ORDER : 1. This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, dated 02.03.2013 in Criminal Appeal No. 534 of 2012 by which the High Court allowed the appeal filed by the respondent and thereby set aside the judgment and order of conviction dated 20.12.2012 passed by the trial court for the offence punishable under Sections 306, 498A and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter “IPC”). The State of Himachal Pradesh is before this Court challenging the respondent’s acquittal by the High Court. 2. It is the case of the prosecution that the deceased, who was married to the respondent on 01.07.2009, committed suicide on 30.09.2009 in her matrimonial home by consuming poison. The respondent is alleged to have abetted her suicide since the deceased was being subjected to cruelty and harassment for demand of dowry made by the appellant. A First Information Report viz. FIR No. 32/2009 was lodged by the father of the deceased approximately a week after her death, i.e. on 08.10.2009 with Police Station – Bagga, District – Solan under Sections 498A, 304B and 201 of IPC. 3. A perusal of the FIR indicates that the deceased had informed her mother about the alleged cruelty at the hands of the respondent, when she had visited her parental home a few days after the marriage. She told her mother that the respondent was demanding a sum of Rs. 50,000/as dowry and would often beat her up after consuming alcohol. Further, on the day on the incident, i.e. 30.09.2009 the deceased’s brother (PW7) received a phone call from the respondent, who asked him to speak to the deceased. When the deceased was handed over the phone, she started weeping over the phone and thereafter, PW7 rang up the respondent’s father i.e. fatherinlaw of the deceased and requested him to solve the problem. PW7 once again received a phone call from the respondent who objected to the fact that his father was asked to intervene. Ultimately, another phone call was made by the respondent to PW7 and he was informed about the passing away of the deceased. 4. The deceased was first taken to the Primary Health Centre at Darlaghat where she was declared dead. Ultimately, another phone call was made by the respondent to PW7 and he was informed about the passing away of the deceased. 4. The deceased was first taken to the Primary Health Centre at Darlaghat where she was declared dead. Then her dead body was taken to Civil Hospital, Arki for postmortem examination, which was conducted by PW13 and his final opinion is reproduced as under: “As per prechemical analysis, organophosphorus poison was found in the specimen sent for chemical analysis, so in my opinion deceased had died because of organ phosphorous poison. I have issued postmortem report Ext. PW13/D (four sheets) in this behalf which is in my hand and bears my signatures.” Thereafter, upon chemical analysis of the deceased’s viscera specimen by the Forensic Science Laboratory (“FSL”), traces of organophosphorus poison were found in the liver and kidney of the deceased, as per the FSL Report. 5. After conclusion of investigation and submission of chargesheet, trial court framed charges against the respondent for offences punishable under Sections 302, 304B, 498A and 201 of IPC. Out of the 17 witnesses examined by the prosecution, the evidence of PW’s 6, 7 and 8 (father, brother and mother of the deceased, respectively) was primarily relied upon by the trial court to arrive at the finding that the respondent is guilty of offences punishable under Sections 306, 498A & 201 of IPC. Additionally, the presumption under Section 113A 1 [[113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman. ––When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. Explanation. Explanation. –– For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” shall have the same meaning as in section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).] of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter ‘Evidence Act’) was applied to hold that because the suicide took place within seven years of marriage and the deceased was subjected to cruelty by the respondent-husband, it ought to be presumed that the suicide had been abetted by her husband. The respondent was sentenced vide a separate order dated 21.12.2012 to 5 years R.I. along with fine of Rs. 20,000/under Section 306 of IPC, 1 year R.I. along with fine of Rs. 5,000/- under Section 498A of IPC and 1 year R.I. along with fine of Rs. 5,000/ under Section 201 of IPC. 6. Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence, respondent filed a Criminal Appeal before the High Court of Himachal Pradesh under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter ‘Cr.P.C’). The High Court, by the impugned order dated 02.03.2013 has allowed the Criminal Appeal preferred by the respondent and consequently, acquitted him of all the charges, holding that the evidence on record was not sufficient to prove that the deceased was being subjected to cruelty or that she was being constantly harassed by the respondent, which would have forced her to end her life. In other words, the High Court was of the opinion that charges of abetment to suicide and cruelty were not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after a perusal of the material on record, we are of the considered opinion that apart from a bald allegation that the respondent made a demand for Rs. 50,000/- as dowry and that he would often beat up the deceased after consuming liquor, there is no worthwhile evidence to even remotely suggest that the respondent has abetted her suicide. In Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda & Ors. vs. State of Gujarat 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3679, it has been held by this Court that mere harassment, by itself would not be sufficient to prove that the accused is guilty of abetment of suicide under Section 306 of IPC, in the absence of a clear intention or mens rea to abet the suicide. vs. State of Gujarat 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3679, it has been held by this Court that mere harassment, by itself would not be sufficient to prove that the accused is guilty of abetment of suicide under Section 306 of IPC, in the absence of a clear intention or mens rea to abet the suicide. Further, in order to prove the guilt of an accused for the offence under Section 306 of IPC, the prosecution is bound to establish that an ‘active or direct’ action was taken by the accused that has led the deceased to take the extreme step of ending her life. A similar view has been taken by this Court in its earlier decisions in Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618 ; Ude Singh and Others vs. State of Haryana (2019) 17 SCC 301 & Kashibai vs. State of Karnataka 2023 INSC 722 Therefore, the law on this point is fairly well settled that without an overt and positive act by the accused which either instigates or aids the commission of suicide, conviction under Section 306 of IPC cannot be sustained. 8. We shall now proceed to consider whether the Trial Court was justified in applying the presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act, so as to presume that the respondent-husband had abetted the suicide. At the outset, we must take note of the fact that while Section 113A of the Evidence Act contains the words “may presume”, the words “shall presume” is used in Section 113-B 2 [113B. Presumption as to dowry death. ––When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation. –– For the purposes of this section, “dowry death” shall have the same meaning as in section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).]] of the Evidence Act. Explanation. –– For the purposes of this section, “dowry death” shall have the same meaning as in section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).]] of the Evidence Act. The marked difference in the language of these two provisions is a clear indication of the legislative intent that the presumption under Section 113A is not mandatory and is not to be applied mechanically, merely on account of the fact that suicide occurred within seven years of marriage [See Mangat Ram vs. State of Haryana (2014) 12 SCC 595 ]. 9. Recently, in Ram Pyarey vs. State of Uttar Pradesh 2025 INSC 71 , this Court while discussing the difference between the two provisions, has also observed that ‘cogent evidence’ regarding cruelty and harassment or evidence pointing towards the specific act of abetment in the form either instigating or aiding the suicide would be a ‘condition precedent’ for applying the presumption under Section 113A of Evidence Act. This is what the Court observed: “13. It is relevant to note that under Section 113B, the Court shall presume dowry death unlike Section 113A where the provision says that Court may presume abetment of suicide. This is the vital difference between the two provisions which raises presumption as regards abetment of suicide. When the Courts below want to apply Section 113A of the Evidence Act, the condition precedent is that there has to be first some cogent evidence as regards cruelty & harassment. In the absence of any cogent evidence as regards harassment or abetment in any form like aiding or instigating, the court cannot straightway invoke Section 113A and presume that the accused abetted the commission of suicide.” 10. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the learned trial court erred in applying the presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act. We therefore, find no merit in this appeal and are of the opinion that the respondent was rightly acquitted by the High Court. We find no reason or scope to interfere with the impugned order of the High Court, in the exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.