ORDER : Y. Lakshmana Rao, J. The revision was directed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C .,’) against the judgment in Crl.A.No.174 of 2010 dated 28.10.2010 on the file of the learned III Additional Sessions Judge, (First Track Court), Bhimavaram, whereunder the judgment passed by the learned II Additional First Class Magistrate, Bhimavaram, in S.T.C.No.2 of 2009 dated 14.06.2010 imposing a fine of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand Only) on the revisionist for the commission of offence punishable under Section 14 (1) of Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation)Act, 1986 (for brevity ‘the Act’), was confirmed. 2. The case of the prosecution was that on 27.07.2007 at about 11:00 a.m, PW.2 G. Raju, Assistant Labour Officer had inspected the establishment of the revisionist along with PW.2 S. Amar Kumar, the Assistant Labour Officer and Inspector under ‘the Act’, 1 st Circle, Bhimavaram found a child worker by name Nakka Ramudu, aged about 12 years, therefore, a complaint under Section 14(1) of ‘the Act’, was filed. 3. The learned Trial Court examined PW.1 and PW.2 the officials of the Labour Department and got marked Ex.P1 to P6 during the trial. After considering the oral and documentary evidence the learned Trial Court imposed a sentence of minimum fine against the revisionist as mentioned above. 4. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. 5. Sri I.V.N. Raju, the learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the impugned judgment on the following grounds: a) There was no jurisdiction enjoined by the PW.1; b) No independent witnesses were examined; c) The learned Trial Court and the Appellate Court failed to appreciate the facts that the child was not working under the revisionist; d) The age of the alleged child labour was in serious dispute; e) There were serious contradictions and omissions in the statements of PW.1 and PW.2; f) The parents of the alleged child labour were not examined let alone child labour; g) No mediators were secured and no mediators report was drafted. Therefore, it was urged to interfere in the revision and set aside the impugned judgment. Alternatively, the learned counsel for the petitioner requested this Court to reduce the sentence of fine imposed on the revisionist. 6. Therefore, it was urged to interfere in the revision and set aside the impugned judgment. Alternatively, the learned counsel for the petitioner requested this Court to reduce the sentence of fine imposed on the revisionist. 6. Per contra, Mr K. Sandeep, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor vehemently argued that there was jurisdiction enjoined by the PW.1 as per Section 7 of ‘the Act’ because there was a notification empowering the Inspector to conduct raids; non-examination of independent witnesses is not fatal to the case of the prosecution since PW.1 and PW.2 are the direct witnesses of the occurrence and the special officers entrusted with the special powers under ‘the Act’. The contention that the child labour was not employed by the revisionist is untenable because PW.1 and PW.2 were the direct eye- witnesses who deposed that the child was employed in the establishment of the revisionist; the age of the child labour cannot be disputed since the certificate issued by the Head Master, Z.P.H.School, Polamur clearly shows that the age of the child labour was 12 years. The minimum sentence of fine was imposed on the petitioner is 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand Only) as per Section 14(1) of ‘the Act’. Therefore, less than that minimum fine amount, no fine amount can be imposed as it is against the statute; the learned Trail Court and the Appellate Court rightly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence and came to the correct conclusion and appropriately sentenced the revisionist; there are no grounds let alone the valid grounds raised in the revision and urged to dismiss the revision. 7. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. I have perused the record. 8. Now the point for consideration is: Whether the judgment in Crl.A.No.174 of 2010 dated 28.10.2010, passed by the learned III Additional Sessions Judge, (First Track Court), Bhimavaram, is correct, legal, and proper with respect to its finding, sentence, or judgment, and there are any material irregularities? And to what relief? 9. I have perused the record. 8. Now the point for consideration is: Whether the judgment in Crl.A.No.174 of 2010 dated 28.10.2010, passed by the learned III Additional Sessions Judge, (First Track Court), Bhimavaram, is correct, legal, and proper with respect to its finding, sentence, or judgment, and there are any material irregularities? And to what relief? 9. It is well settled by the Apex Court in Amarchand Agarwalla v. Santi Bose (1993) 4 SCC 10 that normally the revisional jurisdiction of the Court has to be exercised only in exceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law which has consequently resulted in flagrant miscarriage of justice. 10. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Kalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram , (1973) 2 SCC 583 (1973) 2 SCC 583 held that inspite of wide language of Section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 ( Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ) which empowered the High Court to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any findings, sentence or order recorded or passed by any inferior Court within my jurisdiction and as to the regularity of proceedings of such inferior Court and inspite of the fact that under this provision of law this Court can exercise interalia the power conferred on a Court of appeal, this Court is not supposed to exercise revisional jurisdiction as if it is hearing an appeal. The power being discretionary, it has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily or lightly. Judicial discretion, as has often been said, means a discretion which in informed by tradition, methodized by analogy and disciplined by system. 11. PW.1 and PW.2 being the labour officers, who have enjoined the special powers under ‘the Act’, had conducted the inspection on the establishment of the revisionist and noticed that a child labour was being employed in the establishment. Ex.P4 certificate clearly shows that the child was at that time 12 years. PWs.1 and 2 in crystal clear terms testified that child labour was employed in the establishment, there was no need to secure the mediators. The parents of the minor child need not be examined in this case because PW.1 and PW.2, being the special officers and direct witnesses, noticed that child labour was employed in the establishment of the revisionist. 12. The parents of the minor child need not be examined in this case because PW.1 and PW.2, being the special officers and direct witnesses, noticed that child labour was employed in the establishment of the revisionist. 12. The explanation given by the revisionist under Ex.P5 is not plausible and convincing. It is important to note that Ex.P1 is the inspection report, which was signed by the revisionist and the child labour. This important fact was not disputed by the revisionist. In the absence of animosity suggested to PW.1 and PW.2 by the revisionist that a false case was foisted, the evidence of PW.1 and PW.2, who are the official witnesses, cannot be thrown away lightly. PW.1 being the Assistant Labour Officer is a notified Inspector under Section 17 of ‘the Act’. It is immaterial whether the establishment was a tea buddi or a fast-food center for the reason that the child labour aged about 12 years was employed. PW.1 noted the identification marks of child labour in the inspection report. There was no response from the revisionist against the demand notice under Ex.P2 issued on 15.11.2007 requiring the revisionist to deposit the compensation of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand Only) in favour of the West Godavari Child Labour Rehabilitation cum Welfare Fund, which is mandatory under ‘the Act’. The said notice was received by the wife of the revisionist and this fact was not disputed. Therefore, mere bare denial that the revisionist had never engaged the child labour is of no use. 13. A show cause notice dated 15.12.2007 under Section 3 Item No.15 of Scheduled-A of ‘the Act’, was issued on the revisionist which was received by him on 17.12.2007, but he didn’t choose to give any reply. In this case, sanction was granted vide Ex.P6 by the appropriate authority. PW.2 in unison supported the case of PW.1 that they both inspected the establishment of the revisionist and found one child labour was working by the name Nakka Ramudu and on the spot they prepared the report. Even though PW.1 and PW.2 are the official witnesses of the Labour Department, they are not police officers, and thus, their evidence is not hit by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. They are the officers under a welfare legislation whose solemn duty is to safeguard the vulnerable sections of society being flagrantly abused. Even though PW.1 and PW.2 are the official witnesses of the Labour Department, they are not police officers, and thus, their evidence is not hit by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. They are the officers under a welfare legislation whose solemn duty is to safeguard the vulnerable sections of society being flagrantly abused. As stated earlier, it is immaterial whether the revisionist was running a tea stall or a fast-food center whatever the name and style it is called. As per Ex.P5, the accused categorically admitted that tea buddi did not fetch Rs,100/- (Rupees One Hundred Only) per day which shows that the revisionist was running some establishment, where he prepared and supplied food items to the public. Therefore, it would come under the purview of Section 3 Item No.15 of the Scheduled-A of ‘the Act’. 14. Production of the victim/child labour is immaterial in this case because his evidence was not necessary in the light of the crucial fact that officials of the labour department caught red-handed the revisionist indulged in the violation of the provisions of ‘the Act’. Child labour was found cleansing vessels and tea cups. Ex.P1 drafted at the scene of offence, duly containing the signatures of the revisionist and the child labour. 15. On careful reading of the evidence of PW.1 and PW.2, no material contradictions were there to doubt the version of the prosecution. The minor discrepancies, if any, in the testimony of PW.1 and PW.2 can be safely ignored as they were not going to the roots of the prosecution version. The revisionist cannot deny his signature on Ex.P1 which also contains the signatures of the child labour that shows that the child labour was engaged in employment illegally against ‘the Act’. 16. Even though the Head Master Z.P.H School, Polamuru, who issued Ex.P4 certificate, was not examined as one of the witnesses, there was no suggestion either to PW.1 or PW.2 that Ex.P4 was a fabricated one. Ex.P4 contains the original signatures of the Head Master along with the official seal and the stamp of the Head Master mentioning a certified copy of the date of birth, as per which the date of child labour was 27.07.1995. As stated supra, there was no animosity attributed to PW.1 and PW.2, the revisionist and Head Master, who issued Ex.P4. Ex.P4 contains the original signatures of the Head Master along with the official seal and the stamp of the Head Master mentioning a certified copy of the date of birth, as per which the date of child labour was 27.07.1995. As stated supra, there was no animosity attributed to PW.1 and PW.2, the revisionist and Head Master, who issued Ex.P4. No version is forthcoming in the cross-examination of PW.1 and PW.2 that why a case was foisted against the revisionist by PW.1 and PW.2. Taking this aspect rightly into consideration the learned Trial Court and the Appellate Court rightly found the revisionist guilty for the offence under Section 14(1) of ‘the Act’. 17. In Ram Bilash Roy v. State of Bihar , (1990) 2 BLJ 349 it is held that the witness essential to unfold prosecution case is necessary to be examined and non- examination of a few other witnesses is not fatal to the prosecution case. Non- examination of independent witnesses and not securing mediators and preparing a report to that effect is not fatal to the case of the prosecution, since the official eye-witnesses/P.Ws.1 and 2 belonging to the Labour Department, had proved the case of the prosecution beyond all reasonable doubt. 18. The evidence of PW.1 and PW.2 is reliable, trustworthy, voluntary, truthful and inspiring confidence and it is not affected by material contradictions or omissions. There was no misreading of the evidence. There was no material irregularity concerning the procedure adopted by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court. As rightly pointed out by the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, Section 14(1) of ‘the Act’ gives discretion to the learned Magistrate either to impose imprisonment or fine, but the minimum imposition of the fine shall be Rs.10,000/-. The learned Trial Court invoked its discretion rightly and in proper perspective and imposed minimum fine as mandated by ‘the Act’ in view of no extenuating circumstances adverse to the revisionist. Therefore, the request of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the sentence of fine imposed by the Courts below should be interfered with and reduced cannot be appreciated and considered. 19. Therefore, the request of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the sentence of fine imposed by the Courts below should be interfered with and reduced cannot be appreciated and considered. 19. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision in State of Orissa v. Nakula Sahu , AIR 1979 SC 663 whereunder the Apex Court held that revisional jurisdiction to be exercised when there was a glaring defect in the procedure or manifest error on a point of law which results in a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Therefore, it is manifest that neither the learned Trial Court or the learned Appellate Court committed any error of fact or of law in arriving at their conclusions and this Court cannot upset their concurrent findings ignoring the well recognized principles for the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 20. On careful perusal of the entire material on record, this case is not an exceptional one warranting the interference by this Court since there was neither glaring defect either in the procedure or implementation of law by the learned Trial Court or Appellate Court, nor any manifest error on any point of law which resulted in flagrant miscarriage of justice. 21. In view of the above reasons, the revision falls as I am satisfied that the offence with which the revisionist was charged was brought home to him beyond any reasonable doubt. Accordingly, it is dismissed. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.