JUDGMENT : (Rajesh Shankar, J.) 1. The present writ petition has been filed for issuance of direction upon the respondent-authorities to pay compensation and to provide employment to the petitioner in lieu of acquisition of his land appertaining to Khata No.8, Mouza-Urimari, Thana No.155, District-Hazaribag, Jharkhand, measuring an area of 23.66 acres (hereinafter to be referred as the “said land”) which was acquired vide Notification Nos. S.O.51(E) dated 24 th January, 1975 and S.O. 4609 dated 7 th December, 1983 issued by the Ministry of Energy (Department of Coal), Government of India, New Delhi. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the original raiyat of the said land had failed to pay the rent for which a certificate proceeding being Certificate Case No.1143 of 1932-33 was initiated against him. Subsequently, the decree was prepared in the said case and the said land was purchased by ancestors of the petitioner through auction sale. Thereafter they were put into possession of the said land and became owner of the same. Further, a title dispute over the said land got started between ancestors of the petitioner and the original raiyat which led to filing a suit by the ancestors of the petitioner before the court of Munsif, Hazaribagh being Title Suit No.178 of 1944 which was dismissed vide judgement dated 24 th July, 1946. Being aggrieved with the said judgment, the ancestors of the petitioner preferred Title Appeal No.58 of 1946 before the court of Additional Sub-Judge, Hazaribagh which was allowed vide judgment and decree dated 11 th February, 1947 and 24 th February, 1947 respectively setting aside the judgment and the decree of the learned Munsif, Hazaribagh. Accordingly, the title of the ancestors of the petitioner as certificate auction purchasers of the suit land was declared and the respondents of the said case were directed to deliver possession of the property in suit to the appellants of the said case within a specified period and in default, it was ordered that the appellants of the said case would be entitled to get possession through the court. 3. It is also submitted that the order passed in Title Appeal No. 58 of 1946 was not challenged before any higher court and, as such, the same attained finality. 3. It is also submitted that the order passed in Title Appeal No. 58 of 1946 was not challenged before any higher court and, as such, the same attained finality. It is further submitted that vide Notification No. S.O. 51(E) dated 24 th January, 1975 issued by the Ministry of Energy (Department of Coal), Government of India, New Delhi, the land described in the Schedule appended to the said notification including part of the said land of the petitioner were acquired under the provisions of Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Act, 1957’). Thereafter, by virtue of Notification No. S.O. 4609 dated 7 th December, 1983, the Ministry of Energy (Department of Coal), Government of India also acquired the lands in the locality specified in the Schedule appended to the said notification including part of the said land of the petitioner under the provisions of the Act, 1957. The petitioner represented the General Manager, Barka Sayal Area, Central Coalfields Ltd., Hazaribag (the respondent no.3) for grant of compensation and employment in lieu of acquisition of the aforesaid land, however, the same remained un-responded which has compelled him to prefer the present writ petition. 4. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent-CCL submits that the petitioner is claiming compensation and employment against the land acquired by Central Coalfields Ltd. under the provisions of the Act, 1957 vide aforesaid notifications. It is further submitted that the plot numbers of the land claimed by the petitioner does not entirely match with the plots acquired by the Central Coalfields Ltd. under Khata No.8 and many plots which are being claimed by the petitioner does not fall under the acquisition proceedings of the Central Coalfields Ltd. It is also submitted that as per the records available with the respondent-CCL, the compensation was already paid to Hopna Manjhi and others on 26 th July, 1981 and Bero Manjhi and others on 24 th July, 1986 against 36.95 acres of land under Khata No.8. Moreover in lieu of acquisition of the land made vide Notification No. S.O.51 (E) dated 24 th January, 1975, the employment was given to Charo Manjhi S/o Juti Manjhi, Suresh Manjhi S/o Aghenu Manjhi, Ratiya Manjhi S/o Chunu Manjhi, Sanicharwa Manjhi S/o Chetar Manjhi and Patilal Manjhi S/o Bero Manjhi in the year 1982. 5. Moreover in lieu of acquisition of the land made vide Notification No. S.O.51 (E) dated 24 th January, 1975, the employment was given to Charo Manjhi S/o Juti Manjhi, Suresh Manjhi S/o Aghenu Manjhi, Ratiya Manjhi S/o Chunu Manjhi, Sanicharwa Manjhi S/o Chetar Manjhi and Patilal Manjhi S/o Bero Manjhi in the year 1982. 5. It is further submitted that payment to Hopna Manjhi and others was made by the Central Coalfields Ltd. after obtaining authentication report from the then Circle Officer, Barkagaon, in which the said Circle Officer had reported in favour of Hopna Manjhi and others discarding the claim of Chander Sao and the petitioner. After lapse of about 43 years of payment of compensation having been made to Hopna Manjhi and others, the petitioner is claiming the compensation and employment for the said land in view of the judgement dated 11 th February, 1947 passed in Title Appeal No. 58 of 1946. The descendants of Hopna Manjhi and others have not been made party in this case and without disclosure of the facts by descendants of Hopna Manjhi and others, the veracity of claim made by the petitioner is otherwise not possible. Moreover, a Tribunal has been constituted under the Act, 1957 to deal with such cases which was never approached by the petitioner for redressal of his grievance. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 7. The main argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the said land was purchased by his ancestors by way of an auction sale, hence, he and his co-sharers are legally entitled for compensation and employment in lieu of acquisition of the same. However, till date, the respondent- CCL has neither paid any compensation nor has given employment to them. 8. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent-CCL has contended that the compensation and employment in lieu of acquisition of the said land had already been given to the rightful claimant(s) on the basis of the authentication report submitted by the Circle Officer, Barkagaon and, as such, there is no question of giving compensation and employment to the petitioner with regard to the said land. 9. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vidya Devi Vs. 9. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vidya Devi Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Others reported in (2020) 2 SCC 569. 10. I have perused the aforesaid judgment wherein the fact was that the land of the appellant of the aforesaid case was taken over by the respondent-State in the year 1967-68 for construction of a major district road without taking recourse of acquisition proceeding or following due procedure of law. The said appellant being an illiterate widow, coming from a rural background, was wholly unaware of her rights and entitlement in law. Hence, she did not file any case seeking compensation of the land. In the year 2004, some similarly situated persons filed a writ petition and pursuant to the order of the High Court, the respondent-State initiated the acquisition proceeding in the year 2008 for only those persons who had approached to the High Court. 11. The said appellant along with her two daughters filed a writ petition before the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in the year 2010 praying inter alia for a direction upon the respondent-State to initiate acquisition proceeding for the land of the appellant, however, the High Court vide judgment dated 11 th September, 2013 held that the matter involved disputed question of law and fact for determination on the starting point of limitation which could not be adjudicated in writ proceedings. The appellant was, however, granted liberty to file a civil suit. The matter having travelled to the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Their Lordships directed the respondent- State to pay compensation to the appellant on the same terms as awarded to the other similarly situated persons by observing as under: - 12.7. In this case, the appellant could not have been forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal sanction, and without following due process of law, and depriving her payment of just compensation, being a fundamental right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967. 12.8. The contention of the State that the appellant or her predecessors had “orally” consented to the ac quisition is completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the appellant of her property by the State. 12.9. 12.8. The contention of the State that the appellant or her predecessors had “orally” consented to the ac quisition is completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the appellant of her property by the State. 12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in [Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491] wherein it was held that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution. 12.10. This Court in State of [State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 404 ] held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right. Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multi-faceted dimension. 12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by the State before the High Court, that since it has been in continuous possession of the land for over 42 years, it would tantamount to “adverse” possession. The State being a welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the plea of adverse possession, which allows a trespasser i.e. a person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title over such property for over 12 years. The State cannot be permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its own citizens, as has been done in the present case. 12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of the appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice. 12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it. [P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152 ] 12.14. In [Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 ] , this Court while dealing with a similar fact situation, held as follows: (SCC p. 359, para 11) “ 11. There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario altogether. The functionaries of the State took over possession of the land belonging to the appellants without any sanction of law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode .” (emphasis supplied) 12. Thus, in the aforesaid case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court after considering the fact that the land of the appellant was taken by the respondent-State without resorting to the procedure prescribed by law and the said fact was also admitted by the State, passed the order of payment of compensation to the appellant. Thus, in the aforesaid case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court after considering the fact that the land of the appellant was taken by the respondent-State without resorting to the procedure prescribed by law and the said fact was also admitted by the State, passed the order of payment of compensation to the appellant. The observation made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment will however not be applicable in the present case, as due process of law was adopted by the respondents while acquiring the said land and the compensation as well as the employment in lieu of acquisition of the same was also given to few persons on the basis of authentication report received from the Circle officer, Barkagaon. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in the case of Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz & Others Vs. Government of Karnataka & Others reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 20 . In the said case, the fact was that the lands of the appellants therein were acquired in the year 2003, however, the award was passed only in the year 2019 after filing of the contempt petition by the landowners and the date of preliminary notification was shifted from 29 th January, 2003 to the year 2011. The award was challenged by the respondents of the said case by filing a writ petition which was allowed by the learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court directing the concerned authorities to pass fresh awards. The appellants filed Writ Appeal before the learned Division Bench of the said High Court, however, the same was dismissed. 14. The matter having travelled to the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Their Lordships in exercise of power conferred under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, directed for determination of compensation to the appellants on the basis of the market value of the lands prevailing as on 22 nd April, 2019 by holding that the appellants had been deprived of their legitimate dues for almost 22 years and had knocked the doors of the courts on number of occasions during the said period. It was further held that no delay could be attributed to the appellants in not getting compensation, rather it was on account of the lethargic attitude of the officers of the State/ Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (KIADB) that the appellants were deprived of compensation. 15. Thus, the facts and circumstance of the case of Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz (Supra.) is also different from the fact of the case in hand. In the present case, the compensation and employment in lieu of acquisition of the said land was given without any delay to the persons who were found eligible with regard to the said land on the basis of the authentication report of the Circle Officer, Barkagaon. 16. On bare perusal of the record of the present case, it would be evident that the compensation and employment in lieu of the acquisition of the said land was given to the persons in the years 1981-82 and 1986 who were found eligible for the same on the basis of the authentication report of the Circle Officer, Barkagaon. The petitioner neither challenged the said authentication report nor objected the payment of compensation made to Hopna Manjhi and others before the competent authority and after lapse of about 43 years from the date of payment of compensation and grant of employment, the petitioner has claimed the compensation and employment for the said land by stating that vide judgment dated 11 th February, 1947 passed in Title Appeal No. 58 of 1946, the said land was decreed in favour of his ancestors. 17. In the case of Shankara Coop. Housing Society Ltd. Vs. M. Prabhakar & Others reported in (2011) 5 SCC 607 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: - Re: Delay and laches 46. Delay and laches is one of the factors that requires to be borne in mind by the High Courts when they exercise their discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In an appropriate case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his rights taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances. 47. The Privy Council in Lindsay Petroleum Co. In an appropriate case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his rights taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances. 47. The Privy Council in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd [(1874) LR 5 PC 221] , which was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service [ AIR 1969 SC 329 ] , has stated: (Lindsay Petroleum Co. case [(1874) LR 5 PC 221] , LR pp. 239-40) “Now the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” 48. In Amrit Lal Berry v. CCE [ (1975) 4 SCC 714 ] , this Court took the view that: (SCC p. 726, para 16) “16. … if a petitioner has been so remiss or negligent as to approach the Court for relief after an inordinate and unexplained delay, he certainly jeopardises his claims as it may become inequitable, with circumstances altered by lapse of time and other facts, to enforce a fundamental right to the detriment of the similar claims of innocent third persons.” 49. … if a petitioner has been so remiss or negligent as to approach the Court for relief after an inordinate and unexplained delay, he certainly jeopardises his claims as it may become inequitable, with circumstances altered by lapse of time and other facts, to enforce a fundamental right to the detriment of the similar claims of innocent third persons.” 49. In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar [(1995) 4 SCC 683] , this Court observed that: (SCC p. 683d) Unless the facts and circumstances of the case at hand clearly justify the laches or undue delay, writ petitioners are not entitled to any relief against anybody including the State. 50. In Shiv Dass v. Union of India [ (2007) 9 SCC 274 ] , this Court opined that: (SCC p. 277, para 8) “8. … The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” 51. In City and Industrial Development Corpn. v. DosuAardeshirBhiwandiwala [(2009) 1 SCC 168] , this Court held: (SCC p. 174, para 26) “26. It is well settled and needs no restatement at our hands that under Article 226 of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of a High Court to issue appropriate writs particularly a writ of mandamus is highly discretionary. The relief cannot be claimed as of right. One of the grounds for refusing relief is that the person approaching the High Court is guilty of unexplained delay and the laches. Inordinate delay in moving the court for a writ is an adequate ground for refusing a writ. The principle is that the courts exercising public law jurisdiction do not encourage agitation of stale claims and exhuming matters where the rights of third parties may have accrued in the interregnum.” 52. Inordinate delay in moving the court for a writ is an adequate ground for refusing a writ. The principle is that the courts exercising public law jurisdiction do not encourage agitation of stale claims and exhuming matters where the rights of third parties may have accrued in the interregnum.” 52. Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Counsel for contesting respondents, invites our attention to the observations made by this Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [ (1986) 4 SCC 566 ] , wherein this Court has stated: (SCC p. 595, para 24) “24. … this rule of laches or delay is not a rigid rule which can be cast in a straitjacket formula, for there may be cases where despite delay and creation of third-party rights the High Court may still in the exercise of its discretion interfere and grant relief to the petitioner. But, such cases where the demand of justice is so compelling that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay or creation of third-party rights would by their very nature be few and far between. Ultimately it would be a matter within the discretion of the Court; ex hypothesi every discretion must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it.” 53. Reliance is also placed on the observations made by this Court in DehriRohtas Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur [ (1992) 2 SCC 598 ] , wherein it is observed: (SCC pp. 602-03, para 13) “13. The rule which says that the Court may not enquire into belated and stale claim is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion. Each case must depend upon its own facts. It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how delay arose. The principle on which the relief to the party on the grounds of laches or delay is denied is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay. The principle on which the relief to the party on the grounds of laches or delay is denied is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay. The real test to determine delay in such cases is that the petitioner should come to the writ court before a parallel right is created and that the lapse of time is not attributable to any laches or negligence. The test is not as to physical running of time. Where the circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches.” 18. In the case of Syed Maqbool Ali Vs. State of U.P Another reported in (2011) 15 SCC 383 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: - 10. But that does not mean that the delay should be ignored or the appellant should be given relief. In such matters, the person aggrieved should approach the High Court diligently. If the writ petition is belated, unless there is good and satisfactory explanation for the delay, the petition will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches. Further the High Court should be satisfied that the case warrants the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and that the matter is one where the alternative remedy of suit is not appropriate. For example, if the person aggrieved and the State are owners of adjoining lands and the claims that the State has encroached over a part of his land, or if there is a simple boundary dispute, the remedy will lie only in a civil suit, as the dispute does not relate to any high- handed, arbitrary or unreasonable action of the officers of the State and there is a need to examine disputed questions relating to title, extent and actual possession. But where the person aggrieved establishes that the State had high-handedly taken over his land without recourse to acquisition or deprived him of his property without authority of law, the landholder may seek his remedy in a writ petition. 12. The High Courts should also be cautious in entertaining writ petitions filed decades after the dispossession, seeking directions for acquisition and payment of compensation. 12. The High Courts should also be cautious in entertaining writ petitions filed decades after the dispossession, seeking directions for acquisition and payment of compensation. It is not uncommon for villagers to offer/donate some part of their lands voluntarily for a public purpose which would benefit them or the community as for example, construction of an access road to the village or their property, or construction of a village tank or a bund to prevent flooding/erosion. When they offer their land for such public purpose, the land would be of little or negligible value. But decades later, when land values increase, either on account of passage of time or on account of developments or improvements carried out by the State, the landholders come up with belated claims alleging that their lands were taken without acquisition and without their consent. When such claims are made after several decades, the State would be at a disadvantage to contest the claim, as it may not have the records to show in what circumstances the lands were given/donated and whether the land was given voluntarily. Therefore, belated writ petitions, without proper explanation for the delay, are liable to be dismissed. Be that as it may. 19. Thus, it is no more res integra that the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if there is negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his rights. If the writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. The jurisdiction of a High Court to issue appropriate writs particularly a writ of mandamus is highly discretionary and the relief cannot be claimed as of right. If the writ petition is highly belated, unless there is good and satisfactory explanation for such delay, the same should be rejected on the ground of delay and latches, however, where the person aggrieved, establishes that the State had high-handedly taken over his land without recourse to acquisition or had deprived him of his property without authority of law, the land-holder may seek his remedy in a writ petition. 20. In the case in hand pursuant to acquisition of the land made vide Notification Nos. 20. In the case in hand pursuant to acquisition of the land made vide Notification Nos. S.O. 51(E) dated 24 th January, 1975 and S.O. 4609 dated 7 th December, 1983 issued by the Ministry of Energy (Department of Coal), Government of India, the compensation and employment was given to few persons in the years 1981-82 and 1986 respectively which was not objected by the petitioner at that point of time or within a reasonable period thereafter. He, however, after lapse of about 43 years from the date of payment of compensation for the said land has claimed his right for compensation and employment for acquisition of the said land. The petitioner has failed to explain before this Court as to why the judgment passed in Title Appeal No. 58 of 1946 was not promptly produced by him before the competent authority. Now the position is that the compensation and employment for the said land has already been given to other persons and the right has accrued in their favour due to inordinate delay in filing the present writ petition. If at this belated stage, the claim of the petitioner is entertained, the same will seriously prejudice the right of those persons, who have earlier been benefitted, which is not permissible. 21. In view of the discussions as made hereinabove, I do not find any reason to grant any relief to the petitioner under extraordinary writ jurisdiction. 22. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.