JUDGMENT : G.S. Sandhawalia, C.J. CMP[M] No.2090 of 2024 in LPA No.64 of 2025 and CMP(M) No.77 of 2025 in LPA No.65 of 2025 Keeping in view the averments made in the applications, duly supported by affidavits, we are of the opinion that sufficient cause has been made out to condone the delay. Therefore, delay of 153 days [in CMP(M) No.2090 of 2025] and 238 days [in CMP(M) No.77 of 2025] in filing the appeals are condoned.The applications stand disposed of. The appeals be registered. LPA Nos.64 and 65 of 2025 2. The present set of appeals have been directed against the judgments of learned Single Judge dated 14.05.2024 and 15.03.2024. The learned Single Judge has disposed of the writ petitions by directing to initiate the acquisition proceedings qua the land used for construction of road namely Shimla Mataur Road, keeping in view the law settled by the Apex Court in Vidya Devi Versus State of Himachal Pradesh & Others (2020) 2 SCC 569 and Sukh Dutt Ratra & Anr. Versus State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors., (2022) 7 SCC 508 . 3. Learned Single Judge also noticed that no reply had been filed and similar benefit already stood extended in the cases of Sat Dev Sharma & Ors. Versus State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors., in CWP No.945 of 2022, decided on 29.08.2023, for the same stretch of land. 4. It is not disputed that the said judgment passed by learned Single Judge was upheld in LPA No.177 of 2024, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. Versus Satdev Sharma & Ors., and the Coordinate Bench, as such, was pleased to observe as under :- “6. Learned Additional Advocate General is not able to point out any ground indicating that present case is not squarely covered by aforesaid verdicts of the Court. 7. In aforesaid facts and circumstances, we do not find any illegality, irregularity or any other perversity in the impugned judgment. Therefore, appeal is liable to be dismissed being devoid of merits. 8. We consider it fit to record that State is preferring the appeals despite dismissal of their similar appeals in identical matters. Such conduct is not in consonance with the Litigation Policy adopted by the State of HP which is causing wasting the time and energy of the State as well as the Court. 8. We consider it fit to record that State is preferring the appeals despite dismissal of their similar appeals in identical matters. Such conduct is not in consonance with the Litigation Policy adopted by the State of HP which is causing wasting the time and energy of the State as well as the Court. It may invite imposing cost but taking lenient view, no cost is being imposed. 9. Accordingly, appeal is dismissed with direction that consequential action, in terms of judgment dated 29.08.2023 passed in CWP No.945 of 2022 be taken within four weeks. Appeal stands disposed of along with all pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.” 5. The sole argument as such which is now being raised by learned State Counsel is that an opportunity should be given to file a reply before learned Single Judge. The grounds of appeal, however, portray a different picture and paragraph No.3 states that the matter was contested on behalf of State by filing reply and that the road was constructed on popular demand. The relevant portion of the grounds of appeal, read as under :- “3. That the petition was contested on behalf of the Appellants/State by filing the reply where it was averred that the road was constructed on popular demand with verbal consent of land owners including petitioner of the area. The villager’s voluntarily surrendered possession of their land, budgetary provision was made by the State and the construction of said road commenced. The road stood constructed immediately upon taking over the possession and the petition was barred by delay and latches.” 6. The said ground is also against the record as perusal of the reply filed by the State goes on to show that in Joginder Singh’s case, notice was issued on 21.12.2023 and the matter was taken up on 22.04.2024. On the said date, last opportunity of two weeks’ was granted to file reply, failing which it was observed that the Court would be constrained to decide the same on the next date of hearing i.e. 14.05.2024. Unfortunately on 14.05.2024, State chose not to file reply, leading to the disposal of the matter by learned Single Judge by noticing that the reply was not filed. 7. In Uttam Singh Kaushal’s case, notice was issued on 26.06.2023, directing to file reply within four weeks. The matter was listed on 20.09.2023 when four weeks’ more time was granted. Unfortunately on 14.05.2024, State chose not to file reply, leading to the disposal of the matter by learned Single Judge by noticing that the reply was not filed. 7. In Uttam Singh Kaushal’s case, notice was issued on 26.06.2023, directing to file reply within four weeks. The matter was listed on 20.09.2023 when four weeks’ more time was granted. From September 2023 till 15th March 2024, the State again chose not to file reply, leading to disposal of writ petition on the ground that the matter was covered by the judgment of Sat Dev Sharma’s case, which was pertaining to the same stretch of road. 8. Learned State Counsel submitted that an SLP is pending against a judgment of the Division Bench. However, in the absence of any stay order and in view of the fact that learned Single Judge, as such, had decided the case on the settled principles of law laid down in Vidya Devi’s case, keeping in view the Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, that Welfare State cannot be permitted to take the plea of adverse possession to grab the property of its own citizens. We are of the considered opinion that no question of law arises or any factual matrix which needs to be redressed since it was a clear cut case of land owners in the writ petitions that on account of the construction of road which was started long back in the year 1970, the road had been widened thereafter, and respondents have illegally taken land of petitioners in their possession without initiating any legal process. 9. Thus, it is not a case as such that dispute is regarding the initial acquisition of the land as the land owners were fair enough to submit that possession of land was taken during widening which was done without any acquisition. The claim as such is of 3 Marla in Khasra No.216 and 10 Marlas in Khasra No.10 and 11 in the case of Uttam Singh Kaushal [supra]. 10. Similar pleadings are in case of Joginder Singh, wherein the claim is for Khasra No.686 measuring 00-01-84 Hects situated in Mohal Jalari Badyaran, Tehsil Nadaun District Hamirpur [H.P.], and specific pleading is that only on account of widening as such the possession has been taken. 11. 10. Similar pleadings are in case of Joginder Singh, wherein the claim is for Khasra No.686 measuring 00-01-84 Hects situated in Mohal Jalari Badyaran, Tehsil Nadaun District Hamirpur [H.P.], and specific pleading is that only on account of widening as such the possession has been taken. 11. In the absence of the State having not contested the cases on merits and nothing has been shown in the grounds of appeal that pleadings of land owners were incorrect or there was any concealment of facts or that they were not owners of the land, we do not feel that it would be appropriate to remand the matters to learned Single Judge. In case of specific pleadings, it would have been a different fact if on account of concealment of some facts undue are being taken through legal process, this Court would have interfered. 12. The appropriation of private property by the State on account of improving infrastructure cannot be at the cost of the citizens without acquisition process, as has been laid down in Sukh Dutt Ratra’s case, which was again the case of utilization of land for the construction of Narag Fagla Road way back in 1972-1973. 13. As noticed above, there is no delay and laches also in the present cases, as the land owners have been candid enough to only claim compensation for widening of road. 14. A Co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court based on the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi and others versus Maharashtra Industrial development Corporation and others, (2013) 1 SCC 353 , Vidya Devi versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others, (2020) 2 SCC 569 [supra], Sukh Dutt Ratra and another versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others, (2022) 7 SCC 508 [supra], had outlined in LPA No.54 of 2017, In re: State of Himachal Pradesh and others versus Upender Kumar and other connected matters decided on 27.3.2024 that objection regarding limitation or delay and laches cannot be permitted to come in the way so as render do substantial justice when, the action of forcible deprivation of private land owner from his property was without sanction of law, resulting in expropriation of property by State, resulting in a continuing cause of action and/or such act shocks the judicial conscience in the following terms: “10. It is now trite law that in dealing with constitutional rights in the exercise of writ jurisdiction, one can no longer apply mutatis mutandis, the time frame stipulated in limitation law as if they were attracted . The issue has been dealt with time and again by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, particularly in the context of land acquisition. 11. In Tukaram Kana Joshi and others through Power-of-Attorney Holder versus Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and others (2013) 1 SCC 353 (“Tukaram”), the Hon’ble Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional right to property could not be defeated on technical grounds citing delay. Though, in the case of State of Maharashtra versus Digambar (1995) 4 SCC 683 (“Digambar”) the Hon’ble Supreme Court had denied relief to farmers on the ground of delay, but delay was not simply declared to be an absolute bar on filing of a writ petition. 12. It cannot be disputed that while deciding Tukaram’s case (supra), Digambar’s case (supra) had not been noticed, but the same was later noticed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a fairly recent case of Sukh Dutt Ratra and another versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others (2022) 7 SCC 508 (“Sukh Dutt Ratra”) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt with a number of its judgments to emphasis that there can be no “limitation” to do justice if it is clear that the right to property has been intruded into without due process of law. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repelled the citation of delay and laches in enforcement of the constitutional right to property in land. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, as observed above, has considered the case of Digambar. 13. Thus, the law as stands today is that the State cannot, on the ground of delay and laches, evade its responsibility towards those from whom private property has been expropriated. In any case, what principles a Court must apply while assessing whether a writ petition is so hopelessly barred by delays and laches that a remedy is not worthy of consideration, is well articulated in Maharashtra SRTC versus Balwant Regular Motor Service AIR 1969 SC 329 and these principles stand extracted and endorsed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sukh Dutt Ratra’s case (supra) wherein it was held as under: “16. Given the important protection extended to an individual vis-a-vis their private property (embodied earlier in Article 31, and now as a constitutional right in Article 300-A), and the high threshold the State must meet while acquiring land, the question remains- can the State, merely on the ground of delay and laches, evade its legal responsibility towards those from whom private property has been expropriated ? In these facts and circumstances, we find this conclusion to be unacceptable, and warranting intervention on the grounds of equity and fairness. 17. When seen holistically, it is apparent that the State’s actions, or lack thereof, have in fact compounded the injustice meted out to the appellants and compelled them to approach this court, albeit belatedly. The initiation of acquisition proceedings initially in the 1990s occurred only at the behest of the High Court. Even after such judicial intervention, the State continued to only extend the benefit of the court’s directions to those who specifically approached the courts. The State’s lackadaisical conduct is discernible from this action of initiating acquisition proceedings selectively, only in respect to the lands of those writ petitioners who had approached the court in earlier proceedings, and not other land owners, pursuant to the orders dated 23.04.2007 (in Anakh Singh v. State of H.P., 2007 SCC Online HP 220) and 20.12.2013 (in Onkar Singh vs. State, CWP No. 1356/2010) respectively. In this manner, at every stage, the State sought to shirk its responsibility of acquiring land required for public use in the manner prescribed by law. 18. There is a welter of precedents on delay and laches which conclude either way–as contended by both sides in the present dispute-however, the specific factual matrix compels this court to weigh in favour of the appellant-land owners. The State cannot shield itself behind the ground of delay and laches in such a situation; there cannot be a ‘limitation’ to doing justice. This court in a much earlier case- Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service (1969) 1 SCR 808 , held: "11……Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. This court in a much earlier case- Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service (1969) 1 SCR 808 , held: "11……Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy." 14. By now, it is well settled that right to property though no longer a fundamental right and is otherwise a zealous possession of which one cannot be divested save and except by the authority of law as is enjoined by Article 300A of the Constitution of India. Any callous inaction or apathy of the State and its instrumentalities, in securing just compensation would amount to dereliction of a constitutional duty justifying issuance of writ of mandamus for appropriate remedial directions.” 15. The judgment in Upender Kumar’s case was taken by State Authorities in SLP (C) No. 49057 of 2024 , titled as The State of Himachal Pradesh and others versus Upender Kumar wherein, after cautioning the State Authorities with exemplary costs, the SLP was dismissed on 22.11.2024, in the following terms: “SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) Diary No(s).49057/2024 [Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 27-03-2024 in LPA No. 54/2017 passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla] THE STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. Petitioner(s) VERSUS UPENDER KUMAR Respondent(s) 1. Delay condoned. 2. Petitioner(s) VERSUS UPENDER KUMAR Respondent(s) 1. Delay condoned. 2. We have come across several matters wherein the State of Himachal Pradesh has challenged the orders passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, thereby directing the compensation to be paid to the respondent(s). 3. The writ petitioner(s) has approached the High Court with a grievance that though the possession of their lands were taken for road construction, they did not receive compensation. 4. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has held that the State cannot take possession of citizen land without paying the compensation. 5. Although the right to property is no longer considered a fundamental right, it is still a constitutional right. The State cannot be permitted to acquire citizen land without paying appropriate compensation. 6. In these circumstances, it would have been justified in dismissing the special leave petition(s) with exemplary cost. However, we refrain from doing so now and simply dismiss these special leave petitions.” 16. We do not find any reason, thus to call upon the land owners to defend this futile litigation by the State. Accordingly, both these appeals are dismissed for the reasons given hereinabove alongwith pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.