 16/98-99 and this was therefore liable to be set aside. 111. N. H. Gangaram preferred an appeal to the Deputy Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner, after examining the records also recorded a finding that an extent of 2 acres in Sy.No.58 had been granted to the applicant Huchurangaiah son of Kivuduhuchaiah on 31.10.1977 and the assertion that 2 acres had been granted Huchurangaiah son of Kare Huchaiah (i.e., the father of N. H. Gangaram) and the error in the saaguvali chit had been corrected was untenable. 112. He thereafter proceeded to examine the unregistered partition deed dated 11.08.1997 and observed that the recitals therein clearly stated that the land had been granted to Huchurangaiah son of Kivuduhuchaiah and that N. H. Gangaram was basically trying to claim the land that had been granted to the applicant Huchurangaiah, son of Kivuduhuchaiah and consequently, the order of the Assistant Commissioner who had set aside the order of mutation made in his favor vide MR 16/98-99 could not be found fault with. 113. The finding of fact recorded by the authorities, therefore, clearly establish that land was granted to the applicant Huchurangaiah, son of Kivudu Huchaiah (the father of 5 th , 6 th and 7 th respondent) and the petitioner N.H. Gangaram could not obviously claim this land as being granted to his father, whose name was also Huchurangaiah. In fact, the authorities have recorded a finding that only an extent of 26 guntas in Sy. In fact, the authorities have recorded a finding that only an extent of 26 guntas in Sy. No. 58 had been regularized in favor of his father and hence, he could not claim the land of Huchurangaiah (the father of the 5 th , 6 th and 7 th respondent herein). In my view, in the light of this clear finding of fact, the orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner and as confirmed by the Deputy Commissioner cannot be found fault with. 114. It is to be stated here that once a finding was recorded that it was a granted land, obviously, the revenue entries in favor of this granted land could not have been mutated in favor of a person who had no right over the same on the basis of an unregistered partition deed, which would also be a transfer in contravention of the terms of the grant. 115. Thus, W.P.No.21212/2023 filed by N.H. Gangaram, in which the above proposition of law is not directly involved, is without any merit for the reasons stated above and is accordingly dismissed. 116. In view of the disposal of the petition, all pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand disposed of.