Research › Search › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

2025 DIGILAW 226 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Babubhai Bhojabhai Parmar

2025-03-07

S.V.PINTO

body2025
JUDGMENT : S.V. PINTO, J. 1. The appeal is filed by the appellant State under Section 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the judgement and order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Surendranagar, Limdi Camp (hereinafter referred to as “the learned Trial Court”) in Sessions Case No. 75/2007 on 04.12.2008, whereby, the learned Trial Court has acquitted the respondent for the offence punishable under Sections 306 , 498A and 114 of IPC . 1.1 The respondents are hereinafter referred to as “the accused” as they stood in the original case for the sake of convenience, clarity and brevity. 2. The brief facts that emerge from the record of the case are as under: 2.1 The accused no. 1 is the husband, accused nos. 2, 3 and 6 are the brothers-in-law, accused no. 5 is the mother- in-law and accused nos. 4 and 7 are the sisters-in-law of deceased Kamlaben who was married to the accused no. 1 on 17.01.2006. On 17.05.2007, deceased Kamlaben Babubhai went into the toilet situated outside of the house and arranged pieces of dung cakes and wooden pieces on the floor of the toilet and sprinkled kerosene on herself and on the dung cakes and wooden pieces and set herself ablaze after closing the iron door of the toilet. The children nearby found smoke and fire emitting from the toilet and informed the in-laws of the deceased residing in the village and they came and informed the police and found that she was burnt completely. The complainant Bhagwanbhai Khetabhai Rathod - the father of the deceased filed a complaint that his daughter Kamla was being harassed by the accused and hence, she committed suicide due to the harassment of the accused and the offence was registered under section 306, 498A and 114 of the IPC which was registered at Muli Police Station I - C.R. No. 45 of 2007. 2.2 The Investigating Officer recorded the statements of the connected witnesses and seized the necessary documents and after completion of investigation, a charge- sheet came to be filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Muli and as the said offences against the accused were exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Sessions Court, Surendranagar, Limdi Camp as per the provisions of Section 209 of Code of Criminal Procedure and the case was registered as Sessions Case No. 75/2007. 2.3 The accused were duly served with the summons and the accused appeared before the learned Trial Court and it was verified whether the copies of all the police papers were provided to the accused as per the provisions of Section 207 of the Code and a charge at Exh. 6 was framed against the accused and the statement of the accused were recorded at Exhs. 7 to 13, wherein, the accused denied the contents of the charge and the entire evidence of the prosecution was taken on record. 2.4 The prosecution produced the following evidence to bring home the charge against the accused. ORAL EVIDENCE Sr. No. PW Name of the witness Exh. 1 1 Dr. Kumar Asit Ramapatikumar 16 2 2 Bhagwanbhai Keshabhai 29 3 3 Jashuben w/o Bhagwanbhai Khetabhai Rathod 31 4 4 Kantaben Rameshbhai 32 5 5 K.R. Parmar 33 6 6 S. M. Dhandhal 38 7 7 S.D. Rana 41 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE Sr. No. Particulars Exh. 1 Postmortem Report 20 2 Inquest Panchnama 21 3 Panchnama of place of offence 22 4 Complaint 30 5 Note for sending Muddamaal 42 6 Receipt of Muddamaal received 43 7 Letter of FSL Junagadh 44 8 Report 45 9 FSL Report of Mobile Van 46 10 Letter of blood sample collected 47 11 Letter for using Scientific Report 48 12 Report of FSL Junagadh 49 2.5 After the learned APP filed the closing pursis, the further statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was recorded, wherein, the accused denied all the evidence of the prosecution on record. After the arguments of the learned APP and the learned advocate for the accused were heard, the learned Trial Court by the impugned judgement and order was pleased to acquit the accused from the charges levelled against them. 3. After the arguments of the learned APP and the learned advocate for the accused were heard, the learned Trial Court by the impugned judgement and order was pleased to acquit the accused from the charges levelled against them. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgement and order of acquittal, the appellant State has filed the present appeal mainly stating that the learned Trial Court has not considered the oral and documentary evidences in proper perspective and has erred in holding that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubts. The complainant has fully supported the case of the prosecution and the caste certificate of the complainant is produced on record. The learned Trial Court has not considered the evidences produced on record and even though there is nothing on record that the incident has not occurred, the learned Trial Court has disbelieved the case of the prosecution. The prosecution has successfully established the case against the respondents and the judgement and order of acquittal is unwarranted, illegal and without any basis in the eyes of law and the reasons stated while acquitting the respondent are improper, perverse and bad in law and hence, the impugned judgement and order must be quashed and set aside. 4. Heard learned APP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri for the appellant State. Though served, the respondents have not appeared before this Court either in person or through an advocate. Perused the impugned judgement and order of acquittal and have reappreciated the entire evidence of the prosecution on record of the case. 5. Learned APP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri has taken this Court through the entire evidence of the prosecution on record of the case and submitted that the complainant has fully supported the facts of his complaint. The impugned judgement and order is perverse and learned APP has urged this Court to quash and set aside the same and find the respondent guilty for the offences. 6. At the outset, before discussing the facts of the present case, it would be appropriate to refer to the observations of the Apex Court regarding the scope of interference in acquittal appeals in the case of Chandrappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka reported in 2007 (4) SCC 415 , wherein, the Apex Court has observed as under: Recently, in Kallu Vs. Vs. State of Karnataka reported in 2007 (4) SCC 415 , wherein, the Apex Court has observed as under: Recently, in Kallu Vs. State of M.P. (2006) 10 SCC 313 , this Court stated: "While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial court". From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. 7. The law with regard to acquittal appeals is well crystallized and in acquittal appeals, there is presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and it has finally culminated when a case ends in an acquittal. The learned Trial Court has appreciated all the evidence and when the learned Trial Court has come to a conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the case beyond reasonable doubts, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused gets strengthened. There is no inhibition to re appreciate the evidence by the Appellate Court but if after re appreciation, the view taken by the learned Trial Court was a possible view, there is no reason for the Appellate Court to interfere in the same. 8. As the appeal pertains to a case under Section 306 of the IPC , it would be appropriate to reproduce the observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mahendra Awase vs The State of Madhya Pradhesh Criminal Appeal No. 221/2025 (@ SLP(Cr) No. 11868/2023) passed on 17th January, 2025 which is as under: 11. Section 306 of the IPC reads as under:- “306. Abetment of suicide. If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 12. Section 107 of the IPC reads as under:- “107. Abetment of a thing.-A person abets the doing of a thing, who- First. - Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly. Section 107 of the IPC reads as under:- “107. Abetment of a thing.-A person abets the doing of a thing, who- First. - Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly. - Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly. - Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.” As is clear from the plain language of the Sections to attract the ingredient of Section 306, the accused should have abetted the commission of a suicide. A person abets the doing of a thing who Firstly - instigates any person to do that thing or Secondly - engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing or Thirdly - intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. 13. In Swamy Prahaladdas vs. State of M.P. and Another, [1995 Supp (3) SCC 438], the appellant remarked to the deceased that 'go and die' and the deceased thereafter, committed suicide. This Court held that:- "3. ...Those words are casual nature which are often employed in the heat of the moment between quarreling people. Nothing serious is expected to follow thereafter. The said act does not reflect the requisite 'mens rea' on the assumption that these words would be carried out in all events. …" 14. In Madan Mohan Singh vs. State of Gujarat and Another, (2010) 8 SCC 628 , this Court held that in order to bring out an offence under Section 306 IPC specific abetment as contemplated by Section 107 IPC on the part of the accused with an intention to bring about the suicide of the person concerned as a result of that abetment is required. It was further held that the intention of the accused to aid or to instigate or to abet the deceased to commit suicide is a must for attracting Section 306 . 15. In Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu vs. State of West Bengal, (2010) 1 SCC 707 , this Court held as under:- “12. It was further held that the intention of the accused to aid or to instigate or to abet the deceased to commit suicide is a must for attracting Section 306 . 15. In Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu vs. State of West Bengal, (2010) 1 SCC 707 , this Court held as under:- “12. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC , the court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative but to put an end to her life. It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable. [Emphasis supplied] 16. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 IPC there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC . 17. M. Mohan vs. State, (2011) 3 SCC 626 followed Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 , wherein it was held as under:- 41. This Court in SCC para 20 of Ramesh Kumar has examined different shades of the meaning of "instigation". Para 20 reads as under: (SCC p. 629) “20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do 'an act'. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Para 20 reads as under: (SCC p. 629) “20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do 'an act'. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation." In the said case this Court came to the conclusion that there is no evidence and material available on record where-from an inference of the appellant accused having abetted commission of suicide by Seema (the appellant's wife therein) may necessarily be drawn.” Thereafter, this Court in Mohan (supra) held:- 45. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court are clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and this act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he/she committed suicide.” [Emphasis supplied] 9. In light of the above settled principle of law, the evidence of the prosecution is dissected and the prosecution has examined PW1 – Dr. Kumar Asit Ramapatikumar at Exh. 16 and witness is the Medical Officer at CHC Muli, who has conducted the postmortem on the dead body of the deceased Kamlaben on 17.05.2007. The witness has produced the postmortem note at Exh. 20 and he stated that there were dermo epidermal burns seen all over the body except exterior surface of both elbow joints and front of both lower leg just below the anterior part of both knees joints in superficial part of muscles and skin and all the injuries were antemortem. The cause of death was cardiorespiratory failure due to hypovolemic shock due to burns. The cause of death was cardiorespiratory failure due to hypovolemic shock due to burns. There was an eight month foetus and after dissecting out the uterus, a dead male child was found with no sign of burns but only cyanosis was present on the peripheral part and the cause of death of the child was insufficient blood through placenta field circulation and asphyxia due to burn of his mother. During the cross- examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that there were no marks of hurt or force on the body of the deceased and the injuries were suicidal. 8.1 The prosecution has examined PW2 – Bhagwanbhai Keshabhai at Exh. 29 and the witness is the complainant who has narrated all the details of the complaint which is produced at Exh. 30. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that his daughter was married as per the customs of their community and after marriage, his son-in-law and his daughter were living happily. That his son-in-law is doing centring work with a contractor at Surendranagar and all the accused have separate ration cards. The accused no. 7 has two children and his daughter did not inform him about any harassment by any letter or no police complaint was filed about any harassment. That in the complaint, he has not mentioned that his son-in-law had demanded for any money and the final rites of his daughter were conducted at her matrimonial home. That he had gone to the Surendranagar Police Station to file a complaint and after the incident, his daughter was taken to the hospital at Muli. That he has not given any reason regarding the delay in filing the complaint and when he went to file the complaint 4 to 5 persons of the village, his wife and others were with him. 8.2 The prosecution has examined PW3 - Jashuben w/o Bhagwanbhai Khetabhai Rathod at Exh. 31 and the witness is the mother of the deceased and wife of the complainant who has supported the case of the prosecution. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused the witness has stated that her daughter was living happily at her matrimonial home and her son-in-law was residing at Surendranagar for his work with the contractor. That her son-in-law was earning Rs. 4000/- to Rs. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused the witness has stated that her daughter was living happily at her matrimonial home and her son-in-law was residing at Surendranagar for his work with the contractor. That her son-in-law was earning Rs. 4000/- to Rs. 5000/- per month and he used to give her daughter money for the household expenses. The accused have two to three houses at Shekhpar village and the accused no. 2 is residing separately with his family. The accused no. 7 was married ten years prior to the marriage of her daughter and all the accused are residing separately with their own families. That her daughter never wrote any letter regarding the harassment of the accused and her son-in-law had never asked for any money from her. That they all had gone to Shekhpar village for the Baby Shower Function of her daughter and the function was celebrated nicely and her daughter was given new clothes. That no complaint was filed about any harassment given to her daughter and the police had merely asked her name and details; and left. 8.3 The prosecution has examined PW4 - Kantaben Rameshbhai at Exh. 32 and the witness is the aunt of the deceased who has supported the case of the prosecution. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that all the accused are living separately and they have their own separate kitchens and the deceased and her husband were living separately in their separate house. She had stated that the deceased was burnt on the basis of a doubt and she has not stated in her statement before the police or anywhere else that the deceased was burnt by the accused. 8.4 The prosecution has examined PW5 - K.R. Parmar at Exh. 33. The witness is the Investigating Officer who has investigated Accident Death No. 8/2007, which was registered under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on 18.05.2007. The witness has stated that he had gone to the place of incident and the inquest panchnama was drawn and he had recorded the statements of the connected witnesses. The complaint was filed by the father of the deceased Bhagwanbhai Khetabhai Rathod on 20.05.2007 and he had recorded the complaint in his presence which is produced at Exh. 30. The witness has stated that he had gone to the place of incident and the inquest panchnama was drawn and he had recorded the statements of the connected witnesses. The complaint was filed by the father of the deceased Bhagwanbhai Khetabhai Rathod on 20.05.2007 and he had recorded the complaint in his presence which is produced at Exh. 30. During the cross- examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that the accident death was registered on 17.05.2007 and the complaint was registered on 20.05.2007. 8.5 The prosecution has examined PW6 - Shivrajkumar Merambhai Dhandhal at Exh. 38. The witness is the Investigating Officer who has drawn the panchama of the place of offence in the presence of panch witnesses and has seized the necessary muddamaal which is produced at Exh. 22. That after the complaint was filed, the investigation was handed over to him and he had recorded the statement of the connected witnesses. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that the complaint was filed after the delay of four to five days and no reason for delay in filing of the complaint was given by the complainant. 8.6 The prosecution has examined PW7 - Shivbhadrasinh Ghanshyamsinh Rana at Exh. 41 and the witness is the Investigating Officer who has investigated the offence and narrated the procedure undertaken by him during investigation. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that the information was first received on 17.01.2007 and an accident death was registered and the complaint was registered on 20.05.2007 and no reason for delay in filing of the complaint was given. During investigation, it was found that all the accused were residing separately in their separate houses and the husband of the deceased was working at Surendranagar. 9. On reappreciation of the entire evidence of the prosecution, there is no iota of evidence that the accused were physically and mentally harassing the deceased and immediately preceding the incident, whether the deceased had met the accused and there was any reason for a quarrel between them. 9. On reappreciation of the entire evidence of the prosecution, there is no iota of evidence that the accused were physically and mentally harassing the deceased and immediately preceding the incident, whether the deceased had met the accused and there was any reason for a quarrel between them. The evidence that has emerged on record is that the husband of the deceased was working at Surendranagar with a contractor and residing there and the deceased was separately residing from all the accused and at the time of the incident, she was eight months pregnant and she herself went into the toilet and set herself ablaze after arranging dunk cakes and pieces of wood and sprinkling kerosene on the same. The accidental death was registered and the same was investigated and after a period of four days, the complainant filed the complaint which appears to be as an afterthought and even though the accused no. 7 was married for ten years, she too has been roped in as an accused in the case. There is nothing on record to suggest that the accused were in touch with the deceased and whether immediately prior to the incident, they had incited, abetted or goaded her to commit suicide. 10. In view of the settled position of law in the decisions of Mahendra Awase (supra), the learned Trial Court has appreciated the entire evidence in proper perspective and there does not appear to be any infirmity and illegality in the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. The learned Trial Court has appreciated all the evidence and this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Trial Court was completely justified in acquitting the accused of the charges leveled against them. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are absolutely just and proper and no illegality or infirmity has been committed by the learned Trial Court and this Court is in complete agreement with the findings, ultimate conclusion and the resultant order of acquittal recorded by the learned Trial Court. This Court finds no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order and the present appeal is devoid of merits and resultantly, the same is dismissed. 11. The impugned judgement and order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Surendranagar, Limdi Camp in Sessions Case No. 75/2007 on 04.12.2008, is hereby confirmed. 12. Bail bond stands cancelled. This Court finds no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order and the present appeal is devoid of merits and resultantly, the same is dismissed. 11. The impugned judgement and order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Surendranagar, Limdi Camp in Sessions Case No. 75/2007 on 04.12.2008, is hereby confirmed. 12. Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.