SBI General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Baby M. T. S/o Thomas
2025-08-23
ZIYAD RAHMAN A.A.
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : ZIYAD RAHMAN A.A., J. 1. The petitioner herein is a General Insurance Company, and this writ petition is submitted being aggrieved by Ext.P5 order passed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Ernakulam in I.A No.1510/2024 in C.C No.580/2023. The said complaint was submitted by the 1 st respondent herein, who obtained an insurance policy from the petitioner, as a private car package policy, in respect of the vehicle purchased by him. On 24.01.2023, the said vehicle hit against an electric transformer owned by the 2 nd respondent- Kerala State Electricity Board Ltd (KSEBL) and the 2 nd respondent raised a claim of Rs.68,437/-, based on the estimate prepared by them, as damages. 2. According to the 1 st respondent/complainant, the vehicle was detained by the KSEBL authorities, and in order to get the vehicle released, he was compelled to pay the said amount. As according to the 1 st respondent, the vehicle was covered with a package policy covering the 3 rd party risk, including property damage, the 1 st respondent approached the petitioner seeking reimbursement of the said amount. As the same was not materialized, a complaint was submitted before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Ernakulam by filing C.C No. 580/2023, a copy of which is produced as Ext.P1. In the said complaint, apart from the petitioner, the officer concerned of the KSEBL was also a party. In the aforesaid complaint, I.A No.1510/2024 was submitted by the petitioner, raising the question of jurisdiction and the same was considered by the Consumer Disputes Rederessal Commission as a preliminary issue. 3. After hearing all the parties concerned, Ext.P5 order was passed by the District Commission, rejecting the said contention and holding that, the complaint is maintainable under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 . This writ petition is submitted by the petitioner challenging the same. 4. I have heard Sri.George Cherian (Thiruvalla), the learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Adv.George A Cherian appearing for the petitioner and Sri.B.Premod, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Kerala State Electricity Board Ltd. 5. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that, by virtue of Section 175 of the Motor Vehicles Act, there is a clear bar in entertaining a complaint of this nature, before the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum.
The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that, by virtue of Section 175 of the Motor Vehicles Act, there is a clear bar in entertaining a complaint of this nature, before the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum. It was pointed out that, since the basic question that arises for consideration in the complaint relates to the compensation payable to a third party in a motor accident, the same can only be adjudicated in a proceeding under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and therefore, the conclusion arrived by the District Commission as per Ext.P5 holding that the complaint is maintainable, is not justifiable. The learned Senior Counsel brought the attention of this Court, to various provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 , including Section 175 and also the decision rendered by the Honourable Supreme Court in Chairman, Thiruvalluvar Transport Corporation v. Consumer Protection Council , (1995) 2 SCC 479 . 6. However, the crucial aspect to be noticed is that, as far as Section 175 of the Motor Vehicles Act is concerned, the same prohibits the jurisdiction of other Courts including Civil Courts, from considering any claim for compensation, which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal for that area. The said provision reads as follows: “ Bar on jurisdiction of Civil Courts .—Where any Claims Tribunal has been constituted for any area, no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal for that area, and no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by or before the Claims Tribunal in respect of the claim for compensation shall be granted by the Civil Court.” 7. While trying to understand the purpose and scope of Section 175 , it is to be noted that, the prohibition is applicable in respect of a question relating “any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal for that area”. Thus the question that is to be considered is whether, the subject matter raised in the complaint could be adjudicated as “a claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal to that area”. While considering the said aspect, the category of persons who can submit a claim before the Tribunal, invoking the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, is to be considered.
While considering the said aspect, the category of persons who can submit a claim before the Tribunal, invoking the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, is to be considered. Section 166 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act deals with the categories of persons who can submit an application raising a claim under the Act, which reads as follows: “Application for compensation.— (1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of section 165 may be made— (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (b) by the owner of the property; or (c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or (d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be: Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents to the application.” 8. A careful reading of the aforesaid provision would clearly indicate that, the categories mentioned therein are the persons who sustained injury in the accident or the legal representatives of the person who died in an accident or the owner of the property whose property was damaged due to an accident involving a motor vehicle. As far as the complainant before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in this case is concerned, i.e., the 1 st respondent herein, he is not a person coming under any of the aforesaid categories mentioned. 9. On the other hand, the 1 st respondent herein is an insured, who happened to settle the liability with the KSEBL, the owner of the property that sustained damage, owing to the accident caused by the vehicle owned by the 1 st respondent. Therefore, as far as the 1 st respondent in this case is concerned, he is not competent to submit a claim before the Claims Tribunal under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
Therefore, as far as the 1 st respondent in this case is concerned, he is not competent to submit a claim before the Claims Tribunal under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The bar of jurisdiction under Section 175 , is confined to the cases of any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal for that area. In this case, from the analysis of the provisions referred to above, it is clear that, a claim, at the instance of the 1 st respondent, cannot be entertained by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act,1988. Therefore, the complaint submitted by the 1 st respondent under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, cannot be treated as a matter, that is prohibited under Section 175 of the Act. 10. It is also relevant to note that, when considering the grievance highlighted by the 1 st respondent, it can be seen that, his claim is specifically against the petitioner/insurance company. The very basis of his grievance is that, despite the fact that the petitioner company is under a contractual obligation to compensate the 1 st respondent, for the amounts he had to pay to the victims of the accident, it was not reimbursed. This is a dispute which squarely comes within the purview of the terms of the contract of insurance policy entered into between the petitioner and the 1 st respondent. In other words, the question that arises in the complaint submitted by the 1 st respondent, is whether there is deficiency in service on the part of the petitioner/insurer in fulfilling its obligations under the insurance policy. Such question, could not have been independently decided by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, at the instance of the 1 st respondent/insured, and it could be decided, only in a claim petition submitted under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, by the victim of the accident. In this case, no such claim petition is filed and no possibility of filing such petition is also there. 11.
In this case, no such claim petition is filed and no possibility of filing such petition is also there. 11. As far as the decision rendered by the Honourable Supreme Court, in Chairman, Thiruvalluvar Transport Corporation’ case (Supra), which is relied on by the learned Senior Counsel is concerned, it is to be noted that, it was a case in which, the complaint was submitted by a person, who sustained injuries in the accident and thus he was a person falls within the categories mentioned in Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Thus, being a person competent to raise a claim, to be adjudicated by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal alone, he could not have resorted to any other provisions of law or any other Forum. It was in those circumstances, the Honourable Supreme Court held that, the complaint at the instance of such person cannot be entertained under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act. However, the factual scenario in this case is completely different. 12. Going by the purpose and ambit of Section 175 of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is evident that, the question of ouster of jurisdiction of all other Forums including civil courts, would arise, only in respect of matters which are exclusively entertainable by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. Thus, when it is clear from the facts and circumstances of the case that, the grievance highlighted by the 1 st respondent before the Consumer Commission could not have been entertained by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, in the light of the stipulations contained in Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 , the jurisdiction of the such Commission cannot be considered as ousted, since in such cases, the ouster of jurisdiction contemplated under Section 175 would not come into operation. 13. There is yet another aspect to be considered in this case. If the complaint submitted by the 1 st respondent is rejected for want of jurisdiction, by relying upon Section 175 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the 1 st respondent herein would be prevented from approaching any of the Courts or Forum, to redress his grievances. This is particularly because, if Section 175 is held to be applicable to the facts of this case, the jurisdiction of all the Courts including the Civil Courts are ousted.
This is particularly because, if Section 175 is held to be applicable to the facts of this case, the jurisdiction of all the Courts including the Civil Courts are ousted. At the same time, the respondent herein, would also not be in a position to invoke the jurisdiction of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, as a claim can be entertained by the Tribunal only at the instance of the persons, who are referred to in Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act and evidently the 1 st respondent is not a person coming within the same. In short, if the contention of the petitioner is accepted, the 1 st respondent would become remediless. An interpretation, that takes away all the legal remedies available to a person aggrieved, cannot be made. Such an interpretation would go against the principles explained in the maxim “Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium” which means, “Where there is a right, there is remedy”. The fact that the 1 st respondent has rights based on the contract of insurance that he entered into with the petitioner, is an admitted position. Therefore, he must have a remedy, when he has a grievance of curtailing the rights arising from the contract of insurance. 14. Thus, after carefully going through all the statutory provisions and the implications thereof, with reference to the grievance highlighted by the 1 st respondent in the complaint before the Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, I am of the view that, the question of jurisdiction was rightly decided by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission and no interference is required. It is therefore held that, the District Commission is empowered to consider the grievances highlighted in the complaint, on merits. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed, without prejudice to the other contentions raised by the petitioner. It is clarified that the observations made in this judgment, are only with respect to the jurisdiction of the District Commission to entertain the complaint and no findings on the sustainability of the claim of the 1 st respondent on merits, are entered into by this court.