COMMON JUDGMENT Heard. 2. Since both writ petitions challenge the common order dated 30.04.2019 passed by the III Additional Labour Court, Chennai, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 3.The first writ petition is filed by 40 Petitioners, of whom 39 were the original claimants in separate claim petitions. The 32nd Petitioner, S. Nagendiran, is the son of M. Sankaranarayanan, the Claim Petitioner in C.P. No. 156 of 2015, and he has approached this Court as his legal representative. He has chosen to challenge the common order passed by the Labour Court. Before the Labour Court, a total of 51 claim petitions—being C.P. Nos. 117 to 150 and 152 to 168 of 2015—were clubbed together and adjudicated by way of a common order following a joint trial. 4.Although there were 51 claim petitions, the present writ petition challenges only 40 of them, as 11 of the claimants have not chosen to assail the order. In such circumstances, it was incumbent upon the Petitioners to implead the remaining 11 claimants as party respondents to the writ petition. In the absence of such impleadment, the adjudication would be incomplete, and the unchallenged portion of the order would attain finality and operate as res judicata against them. The first writ petition was admitted on 20.11.2019, and in the application filed for interim relief, only notice was ordered. 5.Fortunately for the 40 Petitioners in the first writ petition, a second writ petition came to be filed by the Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board (hereinafter referred to as the 'Khadi Board'), challenging the very same common order in respect of all 51 claim petitions. By order dated 14.02.2020, the said writ petition was directed to be heard along with the earlier writ petition filed by the workers. 6.In that case, even before the Labour Court, one of the claimants—A. Appavu, the Petitioner in C.P. No. 126 of 2015—had passed away. Consequently, his legal heirs, namely his son and daughter, have been impleaded as Respondents 10 and 11 in the second writ petition. It could be stated that in view of the Khadi Board having filed a comprehensive challenge covering all 51 claim petitions and all concerned parties now being before this Court, the technical defect in the maintainability of the workers’ writ petition, to some extent, stands cured. It could be stated that in view of the Khadi Board having filed a comprehensive challenge covering all 51 claim petitions and all concerned parties now being before this Court, the technical defect in the maintainability of the workers’ writ petition, to some extent, stands cured. 7.Before dealing into the facts of the claim petitions filed under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it is necessary to set out the background of the case. The Petitioners, who were employees of the Khadi Board, were engaged in various handmade paper units. They were represented by a trade union affiliated to the Centre of Indian Trade Unions (CITU). The said trade union raised an industrial dispute concerning the closure of 15 handmade paper units. The dispute was referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Tamil Nadu, and was taken on file as I.D. No. 100 of 2000. 8.The Industrial Tribunal, by its award dated 10.05.2006, held that the closure of the handmade paper units was illegal and amounted to victimization of the workmen. In paragraphs 22 to 25 of the award, the Tribunal observed as follows:– “22. …….So, this Tribunal concluded by way of victimization, the respondent has closed down these 15 units without following the provisions under Sec.25(O) of I.D.Act. 23. As narrated above, the respondent is an Industrial Establishment, the members of the petitioner union who were worked in the hand made paper units are permanent workers as per Ex.W2. As per the evidence of MW1, more than 200 workers were employed in the hand made paper units, Chapter V-B of I.D.Act is applicable. Without obtaining permission under Sec.25(O) of the I.D.Act, closed down these 15 units is unjustified. 24. Hence Chapter V-A is not applicable. So, the compensation paid under Sec.25-FFF of I.D.Act is not correct. Hence, this Tribunal concludes that the closure of these 15 hand made paper units is unjustified. Hence, the workers employed in these 15 hand made paper units are entitled to all the benefits as per Sec.25(O) of I.D.Act. 25. In fine, that the closure of the 15 hand made paper units is unjustified, without permission under Sec.25(O) I.D.Act. Hence, the workers in the 15 hand made paper units are entitled to all the benefits under Section 25(O)(6) of the I.D.Act. 25. In fine, that the closure of the 15 hand made paper units is unjustified, without permission under Sec.25(O) I.D.Act. Hence, the workers in the 15 hand made paper units are entitled to all the benefits under Section 25(O)(6) of the I.D.Act. Award is passed accordingly.” 9.Aggrieved by the said award, the Khadi Board filed a writ petition before this Court challenging its validity. During the pendency of the writ petition, the workmen filed an application seeking interim relief under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. This Court, by order dated 26.02.2008, granted the relief sought. The operative portion of the order reads as follows:– “In the light of the said submission, the writ petitioner (Khadi Board) is directed to pay 17(B) wages to the workers from 05.01.2007 i.e., from the date of filing of the writ petition and pay the arrears of 17(B) wages from 05.01.2007 till 29.02.2008 within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order and continue to pay the 17(B) wages from March 2008 onwards, on or before 10 th of every succeeding month until the workers are reinstated or until futher orders.” 10.The Khadi Board preferred an intra-court appeal before a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No. 963 of 2008. The Division Bench, by order dated 13.10.2008, dismissed the writ appeal and upheld the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Aggrieved by the interim order, the Khadi Board approached the Supreme Court by filing SLP (Civil) No. 9793 of 2009, which was also dismissed on 04.05.2009. Subsequently, the main writ petition, W.P. No. 795 of 2007, filed by the Khadi Board challenging the award came up for final hearing, and the same was dismissed. As a result, the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal in I.D. No. 100 of 2000 dated 10.05.2006 was confirmed. 11.In view of the confirmation of the award, the workers employed in the erstwhile handmade paper units became entitled to full back wages, treating the closure as non est in law, since no prior permission from the Government had been obtained, as mandated under law. The CITU union also issued a letter stating that no settlement or compromise should be entered into and that full wages must be paid to all affected workmen. The CITU union also issued a letter stating that no settlement or compromise should be entered into and that full wages must be paid to all affected workmen. Even the 2 nd writ petitioner, A. Nallayan, addressed a letter dated 13.05.2013 on behalf of all the workers, demanding that the benefits in terms of Section 25-O(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, be provided to all the workmen. 12.However, it appears that the CITU union entered into a Minutes of Understanding dated 17.09.2013, which was styled as a settlement under the Industrial Disputes Act. By this settlement, the union agreed to compromise the terms of the award by consenting to accept only 35% of the dues payable to the workers, while relinquishing the balance. Among the various terms agreed upon between the union and the Khadi Board, the first item pertained to the payment of wages to the workers in accordance with the award, and it reads as follows:– 13.Pursuant to the aforesaid understanding, the Khadi Board convened a Board Meeting and resolved to seek financial assistance from the Government for discharging 35% of the liability arising out of the award. As per the Khadi Board, the total liability for full compliance with the award amounted to Rs. 2,32,28,528/-, whereas 35% of the said liability was calculated at Rs. 85,06,020/-. A proposal was accordingly forwarded to the Government on 21.01.2014, wherein the issue was addressed as follows:– 14.Based on the proposal submitted by the Khadi Board, the Government of Tamil Nadu, after a lapse of two years, issued G.O.(Ms.) No. 20, Handloom, Powerloom, Textile and Khadi Department, dated 29.01.2016, sanctioning a sum of Rs. 85,06,020/- to meet 35% of the award liability. Pursuant to the Government Order, Khadi Board addressed a communication dated 17.06.2016 to the Deputy Director, Khadar Khadi and Village Industries, indicating that each worker would receive Rs. 44,184/- as against the total amount of Rs. 1,26,242/- calculated on the basis of minimum wages. 15.Upon realizing that the compensation disbursed by the Khadi Board was only a fraction of what was legally due, 51 workers filed claim petitions before the III Additional Labour Court under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, seeking enforcement of the award passed in I.D. No. 100 of 2000 dated 10.05.2006. 15.Upon realizing that the compensation disbursed by the Khadi Board was only a fraction of what was legally due, 51 workers filed claim petitions before the III Additional Labour Court under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, seeking enforcement of the award passed in I.D. No. 100 of 2000 dated 10.05.2006. The award had mandated the payment of wages in terms of Section 25-O(6) of the Act, since the closure of the units had been effected without obtaining prior permission from the Government. Each workman claimed revised wages, leave encashment, and bonus, and the cumulative claim for each individual amounted to Rs. 45,61,970/-. 16.The claim petitions were numbered as C.P. Nos. 117 to 150 and 152 to 168 of 2015, and notice was issued to the Khadi Board. In response, the Khadi Board filed identical counter statements dated 01.09.2015. The sole defence raised was that all 178 workers were fully aware of the settlement entered into between the workers' union and the Khadi Board, and that it was on the basis of this settlement that the Board had submitted proposals and obtained financial assistance from the State Government. 17.The Labour Court consolidated all the claim petitions and conducted a joint trial. On behalf of the workmen, A. Nallayan, the petitioner in C.P. No. 119 of 2015, was examined as WW1, and 13 documents were marked on their side as Exs. P1 to P13. On behalf of the Khadi Board, R. Gopalakrishnan, Assistant Director and General Superintendent (Village Industries), was examined as RW1, and four documents were marked on their side as Exs. R1 to R4. 18.The Labour Court, by its common order dated 30.04.2019, dismissed the claim petitions. It held that, since a settlement had been entered into between the CITU Union and the Khadi Board, which was binding on the petitioners, they were not entitled to claim any amount beyond the 35% already sanctioned and disbursed by the Khadi Board. The Court thus upheld the validity of the settlement and rejected the petitioners' attempt to repudiate the same. 19.The Court further observed that, pursuant to the award in I.D. No. 100 of 2000, all workers had been paid 35% of the award amount, which amounted to Rs. 44,184/- per person, and accordingly, all 51 claimants would be entitled to the same sum. 19.The Court further observed that, pursuant to the award in I.D. No. 100 of 2000, all workers had been paid 35% of the award amount, which amounted to Rs. 44,184/- per person, and accordingly, all 51 claimants would be entitled to the same sum. However, the Labour Court directed that the said amount shall carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petitions until the date of realisation. 20.Out of the 51 claim petitions, 40 petitioners filed the first writ petition challenging the denial of full wages, while the Khadi Board filed the second writ petition challenging the grant of 9% interest by the Labour Court. The primary questions that arise for consideration are: (i) whether the Labour Court was justified in denying the workmen the full benefits under the award, and (ii) whether the Khadi Board is justified in assailing the direction to pay 9% interest. 21.The Labour Court framed four issues for consideration. On the first issue—whether the workmen had a pre-existing right to claim the amounts under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act—it held that, in view of Section 25-O(6), the workmen were indeed entitled to all benefits accruing as a consequence of the illegal closure of the units. 22.On the second issue—whether the settlement dated 17.09.2013 could nullify or override the benefits granted under the award in I.D. No. 100 of 2000 —the Labour Court undertook a rather cursory analysis. It began by extracting Rule 25 of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Disputes Rules, which prescribes the manner in which a settlement under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act should be executed. It also set out the text of Section 18 of the Act, distinguishing between bilateral and tripartite settlements and explaining their respective binding nature. Following this, the Labour Court referred to the Memorandum of Understanding dated 28.09.2013, which was executed pursuant to the meeting held on 17.09.2013, and extracted paragraphs 16 to 19 thereof, which read as follows:– “The careful reading of the Ex.R1 would goes to show that, the legal proceedings referred in the charter of demands and the resolutions, refers to the order passed by the High Court in W.P.No.795 of 2000. Hence it is evident that, the agreement entered into by the union with the respondent Board is for the pending amount due to the employees for the period from 01.12.1999, i.e. the date of closure of the unit to 31.12.2006 @ 35%. According to this settlement in order to avoid further appeal by the management before the High Court, the Union agreed for 35% of the due amount for which the respondent Board has also agreed. Now based on this settlement, the respondents are disputing the entitlement of the claim amount by these petitioners. Admittedly the above agreement is not incorporated in Form B prescribed under Rule 25(1) of the ID Rules. Further the said agreement has not been entered into in the presence of the Conciliation Officers or even there is no mention as to, the copy of the agreement has been forwarded to the Labour Officers. On that score the contention of the petitioners that this agreement is not at all a settlement as defined in the ID Act, appears to be sound. On the other hand this Ex.R1 has been entered into by the CITU union through their State Secretary and General Secretary, on behalf of the employees. There is no dispute on the side of the petitioners that the office bearers who have signed in the Ex.R1 have no competency or locus standi to sign the said agreement on behalf of the workers. Further the petitioners have also not disputed that, at the time of the CITU union entering the agreement with the management, they were not members of the said union. It is pertinent to note here that, the same CITU union who have signed in this settlement were the petitioners before the Industrial Tribunal in ID No.100/2000. It is absolutely open to the parties to mould their relief at any stage of the proceedings, and accordingly the CITU who exposed the cause of the employees including these petitioners before the Industrial Tribunal has subsequently moulded their relief and restricted their entitlement to 35% of the back wages alone. Hence the petitioners cannot approbate and reprobate and would take advantage of the ID Award alone for their claim and disown the subsequent settlement entered by the same CITU union. Hence the petitioners cannot approbate and reprobate and would take advantage of the ID Award alone for their claim and disown the subsequent settlement entered by the same CITU union. It is seen from the records available before this court that, in consequence to the Ex.R1 settlement the respondents have sent the proposal to the Government vide Ex.R2 dated 21.01.2014, and accordingly vide Ex.R3 dated 29.01.2016, the Government of Tamilnadu vide G.O.No.20 sanctioned a sum of Rs.85,06,020/- for disbursement of 35% of the back wages agreed as per Ex.R1. Hence it is evident that, the Ex.R1 has been acted upon by the parties and it is pertinent to note here that, other than these petitioners all the employees who were concerned in the I.D.No.100/2000 have received 35% of their back wages, and this fact has been fairly conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Hence whatever may be the shortcomings in the above agreement, by their conduct of enforcing the same the parties have ratified those shortcomings, and hence now they cannot withdraw themselves from the purview of Ex.R1. As such the Ex.R1 clearly binds these petitioners also. On that score this court is inclined to conclude that, the Ex.R1 settlement is nothing but the outcome of the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal, and the rights which were available to the petitioner on the basis of the said award were modified by the subsequent settlement Ex.R1, which is binding on these petitioners also. Accordingly this court further concludes that, the entitlement of these petitioners is restricted to 35% of the amount agreed by the CITU union vide Ex.R1 settlement, and these petitioners are not entitled for any other relief and these points 2 to 4 were answered accordingly.” 23.The finding of the Labour Court that the Minutes dated 17.09.2013 executed between the Khadi Board and the CITU Union constituted a "settlement" within the meaning of Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and that it effectively displaced the earlier award passed in I.D. No. 100 of 2000 dated 10.05.2006 as well as the statutory obligations under Section 25-O(6), reflects a rudimentary and superficial understanding of the legal framework. 24.While the Labour Court did observe that the procedure contemplated under Rule 25(1) of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Disputes Rules, read with Form B, had not been followed, it nevertheless concluded that the said minutes amounted to a valid settlement under the Act. In doing so, it failed to examine or even refer to the definition of “settlement” under Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, which reads as follows:– "settlement" means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and includes a written agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding where such agreement has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof has been sent to the appropriate Government and the conciliation officer; 25.The importance of adhering to procedural requirements while executing a settlement has been considered by the Supreme Court in Jhagarkhand Collieries (P) Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Jabalpur & Others, reported in (1975) 3 SCC 613 . In this decision, the Hon’ble Court elaborated on the scope of Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act and underscored the necessity of executing settlements in the manner and form prescribed under the law. The Court held as follows:– “As analysis of. the above definition would show that it contemplates only two kinds of settlement (i) A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation, proceedings under the Act and (ii) a written agreement between the employer and the workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings. But a written agreement of the latter kind in order to fall within the definition must satisfy two more conditions, namely : (a) it must have been signed by the parties thereto in the prescribed manner, and (b) a copy thereof must have been sent to the authorities indicated in s . 2(p) . The effect of a settlement of the first kind is indicated in subsection (3) and that of the second in sub-s. (1) of s . 18 of the Act. The material part of Rs. 18 reads "18)1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workmen otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. 18 of the Act. The material part of Rs. 18 reads "18)1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workmen otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), an arbitration award which has become enforceable shall be binding on the parties to the agreement who referred the dispute to arbitration." (3) A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act (or an arbitration award in a case where a notification has been issued under ,sub- section (3A) of Section (10A) or (an award of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal) which has become enforceable shall be binding on- (a) all parties to the industrial dispute; (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board, (arbitrator) (Labour Court, Tribunal or National (1) [1965] 11 LLJ 110. (2) [1964]S.C.R. 448. Tribunal), as the case may be, records the opinion that they were summoned without proper cause; (c) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates; (d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part." It is clear from a perusal of Section 18, that a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings is binding not only on the actual parties to the industrial dispute but also on the heirs, successors or assigns of the employer on the one hand, and all the workmen in the establishment, present or future, on the other. In extending the operation of such a settlement beyond the parties thereto, sub-section (3) of the Section departs from the ordinary law of contract and gives effect to the principle of collective bargaining. Thus, had Mr. In extending the operation of such a settlement beyond the parties thereto, sub-section (3) of the Section departs from the ordinary law of contract and gives effect to the principle of collective bargaining. Thus, had Mr. B. D. Sharma been a duly appointed Conciliation Officer, the settlement arrived at in the conciliation proceedings, duly conducted by him under Section 12, would have been binding on the entire body of the workers including Respondents 4 to 173 represented by the Federation. and others who 'are members of the Sabha. Since the finding of the High Court to the effect that the settlement between the Panchayat and the management cannot be deemed to be settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under the Act, now stands unassailed. the aforesaid sub-section (3) cannot be invoked to make it binding on Respondents 4 to 173. The question remains : Can it be enforced against these Respondents by virtue of sub-section (1) of the Section ? This further narrows down into the issue : Were these respondents parties and signatories to the agreement between the management and the Panchayat ? The answer to this question is undoubtedly in the negative. Even Mr. Malhotra has conceded that at the time when the settlement was arrived at on October 22, 1969, these respondents and the members of the Sabha. were not Parties to it. But his argument is that subsequently by drawing V.D.A. in accordance with the settlement, 99% of the workers have accepted the settlement which, in consequence, would be as effective against them as if they were parties to it. The argument is attractive but does not stand a close examination. We have already noticed that according to the scheme of s. 18, read with s. 2(d) , an agreement, made otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings, to be a settlement within the meaning of the Act must be a written agreement signed in the manner prescribed by the Rules framed under the Act. As rightly pointed out by Mr. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Ramamurthy, learned Counsel for the Respondents an implied agreement by acquiescence, or conduct such as acceptance of a benefit under an agreement in which the worker acquiescing or accepting the benefit was not a party being outside the purview of the Act, is not binding on such a worker either under sub-section (1) or under sub- section (3) of s. 18 . It follows, therefore, that even if 99% of the workers have impliedly accepted the agreement arrived at on October 22, 1969, by drawing V.D.A., under it, it will not-whatever its effect under the general law-put an end to the dispute before the Labour Court and make it functus officio under the Act.” 26.It is important to note that the award passed in I.D. No. 100 of 2000 dated 10.05.2006 did not confer any new rights upon the workmen. Rather, the Industrial Tribunal held that, since the Khadi Board had effected the closure of its establishments without obtaining prior permission from the State Government, the workmen were entitled to wages in terms of Section 25-O(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as if no permission for closure had been granted. Section 25-O(6) reads as follows:– “Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made within the period specified therein, or where the permission for closure has been refused, the closure of the undertaking shall be deemed to be illegal from the date of closure and the workmen shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time being in force as if the undertaking had not been closed down.” 27.Therefore, irrespective of the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal, the workmen have an independent statutory right to claim wages in cases where the closure of an establishment is effected without obtaining prior permission from the Government. The award merely declares this entitlement, and the workmen are well within their rights to invoke the provisions of Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act to recover the wages due to them. 28.It is pertinent to note that Section 25-O, which mandates prior permission for closure, was introduced under Chapter V-B of the Industrial Disputes Act by Central Act 32 of 1976 with effect from 05.03.1976. This provision was subsequently amended by Central Act 46 of 1982 with effect from 21.08.1984. 28.It is pertinent to note that Section 25-O, which mandates prior permission for closure, was introduced under Chapter V-B of the Industrial Disputes Act by Central Act 32 of 1976 with effect from 05.03.1976. This provision was subsequently amended by Central Act 46 of 1982 with effect from 21.08.1984. 29.The provisions contained in Chapter V-B occupy a higher statutory footing by virtue of Section 25-S of the Industrial Disputes Act, which reads as follows:– “Certain provisions of Chapter V-A to apply to an industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies- The provisions of sections 25-B, 25-D, 25-FF, 25-G, 25-H and 25-J in Chapter V-A shall, so far as may be, apply also in relation to an industrial establishment to which the provisions of this Chapter apply.” 30.As Section 25-S makes a reference to Section 25-J of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is appropriate to extract the said provision as well for better understanding:– “Effect of laws inconsistent with this Chapter. (1)The provisions of this Chapter shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law [including standing orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946): Provided that where under the provisions of any other Act or rules, orders or notifications issued thereunder or under any standing orders or under any award, contract of service or otherwise, a workman is entitled to benefits in respect of any matter which are more favourable to him than those to which he would be entitled under this Act, the workman shall continue to be entitled to the more favourable benefits in respect of that matter, notwithstanding that he receives benefits in respect of other matters under this Act. (2)For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that nothing contained in this Chapter shall be deemed to affect the provisions of any other law for the time being in force in any State insofar as that law provides for the settlement of industrial disputes, but the rights and liabilities of employers and workmen insofar as they relate to lay- off and retrenchment shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.” 31.Therefore, by virtue of the declaratory provision, the rights conferred under Chapters V-A and V-B of the Industrial Disputes Act are placed on a higher footing than those arising under any other law. It is only in cases where such other law provides more beneficial terms that the workmen may opt for those alternate benefits. In Sree Rajendra Mills Ltd., Salem v. Labour Court, Coimbatore , reported in 37 FJR 249, this Court held that, in view of Section 25-J(2), lay-off compensation must be paid strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, and not under any private settlement entered into between the management and the workmen. 32.The Allahabad High Court, in its decision in Hind Lamps Ltd. v. State of U.P. , reported in 1989 (2) LLJ 230 , took a similar view while interpreting the proviso to Section 25-J of the Industrial Disputes Act. The relevant portion is as follows:– “The Proviso, in so far as it is relevant, lays down that where under the contract of service or otherwise a workman is entitled to benefits in respect of any matter which are more favourable to him than those to which he would be entitled under the Central Act, the workman shall continue to be entitled to the more favourable benefits in respect of that matter. Sub-section (2) of Section 25J declares that the rights and liabilities of employers and workmen, in so far as they relate to lay-off, shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Chapt. V-A, but the provisions of any other law for the time being in force in any State shall have full play in so far as they provide for the settlement of an industrial dispute. To put it differently, any dispute between the employer and the workmen in relation to lay-off shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Chapt. V-A even though the machinery provided for the settlement of industrial dispute under any State law can be set in motion by the aggrieved party under the State law. It, therefore, means that the adjudication of an industrial dispute in relation to the lay-off even though initiated under a State law and pending before a forum constituted under the State law shall be adjudicated upon in accordance with the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Central Act. It, therefore, means that the adjudication of an industrial dispute in relation to the lay-off even though initiated under a State law and pending before a forum constituted under the State law shall be adjudicated upon in accordance with the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Central Act. It, therefore, follows that the Tribunal, in the instant case, was under an obligation to adjudicate upon the dispute referred to it in accordance with the provisions of Chapter V-A, including Section 25J and the proviso thereto in particular, As already indicated, the proviso clearly preserves the contract of service and the benefit given under the incentive scheme falls in the category of a contract of service within the meaning of the proviso. To put it differently, notwithstanding the payment of lay-off compensation in accordance with Chapter V-A of the Central Act. the workmen in addition, will be entitled to the ''"favourable benefits" namely, the benefit under the incentive scheme. The conclusion, therefore, is inevitable that the workmen, in the instant case, were entitled to the benefits under the incentive scheme in addition to the payment of lay-off compensation. A similar view was taken in Rohtak Hissar District Electricity S upply Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Utter Pradesh and Others , wherein the Court held this. The last part of Section 25J(2) categorically provides that the rights and liabilities of the employers and workmen in relation to lay-off shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Chapt. V-A of the Central Act. This clearly means that in regard to the payment of compensation for the lay-off and retrenchment the relevant provisions of the Central Act will apply and not those of the U.P. Act. Section 25-J(2) makes Chapt. V-A of the Central Act applicable to disputes in relation to compensation for lay-off, notwithstanding Sections 6-K and 6-R of the U.P. Act, and amongst the provisions thus made applicable by Section 25-J(2) the proviso to Section 25J(1) under which the Standing Orders which gave more favourable benefits to the employees in respect of compensation for lay-off, will prevail over the provisions of the Central Act.” 33.Therefore, it was not open to the Labour Court to hold that the minutes of the agreement entered into between the CITU Union and the Khadi Board would constitute a settlement capable of overriding or replacing an award passed by the Industrial Tribunal. In this context, the learned senior counsel for the workmen drew the attention of this Court to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Brooke Bond India Ltd. v. The Workmen , reported in (1981) 3 SCC 493, and relied upon the following passage found in paragraph 7, which reads as follows:– “It was argued on behalf of the appellant that as the agreement was signed in the manner prescribed by rule 62 (2) (b) and as the requirements of rule 62 (4) have been complied with, the agreement must be accepted as a settlement within the meaning of section 2 (p) of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such binding on the Rashtriya Union under section 18 (1) of the Act. But, as pointed out by the Tribunal rule 62 only prescribes the form of the memorandum of settlement and by whom it should be signed, and the question whether the procedure prescribed by rule 62 has been complied with will arise only if there is in existence a valid settlement between the parties concerned. In this case it has been found that the office bearers who signed the agreement were not competent to enter into a settlement with the company and as such it cannot be said that an agreement was reached between the employer and the workmen represented by the Rashtriya Union. What is binding as a settlement under section 18 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act is an agreement between the employer and workmen. Here the Tribunal found that there was no agreement between management and the Rashtriya Union. Section 18 (1) makes a settlement arrived at between the employer and workmen otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings binding on the parties to the agreement. Under section 18 (3) an award of a Tribunal on publication shall be binding on all parties to the industrial dispute. In Sirsilk case difficulty was felt in giving effect to the settlement because the proceedings before the tribunal had ended and the tribunal had sent its award to the government before the settlement was arrived at. Under section 18 (3) an award of a Tribunal on publication shall be binding on all parties to the industrial dispute. In Sirsilk case difficulty was felt in giving effect to the settlement because the proceedings before the tribunal had ended and the tribunal had sent its award to the government before the settlement was arrived at. This Court held: "The only way in our view to resolve the possible conflict which would arise between a settlement which is binding under s. 18 (1) and an award which may become binding under s. 18 (3) on publication is to withhold the publication of the award once the Government has been informed jointly by the parties that a settlement binding under s . 18 (1) has been arrived at.. In such a situation we are of opinion that the government ought not to publish the award under s . 17 (1) and in cases where government is going to publish it, it can be directed not to publish the award in view of the binding settlement arrived at between the parties under s . 18 (1) with respect to the very matters which were the subject matter of adjudication under the award." We think this decision was relied on only to emphasize that a settlement reached between the parties concerned in the dispute must prevail if it is reached at any time before the publication of the award. That is undoubtedly so, but the question before us is different-which is, whether in fact a settlement within the meaning of section 2 (p) of the Industrial Disputes Act was reached. Other questions will arise only after it is found that there was such a settlement in existence.” 34.The witness examined on behalf of the Khadi Board (RW1), during his cross-examination conducted on 26.12.2018 and 22.01.2019, made the following statements with regard to the so-called settlement:– 35.It can therefore be conclusively held that the minutes of understanding entered into between the CITU Union and the Khadi Board do not qualify as a "settlement" within the meaning of Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Even assuming it to be a settlement, it cannot override or negate the benefits conferred on the workmen under the award in I.D. No. 100 of 2000 dated 10.05.2006, nor can it curtail their statutory entitlement under Section 25-O(6) of the Act. Even assuming it to be a settlement, it cannot override or negate the benefits conferred on the workmen under the award in I.D. No. 100 of 2000 dated 10.05.2006, nor can it curtail their statutory entitlement under Section 25-O(6) of the Act. 36.Despite this legal position, the learned counsel for the Khadi Board advanced three submissions. The first submission was based on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Herbertsons Limited v. The Workmen of Herbertsons Limited , reported in (1976) 4 SCC 736 . In that case, the Court considered a valid settlement, which was found to be just and fair, as capable of replacing an earlier award, particularly since it had the support of the majority of the workmen. In that context, the Supreme Court observed that once a valid settlement is reached, it must be accepted as a whole and cannot be dissected to declare some parts as good and others as bad. However, the said decision is clearly distinguishable and has no application to the present case. 37.The learned counsel further contended that the union which signed the minutes—namely, the CITU Union—had also filed W.P. No. 10814 of 2017 seeking enforcement of minimum wage benefits in respect of the soap-making units, and that the said writ petition was disposed of by order dated 10.08.2023. On that basis, it was argued that the workmen cannot approbate and reprobate; in other words, they cannot accept one part of the minutes while repudiating another. However, this contention is misplaced in the context of the present case. All the petitioners in the first writ petition had unequivocally refused to accept the 35% payment offered under the purported settlement and had instead approached the Labour Court seeking enforcement of the full benefits flowing from the award. Therefore, the question of approbation and reprobation does not arise. 38.Lastly, the learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bombay Chemical Industries v. Deputy Labour Commissioner , reported in (2022) 5 SCC 629 , to argue that a pre-existing right must be established before workmen can invoke Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and that in the present case, the Labour Court ought not to have examined the validity of the settlement. This argument is without merit. Firstly, there is no valid settlement in the eye of law in the present case. This argument is without merit. Firstly, there is no valid settlement in the eye of law in the present case. Secondly, the workmen’s entitlement to wages had already crystallized both under the statutory mandate of Section 25-O(6) of the Act and by way of the declaratory relief granted through the award in I.D. No. 100 of 2000. Thus, the pre-existing right necessary for invoking Section 33C(2) clearly existed. 39.Even otherwise, in respect of any claim arising under Chapter V-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, the remedies under both Sections 33C(1) and 33C(2) are available to the workmen. This position has been affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s. Agencia E. Sequeira & M/s. Fabril Gasosa v. Labour Commissioner , reported in (1997) 3 SCC 150 , wherein the Court held as follows:– “Besides the rights conferred under Section 33C (2) exist in addition to any other mode of recovery which the workman has under the law. an analysis of the scheme of Sections 33C (1) and 33C (2) shows that the difference between the two sub- sections is quite obvious. While the former sub-section deals with cases where money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter V-A or V-B, sub-section (2) deals with cases where a workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money. Thus, where the amount due to the workmen, flowing from the obligations under a settlement, is per-determined and ascertained or can be arrived at by any arithmetical calculation or simplicitor verification and the only inquiry that is required to be made is whether it is due to the workman or not, recourse to the summary proceedings under Section 33C (1) of the Act is not only appropriate but also desirable to prevent harassment to the workmen. Sub-section (1) of section 33C entitles the workmen to apply to the appropriate Government for issuance of a certificate of recovery for any money due to them under an award or a settlement or under the provisions of chapter-VA and the Government. If satisfied, that a specific sum is due to the workmen, is obliged to issue a certificate for the recovery of the amount due. If satisfied, that a specific sum is due to the workmen, is obliged to issue a certificate for the recovery of the amount due. After the requisite certificate is issued by the Government to the collector, the collector is under a statutory duty to recover the amounts due under the certificate issued to him. The procedure is aimed at providing a speedy, cheap and summary manner of recovery of the amount due, which the employer has wrongfully withheld. It, therefore, follows that where money due is on the basis of some amount predetermined like the VDA, the rate of which stands determined in terms of the settlement an award stands determined in terms of the settlement an award or under Chapter V-A or V-B, and the period for which the arrears are claimed is also known, the case would be covered by sub- section (1) as only a calculation of the amount is required to be made.” In view of the above, all the contentions raised by the counsel for the Khadi Board should necessarily fail. 40.The next question that arises is with regard to the relief to be granted in these two writ petitions. In the writ petition filed by the 40 petitioners, as well as in respect of the remaining 11 workers who are arrayed as respondents in the second writ petition, all the claimants are entitled to succeed in setting aside the common order passed by the III Additional Labour Court, Chennai in C.P. Nos. 117 to 150 and 152 to 168 of 2015 dated 30.04.2019. The finding of the Labour Court in the impugned order—that the workers are not entitled to any amount beyond the 35% provided under the so-called settlement—is not legal and proper. The workers are entitled to the full amount as per the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal in I.D. No. 100 of 2000, dated 10.05.2006. 41.However, it is seen that before the Labour Court, the workers had not only claimed back wages but also leave wages and bonus. These components were not considered or adjudicated upon by the Labour Court. Accordingly, while setting aside the common order dated 30.04.2019, all the claim petitions in C.P. Nos. 117 to 150 and 152 to 168 of 2015 are remanded to the Labour Court for fresh disposal on all issues, including the additional claims. These components were not considered or adjudicated upon by the Labour Court. Accordingly, while setting aside the common order dated 30.04.2019, all the claim petitions in C.P. Nos. 117 to 150 and 152 to 168 of 2015 are remanded to the Labour Court for fresh disposal on all issues, including the additional claims. 42.In the meantime, it is pertinent to note that in the proposal submitted by the Khadi Board to the Government, it was acknowledged that the workers were entitled to 85 months of back wages in terms of the award. The calculation sheet appended to the proposal also indicated that each worker was entitled to approximately Rs. 1,26,242/-. Therefore, each of the workers, or in the case of deceased workmen, their legal representatives, shall be entitled to receive the said amount forthwith, even before the claim petitions are re-heard. 43.Furthermore, in view of the statutory entitlement of the workers and the delay caused by the Khadi Board in effecting payment, the portion of the Labour Court’s order directing payment of interest at 9% per annum is kept intact. The Khadi Board is bound to pay interest at 9% per annum on the aforesaid amount from the date of filing of the respective claim petitions until the date of realisation. 44.In view of the above findings, W.P. No. 25467 of 2019 is allowed to the extent indicated above. Consequently, W.M.P. No. 24992 of 2019 stands dismissed. W.P. No. 3528 of 2020, challenging the grant of interest, is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.