Sivakumar. G, S/o. Late P. v. Gopinathan Nair VS State Of Kerala
2025-08-23
SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI, SYAM KUMAR V.M.
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari, J. The present intra-court appeal filed under Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, assails the judgment dated 20.02.2025 passed in W.P(C)No.11829 of 2019, whereby the learned Single judge has dismissed the writ appeal filed by the appellant/petitioner. 2. The appellant had filed the writ petition seeking for the following reliefs: “(i) To direct the 3rd respondent to consider and dispose of Exhibit P1 representation and complete the proceedings within a time frame fixed by this Hon’ble Court. (ii) To grant such other reliefs which the petitioner may seek from time to time and this Hon’ble Court may deem fit to be granted to the circumstances.” 3. The brief facts of the case are that some of the property belonging to the appellant are proposed to be taken possession of illegally with reference to the powers available under the provisions of Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘SARFAESI Act’ for short). Therefore, the appellant had submitted Ext.P1 representation to the 3rd respondent - Tahasildar, Kanayannur Taluk, complaining about the misconduct of the Village Officer concerned and requesting to take appropriate action. Since the representation was not decided or no action taken, the appellant had approached this Court by filing W.P(C)No.11829 of 2019 seeking directions to the Tahasildar to consider and pass orders on Ext.P1 representation preferred by the appellant. This Court vide judgment dated 16.08.2019, originally disposed of the writ petition directing the Tahasildar to consider and pass orders on Ext.P1. Subsequently R.P.No .1196 of 2019 was filed by the 3rd respondent Tahasildar, essentially pointing out the entire proceedings leading to the taking over possession of the property as complained by the appellant. This review petition was allowed and the judgment dated 16.08.2019 was recalled to the files of this Court. In the review petition it is stated that the contentions of the appellant was already taken note of in C.M.P.No s.1557 of 2017 and 2798 of 2017 in CMP No.2816 of 2016 before the CJM, Ernakulam which were disposed of by order dated 06.10.2017, by appointing an Advocate Commissioner. The Advocate Commissioner had permitted the appellant to show the title deed of the property in question, so as to sustain the contention with respect to the mistake in the property as contended by the appellant.
The Advocate Commissioner had permitted the appellant to show the title deed of the property in question, so as to sustain the contention with respect to the mistake in the property as contended by the appellant. Annexure 6 is the report of the Village Officer, wherein it is stated that the Village Officer has identified the property. On this basis Annexure 7 order dated 25.04.2018 has been issued by the CJM, Ernakulam in CMP No.922 of 2018 in CMP No.2816 of 2016, rejecting the prayers made in the petition, noticing that the appellant was not successful in pointing out and establishing that the property which has been already taken possession of was not the actual property. The order dated 25.04.2018 passed by the CJM, Ernakulam has attained finality. The learned Single Judge by judgment dated 20.02.2025 dismissed the W.P(C)No.11829 of 2019 on the ground of suppression of these material facts as the issue raised in this case is already considered by the CJM, Ernakulam. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge is incorrect and the same deserves to be set aside. The learned Single Judge failed to consider that the Tahasildar has already found that the Village Officer has identified the property by mistake only. The learned Single Judge also does not consider the fact that because of the mistake of the Village Officer, the appellant lost his residential house and the industrial undertaking for no fault of his. The learned counsel for the appellant, therefore, prayed that this appeal be allowed. 5. Per contra the learned Government Pleader appearing for the official respondents opposed the afore prayer and submitted that in fact the learned Single Judge ought not to have entertained the writ petition at all, since statutory remedy is available under the SARFAESI Act and without availing the same, the appellant has approached this Court. Secondly the property in question and its possession has already been taken over. Therefore, at the most, the appellant could have approached the Debts Recovery Tribunal, under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The learned Government Pleader, therefore, submitted that the writ appeal deserves to be dismissed with costs. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant; the learned Government Pleader and the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.5. 7.
Therefore, at the most, the appellant could have approached the Debts Recovery Tribunal, under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The learned Government Pleader, therefore, submitted that the writ appeal deserves to be dismissed with costs. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant; the learned Government Pleader and the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.5. 7. On perusal of the pleadings as well as the arguments, it is apparent that the procedure laid down under Sections 13(2) and 14 of the SARFAESI Act has been followed and the possession of the property in question has already been taken over. Hence the writ petition itself ought not to have entertained. The appellant has suppressed the fact of passing of Annexure 7 order by the CJM, Ernakulam on 25.04.2018 dealing with the issue raised in the writ petition. The appellant, if not satisfied, could have approached the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. It appears that in the writ petition, the appellant prays for action against the 4th respondent - Village Officer for identifying a wrong property. The learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the writ petition. 8. However, at this state, we would like to place on record the correct law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in respect of entertaining writ petitions arising out of the SARFAESI Act. 9. The Apex Court in the case of ICICI Bank Limited and others Vs.Umakanta Mohapatra and others [ (2019) 13 SCC 497 ] has held as follows: "2. Despite several judgments of this Court, including a judgment by Hon'ble Navin Sinha, J., as recently as on 30-1-2018, in State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C. [State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 41] ,the High Courts continue to entertain matters which arise under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI), and keep granting interim orders in favour of persons who are nonperforming assets (NPAs) ." 3. The writ petition itself was not maintainable, as a result of which, in view of our recent judgment, which has followed earlier judgments of this Court, held as follows:(SCC p. 94, para 17) 17.
The writ petition itself was not maintainable, as a result of which, in view of our recent judgment, which has followed earlier judgments of this Court, held as follows:(SCC p. 94, para 17) 17. We cannot help but disapprove the approach of them High Court for reasons already noticed in Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Prem Heavy Engineering Works (P) Ltd. [Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Prem Heavy Engineering Works (P) Ltd., [(1997) 6 SCC 450], observing: (SCC p. 463, para 32) 32. When a position, in law, is well settled as a result of judicial pronouncement of this Court, it would amount to judicial impropriety to say the least, for the subordinate courts including the High Courts to ignore the settled decisions and then to pass a judicial order which is clearly contrary to the settled legal position. Such judicial adventurism cannot be permitted and we strongly deprecate the tendency of the subordinate courts in not applying the settled principles and in passing whimsical orders which necessarily has the effect of granting wrongful and unwarranted relief to one of the parties. It is time that this tendency stops.' 4.The writ petition, in this case, being not maintainable, obviously, all orders passed must perish, including the impugned order, which is set aside. 5. The appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms. Pending applications, if any shall stand disposed of.(Emphasis supplied) 10. Apart from this, the Apex Court in the case of Kalabharti Advertising V. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania and Others [(2010) 9 SCC 437] has poignantly held as under: “22. It is a settled legal proposition that the forum of the writ court cannot be used for the purpose of giving interim relief as the only and the final relief to any litigant. If the Court comes to the conclusion that the matter requires adjudication by some other appropriate forum and relegates the said party to that forum, it should not grant any interim relief in favour of such a litigant for an interregnum period till the said party approaches the alternative forum and obtains interim relief.
If the Court comes to the conclusion that the matter requires adjudication by some other appropriate forum and relegates the said party to that forum, it should not grant any interim relief in favour of such a litigant for an interregnum period till the said party approaches the alternative forum and obtains interim relief. (vide: State of Orissav.Madan Gopal Rungta, [ AIR 1952 SC 12 ]; Amarsarjit Singh v. State of Punjab, [ AIR 1962 SC 1305 [; State of Orissa v. Ram Chandra Dev, [ AIR 1964 SC 685 ]; State of Bihar v. Rambalak Singh "Balak" & Ors., [ AIR 1966 SC 1441 ]; and Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke & Ors., [ AIR 1975 SC 2238 ]) .” 11. The Apex Court in the case of M/s South Indian Bank Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Naveen Mathew Philip & Anr.Etc Etc [2023 Livelaw (SC) 320] has deprecated the practice adopted by the High Courts whereby the writ petitions are being entertained in SARFAESI Act matters, especially against the private banks when the statute prescribes a particular mode, an attempt to circumvent shall not be encouraged by the writ Court. The litigant cannot avoid the non compliance of approaching the Tribunal which requires the prescription of fee and use of constitutional remedy as an alternative. The Apex Court has also deprecated the practice of approaching the High Court for consideration of an offer by the borrower. 12. The Apex Court in the case of M/s South Indian Bank Ltd. (supra) further went on to hold that "we deprecate such practice of entertaining the writ petitions by the High Court in exercise of power u/S 226 of the Constitution of India without exhausting the alternative remedy available under the law." In view of the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the legal pronouncements made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, we are of the considered opinion that no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge in dismissing the writ petition. Accordingly the writ appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.