JUDGMENT : EASWARAN S., J. 1. These appeals raise a common question and, hence, they are being considered together and disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The short facts necessary for the disposal of these appeals are as follows: Three suits, OS Nos.62/2006, 65/2006 and 72/2007, were tried together by the Munsiff’s Court, Sulthanbathery. The plaintiff in OS No.62/2006 is the appellant in these appeals, who is the 1 st defendant in OS No.72/2007. The plaintiff in OS No.72/2007 got herself transposed as the plaintiff in OS No.65/2006. One Kallingal Krishnan Nambiar held a vast extent of land under the Wayanad Colonial Scheme, and got patta as per W.C.S. No.196/1970. He transferred the plaint schedule property to his son Venugopalan vide document No.2555/1998 of SRO, S.Bathery. Venugopalan in turn sold the property to the plaintiff in OS No.62/2006 by document No.1142/2002 (the number is mistakenly shown and the correct number of the said document is 1148/2002) and that the plaintiff constructed a building in the plaint schedule property and is residing there. While so, it is alleged that the defendants attempted to trespass into the plaint schedule property and hence, the suit, OS No.62/2006. The 1 st defendant filed a written statement stating that he had filed OS No.65/2006, contending that A schedule property therein belonged to him and that the plaintiff in OS No.62/2006 attempted to trespass into the property. The 2 nd defendant has got property in the east of the plaint schedule property and that there was a pathway in existence having a width of 10 feet starting from S.Bathery-Panamaram road and lying outside the eastern boundary of the plaint schedule property. The 2 nd defendant therein had property to the east of the said pathway and the pathway reaches the property of the 1 st defendant. According to the plaintiff in OS No.65/2006, A schedule property absolutely belongs to him, purchased by him as per document No.735/2004 of SRO, S.Bathery and B schedule road starts from S.Bathery-Panamaram main road and has a length of 34 metres and a width of 10 feet. The said pathway is the only way leading to A schedule property. Later, the original plaintiff abandoned the said suit and the 2 nd defendant herself got transposed as the plaintiff as per order in IA No.449/2006. The said pathway is the only way leading to A schedule property. Later, the original plaintiff abandoned the said suit and the 2 nd defendant herself got transposed as the plaintiff as per order in IA No.449/2006. Subsequent to the same, the plaint was amended by contending that the B schedule road was trespassed by the 1 st defendant (plaintiff in OS No.62/2006), and it has to be restored to the former status. The 1 st defendant, plaintiff in OS No.62/2006, resisted the claim by contending that the documents of title produced by him would not show that there existed a 10 feet wide pathway. Even though a 10 feet wide pathway is shown in the southern side of the plaint A schedule property, it is not clear as to where it starts and where it ends. B schedule pathway in the plaint does not go through any boundary of the 1 st defendant and that the document produced by the plaintiff does not show that it passes through any boundary of the 1 st defendant. The 2 nd defendant in OS No.62/2006, who preferred OS No.72/2007, contended that she purchased the property from Krishnan Nambiar and one Chathankudiyil Sasidharan vide document No.1039/01 and the southern side of the plaint schedule property is Beenachi- Panamaram PWD road, from which a public way shown as plaint B schedule starts. B schedule way, which according to the plaintiff is a public way, has a width of 10 feet, and starts and reaches plaint A schedule property and then goes through the western boundary of plaint A schedule towards north. The suit was resisted by the plaintiff in OS No.62/2006. All the suits were tried jointly by the Munsiff’s court. On behalf of the plaintiff in OS No.62/2006, Exts.A1 to A4 documents were produced and marked and PW1 was examined. On behalf of the plaintiff in OS Nos.72/2007 and 65/2006, Exts.B1 to B10 documents were produced and marked and DW1 was examined. CW1 was the advocate commissioner, who submitted Exts.C1 to C8 reports, sketch, survey plans etc. 3. On behalf of the plaintiff in OS No.62/2006, Exts.A1 to A4 documents were produced and marked and PW1 was examined. On behalf of the plaintiff in OS Nos.72/2007 and 65/2006, Exts.B1 to B10 documents were produced and marked and DW1 was examined. CW1 was the advocate commissioner, who submitted Exts.C1 to C8 reports, sketch, survey plans etc. 3. On appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the trial court dismissed OS No.62/2006 and decreed OS Nos.65/2006 and 72/2007 and restrained the 1 st defendant (plaintiff in OS No.62/2006) and his men from trespassing into the plaint A and B schedule property or causing any obstruction to B schedule by blocking B schedule or by filling B schedule with loose soil or removing wire fencing on the western side of plaint B schedule. A mandatory injunction was also issued directing the 1 st defendant (plaintiff in OS No.62/2006) to restore the B schedule pathway to its earlier stage. Aggrieved, the plaintiff in OS No.62/2006 preferred three appeals, AS Nos.25, 26 and 27 of 2010, before the Sub Court, Sulthanbathery. The first appellate court by judgment dated 10.12.2014 dismissed all the appeals confirming the judgment of the trial court, and hence, the present second appeals by the plaintiff in OS No.62/2006. 4. Heard Sri.Mohan Jacob George, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, and Sri.Jeswin P.Varghese, the nd learned counsel appearing for the 2 respondent/plaintiff in OS Nos.65/2006 & 72/2007. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Sri.Mohan Jacob George, submitted that both the courts below erred egregiously in finding that plaint B schedule in OS No.72/2007 is a public pathway and that the plaintiff therein has a right over the same. The said finding is not supported by any evidence and that the appreciation of evidence by the courts below is perverse. He would point out that merely because one of the boundaries of the document of title of the plaintiff in OS No.72/2007 is described as a 10 feet wide pathway, that by itself will not confer any right to her to claim that she has a right of access to the aforesaid pathway. Even after the plaintiff transposed herself as an additional plaintiff in OS No.65/2006, there are no substantial changes made in the plaint averments. Even after the plaintiff transposed herself as an additional plaintiff in OS No.65/2006, there are no substantial changes made in the plaint averments. It is further pointed out that going by Ext.B7 settlement deed No.1637/98 dated 28.4.1998 executed by Krishnan Nambiar in favour of his wife Meenakshy, the southern side is shown as a road and the eastern and western sides are shown as the property of Krishnan Nambiar himself. The balance property was sold by Krishnan Nambiar to his son Venugopalan by Ext.B10 dated 17.6.1998, in which the eastern side of the property is shown as the property of Meenakshy Amma. Subsequently, when the property was transferred in the name of the plaintiff/appellant by document No.1148/2002, Ext.A1, the eastern side of the property is shown as the property of Sathi and Mathukutty. But, however, interestingly when the wife of Krishnan Nambiar, namely Meenakshy, sold the property to one Sasidharan by Ext.B6 sale deed No.2564/2002 dated 2.11.2002, the southern side of the property is described as a 10 feet wide public way. The said discrepancy was carried forward in Ext.B1 sale deed No.1039/01 dated 28.3.2001. At any rate, there is no averment in the plaint as regards any claim of the plaintiff in OS No.72/2007 for any easementary right. At any rate, the ingredients of assessment by prescription are not made out and that easement of grant under any circumstances may not arise. As far as the claim for necessity is concerned, there is no pleading apart from a vague statement that the 10 feet wide pathway is required for entering into the plaint A schedule property. There cannot be any claim for easement of necessity over the property of another person. Even otherwise, a claim of extinguishment of a right by the termination of servient tenament has been raised in the plaint. It is further pointed out that when a commission was taken out for inspection, Ext.C3 report was prepared and Ext.C4 plan was drawn, wherein the commissioner has identified the property with reference to the title deed of the appellant and found that the 10 feet wide pathway falls within the 25 cents of land held by him under his title document. In fact, it is the specific case of the appellant that the said pathway has been carved out for the beneficial enjoyment of his property and that the respondents cannot claim any right over the same. In fact, it is the specific case of the appellant that the said pathway has been carved out for the beneficial enjoyment of his property and that the respondents cannot claim any right over the same. 6. Per contra, Sri.Jeswin P.Varghese, the learned nd counsel appearing for the 2 respondent, plaintiff in OS No.72/2007, would contend that the concurrent finding of facts rendered by both the courts below need not be interfered with by this Court, especially since re-appreciation of evidence is required. Both the courts below have found that the pathway in question is the only way to enter into the plaint A schedule property in OS No.72/2007 and therefore, the judgments rendered by the courts below are perfectly legal and nd sustainable. It is further pointed out that the 2 respondent, plaintiff in OS No.72/2007, does not claim any right of easement by prescription and that the B schedule pathway is a public way and, therefore, the plaintiff has got every right to use the same nd and that the appellant cannot obstruct the right of the 2 respondent to use the said pathway. 7. I have considered the rival submissions raised across the bar and perused the judgments rendered by the courts below and the records of the present case. 8. While admitting these appeals, this Court framed the following substantial questions of law as raised commonly in these appeals, which read as under: “1) Are the Courts below justified in law in granting a decree declaring the existence of a public way when there are no pleadings, evidence or finding that there is a public way used by the general public? 2) Are the Courts below right in decreeing the suit for a public way through a private property when the respondents have no claim for any easement right? 3) Are the Courts below right in ignoring Exhibits A1 and A2 which clearly established that there is no other pathway or road on any of the boundaries except the PWD Road on the south?” 9. Before going to the sustainability of the findings rendered by the courts below, this Court needs to address the question as to whether the 2 nd respondent, the plaintiff in OS No.72/2007, has succeeded in establishing that there existed a public way as claimed by her in B schedule to the plaint. Before going to the sustainability of the findings rendered by the courts below, this Court needs to address the question as to whether the 2 nd respondent, the plaintiff in OS No.72/2007, has succeeded in establishing that there existed a public way as claimed by her in B schedule to the plaint. A reading of the B schedule to OS No.72/2007 shows the description as follows: B SCHEDULE District: Wayanad Taluk: S. Bathery Amson, Desom: S. Bathery Lakam: Kacha Road Panchayat: S. Bathery DESCRIPTION OFPROPERTY Pathway having 10 feet width starting from the Beenachi-Panamaram PWD road which goes through the western boundary of the plaint ‘A’ schedule and ends at the property of 2 nd defendant. Boundaries East: Plaint ‘A’ schedule property North: Property in possession of 2nd defendant West: Property in possession of 1st defendant South: Beenachi Panamaram PWD Road This description was perhaps made based on the title deed of the plaintiff, which shows that the western boundary is a 10 feet wide road. One must remember that, when we look at the derivation of the title of the 2 nd respondent/plaintiff as well as the appellant, it is traced to a common predecessor, namely Krishnan Nambiar. The appellant claims title under Venugopalan, S/o.Krishnan Nambiar, through Ext.A1 sale deed No.1148/2002, wherein the western boundary is described as the property belonging to Bhaskaran, but whereas when the property is given to the plaintiff in OS No.72/2007, the western boundary is described as 10 feet wide road. When we further looked into the prior document of the predecessor of the plaintiff, namely Meenakshy, Ext.B7 dated 28.4.1998, the western side was shown as balance property, which was subsequently sold by Krishnan Nambiar to Bhaskaran. Even a cursory reading of Ext.B8 shows that when Krishnan Nambiar transferred his property to his daughter Sathi, the western side of the property is mentioned as the property of Meenakshy Amma, which is the property covered by Ext.B7. Therefore, the ultimate decision on these appeals depends on the construction of these documents, which can qualify as a substantial question of law. Be that as it may, when a reading of the title document of the plaintiff is done, it becomes irresistible to conclude that, the claim of the plaintiff is solely based on the description of the western boundary in Ext.B1 Sale Deed No.1039/01 dated 28.3.2001. Be that as it may, when a reading of the title document of the plaintiff is done, it becomes irresistible to conclude that, the claim of the plaintiff is solely based on the description of the western boundary in Ext.B1 Sale Deed No.1039/01 dated 28.3.2001. Still further, on a proper construction of the documents, especially with regard to the description of the property, nothing is brought out to prove the existence of a 10 feet wide road or, for that matter, any easement by grant in her favour. Therefore, the only way the plaintiff can succeed is by establishing that B schedule to OS No.72/2007 is a public way by adducing other substantial evidence, which is quite lacking in this case. 10. It is pertinent to mention that none of the documents nd produced by the plaintiff in OS No.72/2007 (2 respondent herein), would show that there exists a public pathway. In this context, this Court cannot remain oblivious of the fact that in the cross-examination of DW1, the plaintiff in OS No.72/2007, she categorically admitted that in Exts.B7 to B9 documents, the existence of a 10 feet wide pathway is not mentioned. However, she would submit that though in Ext.B7 document conferring the title in favour of Meenakshy, wife of Krishnan Nambiar, the existence of 10 feet wide pathway is not mentioned, it is only when the said property was subsequently sold to her, the existence of 10 feet wide pathway is mentioned. Equally so, she would admit that in the property given by Krishnan Nambiar to his daughter Sathi, the existence of a 10 feet wide pathway is not shown. Therefore, with the available evidence on record and also the categoric admission of the plaintiff in OS No.72/2007, the irresistible conclusion is that she has miserably failed to establish the existence of a public pathway. If that be so, this Court cannot but notice that the appreciation of evidence by the courts below is perverse. 11. It must be remembered that the property of the appellant was measured out by the commissioner in Exts.C3 and C4. In fact, the commissioner was deputed only for the purpose of identifying the property covered by the document of title in favour of the appellant. A survey plan is also attached to the said report. 11. It must be remembered that the property of the appellant was measured out by the commissioner in Exts.C3 and C4. In fact, the commissioner was deputed only for the purpose of identifying the property covered by the document of title in favour of the appellant. A survey plan is also attached to the said report. A perusal of the said plan would dispel any doubt as regards the existence of the alleged 10 feet wide pathway, which is scheduled as B schedule in OS No.72/2007. On measurement of the document, Sale Deed No.1148/2002, the commissioner specifically found that an extent of 24.532 Ares of land belongs to the appellant and that the disputed pathway falls within his title deed. It is in this context that this Court needs to address the claim of the plaintiff in OS No.72/2007 claiming a right of access to A schedule property through B schedule. On a close scrutiny of the averments contained in the plaint, OS No.72/2007, this Court could not find any averment which points to a claim for easement in any form. But, however, there is a vague assertion that the plaintiff has no other way other than plaint B schedule pathway, to access plaint A schedule property. The question which falls for consideration of this Court, when the remaining questions of law are to be answered, is whether the 2 nd respondent/plaintiff in OS No.72/2007 can sustain her claim merely because she has no other way to enter into plaint A schedule property. It must be remembered that a claim for easement is certainly an encumbrance over a property. In order to claim a particular form of easement, certainly the 2 nd respondent/plaintiff in OS No.72/2007 will have to satisfy various conditions depending upon the form of easement she claims. At the outset, this Court must find that a claim for easement by prescription has to be ruled out at its very inception, especially since, the plaintiff purchased the property only in the year 2001 and that there is no case that there existed a way prior to 2001 and that the predecessors were using the same. This fact is evident from her own admission in the cross-examination. Therefore, what remains is to see as to whether a claim for necessity can be made out. This fact is evident from her own admission in the cross-examination. Therefore, what remains is to see as to whether a claim for necessity can be made out. A claim for necessity would lie only if the plaintiff is able to establish that there existed a way, prior to the derivation of title and interest over the property, and that the right was extinguished because of the termination of servient tenement. But, the pleadings in the plaint would show that, though it is asserted that there is a claim for necessity, such a claim is sought to be established on the premise that B schedule is a public pathway. As this Court has already found that, the plaintiff has miserably failed to establish the existence of a public way, the claim for necessity should also fail, because apart from her assertion, no other evidence is seen to have been adduced by the plaintiff. Added to that, the failure of the 2 nd respondent/plaintiff to file an objection to Ext.C3 report and Ext.C4 plan would lead to an irresistible conclusion that the 10 feet wide pathway is made by the appellant in his own property and that the 2 nd respondent, the plaintiff in OS No.72/2007, cannot have any claim over the same. Therefore, it has become inevitable for this Court to answer the substantial questions of law framed by this Court in favour of the appellant. As an upshot of this discussion, this Court finds that the appellant is entitled to succeed. Accordingly, these appeals are allowed by reversing the judgment and decree in AS Nos.25, 26 and 27 of 2010 on the files of the Sub Court, Sulthanbathery and that of the Munsiff-Magistrate’s Court, Sulthanbathery in OS Nos.62/2006, 65/2006 and 72/2007 dated 31.3.2010. Resultantly, OS Nos.65/2006 and 72/2007 will stand dismissed. OS No.62/2006 will stand decreed, and the defendants therein are restrained by a permanent prohibitory injunction from trespassing into the plaint schedule property. However, this will not stand in the way of the 2 nd respondent, plaintiff in OS No.72/2007, establishing any independent right of easement if permissible under law. The appellant shall be entitled to the costs throughout.