ORDER : K. LAKSHMAN, J. Heard Sri A. Prabhakar Rao, learned counsel for petitioner/Accused No.15 and Ms. Shalini Saxena, learned counsel representing learned Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent. 2. This petition is filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.), to quash the proceedings against petitioner/A.15 in C.C.No.393 of 2023 on the file of the Court of learned Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class for Excise Cases, at Manoranjan Complex, Nampally, Hyderabad. 3. Petitioner herein is A.15 in the aforesaid C.C. The offences alleged against him are under Sections 147, 117, 151, 188, 341, 353 and 506 IPC read with Section 34 IPC; Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984; Section 7(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932, and Sections 145, 147, 174(a), 150(b) & (e) of the Railways Act, 1989. 4. Sri A. Adinarayana, de facto complainant, is impleaded as 2 nd respondent in this Criminal Petition vide order dated 02.04.2025 in I.A.No.1 of 2025. He lodged a complaint dated 15.10.2011 before Government Railway Police, Secunderabad Police Station, against petitioner/A.15 and others alleging that in view of rail roko call given by petitioner/A.15, President of Telangana Political JAC, and A.16, Political JAC for formation of separate State of Telangana, on 15.10.2011 at 6:00 hours, Telangana Jagruthi President along with her 40 followers came to the railway track and stopped the train engine which was coming from Secunderabad side. They sat on the railway track and gave slogans and caused inconvenience to the trains and also obstructed the duties of railway employees. Without obtaining prior permission, they all sat on railway track and threatened that if they were not allowed to sit on railway track, they will pelt the stones on police. On the basis of the said complaint, a case in Crime No.432 of 2011 was registered on the file of Secunderabad Police Station, against petitioner/A.15 and others for the aforesaid offences. Thereafter, the police filed charge sheet against petitioner/A.15 and others in the Court of II Metropolitan Magistrate for Railways, Secunderabad, for the aforesaid offences. 5. In charge sheet, it is stated that A.1 to A.14 pleaded guilty and A.15 and A.16 were absconding. The said charge sheet was filed on 01.02.2013. Cognizance was taken on 01.02.2013 itself. The case against petitioner/A.15 was split up and C.C.No.393 of 2023 was assigned.
5. In charge sheet, it is stated that A.1 to A.14 pleaded guilty and A.15 and A.16 were absconding. The said charge sheet was filed on 01.02.2013. Cognizance was taken on 01.02.2013 itself. The case against petitioner/A.15 was split up and C.C.No.393 of 2023 was assigned. Thereafter, the said C.C. was transferred to the Court of learned Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class for Excise Cases, at Manoranjan Complex, Nampally, Hyderabad. 6. Perusal of record would reveal that in the complaint lodged by 2 nd respondent, the only allegation levelled against petitioner/A.15 is that rail roko call was given by Telangana Political JAC under the leadership of petitioner, President of TRS Party. Except that, there is no other allegation levelled against petitioner/A.15. 7. During the course of investigation, Investigating Officer recorded the statements of 2 nd respondent as L.W.1, eyewitnesses as L.Ws.2 to 10 and panch witnesses as L.Ws.11 and 12. However, none of the aforesaid witnesses spoke about the role played by petitioner/A.15 in commission of aforesaid offences. All of them in one voice stated that political JAC under the leadership of petitioner/A.15 gave a call for rail roko from 15.10.2011 to 17.10.2011 for formation of Telangana State. According to them, rail roko programme was conducted on 15.10.2011 at 6:00 a.m. under the leadership of petitioner/A.15. Except that there is no other allegation levelled against petitioner/A.15. 8. As discussed supra, on consideration of the statements of aforesaid witnesses, the police laid charge sheet against petitioner/A.15 and others for the aforesaid offences. 9. In view of the above, it is apt to note that Section 188 of IPC deals with ‘disobedience to order duly promulgated by a public servant’ and the same is extracted as under: “188.
8. As discussed supra, on consideration of the statements of aforesaid witnesses, the police laid charge sheet against petitioner/A.15 and others for the aforesaid offences. 9. In view of the above, it is apt to note that Section 188 of IPC deals with ‘disobedience to order duly promulgated by a public servant’ and the same is extracted as under: “188. Disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant .—Whoever, knowing that, by an order promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order, he is directed to abstain from a certain act, or to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management, disobeys such direction, shall, if such disobedience causes or tends to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury, or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury, to any person lawfully employed, be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees, or with both; and if such disobedience causes or trends to cause danger to human life, health or safety, or causes or tends to cause a riot or affray, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. Explanation. —It is not necessary that the offender should intend to produce harm, or contemplate his disobedience as likely to produce harm. It is sufficient that he knows of the order which he disobeys, and that his disobedience produces, or is likely to produce, harm. Illustration An order is promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order, directing that a religious procession shall not pass down a certain street. A knowingly disobeys the order, and thereby causes danger of riot. A has committed the offence defined in this section.” 10. It is also apt to note that in N.T. Rama Rao v. The State of A.P., rep.
A knowingly disobeys the order, and thereby causes danger of riot. A has committed the offence defined in this section.” 10. It is also apt to note that in N.T. Rama Rao v. The State of A.P., rep. by Public Prosecutor , [Criminal Petition No.5323 of 2009, decided on 17.09.2009] , while dealing with the offences under Sections 188 and 283 of IPC, the learned Single Judge of erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh held as under: “5) Even if the allegation that the petitioner conducted public meetings at three road junctions contrary to the permission accorded for conducting of a public meeting only at one specified place is true, such a direction under Section 30 of the Police Act, 1861 could have been given only by the Superintendent or the Assistant Superintendent of Police of the District but not by any of their subordinates. If such a permission is granted under Section 30 of the Police Act, 1861 and is violated, Section 195 (1) (a) of Code of Criminal Procedure mandates that the complaint in this regard has to be made by the public servant concerned or some other person to whom such a public servant is administratively subordinate to enable any Court to take cognizance of an offence under Section 188 of Code of Criminal Procedure. In the present case, the charge sheet was filed by the Sub Inspector of Police, who could not have been the authority to grant permission for the public meeting and therefore, the complaint/charge sheet is in violation of the mandatory provision of Section 195(1)(a) of Code of Criminal Procedure. 6) That apart, the offence alleged to have been committed under Section 283 of the Indian Penal Code by the petitioners and others is obviously in consequence to the alleged offence under Section 188 of Indian Penal Code and is not an independent of the same. Even otherwise, the conduct of public meeting at three road junctions or obstruction to the traffic could not have been considered as causing any danger or injury to any person. In so far as the obstruction in any public way is concerned, which can also be covered by Section 283 of the Indian Penal Code, the charge sheet cites only one witness to speak about the traffic jam caused by the road show.
In so far as the obstruction in any public way is concerned, which can also be covered by Section 283 of the Indian Penal Code, the charge sheet cites only one witness to speak about the traffic jam caused by the road show. But, when the conduct of the public meeting at least at one place has been permitted and if the gathering for that public meeting resulted in any inconvenience by way of obstructing the traffic, the same cannot be considered to be with necessary guilty mens rea to construe the existence of an offence punishable under Indian Penal Code. Under the circumstances, none of the offences alleged can be said to have any reasonable basis and in any view, the complaint/charge sheet being in violation of Section 195 (1) (a) of Code of Criminal Procedure, has to fail. 7) As the complaint has failed due to its un-sustainability, the proceedings in their entirety have to fail, though the 1st accused alone approached this Court by way of this Criminal Petition.” 11. In Thota Chandra Sekhar v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, through S.H.O., P.S. Eluru Rural, West Godavari District , [ Criminal Petition No.15248 of 2016, decided on 26.10.2016] , relying on various judgments including N.T. Rama Rao (supra) and the guidelines laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal , [(1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335] , more particularly, guideline No.6, which says that where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious remedy to redress the grievance of the party, the learned Single Judge of High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the States of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh quashed the proceedings in the C.C. mentioned therein by exercising power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It is further held that the proceedings shall not be continued due to technical defect of obtaining prior permission under Section 155(2) of Cr.P.C. and taking cognizance on the complaint filed by V.R.O. and it is against the purport of Section 195(1)(a) of Cr.P.C. 12.
In Bhajan Lal (supra), the Apex Court cautioned that power of quashing should be exercised very sparingly and circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. While examining a complaint, quashing of which is sought, Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint or in FIR. In the said judgment, the Apex Court laid down certain guidelines/parameters for exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The same read as under: "(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." The said principle was reiterated by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions. 13. As discussed supra, in the present case, the contents of complaint dated 15.10.2011 lodged by 2 nd respondent and the statements of aforesaid witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. lack the ingredients of aforesaid offences. Therefore, continuation of proceedings against petitioner/A.15 in the aforesaid C.C. is an abuse of process of law. Therefore, proceedings in the aforesaid C.C. against petitioner/A.15 are liable to be quashed. 14. In the result, proceedings in C.C.No.393 of 2023 on the file of Court of the learned Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class for Excise Cases at Manoranjan Complex, Nampally, Hyderabad, are hereby quashed in respect of petitioner/A.15 only. 15. Accordingly, this Criminal Petition is allowed. Miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.