JUDGMENT : Nitin Jamdar, C.J. 1. By these appeals filed under Section 5 of the KERALA HIGH COURT ACT , 1958, the Appellants have challenged the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 5 October 2023 in W.P.(C) No.22946 of 2023 directing the police authorities to provide police protection to the Original Petitioners to close down the gate in the subject property. 2. The Appellants in W.A. No.1866 of 2023 are Respondent Nos. 3 and 4, and the Appellant in W.A. No.2086 of 2023 is Respondent No. 5 in W.P.(C) No.22946 of 2023. Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 are the children of Respondent No. 3. The writ petition was filed by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2/Original Petitioners. 3. The Petitioners filed the writ petition stating that the Appellants are preventing the Petitioners from enjoying their property, obstructing the closing of the gate, and threatening them. Therefore, they approached the Respondent – police authorities with a complaint and since no action was taken, a writ of mandamus was sought against the Respondent – police authorities, directing them to provide effective police protection to the Petitioners to ensure their peaceful enjoyment of the property, to close and lock the gate. 4. The learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment allowed the writ petition and directed the police authorities to provide adequate and effective police protection to the Petitioners for closing the gate on the eastern side of the disputed way in question, which was the subject matter of the civil suit, O.S. No.190 of 2013 on the file of the First Additional Munsiff Court, Ernakulam. Being aggrieved, the Appellants are before this Court with these appeals. 5. We have heard Mr. C. Anilkumar, learned counsel for the Appellants in W.A. No.1866 of 2023, Mr. K. S. Frijo, learned counsel for the Appellant in W.A. No.2086 of 2023, Mr. Santhosh Mathew, learned Senior Advocate along with Mr. A. A. Mohammed Nazir, learned counsel for the Respondents/Original Petitioners, and Dr. Thushara James, learned Senior Government Pleader. 6. The main contention raised by the Appellants is that by directing police protection to lock the gate, the learned Single Judge entered into the civil dispute between the parties, and the remedy of the Petitioners was to approach the civil court. A. A. Mohammed Nazir, learned counsel for the Respondents/Original Petitioners, and Dr. Thushara James, learned Senior Government Pleader. 6. The main contention raised by the Appellants is that by directing police protection to lock the gate, the learned Single Judge entered into the civil dispute between the parties, and the remedy of the Petitioners was to approach the civil court. It was contended that, in fact, the Petitioners had sought similar reliefs in their counter-claim in O.S. No.190 of 2013, which was dismissed by the Additional Munsiff Court and against the said dismissal, no appeal was preferred by the Petitioners. It was contended that a relief specifically declined by the civil court cannot be sought indirectly by seeking police protection. It was contended that if at all there is any injunction, the civil court also has the power to enforce its own order under Order XXXIX Rule 2A or Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, with police aid and there was no law and order situation. Therefore, a writ of mandamus ought not to have been issued. 7. The learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Original Petitioners contended that there is no bar to the issue of a writ of mandamus even in a dispute of a civil nature, and that the Petitioners need not be relegated to the remedy before the civil court. He relied upon the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of M/s. Essar Telecom Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. C.I. of Police, Angamali Police Station, 2010 (2) KHC 445 (FB). He contended that the Appellants had specifically sought to establish their right of easement and had failed, and that the Petitioners, being the owners of the property, are entitled to police protection for the beneficial enjoyment thereof. It was submitted that there was no error in granting police protection by the learned Single Judge. 8. The family members are in dispute over a property with an extent of 32 cents, located in Survey No.608 of Nadama Village. According to the Respondents/Original Petitioners, this property belonged to late Kittunny, father of late M.K.Rajappan and M.K.Aravindakshan – Respondent No. 3. There was a partition deed in the property and also a gift deed. 8. The family members are in dispute over a property with an extent of 32 cents, located in Survey No.608 of Nadama Village. According to the Respondents/Original Petitioners, this property belonged to late Kittunny, father of late M.K.Rajappan and M.K.Aravindakshan – Respondent No. 3. There was a partition deed in the property and also a gift deed. It was stated that there is a temple situated on the eastern side of the property where there was a motorable pathway, and it is the case of the Petitioners that in the settlement deed wide passage was provided on the southern extremity of the Petitioners’ property to enable the Appellants to have access to the temple road on the east. 9. The suit filed by the Appellants in W.A. No.1866 of 2023 before the Munsiff Court, Ernakulam was for a declaration that they have a prescriptive easementary right over the plaint B schedule way for the enjoyment of plaint A schedule property, and an injunction restraining the Petitioners from causing any obstruction or from destroying the pillars of the gate at its entrance. It was the case of the Appellants that, as per the settlement deed, they had obtained a portion of the property and were entitled to ownership and enjoyment thereof. Due to an accidental slip, the existence of the building was omitted from the document executed by the father of the Appellants, despite the fact that he had renovated it and had access to it via the plaint B schedule pathway. It was also stated that the pathway is necessary for the beneficial enjoyment of the scheduled property. 10. The Petitioners had filed a written statement along with a counter- claim. In the counter-claim, the Petitioners sought an injunction against the Appellants in respect of the subject property. The Munsiff Court framed issues in the suit as regards the claim of the Appellants for permanent prohibitory injunction, whether the Petitioners had title over the written statement A schedule property, and whether they were entitled to a permanent prohibitory injunction as prayed for. The Munsiff Court framed issues in the suit as regards the claim of the Appellants for permanent prohibitory injunction, whether the Petitioners had title over the written statement A schedule property, and whether they were entitled to a permanent prohibitory injunction as prayed for. The reliefs sought in the counter-claim by the Petitioners are reproduced hereunder: (a) Pass a decree for fixation of the southern and western boundaries of the written statement A schedule property adjoining the plaint A schedule property of the plaintiffs after due measurement and demarcation of the same by an Advocate Commissioner with the help of Taluk Surveyor, Kanayannur on the basis of Settlement Deed No.3471/1982 of the SRO, Trippunithura and relevant survey sketches. (b) Pass a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the plaintiffs, their men and agents from trespassing into the written statement A schedule property, causing any obstruction to the defendants, their family members and their tenants in using the written statement A schedule property from locking the Eastern Gate in plaint B schedule property, from in any way changing the character of the written statement A schedule property and from doing anything detrimental to the defendant’s right to use the same.” The Petitioners in the counter-claim also asserted exclusive ownership and possession over the A schedule property. The Petitioners in the counter-claim stated that they apprehended that the Appellants were likely to obstruct the Petitioners from using the schedule A property and concrete or tar the B schedule property so as to assert the right which they have claimed. The Munsiff Court dismissed both the suit and the counter-claim by judgment dated 22 January 2018. 11. Against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsiff, the Appellants filed A.S. No.22 of 2018 before the District Court, Ernakulam. No appeal was filed by the Petitioners against the rejection of their counter-claim. The appeal was dismissed by the Additional District Judge by judgment dated 28 September 2021, against which R.S.A No.813 of 2021 was filed before this Court. The second appeal was dismissed by the learned Single Judge by judgment dated 6 March 2023. 12. The impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge refers to the contentions of the parties on the merits of the above civil dispute. The second appeal was dismissed by the learned Single Judge by judgment dated 6 March 2023. 12. The impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge refers to the contentions of the parties on the merits of the above civil dispute. After referring to paragraphs 1 to 6 of the petition, in paragraph 7, the observations of the trial court are referred to and it is observed that the Appellants have no right to interfere with the act of the Petitioners in closing the eastern gate. Consequently, the learned Single Judge directed that the Petitioners shall be provided police protection for closing the gate. However, there is no reference to the existence of any law and order situation. The order issued in the impugned judgment is based only on the civil rights of the parties. 13. Apart from the contention of the Appellants that relief in favour of the Petitioners, even though prayed for, was not granted by the civil court, the basic question that arises is the parameters of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in issuing a writ of mandamus to the Police. 14. The Petitioners had invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court seeking a writ of mandamus directing the Respondent – police authorities to extend police protection. The broad contours of the exercise of writ jurisdiction are settled. This prerogative remedy is a discretionary remedy. The writ of mandamus is ordinarily issued to enforce the performance of a statutory duty where the public officer has the power but has refused to exercise it. 15. In the petition, a writ of mandamus was sought against the Police officers. The duty of a police officer is prescribed under Section 27 of the KERALA POLICE ACT , 2011, which provides that every police officer has to undertake all reasonable and lawful activities for the efficient and effective discharge of the duties specified under the Act, with respect to the maintenance of law and order and the prevention of danger. Section 149 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 168 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) provides that every police officer may interpose for the purpose of preventing, and shall, to the best of his ability, prevent the commission of any cognizable offence. Section 149 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 168 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) provides that every police officer may interpose for the purpose of preventing, and shall, to the best of his ability, prevent the commission of any cognizable offence. Under these provisions, it is the duty of the police authorities to maintain law and order, and despite a serious apprehension of a law and order situation, if the police authorities refuse to act, a writ of mandamus can be issued. While issuing a writ of mandamus to the police authorities to prevent or stop law and order issues, the Court is primarily concerned with maintaining public peace and preventing the deleterious effects of a deteriorating law and order situation. The Court is not primarily concerned with the adjudication of civil rights between the parties as it falls within the domain of the civil court. 16. In the case of P.R. Muralidharan and Others v. Swami Dharmananda Theertha Padar and Others , (2006) 4 SCC 501 the Hon’ble Supreme Court had occasion to consider a case seeking a writ of mandamus directing the police authorities to extend police protection. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: “17. A writ petition under the guise of seeking a writ of mandamus directing the police authorities to give protection to a writ petitioner, cannot be made a forum for adjudicating on civil rights. It is one thing to approach the High Court, for issuance of such a writ on a plea that a particular party has not obeyed a decree or an order of injunction passed in favour of the writ petitioner, was deliberately flouting that decree or order and in spite of the petitioner applying for it, or that the police authorities are not giving him the needed protection in terms of the decree or order passed by a court with jurisdiction. But, it is quite another thing to seek a writ of mandamus directing protection in respect of property, status or right which remains to be adjudicated upon and when such an adjudication can only be got done in a properly instituted civil suit. But, it is quite another thing to seek a writ of mandamus directing protection in respect of property, status or right which remains to be adjudicated upon and when such an adjudication can only be got done in a properly instituted civil suit. It would be an abuse of process for a writ petitioner to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ of mandamus directing the police authorities to protect his claimed possession of a property without first establishing his possession in an appropriate civil court. The temptation to grant relief in cases of this nature should be resisted by the High Court. The wide jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would remain effective and meaningful only when it is exercised prudently and in appropriate situations.” *** The question as regards the grant of relief for providing police protection came up before the Division Bench of this Court in Sadananda Bai T.V. v. C.M. Ravi and Others , 2008 (3) KLT 542 wherein it was observed as follows: “Recently, the "police protection jurisdiction" is being converted into a special original jurisdiction, not conferred by the Constitution. Under the guise of seeking police protection, civil disputes are raised before this Court, calling upon it to make a prima facie adjudication and based on that finding, ask the police to render assistance to the party, whose right has been, prima facie, found by this Court to be infringed. This Court has no such power to follow the above procedure under the Constitution. The High Court has no power to adjudicate the disputes between private parties, while exercising its power of judicial review. The powers of this Court to issue writs under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are well settled. This Court can issue a mandamus to the police to perform their duty enjoined upon them by the statutes.” *** In the case of Kondo Syokai Leisure India (P) Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Police and Others, 2018 SCC Online Ker 22605 the Division Bench of this Court made a reference to the above two decisions and held as follows: “18. In view of the settled legal principles, the irresistible conclusion that we arrive at, is that the disputed questions in regard to the title and possession of the properties over which the petitioner asserts title and possession, cannot have been the subject matter for adjudication by a writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India under the guise of police protection for the reasons which we have adverted to earlier. We are of the considered view that the petitioner cannot claim relief by way of police protection and the remedy of the petitioner is to pursue its appropriate action before the competent Civil Court. The writ petition is liable to be dismissed. However, we make it clear that the dismissal will be without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to seek appropriate reliefs before the competent civil court, if so advised in accordance with law and as and when the petitioner sets the law in motion, such court is at liberty to decide the matter untrammelled by the observations contained in this judgment.” *** In the case of Rajendran Kambakkaram C.K. v. State of Kerala and Othes , 2022 (5) KLT 915 the Division Bench of this Court observed that the police cannot be made adjudicators of civil disputes. A similar view was taken by the Division Benches in the cases of Suseela v. State of Kerala , 2008 (4) KLT 561 , Kallai Abu v. Sub Inspector of Police, Malappuram and Others , 2013 (1) KLT 320 and V.O. John v. Circle Inspector of Police, Kalloorkadu Police Station & Others, 2018 KHC 3260. 17. In the case of M/s. Essar Telecom Infrastructure (P) Ltd., relied upon by the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Petitioners, the issue referred to the Full Bench was to reconcile the jurisdiction to grant police protection under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with the remedy available before the civil court, notwithstanding any failure on the part of the police to discharge their duty. In the case before the Full Bench, a law and order situation had arisen when local inhabitants were forcefully obstructing the construction or energisation of mobile base stations. In these circumstances, it was held that the police cannot act as silent spectators. In the case before the Full Bench, a law and order situation had arisen when local inhabitants were forcefully obstructing the construction or energisation of mobile base stations. In these circumstances, it was held that the police cannot act as silent spectators. The Full Bench while answering the reference also observed that the construction of mobile base station, by itself, will not give rise to a dispute of purely civil nature to be relegated to the civil court merely for the reason that a section of the public apprehends that it might cause health hazards and if the mobile tower companies had obtained requisite permissions, nobody can physically obstruct such work. Therefore, it was held that in the event of obstruction by a member of the public to the construction of a mobile tower, the affected party could not be relegated to the civil court. The Full Bench noticed the divergent views of the Division Bench and also noticed the remedy available under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for violation of an injunction order. The Full Bench opined that if there is not much disputed facts which require evidence, the party need not be relegated to civil court, and that there is a statutory duty cast upon the police under Sections 29(b), (d), (h), and (r) of the KERALA POLICE ACT , 1960 and Section 149 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to prevent the commission of any cognizable offence and meet the threat to law and order. The Full Bench held that where there are no disputed questions of fact that need to be adjudicated, and a threat to law and order emerges, then a writ of mandamus can be issued. 18. In the cases at hand, both parties had sought injunctions and declarations, which were dismissed. The Petitioners in their counter-claim thus sought to restrain the Appellants and their men from trespassing into the A schedule property, from locking the eastern gate in plaint B schedule property, and from doing anything detrimental to the right to use the same, and also sought fixation of the boundary of the schedule A property. The counter-claim was dismissed by the Munsiff, against which no appeal was filed by the Petitioners. According to the Petitioners, even assuming the position to be this, still being the owners, they can protect the property and seek police protection. The counter-claim was dismissed by the Munsiff, against which no appeal was filed by the Petitioners. According to the Petitioners, even assuming the position to be this, still being the owners, they can protect the property and seek police protection. 19. It is essential to note that police assistance under the CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE , 1908, and police protection to be ordered under Article 226 of the Constitution of India stand on a different footing. The Court has to ensure that all prerequisites for issuing a writ of mandamus are met before directing the police authorities to provide protection to private parties. The existence of a threat to law and order is a jurisdictional fact for the issuance of the writ of mandamus. This jurisdictional fact needs to be established before a writ of mandamus can be issued. In a given case, the remedy of the party to approach the civil court and/or to invoke Order XXXIX Rule 2A or Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 may exists, and in some cases, to other competent adjudicating forum. While exercising writ jurisdiction, the existence of an alternate remedy is a relevant factor to be kept in mind. 20. The impugned judgment does not record any finding as to the existence of any law and order situation, but simpliciter refers to the civil rights of the parties. The police authorities had taken a stand that there is no such law and order perceived, and the parties will have to approach the civil court. The impugned judgment, rendered without recording the existence of jurisdictional facts and based merely on findings in the civil dispute, that too, only partial findings, cannot be sustained. 21. The learned counsel for the Appellants submitted that, pursuant to the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge, the Petitioners have closed the gate and that the earlier position be now restored. However, it is to be noted that the impugned judgment was rendered on 5 October 2023, and the Appeals have since been pending without any interim order. Though the case was referred for mediation, the mediation has failed. The position as complained of has continued for almost two years. 22. However, it is to be noted that the impugned judgment was rendered on 5 October 2023, and the Appeals have since been pending without any interim order. Though the case was referred for mediation, the mediation has failed. The position as complained of has continued for almost two years. 22. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the impugned judgment needs to be set aside and petition needs to be restored to the file of the learned Single Judge, to ascertain whether the jurisdictional fact for issuance of a writ of mandamus, namely, the existence of a threat to law and order, was established; whether, in the circumstances, the alternate remedy is more appropriate; and whether an order of status quo ante, that is, opening of the lock put up pursuant to the impugned judgment, needs to be granted leaving it to the parties to approach the civil court. 23. Accordingly, the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 5 October 2023 in W.P.(C) No.22946 of 2023 is quashed and set aside, and the petition filed by the Respondents/Original Petitioners stands restored to the file. Leave is granted to the Appellants to take out an application for early hearing of the Petition and/or restoration of status quo ante. 24. The Appeals are accordingly disposed of. 25. Though the police protection jurisdiction has been routinely invoked in the State over several years, it has to be now borne in mind that over the years the demands on the police force have grown manifold. The police force operates with limited resources and has to attend to various duties, often emergent ones. Routinely ordering police protection under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, without the apprehension of serious law and order issues being established, would divert the time and energy of the police force from areas where genuine law and order issues exist. Thus, orders for police protection may have implications extending beyond the parties before the Court, and this is a factor which the writ court ought to keep in mind.