ORDER : MURALEE KRISHNA S., J. This Criminal Revision Petition is filed under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘Cr.P.C.’ in short) by the petitioner, challenging the order dated 21.12.2013, passed by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Muvattupuzha, in C.M.P.No.839 of 2011, whereby the complaint filed by the petitioner was dismissed under Section 203 of Cr.P.C. 2. Crime No.868 of 2010 was registered at Muvattupuzha Police Station on 08.09.2010, at 17.00 hours under Sections 279 and 338 of IPC based on the First Information Statement of the petitioner recorded on 08.09.2010 at 04.00 p.m., from a hospital wherein he was under treatment due to the injuries suffered in a road traffic accident. On completion of the investigation, on 10.11.2010, the Assistant Sub Inspector of Police, Muvattupuzha, filed a final report before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Muvattupuzha, referring the case as false. 3. On receipt of notice about the filing of the final report, the petitioner appeared before the learned Magistrate and filed C.M.P.No.839 of 2011 under Section 190 Cr.P.C. After recording the sworn statement of the petitioner and a witness, the learned Magistrate passed the impugned order, which is extracted below: “This is a protest complaint filed, aggrieved by the refer report filed by the police in crime No. 868/2010 of Muvatupuzha police Station as "false". On going through the sworn statements of the complainant and his witness and also the refer report, it can be seen that there is nothing improper in the investigation done by the police which revealed that the motor accident occurred due to the negligence of the complainant himself as he was riding the scooter on the wrong side of the road near the patrol pump and there was no negligent act on the part of the accused. It appears that the sole intention of the complainant is to get a motor accident claim by foisting a false case against the accused. There is no sufficient ground to proceed with the complaint. Hence the complaint is dismissed u/s 203 Cr.PC.” 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that in the sworn statement of the petitioner, it is stated that the accident was caused due to the driving of the vehicle by the accused at high speed. Hence the complaint is dismissed u/s 203 Cr.PC.” 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that in the sworn statement of the petitioner, it is stated that the accident was caused due to the driving of the vehicle by the accused at high speed. CW2, a witness examined from the side of the petitioner, who was an employee of a petrol pump situated near the place of occurrence, categorically stated in his sworn statement that, it was due to the rash and negligent driving of the accused, the accident occurred. However, without properly considering these statements, the learned Magistrate dismissed the complaint under Section 203 Cr.P.C. 6. On the other hand, the learned Special Public Prosecutor submitted that in the refer report filed by the investigating officer, it is clearly stated that the petitioner gave a false First Information Statement before the Police, to make the Police to register a crime against the accused with a view to raise insurance claim for the injuries suffered by him in a road traffic accident, which was caused due to the negligence of the petitioner himself. Hence, there is no necessity to interfere with the impugned order passed by the learned Magistrate. 7. I have carefully verified the impugned order of the learned Magistrate as well as the trial court records. As noted above, the crime in this case was registered on 08.09.2010 at 17.00 hours based on the First Information Statement of the petitioner recorded on the very same day at 04.00 p.m. from a hospital, wherein he was under treatment. In the First Information Statement, the petitioner stated that the accident was caused due to the rash and negligent driving of a motorcycle by the accused. According to the petitioner, while he was riding his motorcycle through the public road, the accused came out from a nearby petrol pump on his motorcycle in a rash and negligent manner at high speed and dashed against his motorcycle, which resulted in capsizing of his motorcycle and causing serious injuries to the petitioner. 8. On completion of the investigation, the Assistant Sub Inspector filed the final report before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Muvattupuzha, referring the case as ‘false’. It is stated in the final report that the investigating officer has recorded the statements of seven witnesses. 8. On completion of the investigation, the Assistant Sub Inspector filed the final report before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Muvattupuzha, referring the case as ‘false’. It is stated in the final report that the investigating officer has recorded the statements of seven witnesses. In his investigation, he could gather that the accident was caused due to the negligence of the petitioner. In fact, the motorcycle of the petitioner dashed against the motorcycle of the accused, who had stopped his motorcycle, seeing the motorcycle of the petitioner. However, along with the final report, the investigating officer did not produce the statements of any of the witnesses. On getting notice from the court about the final report filed by the investigating officer, the petitioner filed the complaint under Section 190 Cr.P.C. 9. In Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police and another [ (1985) 2 SCC 537 ] , the Apex Court held thus: "4. Now, when the report forwarded by the officer in charge of a police station to the Magistrate under sub-section (2)(i) of S.173 comes up for consideration by the Magistrate, one of two different situations may arise. The report may conclude that an offence appears to have been committed by a particular person or persons and in such a case, the Magistrate may do one of three things: (1) he may accept the report and take cognizance of the offence and issue process or (2) he may disagree with the report and drop the proceeding or (3) he may direct further investigation under sub-section (3) of S.156 and require the police to make a further report. The report may on the other hand state that, in the opinion of the police, no offence appears to have been committed and where such a report has been made, the Magistrate again has an option to adopt one of three courses: (1) he may accept the report and drop the proceeding or (2) he may disagree with the report and taking the view that there is sufficient ground for proceeding further, take cognizance of the offence and issue process or (3) he may direct further investigation to be made by the police under sub-section (3) of S.156.” [Underline Supplied] 10. In Gangadhar Janardan Mhatre v. State of Maharashtra [ (2004) 7 SCC 768 ] , the Apex Court held thus: “9. In Gangadhar Janardan Mhatre v. State of Maharashtra [ (2004) 7 SCC 768 ] , the Apex Court held thus: “9. When a report forwarded by the police to the Magistrate under S.173(2)(i) is placed before him several situations arise. The report may conclude that an offence appears to have been committed by a particular person or persons and in such a case, the Magistrate may either (1) accept the report and take cognizance of the offence and issue process, or (2) may disagree with the report and drop the proceeding, or (3) may direct further investigation under S.156(3) and require the police to make a further report. The report may on the other hand state that according to the police, no offence appears to have been committed. When such a report is placed before the Magistrate he has again option of adopting one of the three courses open i.e., (1) he may accept the report and drop the proceeding; or (2) he may disagree with the report and take the view that there is sufficient ground for further proceeding, take cognizance of the offence and issue process; or (3) he may direct further investigation to be made by the police under S.156(3). The position is, therefore, now well settled that upon receipt of a police report under S.173(2) a Magistrate is entitled to take cognizance of an offence under S.190(1)(b) of the Code even if the police report is to be effect that no case is made out against the accused. The Magistrate can take into account the statements of the witnesses examined by the police during the investigation and take cognizance of the offence complained of and order the issue of process to the accused. S.190(1)(b) does not lay down that a Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence only if the Investigating Officer gives an opinion that the investigation has made out a case against the accused. The Magistrate can ignore the conclusion arrived at by the Investigating Officer and independently apply his mind to the facts emerging from the investigation and take cognizance of the case, if he thinks fit, exercise of his powers under S.190(1)(b) and direct the issue of process to the accused. The Magistrate can ignore the conclusion arrived at by the Investigating Officer and independently apply his mind to the facts emerging from the investigation and take cognizance of the case, if he thinks fit, exercise of his powers under S.190(1)(b) and direct the issue of process to the accused. The Magistrate is not bound in such a situation to follow the procedure laid down in S.200 and 202 of the Code for taking cognizance of a case under S.190(1)(a) though it is open to him to act under S.200 or S.202 also. [See India Carat Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka ( 1989 (2) SCC 132 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 306 : AIR 1989 SC 885 )]. The informant is not prejudicially affected when the Magistrate decides to take cognizance and to proceed with the case. But where the Magistrate decides that sufficient ground does not subsist for proceeding further and drops the proceeding or takes the view that there is material for proceeding against some and there are insufficient grounds in respect of others, the informant would certainly be prejudiced as the First Information Report lodged becomes wholly or partially ineffective. Therefore, this Court indicated in Bhagwant Singh’s case (supra) that where the Magistrate decides not to take cognizance and to drop the proceeding or takes a view that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against some of the persons mentioned in the First Information Report, notice to the informant and grant of opportunity of being heard in the matter becomes mandatory. As indicated above, there is no provision in the Code for issue of a notice in that regard”. [Underline Supplied] 11. In Anilkumar v. Latha Mohan and Others [2021 (1) KHC 564] , a learned Single Judge of this Court held thus: “13. Then comes the question whether the investigating officer in a refer report (referred charge) is bound to comply with the requirement under sub-section (5) of S.173 Cr.P.C. by forwarding all the documents and statement along with the report or a formal refer report without the documents and the statement recorded would be sufficient. It is not addressed anywhere in the Code except under S.173(4) Cr.P.C., wherein the jurisdiction of discharge of bail bond and such other act alone were addressed. It is not addressed anywhere in the Code except under S.173(4) Cr.P.C., wherein the jurisdiction of discharge of bail bond and such other act alone were addressed. The language employed in clause (ii) of S.173(2) Cr.P.C. would show that the production of documents collected and statement recorded as mandated under S.173(5) Cr.P.C. would be applicable with respect to a case which would fall under S.170 Cr.P.C. (a final report for taking cognizance against the accused person). There is no provision in the Code mandating production of those records with a refer report (referred charge). But it is settled by the Apex Court in Bhagwant Singh’s case (supra) that there are three options available to the Magistrate on submission of a refer report under S.173(2) Cr.P.C. that (1) he may accept the report and drop the proceeding or (2) he may disagree with the report and taking the view that there is sufficient ground for proceeding further, take cognizance of the offence and issue process or (3) he may direct further investigation to be made by the police under sub-section (3) of S.156. To exercise these options, especially the last two, the documents collected and the statements recorded including the one under S.161 Cr.P.C. must be made available to the Magistrate subject to the restriction imposed under S.173(6) Cr.P.C... Otherwise, it would amount to curtailing the exercise of jurisdiction by the Magistrate. Hence all the documents or relevant extracts thereof collected during the course of investigation and all statements including statement recorded under S.161 Cr.P.C., subject to the restriction imposed under S.173(6) Cr.P.C., must be forwarded along with a refer report (referred charge), so as to enable the Magistrate to exercise his jurisdiction. The said requirement was also taken into consideration by the Apex Court in dealing with the application of S.173(2) Cr.P.C. in Gangadhar Janardhan Mhatre’s case (supra) and laid down that: "The position is, therefore, now well settled that upon receipt of a police report under S.173(2), a Magistrate is entitled to take cognizance of an offence under S.190(1)(b) of the Code even if the police report is to the effect that no case is made out against the accused. The Magistrate can take into account the statements of the witnesses examined by the police during the investigation and take cognizance of the offence complained of and order the issue of process to the accused. The Magistrate can take into account the statements of the witnesses examined by the police during the investigation and take cognizance of the offence complained of and order the issue of process to the accused. S.190(1)(b) does not laid down that a Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence only if the investigating officer gives an opinion that the investigation has made out a case against the accused. The Magistrate can ignore the conclusion arrived at by the investigating officer and independently apply his mind to the facts emerging from investigation and take cognizance of the case, if he thinks fit, exercise his powers under S.190(1)(b) and direct the issue of process to the accused." It is made clear that all the above said legal positions are squarely applicable to a report to be submitted under S.173(8) Cr.P.C., which would stand as a supplementary report to the final report submitted under S.173(2) Cr.P.C”. [Underline Supplied] 12. As noted herein above, the investigating officer filed the refer report before the Court concerned without producing the documents relied upon by him to arrive at a conclusion that there are no sufficient material to proceed against the accused. Therefore, the Court concerned ought to have returned that report for curing the defect. Anyhow, the learned Magistrate issued notice to the defacto complainant before accepting the refer report filed by the investigating officer. 13. When the investigating officer files a closure report referring the case, and on getting notice, the defacto complainant objects to the receipt of said final report, there are three options available to the Magistrate. If the objection filed by the defacto complainant is a mere objection against the acceptance of the final report, contending that the ingredients of the final report and the documents produced by the investigating officer itself is sufficient to take a different view than that of the investigating officer, and on perusal of the materials placed on record the learned Magistrate has convinced that there are sufficient materials to take cognizance of the offence, the learned Magistrate can take cognizance of the offence and reject the closure report. From the materials on record, if the Magistrate forms an opinion that no proper investigation was conducted by the investigating officer to arrive at the conclusion stated in the final report, the learned Magistrate can direct further investigation. From the materials on record, if the Magistrate forms an opinion that no proper investigation was conducted by the investigating officer to arrive at the conclusion stated in the final report, the learned Magistrate can direct further investigation. [See Bhagwant Singh [ (1985) 2 SCC 537 ] and Gangadhar Janardan Mhatre [ (2004) 7 SCC 768 ] . However, if the defacto complainant files the objections in the form of a complaint, by providing all the details of the offence, including the particulars of the witnesses to be examined from his side, the Magistrate can treat it as a private complaint under Section 190 Cr.P.C., and in that event, the Magistrate has to proceed under Chapter XV of Cr.P.C. 14. Chapter XIV of Cr.P.C. deals with the conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings. As per Section 190 Cr.P.C., a Magistrate of First Class, and any Magistrate of the Second Class specially empowered in this behalf under sub-section (2) of that Section, may take cognizance of any offence (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a police report of such facts, (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. 15. In the instant case, the complaint filed by the petitioner is under Section 190 Cr.P.C. He had produced the documents relied on by him along with that complaint. He has also furnished the details of the witness to be examined from his side. On the basis of that complaint, the learned Magistrate recorded the sworn statement of the petitioner/defacto complainant and also that of one of the witnesses provided in the witness list submitted by him. From the impugned order passed by the learned Magistrate, it is evident that the learned Magistrate treated the complaint filed by the petitioner/defacto complainant as a private complaint filed under Section 190 Cr.P.C. and not as a mere protest complaint. 16. In Mukhtar Zaidi v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2024 (3) KHC 503] , the Apex Court dealt in detail the nature of the objections filed by a complainant against accepting a refer report filed by the police. 16. In Mukhtar Zaidi v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2024 (3) KHC 503] , the Apex Court dealt in detail the nature of the objections filed by a complainant against accepting a refer report filed by the police. By noting previous judgment of the Apex Court, on the point in Vishnu Kumar Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh through Secretary Home, Civil Secretariat Lucknow and Another [ (2019) 8 SCC 27 ] and also that of the High Court of Karnataka in Veerappa and Others v. Bhimareddappa [2002 CriLJ 2150] , the Apex Court held that if a protest petition fulfills the requirements of a complaint, the Magistrate may treat the protest petition as a complaint and deal with the same as required under Section 200 read with Section 202 of Cr.P.C. In that case, since the protest petition was not filed with all the materials, the Apex Court held that the learned Magistrate ought to have rejected the protest petition with liberty to file a fresh complaint. With that observation, the Apex Court held that the Magistrate ought to have followed the provisions and procedure prescribed under Chapter XV of Cr.P.C and set aside the order passed by the learned Magistrate leaving it open for the Magistrate to treat the protest petition as a complaint and proceed in accordance with law as laid down under Chapter XV of Cr.P.C. 17. As noticed hereinabove, the petition/complaint filed by the petitioner/defacto complainant was considered by the learned Magistrate as one filed under Section 190 Cr.P.C. However, a cryptic order was passed by the learned Magistrate, that also relying on the final report filed by the investigating officer. When a Magistrate is analysing the ingredients of a private complaint, he cannot arrive at a satisfaction of prima facie case relying on the conclusion arrived at by the investigating officer. Interestingly, in the instant case, the investigating officer has not produced any material, including the statement of the witnesses claimed as recorded by him or the details of the nature of those statements, except his observations while filing the final report. 18. The upshot of the above discussion is that there was no proper application of mind by the learned Magistrate while dismissing the private complaint filed by the petitioner. 18. The upshot of the above discussion is that there was no proper application of mind by the learned Magistrate while dismissing the private complaint filed by the petitioner. In such circumstances, it is only to be held that the impugned order of the learned Magistrate is liable to be set aside and the matter has to be sent back for reconsideration. In the result, this Criminal Revision Petition is allowed, and the matter is remanded back to the Court of Judicial First Class Magistrate, Muvattupuzha, for reconsideration in the light of the observations made above.