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2025 DIGILAW 2288 (MAD)

V. Rukmani Wife of R. Kathiresan v. Management

2025-04-25

A.D.MARIA CLETE

body2025
JUDGMENT : A.D. MARIA CLETE, J. Heard. 2. The Petitioner was employed as a Salesperson in the Respondent Society from 01.07.1978. Upon attaining the age of superannuation, she retired from service on 31.05.2013, having rendered 35 years of service. Her last drawn monthly salary was Rs.11,783/-. Following her retirement, she approached the Additional Labour Court, Coimbatore, by filing a petition under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, seeking payment of earned leave wages for a period of eight months, amounting to a sum of Rs.1,00,336/-. The said petition was registered as C.P. No. 85 of 2013, and notice was ordered to be issued to the Respondent Society. 3. The Respondent Society filed its counter statement dated 01.07.2015. During the proceedings before the Labour Court, the Petitioner examined herself as WW1 and her husband, R. Kathiresan, as WW2. In support of her case, 18 documents were filed and marked as Exhibits W1 to W18. On behalf of the Respondent Society, one Selvi Latha was examined as MW1, and 7 documents were filed on their side, which were marked as Exhibits M1 to M7. 4. During the pendency of the proceedings, the Petitioner filed an application in I.A. No. 1 of 2019 seeking production of three documents from the Respondent Society, namely: the acquittance register, the special byelaws of the Society, and the punishment order issued to her. By order dated 04.03.2019, the Labour Court directed production of the said documents, subject to the Petitioner paying a cost of Rs.1,000/- to the Respondent Society. Pursuant thereto, the three acquittance registers and the byelaws, including the special byelaws of the Society, were produced and marked as Exhibits X1 to X5. The Petitioner also filed written submissions, dated Nil, before the Labour Court. 5. Upon consideration of the materials placed on record, the Labour Court concluded that the Claim Petition filed under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, seeking earned leave wages, was not maintainable, as the Petitioner had no pre-existing right to the said claim. The Labour Court further upheld the preliminary objection raised by the Respondent Management, holding that the Petitioner, having retired from service, does not fall within the definition of a "workman" under Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act. On both these grounds, the Claim Petition was dismissed. The Labour Court, in paragraphs 22 to 24 of its order, observed as follows:– “22. On both these grounds, the Claim Petition was dismissed. The Labour Court, in paragraphs 22 to 24 of its order, observed as follows:– “22. 33-C(2) of the I.D.Act would not contemplate the determination and adjudication of rights of parties. Accordingly, the claims of the petitioner, when denied by the management, cannot be adjudicated and determined under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. The application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act is maintainable only when there is a determined amount and when such amount is denied by the employer. Hence the claim made by the petitioner, is not maintainable, as it requires prior adjudication. Therefore, the contention of the respondent that this petition has been filed without any basis and on imaginary grounds, merits acceptance by this court. 23. Further, the petitioner has not filed any petition seeking fixation of her wages, while she was in service. The Joint Registrar has not specifically fixed the wages of the petitioner. Thus, it is clear that the wages of the petitioner is not determined. The decisions cited by the respondent reveal that the retired employee is not a workman as defined u/s. 2(s) of the I.D.Act and so when the status denied by the respondent, its contention that the petitioner cannot maintain this petition, cannot be simply brushed aside. The petitioner has expanded her case by raising new aspects at the time of evidence, cross-examination of M.W-1 and in the arguments, without proper pleadings in the computation petition. Those aspects which are seriously disputed by the respondent, require prior adjudication by proper authority. The decisions relied on by the respondent are squarely attracted to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 24. From the above discussions, it is clear that in the absence of any prior adjudication or recognition thereof by the employer, the entitlement cannot be decided in the special proceedings. In view of the same this court is satisfied that this petition u/s.33-C(2) is not maintainable, that the petitioner is not entitled for computation of monetary benefit as claimed in his petition and that she is not entitled for any relief. Accordingly these points are decided as against the petitioner.” 6. Aggrieved by the said order, the present writ petition has been filed. Accordingly these points are decided as against the petitioner.” 6. Aggrieved by the said order, the present writ petition has been filed. A perusal of the impugned order of the Labour Court dated 27.09.2019 reveals that the reasoning is rather superficial and lacks a comprehensive consideration of all relevant aspects, including the applicable statutory provisions. The Labour Court failed to take note of the well-settled legal position that not only a retired workman, but even the legal representatives of a deceased workman, are entitled to maintain an application under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The core emphasis under Section 33C(2) is the existence of a right in the workman to claim any amount due from the employer, and the Labour Court’s omission to examine the claim in that context vitiates the impugned order. 7. The Government of Tamil Nadu has framed rules under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, titled the Tamil Nadu Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958. Rule 54(1) of the said Rules reads as follows:– “Mode of computation of cash value under section 33-C (2) of the Act. -- 1 Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit, the workman himself or any other person authorised by the workman or in the case of death of the workman, his assignee or heirs as the case may be, may make an application under sub-section (2) of section 33-C to the Labour Court. The application by the workman shall be made in Form ‘M’ and the application by the assignee or heirs or any person authorised by the workman shall be made in Form ‘M-1’. 8. As early as in the year 1963, in Paragaon Talkies v. Manickam reported in 1963 (1) MLJ 304 = 1968 (1) LLJ 355 (Mad), the Court held as follows:– “It is next contended that since on the date of the application under Section 330 respondent I was no longer a workman, and since also he had resigned from service, he would not be a workman within the meaning of the term under the Industrial Disputes Act, and that, therefore, the application under Section 33C was not maintainable. It is true that a person who has resigned from service is not one of the categories of persons within the ambit of the inclusive part of the definition of a " workman." But it is a well-known principle that the status of the party for purposes of relief on the execution side should be determined as on the date when the right accrued and not on the date on which the right is said to be enforced. When that settlement was entered into which was the source of liability for gratuity in favour of respondent 1, he was undoubtedly a workman within the meaning of the Act. That being the case, he was competent to file the application under Section 33C.” 9. The Allahabad High Court has also taken a similar view in its decision in Hindustan Cables Ltd. v. Labour Court, Allahabad, reported in 1998 (78) FLR 152, wherein it was held as follows:– “…. The Settlement became operative from a retrospective date. All those trainees who completed three months' training were given the regular grade. The said grade cannot be denied to the respondent only because he had resigned. When the respondent- workman was in the employment, he was entitled to equal treatment, but if he has subsequently resigned that would not be a relevant factor for denying him the wages. The Settlement does not make any definition based on continuation in service or otherwise, hence the workman is entitled to claim the same benefit which his counterparts were entitled. The action of the petitioner-management is not in consonance with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Labour Court was perfectly justified in allowing the claim of the workman under Section 33C(2) of the Act.” 10. Mr. Balan Haridas, learned counsel for the Petitioner, also referred to proceedings initiated by the Petitioner before the Payment of Wages Authority, Coimbatore, in P.W. Case No. 65 of 2013. During the hearing of the said application, the Respondent Society reported "no instructions," and the Authority proceeded to pass an ex parte order dated 21.07.2014, directing the Society to pay a sum of Rs.4,56,054/- within a period of 30 days. Subsequently, the Society filed I.A. No. 7 of 2016 seeking condonation of a delay of 125 days and for reopening of the case. The Authority allowed the application and reopened the proceedings. Subsequently, the Society filed I.A. No. 7 of 2016 seeking condonation of a delay of 125 days and for reopening of the case. The Authority allowed the application and reopened the proceedings. However, on 26.06.2015, the Authority once again closed the Management's evidence. Thereafter, the Management filed I.A. No. 6 of 2016, which was allowed by the Authority by order dated 18.11.2016. 11. The Petitioner challenged the said order by filing W.P. No. 3847 of 2017 before this Court. The writ petition was disposed of by order dated 11.04.2022, wherein this Court issued the following directions:– “In consideration of the above development, the Writ Petition is disposed of with the directions as under. i) The 2nd respondent is directed to make payment of Rs.3,26,954/- (Rupees Three Lakhs Twenty Six Thousand Nine Hundred and Fifty Four only) to the petitioner as admitted by them in their calculation sheet filed before this Court within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. ii) The 1st respondent authority is directed to proceed with the proceedings in P.W.No.65/2013 in respect of the remaining part of the claim of the petitioner herein and dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible, not later than six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. iii) It is needless to mention that the payment of Rs.3,26,954/- is without prejudice to the rights of the petitioner in the pending proceedings before the 1st respondent authority. No costs.” 12. Pursuant to the directions issued by this Court, the Payment of Wages Authority, by order dated 18.03.2025, allowed P.W. Case No. 65 of 2013 and issued the following direction:– 13. Although the aforesaid order was not available during the proceedings before the Labour Court, it is pertinent to note that in the course of cross- examination, RW1 admitted to the pendency of the payment of wages proceedings before the Payment of Wages Authority at Coimbatore. Mr. Balan Haridas, learned counsel for the Petitioner, further submitted that the Petitioner had summoned the acquittance registers from the Respondent, which were marked as Exhibits X1 to X3. Referring to Ground No. 8(h), he contended that the entries in the said registers did not accurately reflect the actual amounts paid to the Petitioner. 14. Mr. Balan Haridas, learned counsel for the Petitioner, further submitted that the Petitioner had summoned the acquittance registers from the Respondent, which were marked as Exhibits X1 to X3. Referring to Ground No. 8(h), he contended that the entries in the said registers did not accurately reflect the actual amounts paid to the Petitioner. 14. Before the Labour Court, the Petitioner filed, as Ex.W1, the order dated 22.04.2013 passed by the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies under Section 153 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983. When the said order was not implemented by the Respondent Society, the Respondent’s witness was cross-examined, during which the following admissions were elicited:– 15.To support the stand taken by the Labour Court, the learned counsel for the Respondent relied on two judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Shri Birendra Bhandari reported in 2006 (10) SCC 211 , the Court held as follows:– “The principles enunciated in the decisions referred by either side can be summed up as follows: Whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied of such benefit can approach Labour Court under Section 33 C(2) of the Act. The benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33 C(2) of the Act is necessarily a pre- existing benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right The difference between a pre- existing right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33 C(2) of the Act is necessarily a pre- existing benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right The difference between a pre- existing right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising powers under U.P. State Road Transport Corporation vs Shri Birendra Bhandari on 28 September, 2006 Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1997253/ 2 Section 33 C(2) of the Act while the latter does not.” 16.In the second decision, Bombay Chemical Industries v. Deputy Labour Commissioner , reported in 2022 (5) SCC 629 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:– “In the case of Kankuben (supra), it is observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied of such benefit can approach Labour Court under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a pre?existing benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The difference between a pre?existing right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising powers under Section 33C (2) of the ID Act while the latter does not. ………..thereafter the Labour Court ought not to have proceeded further with the application under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour Court ought to have relegated respondent No.2 to initiate appropriate proceedings by way of reference and get his right crystalized and/or adjudicate upon.” 17. ………..thereafter the Labour Court ought not to have proceeded further with the application under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour Court ought to have relegated respondent No.2 to initiate appropriate proceedings by way of reference and get his right crystalized and/or adjudicate upon.” 17. To reinforce his contention that the burden of proof lies on the workman to establish the existence of a right before the Labour Court, the learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Mohammed Abdul Malik v. Presiding Officer , reported in 2007 (2) LLJ 281 , and emphasized the following passage from the said judgment:– “Thus, the apex Court has clarified through several pronouncements that the burden lies always on the workman to prove that he has worked as employee and he has drawn particular salary as regular employee and he was discharged from service or dismissed from service and he is entitled for relief sought for. In the instant case there is no evidence in this respect. There is no evidence that documents are suppressed. Hence drawing adverse inference is bad in law. For the foregoing reasons, this Court comes to a conclusion that there is no evidence on behalf of the workman to prove his claim and the Labour Court has erroneously awarded the amount therefore, the Award of the Labour Court is liable to be set aside and accordingly the writ petition is allowed. No costs.” 18. However, in the present case, the Petitioner had duly discharged the burden cast upon her under law. She produced Ex.W1, being the revisional order passed by the Joint Registrar. In addition, she filed Exhibits W7 to W17, comprising various Government Orders pertaining to pay fixation. The calculation of earned leave wages was set out in the statement marked as Ex.W18. To substantiate her claim regarding the actual wages received, she also summoned and produced the acquittance registers, which were marked as Ex.X1 to Ex.X3. The only document that was not available before the Labour Court at the time of adjudication was the final order dated 18.03.2025 passed by the Payment of Wages Authority. 19. The Labour Court failed to consider all the relevant materials placed on record and adopted a cursory approach in dismissing the Claim Petition in C.P. No. 85 of 2013 on unsustainable grounds. 19. The Labour Court failed to consider all the relevant materials placed on record and adopted a cursory approach in dismissing the Claim Petition in C.P. No. 85 of 2013 on unsustainable grounds. Accordingly, W.P. No. 15678 of 2020 stands allowed and the matter is remanded to the Labour Court for fresh consideration. While undertaking the fresh adjudication, the Labour Court shall also take into account the final order passed by the Payment of Wages Authority dated 18.03.2025. It is held that C.P. No. 85 of 2013 is maintainable at the instance of the Petitioner, and that she possesses a pre-existing right to claim earned leave wages. The Labour Court, upon receipt of this order and after issuing notice to both parties, shall compute the amount due to the Petitioner within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order. The Writ Miscellaneous Petition stands closed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.