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2025 DIGILAW 229 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Suresh @ Chandu Valabhai

2025-03-07

S.V.PINTO

body2025
JUDGMENT : S.V. PINTO, J. 1. This appeal has been filed by the appellant – State under Section 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’) against the judgment and the order dated 01.10.2007 in Sessions Case No.48 of 2004 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and Presiding Officer, 7 th Fast Track Judge, Gondal camp at Dhoraji (hereinafter referred to as ‘the learned Trial Court’), whereby, the learned Trial Court has acquitted the respondents – accused from the offences punishable under Sections 498(A), 323, 306 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘the IPC’). The respondents are hereinafter referred to as ‘the accused’ as they stood in the rank and file in the original case, for the sake of convenience, clarity and brevity. 2. The relevant facts leading to filing of the present appeal are as under: 2.1. The accused No.1 was married to Rekhaben and was her husband, The accused Nos.2 and 3 are father-in-law and mother-in-law of Rekhaben and all the accused used to mentally and physically harass Rekhaben to such an extent that on 28.05.2002, at about 5:30am, Rekhaben took her minor daughter Deval, aged about eight months, and sprinkled kerosene on herself and set herself ablaze and both of them expired during treatment. The complaint was filed by Rekhaben herself and as she expired during treatment, the complaint was registered 1-C.R. No. 43 of 2002 at Gondal Taluka Police Station for the under sections 498(A), 306, 323 and 114 of the IPC on 28.05.2002. 2.2. After registration of the FIR, the investigation was carried out by the concerned Investigating Officer and after having sufficient material against the accused, the chargesheet came to be filed before the concerned jurisdictional Magistrate. As the case was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions therefore, after completion of process under Section 209 of the Cr.P.C., the case was committed to the Sessions Court and the same was registered as Sessions Case No.48 of 2004. 2.3. The accused were duly served with the summons and the accused appeared before the learned Trial Court and it was verified whether the copies of all the police papers were provided to the accused as per the provisions of Section 207 of the Code. 2.3. The accused were duly served with the summons and the accused appeared before the learned Trial Court and it was verified whether the copies of all the police papers were provided to the accused as per the provisions of Section 207 of the Code. A charge was framed by the learned Trial Court at Exh.6 and the statements of the accused were recorded at Exhs.7 to 9 respectively, wherein, the accused denied all the contents of the charge and the entire evidence of the prosecution was taken on record. The prosecution has examined 7 witnesses and has produced 5 documentary evidence in support of the case. 2.4 After the closing pursis was submitted by the learned APP, the further statements of the accused under Section 313 of the Code were recorded. After hearing the arguments of the learned APP and learned advocate for the accused and after perusing the documents on record, the learned Trial Court, by the impugned judgment and order, has acquitted the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 498(A), 323, 306, and 114 of the IPC. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the appellant – State has filed the present appeal mainly stating that the learned Trial Court has committed grave error on record of the case as the learned Trial Court has not properly appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence in its true and proper perspective. That the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court is based on inferences not warranted by facts of the case and also on presumption not permitted by law. The learned Trial Court has erred in not considering the ratio laid down by the judgment of the Apex Court which are applicable to the facts of the present case and the impugned judgment and order is perverse and suffering from legal and factual error apparent on the record. The learned Trial Court has erred in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the case beyond reasonable doubts. The learned Trial Court has, without giving any specific reason, not discussed the evidence of the witnesses in the impugned judgment and order of acquittal and has discarded the evidence of the witnesses. The learned Trial Court has erred in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the case beyond reasonable doubts. The learned Trial Court has, without giving any specific reason, not discussed the evidence of the witnesses in the impugned judgment and order of acquittal and has discarded the evidence of the witnesses. The learned Trial Court has erred in not considering the evidence of the complainant and other witnesses which was fully supported the case of the prosecution. The learned Trial Court has passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal is without giving any cogent and convincing reasons, illegal, invalid and improper, and therefore, the same requires to be quashed and set aside. 4. Heard learned APP Mr.Bhargav Pandya for the appellant – State and learned advocate Mr.Ashish Dagli for the respondents. Perused the impugned judgment and order of acquittal and have re-appreciated the entire evidence of the prosecution on record of the case. 5. Learned APP Mr.Bhargav Pandya for the appellant – State has taken this Court through the entire evidence produced by the prosecution and has vehemently argued that the learned Trial Court has not appreciated the evidence properly and the prosecution has produced cogent evidence to prove the case and has successfully proved the case against the accused but the learned Trial Court has not considered the same and has acquitted the accused. The judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Judge is contrary to law, evidence on record and principles of justice. The judgment and order of acquittal passed by learned Judge is based on inferences, not warranted by facts of the case and also on presumptions, not permitted by law. Learned APP has urged this Court to quash and set aside the impugned judgment and order of acquittal and to find the accused guilty for the said offence and impose maximum sentence on the accused. 6. Learned advocate Mr.Ashish Dagli for the respondents – original accused has submitted that the learned Trial Court has appreciated all the evidence in true perspective and has not committed any error in acquitting the accused. Therefore, no interference of this Court is required in the impugned judgment and the order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court and has urged this Court to reject the appeal. 7. Therefore, no interference of this Court is required in the impugned judgment and the order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court and has urged this Court to reject the appeal. 7. At the outset, before discussing the facts of the present case, it would be appropriate to refer to the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Chandrappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka reported in 2007 (4) SCC 415 , the Apex Court has observed as under: Recently, in Kallu Vs. State of M.P. (2006) 10 SCC 313 : AIR 2006 SC 831 , this Court stated; "While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial court". (emphasis supplied) …….. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge;] (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. 8. It is a settled principle of law that in an appeal against acquittal, the Appellate Court is circumscribed by limitation that no interference has to be made in the order of acquittal unless after appreciation of the evidence produced before the learned Trial Court, it appears that there are some manifest illegality or perversity which could not have been possibly arrived at by the Court. It is also a settled principle that there is no embargo on the Appellate Court to review the evidence but, generally the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with as the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by the order of acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case of the prosecution i.e. (i) guilt of the accused and (ii) his innocence, the view, which is in favour of the accused, should be adopted, and if the trial Court has taken the view in favour of the accused, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of the acquittal. The Appellate Court can interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal only when there are compelling and substantial reasons and the order is clearly unreasonable and where the Appellate Court comes to conclusion that based on the evidence, the conviction is a must. 9. The accused has been charged with the offence under Section 306 of the IPC and at this juncture it would be fit to reproduce the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Prakash and others versus State of Maharashtra in the order passed in Criminal Appeal No.5543 of 2024 (Arising out of SLP (Cri.) No. 1073 of 2023 on 20 December 2024 in paras 12 to 22 which are as under: “12. The relevant provisions of the IPC that fall for consideration are as under: “306. Abetment of suicide.- If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. 107. Abetment of a thing—A person abets the doing of a thing, who— First.— Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly.— Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.— Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation-1: A person who, by willful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing. Explanation 2: Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.” 13. Section 306 of the IPC has two basic ingredients-first, an act of suicide by one person and second, the abetment to the said act by another person(s). In order to sustain a charge under Section 306 of the IPC, it must necessarily be proved that the accused person has contributed to the suicide by the deceased by some direct or indirect act. In order to sustain a charge under Section 306 of the IPC, it must necessarily be proved that the accused person has contributed to the suicide by the deceased by some direct or indirect act. To prove such contribution or involvement, one of the three conditions outlined in Section 107 of the IPC has to be satisfied. 14. Section 306 read with Section 107 of IPC, has been interpreted, time and again, and its principles are well- established. To attract the offence of abetment to suicide, it is important to establish proof of direct or indirect acts of instigation or incitement of suicide by the accused, which must be in close proximity to the commission of suicide by the deceased. Such instigation or incitement should reveal a clear mens rea to abet the commission of suicide and should put the victim in such a position that he/she would have no other option but to commit suicide. 15. The law on abetment has been crystallised by a plethora of decisions of this Court. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating or intentionally aiding another person to do a 10 particular thing. To bring a charge under Section 306 of the IPC, the act of abetment would require the positive act of instigating or intentionally aiding another person to commit suicide. Without such mens rea on the part of the accused person being apparent from the face of the record, a charge under the aforesaid Section cannot be sustained. Abetment also requires an active act, direct or indirect, on the part of the accused person which left the deceased with no other option but to commit suicide. 16. This Court in the case of S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan and Another12, had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 306 of the IPC and the ingredients which are essential for abetment, as set out in Section 107 of the IPC. It observed as follows: 16. The word “suicide” in itself is nowhere defined in the Penal Code, however its meaning and import is well known and requires no explanation. “Sui” means “self” and “cide” means “killing”, thus implying an act of self- killing. In short, a person committing suicide must commit it by himself, irrespective of the means employed by him in achieving his object of killing himself. ……….. 18. “Sui” means “self” and “cide” means “killing”, thus implying an act of self- killing. In short, a person committing suicide must commit it by himself, irrespective of the means employed by him in achieving his object of killing himself. ……….. 18. In our country, while suicide in itself is not an offence, considering that the successful offender is beyond the reach of law, attempt to suicide is an offence under Section 309 IPC. ………. 21. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Mahendra Singh V. State of M.P. [1995 Supp (3) SCC 731 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1157] In Mahendra Singh [1995 Supp (3) SCC 731 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1157] the allegations levelled were as under: (SCC p. 731, para 1) “1. … My mother-in-law and husband and sister-in-law (husband's elder brother's wife) harassed me. They beat me and abused me. My husband Mahendra wants to marry a second time. He has illicit connections with my sister-in-law. Because of these reasons and being harassed I want to die by burning.” The Court on the aforementioned allegations came to a definite conclusion that by no stretch the ingredients of abetment are attracted on the statement of the deceased. According to the appellant, the conviction of the appellant under Section 306 IPC merely on the basis of the aforementioned allegation of harassment of the deceased is unsustainable in law. … ……….. 23. In State of W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal [ (1994) 1 SCC 73 :1994 SCC (Cri) 107] this Court has cautioned that:(SCC p. 90, para 17) “17. … The court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it [appears] to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and 12 differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty.” 24. This Court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [ (2009) 16 SCC 605 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 367] had an occasion to deal with this aspect of abetment. The Court dealt with the dictionary meaning of the words “instigation” and “goading”. The Court opined that there should be intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter. Each person's suicidability pattern is different from the other. Each person has his own idea of self-esteem and self-respect. Therefore, it is impossible to lay down any straitjacket formula in dealing with such cases. Each case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts and circumstances. 25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide.” 17. This Court held that abetment involves the mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Therefore, without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid a person in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. This Court further observed that the intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 of IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. Abetment also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no other option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide. Abetment also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no other option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide. However, this Court has cautioned that since each person reacts differently to the same provocation depending on a variety of factors, it is impossible to lay down a straightjacket formula to deal with such cases. Therefore, every such case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts and circumstances. 18. More recently, in the case of Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda and Others v. State of Gujarat, this Court has relied on S.S. Chheena (supra) to hold that the element of mens rea cannot simply be presumed or inferred, instead it must be evident and explicitly discernible. Without this, the foundational requirement for establishing abetment under the law, that is deliberate and conspicuous intention to provoke or contribute to the act of suicide, would remain unfulfilled. This Court observed as follows: “18. For a conviction under Section 306 of the IPC, it is a well-established legal principle that the presence of clear mens rea—the intention to abet the act—is essential. Mere harassment, by itself, is not sufficient to find an accused guilty of abetting suicide. The prosecution must demonstrate an active or direct action by the accused that led the deceased to take his/her own life. The element of mens rea cannot simply be presumed or inferred; it must be evident and explicitly discernible. Without this, the foundational requirement for establishing abetment under the law is not satisfied, underscoring the necessity of a deliberate and conspicuous intent to provoke or contribute to the act of suicide.” 19. It is, therefore, evident that the positive act of instigation is a crucial element of abetment. While dealing with an issue of a similar nature, this Court in the case of Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh laid down the parameters of what would be constituted to be an act of instigation. This Court observed as follows:- “20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an act”. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. This Court observed as follows:- “20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an act”. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation.” 20. It could thus be seen that this Court observed that instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an act”. It has been held that in order to satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence, however, a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. Applying the law to the facts of the case, this Court went on to hold that a word uttered in the fit of anger or 16 emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. 21. Relying on the decision in the case of Ramesh Kumar (supra), this Court in the case of Ude Singh and Others v. State of Haryana observed as follows: “16. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be a proof of direct or indirect act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. It could hardly be disputed that the question of cause of a suicide, particularly in the context of an offence of abetment of suicide, remains a vexed one, involving multifaceted and complex attributes of human behaviour and responses/reactions. In the case of accusation for abetment of suicide, the court would be looking for cogent and convincing proof of the act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. In the case of accusation for abetment of suicide, the court would be looking for cogent and convincing proof of the act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. In the case of suicide, mere allegation of harassment of the deceased by another person would not suffice unless there be such action on the part of the accused which compels the person to commit suicide; and such an offending action ought to be proximate to the time of occurrence. Whether a person has abetted in the commission of suicide by another or not, could only be gathered from the facts and circumstances of each case. 16.1. For the purpose of finding out if a person has abetted commission of suicide by another, the consideration would be if the accused is guilty of the act of instigation of the act of suicide. As explained and reiterated by this Court in the decisions above referred, instigation means to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do an act. If the persons who committed suicide had been hypersensitive and the action of the accused is otherwise not ordinarily expected to induce a similarly circumstanced person to commit suicide, it may not be safe to hold the accused guilty of abetment of suicide. But, on the other hand, if the accused by his acts and by his continuous course of conduct creates a situation which leads the deceased perceiving no other option except to commit suicide, the case may fall within the four corners of Section 306 IPC. If the accused plays an active role in tarnishing the self-esteem and self- respect of the victim, which eventually draws the victim to commit suicide, the accused may be held guilty of abetment of suicide. The question of mens rea on the part of the accused in such cases would be examined with reference to the actual acts and deeds of the accused and if the acts and deeds are only of such nature where the accused intended nothing more than harassment or snap show of anger, a particular case may fall short of the offence of abetment of suicide. However, if the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words or deeds until the deceased reacted or was provoked, a particular case may be that of abetment of suicide. However, if the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words or deeds until the deceased reacted or was provoked, a particular case may be that of abetment of suicide. Such being the matter of delicate analysis of human behaviour, each case is required to be examined on its own facts, while taking note of all the surrounding factors having bearing on the actions and psyche of the accused and the deceased. 16.2. We may also observe that human mind could be affected and could react in myriad ways; and impact of one's action on the mind of another carries several imponderables. Similar actions are dealt with differently by different persons; and so far a particular person's reaction to any other human's action is concerned, there is no specific theorem or yardstick to estimate or assess the same. Even in regard to the factors related with the question of harassment of a girl, many factors are to be considered like age, personality, upbringing, rural or urban set-ups, education, etc. Even the response to the ill action of eve teasing and its impact on a young girl could also vary for a variety of factors, including those of background, self-confidence and upbringing. 18 Hence, each case is required to be dealt with on its own facts and circumstances.” 22. It could thus be seen that this Court observed that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be a proof of direct or indirect act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. It has been held that since the cause of suicide particularly in the context of the offence of abetment of suicide involves multifaceted and complex attributes of human behaviour, the court would be looking for cogent and convincing proof of the act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. This Court further observed that a mere allegation of harassment of the deceased by another person would not suffice unless there is such action on the part of the accused which compels the person to commit suicide. This Court also emphasised that such an offending action ought to be proximate to the time of occurrence. It was further clarified that the question of mens rea on the part of the accused in such cases would be examined with reference to the actual acts and deeds of the accused. This Court also emphasised that such an offending action ought to be proximate to the time of occurrence. It was further clarified that the question of mens rea on the part of the accused in such cases would be examined with reference to the actual acts and deeds of the accused. It was further held that if the acts and deeds are only of such nature where the accused intended nothing more than harassment or a snap-show of 19 anger, a particular case may fall short of the offence of abetment of suicide, however, if the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words or deeds until the deceased reacted or was provoked, a particular case may be that of abetment of suicide. This Court held that owing to the fact that the human mind could be affected and could react in myriad ways and that similar actions are dealt with differently by different persons, each case is required to be dealt with its own facts and circumstances.” 10. In light of the above, the evidence produced by the prosecution on record is appreciated and the prosecution has examined PW-1 Haribhai Ukabhai Jadav at Exh.25 and the witness is the uncle of deceased Rekhaben, who has stated that on 28.05.2002, he received a phone call from village Jamkandorna that his niece Rekhaben has sustained burn injuries and was taken to the hospital at Dhoraji. That he had gone to Dhoraji, and from there, Rekha and her minor daughter were taken to the Government Hospital, Junagadh and she was admitted in the burns ward. The minor daughter had expired, and after they went, Rekha to expired. While she was in the hospital, Rekha had told him that while she went to heat water, the edge of her saree touched the stove and she was burnt, and as she had carried the minor child, she too was burnt. The witness has not supported the case of the prosecution and has been declared hostile and cross-examined at length by the learned APP, but nothing to support the case of the prosecution has come on record. During the cross-examination by the learned for the accused, the witness has stated that after marriage, Rekha and her husband would often come to his house and Rekha did not have any mental or physical harassment in her matrimonial home. During the cross-examination by the learned for the accused, the witness has stated that after marriage, Rekha and her husband would often come to his house and Rekha did not have any mental or physical harassment in her matrimonial home. That her husband and father-in-law and mother-in-law kept her very well, and her marital life was very good. That when the Executive Magistrate, Junagadh had recorded the statement of Rekha, they all were present and they had explained to Rekha what reply to be given and she had narrated as she was told. Rekha was around 20 years at the time of her marriage, and after five years, she had a son and when she expired, she was aged 28 years and she had a son and a daughter. 10.1. The prosecution has examined Limbabhai Kanabhai Jadhav at Exh.26 and the witness is the uncle of deceased Rekha, who has stated that when they received a phone call, they had all gone to the Government Hospital, Junagadh and he did not have any conversation with Rekha. The marital life of Rekha was very good and he does not know any other facts, The witness has not supported the case of the prosecution and has been permitted to be cross-examined by the learned APP, but no facts to support the case of the prosecution has come on record. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that whenever Rekha would come to his house on any occasions, she would say that she was being treated very well by her father-in-law, mother-in-law and husband. After they reached the Government Hospital, Junagadh, the police and the Executive Magistrate had come and before they had reached, nobody had come. That when they reached the hospital, Rekha could not speak anything and she was fully burnt. 10.2. The prosecution has examined PW-3 Somandas Dungarmal Chandwani at Exh.29 and the witness is the Executive Magistrate, who has recorded the dying declaration of deceased of deceased Rekhaben, which is produced at Exh.31. The witness has narrated the procedure that was undertaken by him and during the cross examination by the learned for the accused, the witness has stated that he had given his identity to the deceased, but the same is not mentioned in the dying declaration at Exh.31. The witness has narrated the procedure that was undertaken by him and during the cross examination by the learned for the accused, the witness has stated that he had given his identity to the deceased, but the same is not mentioned in the dying declaration at Exh.31. There is a correction in Page No.2 and there are other corrections also, which have not been initialed by him. That even in the identity of the thumb impression, Chandubhai is written, which is cancelled and Sureshbhai is written. That the husband of Rekha had two names, Chandubhai and Sureshbhai, and hence, he has cancelled Chandubhai and written Sureshbhai. There are other irregularities in the dying declaration and he has not asked her as to how she was burnt. The witness has admitted that there are many corrections in the dying declaration, and he has not mentioned that the answers were given after certain breaks. 10.3. The prosecution has examined PW-4 Mamadbhai Hasambhai Kherani at Exh.32 and the witness was working as an ASI in Jamkandorna Police Station and he had received a message from Junagadh ‘B’ Division Police Station that Rekhaben, wife of Sureshbhai Valjibhai, resident of Jamkandorna, was burnt while she was heating water and was admitted in the Government Hospital, Junagadh and to go to the hospital and do the necessary procedure and he had gone to the hospital. Rekhaben, wife of Sureshbhai, was admitted in the burns ward and he had recorded her complaint and taken her right thumb impression and minor daughter Deval had expired and her dead body was in the hospital and he drew the inquest panchnama and the necessary procedure for the post-mortem. That he had also given the yadi for recording the dying declaration, and while he was doing the procedure, he found that Rekhaben had expired during treatment, and hence, the inquest panchnama was drawn and the procedure for the post-mortem was undertaken. The offence was registered at 1-C.R.No.46 of 2002 and he had taken over the investigation of Station Diary Entry No.8 of 2002, recorded the statements of the connected witnesses, seized the necessary documents and drawn the necessary panchnama. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that he does not remember what time the complaint was taken, and the complaint is not in his handwriting. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that he does not remember what time the complaint was taken, and the complaint is not in his handwriting. That he has not taken the opinion of any doctor as to whether Rekhaben was conscious and could record her complaint. At that time, the uncle and auntie of Rekhaben were present and other women of the parental home were also present, but he does not know their names. That he did not record the statement of any relatives of Rekhaben and after he took the complaint, Rekhaben expired 4 to 5 hours thereafter. The complaint does not state that Rekhaben was conscious and in her senses. 10.4. The prosecution has examined PW-5 Mangabhai Ukabhai Jadav at Exh.53 and the witness is the father of Rekha, who has stated that his daughter Rekha was married at Jamkandorna with the accused No.1 around 10 years prior to the incident and she had one son and one daughter. That on 28.05.2002 when he was at his home, his younger brother and his wife came and told him that they had received a phone call from Jamkandorna that Rekha was burnt and was taken to Government Hospital, Dhoraji, and hence, he along with others went to the hospital and found that she was taken to the Government Hospital, Junagadh and admitted in the burns ward, her minor daughter had expired and after they went to the hospital after about three hours, Rekha too expired. That while they were in the hospital, besides relatives, no other persons had come and no official had recorded her statement in their presence. That when they went to the hospital, Rekha was very serious and not conscious and did not speak anything to them as she could not talk. After Rekha expired, her dead body and the dead body of her minor daughter Deval were given to her in- laws. The witness has stated that the husband and in-laws of Rekha would treat her very well and he does not have any complaints against them and Rekha had never complained against them. The witness has been permitted to be cross examined by the learned APP and during the lengthy cross- examination, nothing to support the case of the prosecution has come on record. The witness has been permitted to be cross examined by the learned APP and during the lengthy cross- examination, nothing to support the case of the prosecution has come on record. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that whenever Rekha would come home, she had never complained about any ill-treatment by the accused. Moreover, she had never told him that accused were demanding for any money from her. 10.5. The prosecution has examined PW-6 Vanrajbhai Maganlal Chauhan at Exh.57 and the witness had investigated the offence and has narrated the procedure that was undertaken by him. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that during investigation, he did not collect any document regarding the marriage of Rekha and in the Station Diary Entry No.8 of 2002 at Jamkandorna Police Station on 28.05.2002, it was recorded that Rekha and her daughter had sustained burn injuries while she was trying to heat water on the stove. 10.6. The prosecution has examined PW-7 Pravinsinh Bavubbha Zala at Exh.64 and the witness is the Investigating Officer, who had taken over the investigation from PW-6 Vanrajbhai Maganlal Chauhan and recorded the statements of some witnesses and filed the charge sheet against the accused. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that there was no evidence about the marital span of Rekhaben and as per the radio message received at Dhoraji Police Station, on the day of the incident, Rekhaben was putting water to heat and she was burnt. 11. On minute appreciation of the entire evidence of the prosecution, it is found that the prosecution has examined the father of deceased Rekhaben at Exh.53 and uncles of deceased Rekhaben at Exh.25 and Exh.26 and all the three witnesses are the near relatives of Rekhaben, but they have not supported the case of the prosecution and there is no iota of evidence that deceased Rekhaben was ever harassed by the accused. The investigating officer has not collected any evidence about the marital life span of Rekhaben, and in the evidence of the witnesses, it has come on record that Rekhaben did not have any mental or physical harassment from any of the accused and they were treating her very well. The investigating officer has not collected any evidence about the marital life span of Rekhaben, and in the evidence of the witnesses, it has come on record that Rekhaben did not have any mental or physical harassment from any of the accused and they were treating her very well. The evidence that has emerged on record is that on the day of the incident, a radio message was sent to Dhoraji Police Station stating that Rekhaben of Jamkandorna was burnt while she was heating water on the stove as the edge of her saree was burnt and as she had carried her a daughter, the minor child was too burnt. The dying declaration produced at Exh.31 states that she herself had sprinkled kerosene and set herself ablaze, but in the deposition of PW-3, Somandas Dungarmal Chandwani at Exh.29, it has come record that the dying declaration has not been recorded in the proper manner, and there are a number of mistakes and corrections, which have not been initialed. The learned Trial Court has appreciated the entire evidence and the infirmities in the case of the prosecution have come on record. 12. In view of the above, the learned trial Court has appreciated the entire evidence in proper perspective and there does not appear to be any infirmity and illegality in the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. The learned Trial Court has appreciated all the evidence and this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Trial Court was completely justified in acquitting the accused of the charges leveled against them. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are absolutely just and proper and no illegality or infirmity has been committed by the learned trial Court and this Court is in complete agreement with the findings, ultimate conclusion and the resultant order of acquittal recorded by the learned Trial Court. This Court finds no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order and the present appeal is devoid of merits and resultantly, the same is dismissed. 13. The impugned judgment and order dated 01.10.2007 in Sessions Case No.48 of 2004 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and Presiding Officer, 7 th Fast Track Judge, Gondal camp at Dhoraji is hereby confirmed. 14. Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.