JUDGMENT : JOBIN SEBASTIAN, J. 1. The petitioner herein is the brother of one Ramesh Kusulia ('detenu' for the sake of brevity) and his challenge in this Writ Petition is directed against Ext.P2 order of detention dated 11.03.2025 passed by the 2nd respondent under Section 3 (1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (PITNDPS Act for brevity). The said order stands confirmed by the Government, vide order dated 22.08.2025, after obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board, and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of one year with effect from the date of detention. 2. The records reveal that a proposal was submitted by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Kochi City, on 30.01.2025, seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under the PITNDPS Act before the jurisdictional authority, the 2nd respondent. Altogether, two cases in which the detenu got involved have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing the order of detention. Out of the two cases considered, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.1031/2024 of Kalamassery Police Station, alleging the commission of offences punishable under Sections 20 (b)(ii) (C) and 29 of NDPS Act. 3. We heard Smt. Saipooja, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K.A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader. 4. Relying on the decision in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and another, 1991 (1) SCC 128 , the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in cases wherein the detenu is in judicial custody, in connection with the last prejudicial activity, a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed only on satisfaction of the triple test mentioned in the said decision by the Supreme Court. According to the counsel, as the impugned order was passed while the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, it was incumbent upon the authority to satisfy itself that it has reason to believe, on the basis of reliable material placed before it that, there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity. According to the counsel, though in Ext.P2 order, it is mentioned that the detenu was undergoing judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, it is nowhere mentioned that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail in connection with the last prejudicial activity. The learned counsel submitted that for the above-mentioned sole reason, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 5. In response, the learned Government Pleader submitted that Ext.P2 order of detention was passed by the jurisdictional authority after complying with all the procedural formalities and after arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the Government Pleader, the impugned order of detention was passed by the jurisdictional authority after being satisfied that a detention order under Section 3 (1) of the PITNDPS Act is the only way to deter the detenu from repeating criminal activities. It was further contended that the jurisdictional authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, and it was on being satisfied that there is every chance that the detenu be released on bail, and if so released, he would in all probability indulge in criminal activities further, the order of detenion was passed. According to him, therefore, the order of detention will legally sustain irrespective of the fact that the detenu was under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity while the impugned order was passed. 6. From the rival contentions raised, it is gatherable that the main question that revolves around this petition is whether an order of detention under Section 3 (1) of the PINDPS Act can be validly passed against a person who is under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. While answering the said question, it is to be noted that, through a series of judicial pronouncements rendered by the Apex Court as well as by this Court, it is well settled that there is no legal impediment in passing an order of detention against a person who is under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. However, an order of detention against a person who is in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity cannot be passed in a mechanical manner. However, an order of detention against a person who is in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity cannot be passed in a mechanical manner. Undisputedly, an order of detention under the PITNDPS Act is a drastic measure against a citizen as it heavily impacts his personal as well as his fundamental rights. When an effective and alternative remedy exists to prevent a person from repeating criminal activities, resorting to preventive detention is neither warranted nor permissible. When a detenu is in jail in connection with the last prejudicial activity, obviously, there is no imminent possibility of being involved in criminal activities. Therefore, before passing a detention order in respect of a person who is in jail, the concerned authority must satisfy itself that there is a real possibility that the detenu is on bail, and further, if released on bail, the material on record reveals that he will indulge in prejudicial activity if not detained. The circumstances that necessitate the passing of such an order must be reflected in the order itself. 7. In Kamarunnissa’s case (cited supra), the Supreme Court made it clear that a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed even in the case of a person in custody (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable materials placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail and (b) that on being so released he would in probability indulged in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is essential to detain him to prevent him from doing so. If the authority passes an order after recording its satisfaction in this regard, such an order would be valid. 8. A similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Veeramani v. The State of Tamil Nadu, 1994 (2) SCC 337 and Union of India v. Paul Manickam, 2003 (8) SCC 342 . 9. In view of the said decisions, in cases wherein the detenu is in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed only on satisfaction of the triple test mentioned in the said decisions by the Supreme Court. 10. 9. In view of the said decisions, in cases wherein the detenu is in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed only on satisfaction of the triple test mentioned in the said decisions by the Supreme Court. 10. Keeping in mind the above proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court, while reverting to the facts in the present case, it can be seen that the case registered against the detenu with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.1031/2024 of Kalamassery Police Station, alleging the commission of offences punishable under Sections 20 (b)(ii) (C) and 29 of NDPS Act. The detenu who is arrayed as the 2nd accused in the said case was arrested on 11.11.2024, and since then, he has been under judicial custody. It was on 30.01.2025, while the detenu was under judicial custody, the proposal for proceedings under the PITNDPS Act was initiated. Later, it was on 15.05.2025, the impugned order was passed. 11. In Ext.P2 impugned order, the fact that at the time of passing the said order, the detenu was under custody in connection with the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is specifically adverted to. Similarly, it is mentioned that the bail application filed by the detenu before the Sessions Court, Ernakulam, was dismissed by the said court on 21.03.2025. Likewise, in the impugned order, it is stated that the detenu is still trying to come out of jail, and if he is released on bail, there is a high propensity that the detenu will indulge in drug peddling activities in the future. The order further reads that it is absolutely imperative to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities in the event of getting bail. We do agree that the detaining authority has not specifically recorded that “detenu is likely to be released on bail”. 12. The order further reads that it is absolutely imperative to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities in the event of getting bail. We do agree that the detaining authority has not specifically recorded that “detenu is likely to be released on bail”. 12. Dealing with a similar situation, the Supreme Court in Union of India and another vs. Dimple Happy Dhakad, 2019 KHC 6662, after considering the dictum laid down in Kamarunissa (cited supra) in paragraph 35 of the judgment, observed as follows; “In the light of the well settled principles, we have to see, in the present case, whether there was awareness in the mind of the detaining authority that detenu is in custody and he had reason to believe that detenu is likely to be released on bail and if so released, he would continue to indulge in prejudicial activities. In the present case, the detention orders dated 17.05.2019 record the awareness of the detaining authority that (i) the detenu is in custody, (ii) that the bail application filed by the detenus have been rejected by the court. Of course, in the detention order, the detaining authority has not specifically recorded that the “detenu is likely to be released. It cannot be said that the detaining authority has not applied its mind merely on the ground that in the detention orders, it is not expressly stated as to the “detenu’s likelihood of being released on bail” and if so released, he is likely to indulge in the same prejudicial activities. But the detaining authority has clearly recorded the antecedents of the detenu and its satisfaction that the detenus, Happy Dhakad and Nisar Aliyar, have the high propensity to commit such offences in the future.” 13. Keeping in mind the above principles laid down by the Supreme Court while reverting to the case at hand, it can be seen that, in the impugned order, it is not specifically recorded that the detenu is likely to be released on bail. However, in the order, it is stated that if the detenu is released on bail, there is every possibility of him indulging in criminal activities again. However, in the order, it is stated that if the detenu is released on bail, there is every possibility of him indulging in criminal activities again. The satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenu is already in custody and he is likely to be released on bail, and on being so released, he is likely to indulge in prejudicial activity, is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, and normally, the subjective satisfaction is not to be interfered with. The impugned order reflects that there is a proper application of mind and, based on the materials available on record, the detaining authority subjectively satisfied that there is a reason to believe that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that, on so released, the detenu will in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities. Therefore, merely because of the reason that the detaining authority has not specifically recorded that “the detenu is likely to be released on bail”, it cannot be said that the impugned order lacks satisfaction of the detaining authority regarding the chance of the detenu being released on bail. 14. Therefore, it is clear that the order of detention was passed by the jurisdictional authority after being satisfied that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that, on being so released, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities. A perusal of the records further reveals that all the procedural formalities before and after passing an order of detention have been fully complied with in this case. Similarly, from the records as well as from the impugned order, it is discernible that the said order has been passed by the jurisdictional authority after arriving at the requisite subjective as well as objective satisfaction. Hence, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.