JUDGMENT : SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI, J. Heard learned counsel appearing for the appellants. 2. This second appeal is preferred against the judgment dated 02.07.2024 passed learned Principal District Judge, Dhanbad in Civil Misc. Appeal No.27 of 2023 by which he has been pleased to dismiss the same on the ground of limitation. 3. Mrs. Mazumdar, learned counsel appearing for the appellants submits that the title suit was instituted under Section 87 of Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act being Suit No.58 of 2010 and by judgment dated 12.09.2022 it was allowed in favour of the plaintiff. She submits that against that judgment the defendant has preferred Civil Misc. Appeal No.27 of 2023 which was dismissed by judgment dated 02.07.2024 on the ground of limitation. She submits that 285 days delay has occurred in presenting the appeal as appellant No.3, who is aged about 76 years was ill and she was looking after the case and in view of that the delay has occurred and the learned Court without appreciating the same has been pleased to dismiss the appeal on the ground of limitation. She relied in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another versus Mst. Katiji and Others reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107 and submits that the case of the appellant is covered, as such this second appeal may kindly be admitted on the substantial question of law. 4. The plea has been taken that the defendant No.3 is aged about 76 years and a lady was conducting the case and she was ill and her statement was going to Apollo and in view of that the said delay has occurred. 5. The learned appellate court has found that such plea was taken, however, no prescription or other report/medical papers are placed on record showing the appellant No.3 was suffering from any serious ailment. It is averred in para-3 of the application that appellant No.3 fell seriously ill and under treatment at Apollo Hospital, Chennai. It has been claimed that photocopy of medical papers marked as Annexure-1, 1/a, 1/b & 1/c were annexed with the application, but surprisingly, there was no copy of any medical paper annexed. Even the date of her treatment and ailment were also not mentioned in the application nor disclosed at the time of argument. It has been claimed that photocopy of medical papers marked as Annexure-1, 1/a, 1/b & 1/c were annexed with the application, but surprisingly, there was no copy of any medical paper annexed. Even the date of her treatment and ailment were also not mentioned in the application nor disclosed at the time of argument. The learned Court has further held that there is no law that only one appellant i.e. appellant No.3 would take steps and remaining appellants are debarred from taking steps. Appellant No.1 was said to be aged about 53 years whereas appellant Nos.2 and 4 are 50 years and 67 years old respectively and the most aged person was taking the step in the case that was found to be unheard by the learned appellate court. In this background, the learned appellate court has been pleased to dismiss the appeal on the ground of limitation. 6. It requires to refer herein that the law of limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the public good that there be an ends of litigation). Therefore, it is well settled that Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time, as has been held in the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Brijesh Kumar & Ors. versus State of Haryana & Ors. (2014) 11 SCC 351. The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, (1939-40) 67 IA 416, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lecturers, 1932, wherein, it has been said that :- “A Law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognized by law.” 7. This issue was further reconsidered by Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy , (2013) 12 SCC 649 wherein it has been held as under :- “21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal approach. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a nonserious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 8. In view of the above, it is well settled that when a litigant does not act with bona fide motive and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part, the period of limitation for filing the appeal expires, such lack of bona fide and gross inaction and negligence are the vital factors which should be taken into consideration while considering the question of condonation of delay. 9. Sufficient cause was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. , (1962) 2 SCR 762 , wherein it has been held that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of the given case, there is no right to the appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph-12, it has been held as under :- “12. It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the appellant because apart from the general criticism made against the appellant’s lack of diligence during the period of limitation no other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant’s application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it was appellant’s duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground.” 10. The meaning of “sufficient cause” has been further considered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of “Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. The meaning of “sufficient cause” has been further considered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of “Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [ (2013) 14 SCC 81 ] wherein at paragraph Nos.9 to 15 it has held as under:- “9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices - 12 - to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [ AIR 1964 SC 1336 ] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [ (1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953 ] , Parimal v. Veena [ (2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150 ] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [ (2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629 ] .) 10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [ AIR 1964 SC 993 ] this Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. of Brihan Mumbai [ (2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629 ] .) 10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [ AIR 1964 SC 993 ] this Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”. 11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [ (2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100 ] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [ (2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201 ] .) 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “605. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party’s own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) - 14 - SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [ (1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537 ] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [ (2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [ (2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856 ] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [ (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR 1992 SC 1701 ] . 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” 11. In view of the above, the statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale in this regard reference may be made to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266 wherein at 605 it has been held as under :- “605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” 12. Looking into the above principle of law, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Bhutnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336 , Lala Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan , (1969) 2 SCC 770 , Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti , (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai , (2012) 5 SCC 157 . 13. In the aforesaid judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that expression “sufficient cause? should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. 14. What has been discussed here-in-above and what has reimbursed from the judgment of the learned first appellate court, it is crystal clear that bona fide or sufficient cause has not been shown, the plea was taken of medical emergency, however no document was annexed with the petition in spite of making a statement that it has been annexed. Thus, bona fide and sufficient cause is missing and the learned Court in view of that fact not condoned the delay and dismissed the appeal. 15. In the case of “ Pundlik Jalam Patil V. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project , reported in (2008) 14 SCC 448 it was observed that the laws of limitation are founded on public policy. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as “statutes of peace”. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty’ some kind of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is based on the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium”, that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. The principle is based on the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium”, that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. The object for fixing time limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy. 16. So far judgment relied by Mrs. Mazumdar in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another (supra) is concerned in that case only four days delay was occurred in filing the case and in that background Hon’ble Supreme Court has set aside the order of the High Court holding that merely because the State has filed the appeal after the delay of four days that cannot be a ground of not condoning the same and the facts of that case was otherwise. 17. What has been discussed here-in-above that judgment is not helping the learned counsel appearing for the appellants. 18. The Court finds that there is no illegality in the judgment of learned first appellate court, as such this second appeal is dismissed.