Order : 1. This criminal revision petition under Section 438 read with Section 442 of the BNSS has been preferred by the accused-petitioner for quashing and setting aside of the order dated 02.09.2024 passed by the Court of learned Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act No. 1, Jaipur Metro II (for short, the ‘trial Court’) in Criminal Case No. 10/2024, State Vs. Virendra Singh whereby charges have been framed against the petitioner for offences punishable u/S 384 of IPC and Section 8 & 12 of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 (for short ‘the Amended Act of 2018’) and also Section 12 0B IPC . 2. The facts in brief of the case are that on 11.07.2019 informant Rajendra Singh Bidhudi submitted a complaint before the Inspector General of Police, Anti Corruption Bureau, Rajasthan, Jaipur, which is as under:- Based on the aforesaid complaint, proceedings were initiated wherein an alleged sum of Rs.11,18,600/- were given to Tejpal i.e. worker of the informant by one Sh. Himanshu Agarwal and the amount so given was alleged to be the illegal gratification to be given to the informant on behalf of the petitioner by way of Hawala. The alleged amount was said to be accumulated by way of extortion which was given to the informant in order to aid the petitioner. 3. On the basis of aforesaid information, reverse trap and recovery of amount given by Himanshu Agarwal to Tejpal, an FIR No. 289/2019 dated 27.09.2019 was registered at Police Station Pradhan Aarakshi Kendra, Anti Corruption Bureau, Jaipur, District Jaipur for the offences under Section 8, 12 of the Amended Act of 2018 read with Section 109 and 120B IPC . 4. After investigation the Police submitted the charge- sheet against the accused petitioner as well as Himanshu Agarwal for the offences under Sections 8, 12 of the Amended Act of 2018 and under Section 120B IPC . 5. The so-called co-accused Himanshu Agarwal filed a S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.119/2020 before the High Court seeking quashing of criminal proceedings. It was contended by Himanshu Agarwal that he was having transactions with Sidhanta Alumint Private Limited and on receiving a call from his father, he delivered the amount. His father received the message from Sushant who is the Director of the Sidhanta Alumint Private Limited and Sushant has also been interrogated. It was contended by Himanshu Agarwal that he was having transactions with Sidhanta Alumint Private Limited and on receiving a call from his father, he delivered the amount. His father received the message from Sushant who is the Director of the Sidhanta Alumint Private Limited and Sushant has also been interrogated. He also placed before the Court the purchase order for the alleged amount which as per him was the valid sale consideration. Having taken into consideration the aforesaid submissions, the High Court vide an interim order dated 06.03.2020 stayed the proceedings pertaining to the charge-sheet qua him. 6. After taking cognizance, the learned trial Court framed the charges only against the accused petitioner for the aforementioned offences vide order dated 02.09.2020 for the offences punishable under section 384 IPC , sections 8 and 12 of the Amended Act of 2018 and Section 120B IPC . The proceedings against other accused were stayed by the High Court. The accused petitioner aggrieved with the order of framing charges has preferred instant criminal revision petition before this Court. 7. Mr. David Mehla alongwith Mr. Sandeep Singh Shekhawat appearing for the accused petitioner has submitted that the impugned order dated 02.09.2024 passed by the learned trial Court is ex-facie illegal as it has been passed over-looking material evidence on record as well as the same is also in sheer contravention of the settled canons of law due to which the impugned order is liable to be quashed and set aside. Learned counsel further submitted that the learned trial court failed to take note of the fact that there were glaring contradictions in the contents of the complaint and the statements so made by the witnesses. It is vital to note that the learned court below has materially erred in considering the vital fact that no work of the petitioner was pending before the informant as well as the informant has not made any complaint against the petitioner to the higher officials ever and the complaint has been made solely to settle the political scores with the petitioner. He further submitted that the learned trial court has overlooked the vital fact that for an offence under Section 384 to be constituted, the transaction of extortion must be proved and the same has to be on account of being putting in fear or injury but in the instant matter at hand, there is not an iota of evidence or proof which can connect to the aforesaid event in the remotest manner possible. Counsel further submitted that there is no material to establish a prima-facie case of extortion under Section 384 of the IPC . Extortion requires the use of force or threat to unlawfully compel the victim to part with property or any valuable security. The charges in this case are vague and do not specify any threat or demand of money in the manner prescribed under the law. He further submitted that the glaring aspect of the matter at hand is that the prosecution itself has not averred any such allegation as against the petitioner with regards to the extortion being done by the petitioner as well as the charge-sheet so submitted by the Investigating Agency does not reveal any such factum due to which the very framing of the charge against the petitioner for the offence under Section 384 of the IPC is wholly arbitrary and illegal due to which the same is liable to be quashed and set aside. He further submitted that the Section 8 of the Amended Act of 2018 provides for the offence of bribing the public servant with a view to induce a public servant to perform improperly a public duty or to reward such public servant for the improper performance of public duty. In the instant matter at hand, the informant has averred that the petitioner offered him a sum of Rs. 15 Lakhs whereas the alleged money so recovered is tuning to the sum of Rs. 11,18,600/- due to which it is crystal clear that the petitioner has not offered any amount to the informant. He further submitted that the amount so alleged to be recovered by the Investigating Agency tuning to the sum of Rs. 11,18,6000/- was pertaining to the amount so given for the purchase of minerals by Himanshu Agarwal yet this vital aspect has not been considered by the learned trial court. He further submitted that the amount so alleged to be recovered by the Investigating Agency tuning to the sum of Rs. 11,18,6000/- was pertaining to the amount so given for the purchase of minerals by Himanshu Agarwal yet this vital aspect has not been considered by the learned trial court. It is duly submitted that the essential ingredients of section 8 of the Amended Act of 2018 are not even attracted in the remotest manner yet the learned trial court has proceeded on erroneous grounds to frame the charges against the petitioner. In support of the submissions, learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shashikant Sharma & Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 1037 while relying on an earlier decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court so rendered in the matter of Suresh @ Pappu Bhudharmal Kalani Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 2001 SC 1375 which in unequivocal terms laid down that if the necessary ingredients of an offence are not made out then the court is not obligated to form charge for such offences against the accused. In the present case, the trial Court has acted entirely on the basis of mere assumptions and surmises without proper appreciation of the facts and hence the impugned order is liable to be quashed and set aside. He further submitted that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Dipakbhai Jagdish chandra Patel vs. State of Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC 547 while considering the law relating to the framing of the charge has duly held as follows:- "21. At the stage of framing the charge in accordance with the principles which have been laid down by this Court, what the court is expected to do is, it does not act as a mere post office. The Court must indeed sift the material before it. The material to be sifted would be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting is not to be meticulous in the sense that the court dons the mantle of the trial judge hearing arguments after the entire evidence has been adduced after a full- fledged trial and the question is not whether the prosecution has made out the case for the conviction of the accused. The sifting is not to be meticulous in the sense that the court dons the mantle of the trial judge hearing arguments after the entire evidence has been adduced after a full- fledged trial and the question is not whether the prosecution has made out the case for the conviction of the accused. All that is required is, the court must be satisfied that with the materials available, a case is made out for the accused to stand trial. A strong suspicion suffices. However, a strong suspicion must be founded on some material. The material must be such as can be translated into evidence at the stage of trial. The strong suspicion cannot be the pure subjective satisfaction based on the moral notions of the Judge that here is a case where it is possible that accused has committed the offence. Strong suspicion must be the suspicion which is premised on some material which commends itself to the court as sufficient to entertain the prima facie view that the accused has committed the offence." Counsel further submitted that it is of utmost importance to note that the learned trial court in the instant matter at hand has completely lost sight of the vital fact that no material exists as against the petitioner which can be translated into evidence at the stage of trial due to which the impugned order is wholly arbitrary and illegal due to which the same is liable to be quashed and set aside. Learned counsel further submitted that the Investigating Agency as well as the learned court below has completely failed to appreciate that the petitioner while discharging the duties of the Station House Officer was neither member of the Committee responsible for the disposal of the poppy-husk nor any meeting was ever convened in his presence for the disposal of the same. The Committee comprises of the Members of the Narcotics and Excise officials due to which it is quite evident that the petitioner is in no manner connected to the same. He further submitted that neither any money has been recovered from the petitioner nor the alleged money so trapped by the Investigating Agency belong to the petitioner as the same was the payment of the minerals which was being paid by Himanshu Agarwal for the purchase done by his father. He further submitted that neither any money has been recovered from the petitioner nor the alleged money so trapped by the Investigating Agency belong to the petitioner as the same was the payment of the minerals which was being paid by Himanshu Agarwal for the purchase done by his father. Also, it is out of place to mention that the money so recovered by the respondent is tuning to the Sum of Rs. 11,18,600/- whereas the amount so alleged to have been given by the petitioner was Rs. 15 Lakhs which clearly establishes that the money was not belonging to the petitioner. Counsel further submitted that the informant has never made any complaint against the petitioner to any of the Superior Officials regarding any illegal activity of the petitioner. Also, the informant met with the petitioner on numerous occasions wherein no money was being given to him due to which it is crystal clear that the petitioner herein has been made a scapegoat by the informant in order to attain his political scores. Counsel further submitted that neither the informant was having any power to exercise his control over the working of the petitioner nor he was in any manner responsible for the transfer of the petitioner due to which it is imperative that the complaint was made by the informant with oblique motives simply to pressurize the petitioner to arm twist him to his own terms. 8. Learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State opposed the submissions advanced by the counsel appearing for the accused petitioner and submitted that the learned trial court after meticulously and minutely examining the material, passed the impugned order of framing the charge against the accused petitioner. Learned Public Prosecutor has also raised an issue that the informant has not been arrayed as a respondent in the criminal revision petition filed under section 438 read with section 442 of the BNSS. 9. The learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that the petitioner by filing S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.499/2024 has challenged the order dated 05.01.2024 before the High Court, which was disposed of vide order dated 4.7.2024 by directing the trial court to expedite the petitioner’s case separately and therefore, at this juncture he cannot challenge the order of framing the charge. 9. The learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that the petitioner by filing S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.499/2024 has challenged the order dated 05.01.2024 before the High Court, which was disposed of vide order dated 4.7.2024 by directing the trial court to expedite the petitioner’s case separately and therefore, at this juncture he cannot challenge the order of framing the charge. Learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that the evidence collected during the course of investigation clearly speaks that the offence under section 8 of the Amended Act of 2018 is made out against the petitioner and there is an ample evidence collected during the course of investigation so as to prosecute the petitioner for the said offence. He further submitted that there are call conversations of which transcripts are there on record. He also submitted that the accused petitioner sent the bribe money of Rs.11,18,600/- to the informant through Hawala and the same recovered and rendered from co- accused Himanshu Agarwal and the independent witnesses namely; Ravindra Chatturvedi and Ashok corroborate the allegations in their statements recorded by the Police under section 161 CrPC. He has also argued that there is very limited scope under the revisional jurisdiction so as to consider the order of framing the charge. 10. Considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the accused petitioner, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State and also gone through the entire material made available on the record in the form of charge-sheet and so also the order of framing the charge. 11. One of the objection raised by the learned Public Prosecutor as regards the maintainability of the criminal revision petition for want of impleading the complainant as a party to the criminal revision petition, it is to be noted that the criminal law recognizes the rights of the victim and therefore as and when an issue is considered then the victim could be allowed an opportunity of hearing. In the present case the informant Rajendra Singh Bidhudi is not a victim. The present criminal case has been lodged by the ACB which is being represented by the learned Public Prosecutor and therefore, the aforesaid objection raised by the learned Public Prosecutor is not sustainable. 12. In the present case the informant Rajendra Singh Bidhudi is not a victim. The present criminal case has been lodged by the ACB which is being represented by the learned Public Prosecutor and therefore, the aforesaid objection raised by the learned Public Prosecutor is not sustainable. 12. By filing this criminal revision petition a challenge has been made to the order dated 02.09.2024 passed by the Court of learned Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, No.1, Jaipur Metropolitan-II, whereby charges for the offences under section 384 IPC and sections 8 and 12 of the Amended Act of 2018 and Section 120B IPC have been framed against the accused petitioner. The charges framed as against the accused petitioner read as under:- 13. The first charge framed against the accused petitioner is under section 384 IPC i.e. ‘punishment for extortion’. Section 384 IPC reads as under:- “ 384. Punishment for extortion.- Whoever commits extortion shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.” The extortion has been defined under section 383 IPC which reads as under:- “ 383. Extortion.- Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person, or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property, or valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits "extortion".” 14. As per the statement of charge, the allegation against the accused petitioner is that while he was posted as Police Inspector/ SHO, Police Station, Begu, District Chhitorgarh, prior to 11.07.2019, during the procedure of destroying the poppy-husk (doda-dhura), he with conspiracy and involvement of the Excise, Narcotics and other administrative Officers, threatened the farmers for implicating them in false cases and extorted Rs.10,000-20,000 per Patta and dishonestly collected the crores of rupees. 15. On perusal of the charge-sheet in view of the allegations as leveled against the accused petitioner, this Court finds that there is no iota of evidence which connects the accused petitioner with the charge of extortion which is punishable under section 384 IPC . Not even of a single incident of this nature has been mentioned in the charge- sheet and there is no witness / farmer that he was threatened by the accused petitioner and he extorted the money. Not even of a single incident of this nature has been mentioned in the charge- sheet and there is no witness / farmer that he was threatened by the accused petitioner and he extorted the money. In the order of framing the charge it is also alleged that the accused petitioner in conspiracy with the Excise, Narcotics and other Administrative Officers has threatened the farmers and collected the money in a dishonest manner but the charges have been framed only against the petitioner and there is no other accused incorporated in the charge-sheet so as to substantiate the allegations of conspiracy with other Officers and the petitioner. The prosecution has failed to come out with any witness or person that he has been induced/ threatened by the petitioner. 16. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Isaac Isanga Musumba & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., reported in (2014) 15 SCC 357 , has observed as under:- " 3 ...............If that be so, we fail to see as to how an offence of extortion as defined in Section 383 IPC is made out. Section 383 IPC states that: “ 383. Extortion .—Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person, or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property or valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits ‘extortion’.” Hence, unless property is delivered to the accused person pursuant to the threat, no offence of extortion is made out and an FIR for the offence under Section 384 could not have been registered by the police." 17. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances this Court finds that when there is no evidence on record which may substantiate the allegations of extortion against the petitioner in conspiracy with other Officers. The trial court has framed the charges in a mechanical manner without there being any evidence for the same. Thus, the order of framing the charge for the offence under section 384 IPC is not sustainable and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. 18. The another charge framed against the accused petitioner is for the offences under sections 8 and 12 of the Amended Act of 2018. Sections 8 and 12 of the Amended Act of 2018 read as under:- “8. 18. The another charge framed against the accused petitioner is for the offences under sections 8 and 12 of the Amended Act of 2018. Sections 8 and 12 of the Amended Act of 2018 read as under:- “8. Offence relating to bribing of a public servant.- (1) Any person who gives or promises to give an undue advantage to another person or persons, with intention— (i) to induce a public servant to perform improperly a public duty; or (ii) to reward such public servant for the improper performance of public duty; shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years or with fine or with both: Provided that the provisions of this section shall not apply where a person is compelled to give such undue advantage: Provided further that the person so compelled shall report the matter to the law enforcement authority or investigating agency within a period of seven days from the date of giving such undue advantage: Provided also that when the offence under this section has been committed by commercial organisation, such commercial organisation shall be punishable with fine. Illustration.—A person, ‘P’ gives a public servant, ‘S’ an amount of ten thousand rupees to ensure that he is granted a license, over all the other bidders. ‘P’ is guilty of an offence under this sub-section. Explanation.—It shall be immaterial whether the person to whom an undue advantage is given or promised to be given is the same person as the person who is to perform, or has performed, the public duty concerned, and, it shall also be immaterial whether such undue advantage is given or promised to be given by the person directly or through a third party. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to a person, if that person, after informing a law enforcement authority or investigating agency, gives or promises to give any undue advantage to another person in order to assist such law enforcement authority or investigating agency in its investigation of the offence alleged against the later. 12. Punishment for abetment of offences.- Whoever abets any offence punishable under this Act, whether or not that offence is committed in consequence of that abetment, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than three years, but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.”. 19. 12. Punishment for abetment of offences.- Whoever abets any offence punishable under this Act, whether or not that offence is committed in consequence of that abetment, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than three years, but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.”. 19. The allegation against the accused petitioner is that while he was posted as Police Inspector/ SHO Police Station Begu, District Chhittorgarh, prior to 11.07.2019 he sent Rs.11,18,600/- out of the illegally collected money to the public servants and the Members of the Committee for taking action against the destruction of poppy-husk (doda-chura) with intention of instigating the public servants and the members of the Committee. As per the statement of charge it is also alleged that under the instructions of the accused petitioner on conspiracy with other co-accused, so as to assist him in the illegal recovery and his transfer, sent money to the informant Rajendra Singh Bidhudhi, MLA, Begu on 25.09.2019 which was handed over to his employee Tejpal by Himanshu Agarwal. 20. The essential element for prosecuting a person punishable under section 8 of the Amended Act, 2018 is giving of undue advantage by inducing a public servant to perform improperly a public duty; or to reward such public servant for the improper performance of a public duty. The main allegation against the accused petitioner is that he by sending the money to the MLA through his employee, was expecting favour in the process of destroying the poppy-husk (doda-chura). 21. As per the Notification dated 16.01.2015 issued by the Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue), the Member of the Legislative Assembly is not the Member of the Drug Disposal Committee. 22. Clause 5 of the Notification provides for ‘Drug Disposal Committee’ and Clauses 6 and 7 thereof provide for ‘functions and procedures to be followed by the Drug Disposal Committee with regard to disposal of seized items’. Clauses 5,6 and 7 of the said Notification read as under:- " 5. 22. Clause 5 of the Notification provides for ‘Drug Disposal Committee’ and Clauses 6 and 7 thereof provide for ‘functions and procedures to be followed by the Drug Disposal Committee with regard to disposal of seized items’. Clauses 5,6 and 7 of the said Notification read as under:- " 5. Drug Disposal Committee .-The Head of the Department of each Central and State drug law enforcement agency shall constitute one or more Drug Disposal Committees comprising three Members each which shall be headed by an officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police, Joint Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise, Joint Director of Directorate of Revenue Intelligence or officers of equivalent rank and every such Committee shall be directly responsible to the Head of the Department. 6. Functions.- The functions of the Drug Disposal Committee shall be to- (a) meet as frequently as possible and necessary; (b) conduct a detailed review of seized items pending disposal; (c) order disposal of seized items; and (d) advise the respective investigation officers or supervisory officers on the steps to be initiated for expeditious disposal. 7. Procedure to be followed by the Drug Disposal Committee with regard to disposal of seized items.- (1) The officer-in-charge of godown shall prepare a list of all the seized items that have been certified under section 52A of the said Act and submit it to the Chairman of the concerned Drug Disposal Committee. (2) After examining the list referred to in sub- paragraph (1) and satisfying that the requirements of section 52A of the said Act have been fully complied with, the members of the concerned Drug Disposal Committee shall endorse necessary certificates to this effect an thereafter that Committee shall physically examine and verify the weight and other details of each of the seized items with reference to the seizure report, report of chemical analysis and any other documents, and record its findings in each case." 23. Since the informant Rajendra Singh Bidhudi is not the Member of the Drug Disposal Committee, therefore, there was no occasion for the accused petitioner to convince him or instigate him for favour in the process of disposal of the seized drugs. Since the informant Rajendra Singh Bidhudi is not the Member of the Drug Disposal Committee, therefore, there was no occasion for the accused petitioner to convince him or instigate him for favour in the process of disposal of the seized drugs. The MLA is also not having the powers to interfere in the functions of the petitioner and he also neither have the power to transfer the petitioner from the place of posting nor he can conduct any proceedings against him. The prosecution has also failed to point out any evidence as to for what purpose the petitioner offered the bribe to the MLA. 24. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Babji Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh , reported in (2018) 17 SCC 732 has observed in para 6 as under:- “ 6. In order to constitute an offence under Section 8 of the Act, three things are essential. In the first place there must have been the solicitation or receipt of the gratification. Secondly, such gratification must have been asked for or paid as a motive or reward for inducing a public servant to do an act or do a favour or render some service as stated under Section 8 of the Act. In the present case, the evidence adduced by the prosecution is vague for whom the appellant had demanded the money and whether the person for whom the appellant demanded and received the money is a public servant. Though the receiver of the money, like in the present case may not be a public servant, the prosecution has to establish by convincing evidence that the amount must have been received for inducing a public servant for doing something by that public servant in his official capacity. So far as confirmation of the seat in the Indian Airlines, there may be persons in the middle who may be a public servant or a travel agency or others. In the absence of convincing evidence to show that the appellant had received the money from PW 4, to induce a public servant to get the confirmation of the ticket, the conviction of the appellant under Section 8 of the PC Act cannot be sustained. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the appellant is acquitted.” 25. In the absence of convincing evidence to show that the appellant had received the money from PW 4, to induce a public servant to get the confirmation of the ticket, the conviction of the appellant under Section 8 of the PC Act cannot be sustained. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the appellant is acquitted.” 25. On the bare perusal of the provisions of section 8 of the Amended Act of 2018, it is very much clear that the basic ingredients are giving or promising to give undue advantage to another person/ persons with intention to induce a public servant to perform improperly a public duty or to reward such public servant for the improper performance of a public duty. In the present case, the allegation against the accused petitioner is that he for seeking favour in the Drug Disposal Procedure, sent the money to the MLA through his employee. As per the provisions contained in the Notification dated 16.1.2015 the MLA is neither the Member of the Drug Disposal Committee nor he is connected with the procedure of Drug Disposal and also he is not the authority to issue transfer order of the petitioner and there is no evidence available on the record that for what purpose the petitioner transmitted the money to the MLA. 26. Section 12 of the Amended Act of 2018 deals with the punishment for abetment of the offence. An accused for an act can either be prosecuted and punished for the offence under section 8 of the Amended Act of 2018 or under section 12 thereof. As per the evidence available on the record, there is no cogent evidence to show that the accused petitioner was having any work pending with the MLA in order to derive any undue advantage from him. As stated in the above para, the MLA is neither the Member of the Drug Disposal Committee nor he is having any concern with the transfer and posting of the accused petitioner. 27. As regards the amount of Rs.11,18,600/- is concerned, the amount was being transferred to the employee of the MLA Rajendra Singh Bidhudi by Himanshu Agarwal who has also been implicated as an accused, however, on being submitting a satisfactory explanation by him as regards the amount, the criminal proceedings against him have already been stayed by the High Court vide order dated 06.03.2020 in S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.119/2020. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses namely; Naresh Kumar Gupta, Sushant Solanki and Vishal also clearly speak that the amount of Rs.11,18,600/- which was sent to Tejpal by Himanshu Agarwal, was in connection with the business deal. The so-called co-accused Himanshu Agarwal filed a S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.119/2020 before the High Court seeking quashing of criminal proceedings. It was contended by Himanshu Agarwal that he was having transactions with Sidhanta Alumint Private Limited and on receiving a call from his father, he delivered the amount. His father received the message from Sushant who is the Director of the Sidhanta Alumint Private Limited and Sushant has also been interrogated. He also placed before the Court the purchase order for the alleged amount which as per him was the valid sale consideration. Having taken into consideration the aforesaid submissions, the High Court vide an interim order dated 06.03.2020 stayed the proceedings pertaining to the charge- sheet qua him. There is no other evidence available on the record so as to connect the aforesaid amount being given to Tejpal for the purpose of seeking some favour by the petitioner. 28. The explanation submitted by Himanshu Agarwal was prima facie found to be convincing by the High Court and stayed the proceedings qua Himanshu Agarwal. 29. When the alleged occurrence of money i.e. Rs.11,18,600/- is prima facie found to be in connection with the business deal and same seems to be justified in view of the statements of the witnesses who are connected in the alleged chain of the said transaction then the alleged charges against the petitioner do not have any basis so as to bring conviction of the accused petitioner for the said charges. 30. The learned Public Prosecutor has come with the submission that the transcripts of the conversations on mobiles in between the accused petitioner and the MLA, which is said to have been recorded by the MLA on its mobile, speaks of the facts regarding giving of the bribe. Counsel for the accused petitioner has submitted that the transcript of the mobile conversation is not supported with the Certificate/ Affidavit as required under section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act. Sub-sections (1), (2) & (4) of Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act read as under:- “65B. Admissibility of electronic records.- 65B. Counsel for the accused petitioner has submitted that the transcript of the mobile conversation is not supported with the Certificate/ Affidavit as required under section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act. Sub-sections (1), (2) & (4) of Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act read as under:- “65B. Admissibility of electronic records.- 65B. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence or any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible. (2) The conditions referred to in sub-section (1) in respect of a computer output shall be the following, namely: –– (a) the computer output containing the information was produced by the computer during the period over which the computer was used regularly to store or process information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of the computer; (b) during the said period, information of the kind contained in the electronic record or of the kind from which the information so contained is derived was regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities; (c) throughout the material part of the said period, the computer was operating properly or, if not, then in respect of any period in which it was not operating properly or was out of operation during that part of the period, was not such as to affect the electronic record or the accuracy of its contents; and (d) the information contained in the electronic record reproduces or is derived from such information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities. (4) In any proceedings where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things, that is to say, –– (a) identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced; (b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer; (c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and for the purposes of this subsection it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it.” 31. Counsel for the accused petitioner has submitted that the transcript is a secondary evidence and it is not admissible in evidence without the same being supported by the certificate required under section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar Vs. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal & Ors., reported in (2020) 7 SCC 1 , has observed in para 61 as under:- “61. We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate required under Section 65-B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence by way of electronic record, as correctly held in Anvar P.V. [Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 27 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 24 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 108] , and incorrectly “clarified” in Shafhi Mohammad [Shafhi Mohammad v. State of H.P., (2018) 2 SCC 801 : (2018) 2 SCC 807 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 346 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 351 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 860 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 865] . Oral evidence in the place of such certificate cannot possibly suffice as Section 65-B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law. Oral evidence in the place of such certificate cannot possibly suffice as Section 65-B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law. Indeed, the hallowed principle in Taylor v. Taylor [Taylor v. Taylor, (1875) LR 1 Ch D 426] , which has been followed in a number of the judgments of this Court, can also be applied. Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act clearly states that secondary evidence is admissible only if led in the manner stated and not otherwise. To hold otherwise would render Section 65-B(4) otiose.” The Coordinate Bench of this Court after having a detailed discussion about the provisions of section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act in the case of Nimba Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., S.B. Criminal Misc. (Petition) No.5514/2021, decided on 20.03.2023 has observed in para 43 as under:- “ 43. The nature and manner of admission of electronic records was one of the key points decided in the climacteric judgment of Anvar P.V. Vs. P.K. Basheer reported in AIR 2015 SC 180 passed by the top court of the country. It is stated therein that source and authenticity are the two hallmarks that are to be taken into account when an electronic record is sought to be used as evidence. In order to use an electronic record as proof against an accused, it is necessary that the requirements of Section 65-B are complied with before oral evidence pertaining to electronic record can be considered. In paragraph 21 of the judgment, it is stated that it may be seen that it was a case where a responsible official had duly certified the document at the time of production itself. In the case at hand, the same has not been [2023/RJJP/004396] (35 of 50) [CRLMP- 5514/2021] done as the certificate under Section 65-B has not been supplied at the time of production of the pendrive P1 rather it was submitted after more than one and a half months, that too, without watching the contents of the pendrive.” 32. In the present case the transcript placed on record is not supported by the certificate as required under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act of the concerned persons. 33. As per the charge-sheet there was What's App chatting in between the accused petitioner and the informant during the period 22.09.2019 to 24.09.2019 on a Mobile SIM No. 9929915805 of the informant. 33. As per the charge-sheet there was What's App chatting in between the accused petitioner and the informant during the period 22.09.2019 to 24.09.2019 on a Mobile SIM No. 9929915805 of the informant. The screenshots of the said chatting were said to have been saved by the informant in his Mobile and the Mobile was handed over to the Investigating Officer on 25.09.2019 which was transferred through Mail-ID of the informant to the Mail ID of the Anti Corruption Bureau and thereafter, the C.D. of the chats was prepared. 34. It is pertinent to mention here that as per the provisions of section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, a certificate is required to be given by the person who is in lawful possession of the device. There is no certificate/ affidavit given by the informant who was in possession of the Mobile having SIM No. 9929915805 from which the What's App chats is said to have been transferred to the Anti Corruption Bureau through its Mail ID. There is no certificate by the informant that during the period the alleged What's App chats have been saved, the same have not been tampered with in any manner. Thus, there is no evidence so as to connect the chats in between Himanshu Agarwal and other persons as regards the delivery of the alleged amount so as to connect the accused petitioner with the alleged crime. 35. No certificate as required under section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act has been given by the person who prepared the transcript of conversation in between the accused petitioner and the informant. In absence of the aforesaid certificate and so also the source of information and the authenticity, the alleged transcript is not admissible in evidence against the petitioner. 36. The Court has also gone through the transcript of the conversation alleged to be in between the informant and the accused petitioner. No voice sample of the petitioner was taken by the Investigating Agency so as to verify that it is the voice of the accused petitioner in the alleged conversation of which transcript has been prepared and in such circumstances the alleged conversation without there being any sufficient certificate under section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act also cannot be used against the petitioner. 37. 37. On perusal of the transcript also, the Court finds that even if it is to be taken genuine for a moment then also there is nothing in the transcript which could show that the accused petitioner promises to give any undue advantage to the informant to perform improperly a public duty. 38. From the transcription the malpractice in the Department as regards the disposal of the Drugs is disclosed without there being any faulty connection of the accused petitioner. If the alleged conversation and the transcript of the alleged conversation is relied upon then there would be several Officers of various Departments who could be the accused in this case. The Anti Corruption Bureau seems to have adopted the pick and choose theory, may be under some political compulsion. However, the Courts cannot overlook such material things. As per the transcript the informant who is the MLA was advising the accused petitioner to get himself transferred after talking to the S.P. within 2-4 days. 39. The charge for the offence under Section 120B IPC has also been framed against the accused petitioner stating that he in conspiracy with other persons has offered the money so as to get favour in the process of destroying the drugs after collecting the money from the farmers under the threat of implicating them in false cases. Till date the charge has been framed only against the present petitioner and there is no other accused before the learned trial court. The charge for the offence under Section 120B IPC cannot be framed against the sole accused. The Anti Corruption Bureau has also not kept the investigation pending against any person. The prosecution has arrayed the petitioner and one Himanshu Agarwal as a co-accused in the present case but the proceedings against him (Himanshu Agarwal) have been stayed by the High Court and now the only accused is the sole petitioner. So as to substantiate the charge under Section 120B IPC there must be criminal conspiracy at-least in between two or more persons but in the present case there is only one person i.e. the present petitioner and there is no iota of evidence to establish that there was any conspiracy and therefore, in such circumstances the charge of offence under Section 120B IPC against the accused petitioner being a sole accused is not sustainable. 40. 40. The learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that the criminal proceedings against Himanshu Agarwal have been stayed by the High Court by an interim order and the same is not final. 41. In the criminal revision petition filed by Himanshu Agarwal, the proceedings against him being a co-accused have been stayed by the High Court vide order dated 06.03.2020 considering the explanation submitted by him for an amount of Rs.11,18,600/- which has been made the basis for framing the charge against the accused petitioner, though the learned trial court could not have framed the charges against the present accused petitioner. 42. Learned Public Prosecutor has also raised an issue of scope under the revisional jurisdiction as regards the challenge to the order of framing the charge, this Court does not dispute the legal position that there is a very limited scope under the revisional jurisdiction, however, the Court has ample jurisdiction to interfere in the order of framing the charge if the Court comes to the conclusion that there is no prima facie evidence available on the record so as to prosecute the accused. 43. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shashikant Sharma & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., reported in 2023 Live Law (SC) 1037 has observed as under:- " 12 ........Nevertheless, there is also a long line of precedents that from the admitted evidence of the prosecution as reflected in the documents filed by the Investigating Officer in the report under Section 173 CrPC, if the necessary ingredients of an offence are not made out then the Court is not obligated to frame charge for such offence against the accused. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Suresh @ Pappu Bhudharmal Kalani Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 2001 SC 1375 ." 44. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel vs. State of Gujarat & Ors., reported in AIR 2019 SC 3363 has observed as under:- " 21 .......At the stage of framing the charge in accordance with the principles which have been laid down by this Court, what the Court is expected to do is, it does not act as a mere post office. The Court must indeed sift the material before it. The Court must indeed sift the material before it. The material to be sifted would be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting is not to be meticulous in the sense that the Court dons the mantle of the Trial Judge hearing arguments after the entire evidence has been adduced after a full-fledged trial and the question is not whether the prosecution has made out the case for the conviction of the accused. All that is required is, the Court must be satisfied that with the materials available, a case is made out for the accused to stand trial. A strong suspicion suffices. However, a strong suspicion must be founded on some material. The material must be such as can be translated into evidence at the stage of trial. The strong suspicion cannot be the pure subjective satisfaction based on the moral notions of the Judge that here is a case where it is possible that accused has committed the offence. Strong suspicion must be the suspicion which is premised on some material which commends itself to the court as sufficient to entertain the prima facie view that the accused has committed the offence." 45. In the present era, the Courts are burdened with the heavy workload of the cases. So as to enable the Courts to give sufficient time to genuine cases, we are also under obligation to ensure that the cases lacking substantial evidence, are required to be eliminated. 46. In view of the discussions made above with regard to the evidence collected during investigation against the accused petitioner, this Court has also observed that there is no sufficient and incriminating evidence which can lead to conviction of the accused petitioner. Even if the whole evidence is taken into consideration, then also there is nothing on record to prosecute the accused petitioner for the charges for offence under Section 384 IPC . The charges for offence under Sections 8 & 12 of the Amended Act of 2018 is in connection with the money alleged to have been extorted by the accused petitioner in collusion with the other officers. Since there is no evidence with regard to prosecuting the accused petitioner for offence under Section 384 IPC , the other charge is also not sustainable as both the charges are connected with each other. Since there is no evidence with regard to prosecuting the accused petitioner for offence under Section 384 IPC , the other charge is also not sustainable as both the charges are connected with each other. The charges have been framed only against the accused petitioner for offence under Section 120-B IPC , which is also not sustainable as the said charge under Section 120-B IPC can only be framed in case there are two or more accused persons. 47. In view of the discussions made above, the criminal revision petition filed by the accused petitioner deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed and the order dated 02.09.2024 passed by the Court of learned Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act No. 1, Jaipur Metro II in Regular Criminal Case No. 10/2024, State Vs. Virendra Singh, whereby charges have been framed against the accused petitioner for offences punishable under Section 384 of IPC and Sections 8 & 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Amendment), 2018 and Section 120B IPC , is quashed and set aside. 48. In view of the discussions made above, the criminal proceedings against the present accused petitioner are also quashed and set aside in exercise of inherent jurisdiction of this Court. 49. In view of the order passed in the main petition, the stay application and pending application/s, if any also stand disposed of.