ORDER : 1. Instant M.Cr.C. has been filed by the petitioner under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. read with section 528 of BNSS, 2023 seeking quashment of FIR dated 12.10.2023 bearing crime no.668/2023 registered by P.S.-Dehat, District-Damoh and all other consequential proceedings arising thereto and letter dated 14.07.2023 bearing no.32-365/2022/NCPCR/Misc/LC/DD7310 issued by respondent No.2 National Commission for Protection of Child Rights so far as it relates to the petitioner and for taking appropriate action in accordance with law against respondent No.11 for misusing his powers and position. 2. Thus, primarily, present petition has been filed by the petitioner for quashment of aforesaid FIR. Hence, it would be appropriate to reproduce, contents of FIR dated 12.10.2023, bearing crime no.668/2023 P.S. Dehat, District Damoh against the petitioner, which are as follows:- 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner at the outset, after referring to respondent No.2’s letter dated 14.7.2023 (Annexure P/2), submits that respondent no.2 has no jurisdiction to send/issue such letter for registration of FIR against the petitioner. At the most, respondent no.2 can recommend action against petitioner. With respect to aforesaid, learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to section 13(c) of the Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as The Act, 2012). It is urged that FIR (Annexure P/1) has been registered against the petitioner under Sections 19 and 21 of the Act, 2012 on the ground that petitioner despite having knowledge about commission of the offence under the Act, 2012, still petitioner did not report the matter/did not take any action from 21.05.2023 to 30.05.2023. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner, after referring to column 9 of petitioner’s reply dated 25.07.2023, submits that petitioner came to know about the offence under the Act, 2012 for the first time on 29.05.2023. Thereafter, petitioner sent letter (Annexure P/3) on 30.05.2023 to Head/Superintendent of Aadharsheela Bal Dekhrekh Sanstha, Damoh MP for necessary action. Thereafter, another letter dated 31.05.2023 (Annexure P/4) was sent to Incharge, Special Juvenile Police Unit, Damoh for taking necessary action. When despite aforesaid letters, no action was taken, then, the petitioner again sent the reminder (Annexure P/5) dated 09.06.2023 to the Incharge, Special Juvenile Police Unit, Damoh. In view of aforesaid, it cannot be said that petitioner did not promptly report the matter/inform the concerned persons for taking necessary action. 5. When despite aforesaid letters, no action was taken, then, the petitioner again sent the reminder (Annexure P/5) dated 09.06.2023 to the Incharge, Special Juvenile Police Unit, Damoh. In view of aforesaid, it cannot be said that petitioner did not promptly report the matter/inform the concerned persons for taking necessary action. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that Lokesh, adoptive father of victim, did not report the matter. Lokesh is the person, who had the knowledge that the offence under the Act, 2012 has been committed. Therefore, he is the offender because he did not report the matter. Further, after referring to Annexure P/6 dated 9.6.2023, it is urged that aforesaid FIR has been registered on the basis of complaint made by the petitioner and therein petitioner’s complaint dated 30.05.2023 (Annexure P/3) has also been mentioned. Learned counsel for the petitioner, after referring to Section 19 of the Act, 2012 submits that therein, no limitation for giving information with respect to commission of offence under the Act, 2012 has been provided. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that there is any inordinate delay in reporting the matter. It is a continuing offence. Therefore, there was no delay in reporting the matter. On above grounds, it is urged that, if documents available on record as well as facts of the case are taken into consideration, then, prima facie, no offence under Sections 19 and 21 of the Act, 2012 is made out. Therefore, FIR dated 12.10.2023 registered by Police Station-Dehat, District-Damoh bearing crime no.668/2023 be quashed along with all consequential proceedings arising thereto. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 4 to 8 submits that in the instant case, with respect to incident dated 21.05.2023 to 30.05.2023, FIR has been registered against the petitioner on 12.10.2023. It is also urged that FIR has been registered after detail enquiry. Investigation is going on. From Annexure P/2, it is evident that petitioner was in continuous contact with the adoptive father of the victim. Therefore, no ground for quashment of FIR is made out. Therefore, petition filed by the petitioner be dismissed. 7. It is also urged that FIR has been registered after detail enquiry. Investigation is going on. From Annexure P/2, it is evident that petitioner was in continuous contact with the adoptive father of the victim. Therefore, no ground for quashment of FIR is made out. Therefore, petition filed by the petitioner be dismissed. 7. Learned counsel for respondent No.9 (Adoptive father of victim), after referring to Section 19 of the Act, 2012 as well as contents of the FIR dated 12.10.2023, Annexure P/2 (letter written by National Commission For Protection of Child Rights to S.P. Damoh dated 14.7.2023) as well as reply filed by respondent No.9, submits that in the instant case, evidently, offence under the Act, 2012 was committed between 21.05.2023 to 28.05.2023 and present petitioner was having knowledge about the same since from the very beginning but still he did not promptly reported the matter to competent authorities. Therefore, prima facie, offence under Sections 19 and 21 of the Act, 2012 is clearly made out against the petitioner. Hence, no case for quashment of FIR is made out. Therefore, petition filed by the petitioner be dismissed. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent No.2 (National Commission For Protection of Child Rights), after referring to petitioner’s letter dated 30.05.2023 (Annexure P/3) submits that this letter has been addressed to Head/Superintendent of Aadharsheela Bal Dekhrekh Sanstha, Damoh MP, whose employee, itself was the accused. Further, after referring to Annexure P/6, it is urged that FIR has not been registered on the basis of complaint made by the petitioner. Instead, it has been registered on behalf of Frank Harison. Further, after referring to provision of Section 19 of the Act, 2012, it is urged that as per provisions of law, any person who has apprehension that an offence under this Act is likely to be committed or has knowledge that such an offence has been committed, is duty bound to report the matter/inform the competent authorities. Further, it is also urged that disputed question of facts cannot be decided at this stage and mini trial cannot be conducted at the stage of deciding the petition filed for quashing of FIR etc. In the instant case, investigation is on. The question, when the petitioner came to know about the offence under the Act, 2012, is a disputed question of fact. Hence, it cannot be decided at this stage. In the instant case, investigation is on. The question, when the petitioner came to know about the offence under the Act, 2012, is a disputed question of fact. Hence, it cannot be decided at this stage. Therefore, petition filed by the petitioner be dismissed. 9. This Court has heard submissions of learned counsel for the parties and perused record of the case. Scope of exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C./528 of BNSS and Sections 19 and 21 of the Act, 2012 :- 10. Before considering the case on merits, this Court think it appropriate to refer to legal position with respect to scope of exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C./528 of BNSS as well as Sections 19 and 21 of the Act, 2012. 11. Recently, Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra and Anr. Vs. Dr. Maroti, (2023) 4 SCC 298 , after discussing the ambit and scope of exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C./528 of BNSS has held as under:- “7........ Exercise of power under Section482CrPC is an exception and not the rule and it is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. This position has been stated and reiterated by this Court time and again. 8. This Court in the decision in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 , held that the High Court could not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence is reliable or not while exercising the power under Section 482 CrPC. In  State of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, at para 102 this Court held that quashing may be appropriate where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused and where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section155(2) of the Code. 9. 9. In the decision in State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta, (2004) 1 SCC 691 , this Court held that the High Court could not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence is reliable or not as that would be the function of the trial court. In Monica Kumar v. State of U.P. (2008) 8 SCC 781 , this Court held that the inherent power under Section 482CrPC should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. 10. In Shiji v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705 , a two-Judge Bench of this Court held thus: (SCC p. 713, para 18) “18. … plenitude of the power under Section 482CrPC by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and caution. The width and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power under Section 482 may be justified. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law.” 11. Having made such a short survey on authorities on the exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC as above, we will now refer to the object and purposes of the POCSO Act. Article 15 of the Constitution, inter alia confers powers upon the State to make special provisions for children and Article 39(f) provides not only that the State shall direct its policy towards securing that the children are given opportunities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity but also to ensure that their childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment. Recognising the constitutional obligation and keeping in view the fundamental concept under Article 15 of the Constitution and also realising that sexual offences against children are not adequately addressed by the existing laws, the POCSO Act was enacted. Recognising the constitutional obligation and keeping in view the fundamental concept under Article 15 of the Constitution and also realising that sexual offences against children are not adequately addressed by the existing laws, the POCSO Act was enacted. The provisions thereunder would reveal that it also aims to ensure that such offenders are not spared and should be properly booked. 12. To achieve the avowed purpose, a legal obligation for reporting of offence under the POCSO Act is cast upon on a person to inform the relevant authorities specified thereunder when he/she has knowledge that an offence under the Act had been committed. Such obligation is also bestowed on person who has apprehension that an offence under this Act is likely to be committed. Besides casting such a legal obligation under Section 19, the legislature thought it expedient to make failure to discharge the obligation thereunder as punishable, under Section 21 thereof. True that under Section 21(1), failure to report the commission of an offence under sub-section (1) of Section 19 or Section 20 or failure to report such offence under sub-section (2) of Section 19 has been made punishable with imprisonment of either description which may extend to six months or with fine or with both. Sub-Section (2) of Section 21 provides that any person who being in-charge of any company or an institution (by whatever name called) who fails to report the commission of an offence under sub-section (1) of Section 19 in respect of a subordinate under his control, shall be punishable with imprisonment with a term which may extend to one year or with fine. Certainly, such provisions are included in with a view to ensure strict compliance of the provisions under the POCSO Act and thereby to ensure that the tender age of children is not being abused and their childhood and youth is protected against exploitation. 13. Looking at the penal provisions referred above, making failure to discharge the obligation under Section 19(1) punishable only with imprisonment for a short duration viz. six months, one may think that it is not an offence to be taken seriously. However, according to us that by itself is not the test of seriousness or otherwise of an offence of failure to discharge the legal obligation under Section 19, punishable under Section 21 of the POCSO Act. six months, one may think that it is not an offence to be taken seriously. However, according to us that by itself is not the test of seriousness or otherwise of an offence of failure to discharge the legal obligation under Section 19, punishable under Section 21 of the POCSO Act. We are fortified in our view, by the decisions of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1 and a two-Judge Bench in Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 546 . 14. In the decision in Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 546 , a two-Judge Bench of this Court in paras 77.5 and 77.6 issued certain directions for due compliance and they read thus: (SCC p. 583, para 77) “77. … 77.5. If hospitals, whether government or privately-owned or medical institutions where children are being treated come to know that children admitted are subjected to sexual abuse, the same will immediately be reported to the nearest Juvenile Justice Board/SJPU and the Juvenile Justice Board, in consultation with SJPU, should take appropriate steps in accordance with the law safeguarding the interest of the child. 77.6. The non-reporting of the crime by anybody, after having come to know that a minor child below the age of 18 years was subjected to any sexual assault, is a serious crime and by not reporting they are screening the offenders from legal punishment and hence be held liable under the ordinary criminal law and prompt action be taken against them, in accordance with law.” 15. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary case v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1 , this Court observed that the length of punishment is not only the indicator of the gravity of offence and it is to be judged by a totality of factors, especially keeping in mind the background in which the offence came to be recognised by the legislature in the specific international context. In this context, it is also relevant to note that the United Nations Convention on Rights of Children, which was ratified by India on 11-12-1992, requires the State parties to undertake all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent the inducement or coercion of child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity, the exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices, etc. Articles 3(2) and 34 of the Convention have placed a specific duty on the State to protect the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and abuse. 16. Prompt and proper reporting of the commission of offence under the POCSO Act is of utmost importance and we have no hesitation to state that its failure on coming to know about the commission of any offence thereunder would defeat the very purpose and object of the Act. We say so taking into account the various provisions thereunder. Medical examination of the victim as also the accused would give many important clues in a case that falls under the POCSO Act. Section 27(1) of the POCSO Act provides that medical examination of a child in respect of whom any offence has been committed under the said Act, shall, notwithstanding that a first information report or complaint has not been registered for the offence under the Act, be conducted in accordance with Section 164- ACrPC, which provides the procedures for medical examination of the victim of rape. 17. In this contextual situation, it is also relevant to refer to Section 53-ACrPC that mandates for examination of a person accused of rape by a medical practitioner. It is also a fact that clothes of the parties would also offer very reliable evidence in cases of rape. 18. We refer to the aforesaid provisions only to stress upon the fact that a prompt reporting of the commission of an offence under the POCSO Act would enable immediate examination of the victim concerned and at the same time, if it was committed by an unknown person, it would also enable the investigating agency to commence investigation without wasting time and ultimately to secure the arrest and medical examination of the culprit. There can be no two views that in relation to sexual offences medical evidence has much corroborative value.” 12. Similarly, Hon’ble Apex Court in Sr. Tessy Jose and others Vs. There can be no two views that in relation to sexual offences medical evidence has much corroborative value.” 12. Similarly, Hon’ble Apex Court in Sr. Tessy Jose and others Vs. State of Kerala, (2018) 18 SCC 292 , has also discussed and examined the ambit and scope of Sections 19(1) of the Act, 2012 and held as under:- “5. .............. However, the charge against these appellants is primarily on account of purported commission of an act under Sections 19(1) of the POCSO Act. This section reads as under: “19. Reporting of offences.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure , 1973 (2 of 1974), any person (including the child), who has apprehension that an offence under this Act is likely to be committed or has knowledge that such an offence has been committed, he shall provide such information to— (a) the Special Juvenile Police Unit; or (b) the local police. (2) Every report given under sub-section (1) shall be— (a) ascribed an entry number and recorded in writing; (b) be read over to the informant; (c) shall be entered in a book to be kept by the Police Unit. (3) Where the report under sub-section (1) is given by a child, the same shall be recorded under sub-section (2) in a simple language so that the child understands contents being recorded. (4) In case contents are being recorded in the language not understood by the child or wherever it is deemed necessary, a translator or an interpreter, having such qualifications, experience and on payment of such fees as may be prescribed, shall be provided to the child if he fails to understand the same. (5) Where the Special Juvenile Police Unit or local police is satisfied that the child against whom an offence has been committed is in need of care and protection, then, it shall, after recording the reasons in writing, make immediate arrangement to give him such care and protection (including admitting the child into shelter home or to the nearest hospital) within twenty-four hours of the report, as may be prescribed. (6) The Special Juvenile Police Unit or local police shall, without unnecessary delay but within a period of twenty-four hours, report the matter to the Child Welfare Committee and the Special Court or where no Special Court has been designated, to the Court of Session, including need of the child for care and protection and steps taken in this regard. (7) No person shall incur any liability, whether civil or criminal, for giving the information in good faith for the purpose of sub-section (1).” 6. As is clear from the aforesaid provision, a person who had an apprehension that an offence under the said Act is likely to be committed or has knowledge that such an offence had been committed would be required to provide such information to the relevant authorities. 7. Thus, what is alleged against the appellants is that they had the knowledge that an offence under the Act had been committed and, therefore, they were required to provide this information to the relevant authorities which they failed to do. 9...............The provisions of Section 19(1), reproduced above, put a legal obligation on a person to inform the relevant authorities, inter alia, when he/she has knowledge that an offence under the Act had been committed. The expression used is “knowledge” which means that some information received by such a person gives him/her knowledge about the commission of the crime. There is no obligation on this person to investigate and gather knowledge................................ 10. The term “knowledge” has been interpreted by this Court in A.S. Krishnan v. State of Kerala, (2004) 11 SCC 576 to mean an awareness on the part of the person concerned indicating his state of mind. Further, a person can be supposed to know only where there is a direct appeal to his senses. We have gone through the medical records of the victim which were referred by Mr Basant R., Senior Advocate for the appellants. The medical records, which are relied upon by the prosecution, only show that the victim was admitted in the hospital at 9.15 a.m. and she immediately went into labour and at 9.25 a.m. she gave birth to a baby. Therefore, Appellant 1 attended to the victim for the first time between 9.15 a.m. and 9.25 a.m. on 7-2-2017. The medical records of the victim state that she was 18 years' old as on 7-2-2017. Therefore, Appellant 1 attended to the victim for the first time between 9.15 a.m. and 9.25 a.m. on 7-2-2017. The medical records of the victim state that she was 18 years' old as on 7-2-2017. Appellant 1 did not know that the victim was a minor when she had sexual intercourse. 13. Further, in view of issue involved in the case, it would also be appropriate to refer to “Introduction” and “Statement of objects and reasons” of “The Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Bill, which reads as under:- INTRODUCTION “Sexual Offences against children are not adequately addressed by the existing laws. A large number of such offences are neither specifically provided for nor are they adequately penalized. Such offences against children need to be defined explicitly and countered through adequate penalities as an effective deterence. This Act provides for protection of children from offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment and pornography with due regard for safeguarding the interest and well being of children.” Statement of Objects and Reasons “Article 15 of the Constitution, inter alia, confers upon the State powers to make pecial provision for children. Further, article 39, inter alia, provides that the State hall in particular direct its policy towards securing that the tender age of children are not abused and their childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and they are given facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity. 2. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Children, ratified by India on 1th December, 1992, requires the State Parties to undertake all appropriate national, Bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent (a) the inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity; (b) the exploitative use of children n prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices and (c) the exploitative use of Children in pornographic performances and materials. 3. The data collected by the National Crime Records Bureau shows that there has been increase in cases of sexual offences against children. This is corroborated by the 'Study on Child Abuse: India 2007' conducted by the Ministry of Women and Child Development. Moreover, sexual offences against children are not adequately addressed by the existing laws. A large number of such offences are neither specifically provided for nor are they adequately penalised. This is corroborated by the 'Study on Child Abuse: India 2007' conducted by the Ministry of Women and Child Development. Moreover, sexual offences against children are not adequately addressed by the existing laws. A large number of such offences are neither specifically provided for nor are they adequately penalised. The interests of the child, both as a victim as well as a witness, need to be protected. It is felt that offences against children need to be defined explicitly and countered through commensurate penalties as an effective deterrence. 4. It is, therefore, proposed to enact a self contained comprehensive legislation inter alia to provide for protection of children from the offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment and pornography with due regard for safeguarding the interest and well being of the child at every stage of the judicial process, incorporating child-friendly procedures for reporting, recording of evidence, investigation and trial of offences and provision for establishment of Special Courts for speedy trial of such offences. 5. The Bill would contribute to enforcement of the right of all children to safety, security and protection from sexual abuse and exploitation. 6. The notes on clauses explain in detail the various provisions contained in the Bill. 7. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objectives.” 14. Further, The Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012, begins with the following:- “An Act to protect children from offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment and pornography and provide for establishment of Special Courts for trial of such offences and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 7. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objectives.” 14. Further, The Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012, begins with the following:- “An Act to protect children from offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment and pornography and provide for establishment of Special Courts for trial of such offences and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. WHEREAS clause (3) of article 15 of the Constitution, inter alia, empowers the State to make special provisions for children; AND WHEREAS, the Government of India has acceded on the 11th December, 1992 to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which has prescribed a set of standards to be followed by all State parties in securing the best interests of the child; AND WHEREAS it is necessary for the proper development of the child that his or her right to privacy and confidentiality be protected and respected by every person by all means and through all stages of a judicial process involving the child; AND WHEREAS it is imperative that the law operates in a manner that the best interest and well being of the child are regarded as being of paramount importance at every stage, to ensure the healthy physical, emotional, intellectual and social development of the child; AND WHEREAS the State parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child are required to undertake all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent— (a) the inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity; (b) the exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices; (c) the exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials; AND WHEREAS sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of children are heinous crimes and need to be effectively addressed” 15. Thus, from aforesaid introduction, statement of objects and reasons of Bill as well as objective of the Act 2012, it is evident that Legislature has enacted the Act 2012 bearing in mind the safety and security of children from sexual offences and to ensure that they do not become victim of the offences as mentioned in the Act 2012. For achieving the aforesaid objective, Legislature has provided some measures in the form of Section 19(1) of the Act 2012. For achieving the aforesaid objective, Legislature has provided some measures in the form of Section 19(1) of the Act 2012. Hence, in this Court’s opinion, object of provisions of Section 19(1) of the Act 2012 is in a sense preventive in nature so that the child does not become victim of any offence under the Act 2012. Though in a given case, it may be that the offence in relation to child under the Act, 2012 has been committed, still in that case also, to ensure that, whether or not offence is continuing, he is not further subjected to crime or he does not continue to remain victim of aforesaid crime/does not further suffer on account of commission of any offence under the Act, 2012. 16. To achieve aforesaid object, Section 19(1) of the Act, 2012 has been enacted and to achieve the aforesaid objective, statutory/legal liability has been imposed on any person, who has apprehension that an offence under the Act 2012 is likely to be committed or has knowledge that such offence has been committed, he shall provide such information to the Special Juvenile Police Unit or local Police. Use of word “shall” indicates mandatory nature of statutory liability/legal liability/duty on any person as aforesaid. Therefore, if any person has any apprehension or knowledge as mentioned in Section 19 (1) of the Act 2012, he is legally duty bound under the Act, 2012 to report the matter immediately/forthwith/promptly and without any undue delay, so that the child does not become victim of any offence or that if any offence has already been committed, then, the child does not continue to suffer or is not further subjected to the same offence, if offence is continuing, as the case may be, to the Special Juvenile Police Unit or Local Police. 17. Hence, it is immaterial that no limitation or period for providing information under Section 19(1) of the Act 2012 has been provided in the Act, 2012. It would depend on the facts and circumstances of each and every case as to whether information, as required under the aforesaid provision, has been provided immediately/forthwith/promptly and without any undue delay to the authorities mentioned in the aforesaid provisions. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS:- 18. It would depend on the facts and circumstances of each and every case as to whether information, as required under the aforesaid provision, has been provided immediately/forthwith/promptly and without any undue delay to the authorities mentioned in the aforesaid provisions. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS:- 18. Bearing in mind the legal position with respect to exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C./528 of BNSS, the provisions of penal and procedure under the POCSO Act, 2012, now this Court will proceed to consider the case at hand on merits. 19. Perusal of submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner reveals that petitioner has sought quashment of FIR primarily on three grounds i.e., that National Commission For Protection of Child Rights has no jurisdiction to direct registration of FIR against the petitioner, FIR has been registered on the basis of complaint made by the petitioner, and on 29.5.2023 for the first time, petitioner got information about the offence and thereafter, immediately, he informed/reported the matter. 20. Failure to report, regarding the commission of the offence under the POCSO Act despite knowledge about the same is the accusation against the petitioner revealed from the FIR. Thus, charge against the petitioner is primarily on account of purported commission of offence under Section 19 (1) of the Act, 2012. 21. During submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner has primarily referred to Annexure P/1 (FIR dated 12.10.2023 registered against the petitioner), Annexure P/2 (letter written by National Commission to S.P. Damoh on 14.07.2023), Annexure P/3 (letter dated 30.05.2023 written by petitioner to Head of Aadharsheela Bal Dekhrekh Sanstha, Damoh MP, Annexure P/4 (letter dated 31.5.2023 written by petitioner to Presiding Officer, Special Juvenile Police Unit), Annexure P/5 (reminder dated 09.06.2023 written by petitioner to Special, Juvenile Police Unit, Damoh), Annexure P/6 (FIR dated 09.06.2023 registered against Divendra Daniel) and Annexure P/8 (reply of the petitioner to the notice, dated 25.07.2023. Perusal of case diary reveals that aforesaid documents are also part of the case diary. 22. From perusal of submissions of both the parties as well as documents available in the case diary, it is evident that custody of victim was handed over to respondent No.9, adoptive father of victim, on 17.05.2023 and since, then, petitioner was regularly apprised by respondent No.9 (Adoptive father of the victim) through Whatsapp chats/messages. 23. 22. From perusal of submissions of both the parties as well as documents available in the case diary, it is evident that custody of victim was handed over to respondent No.9, adoptive father of victim, on 17.05.2023 and since, then, petitioner was regularly apprised by respondent No.9 (Adoptive father of the victim) through Whatsapp chats/messages. 23. Hence, for deciding the case on merits, Whatsapp chats/messages sent by adoptive father of victim to petitioner from 21.05.2023 to 29.05.2023 are relevant for deciding the case appropriately. Aforesaid Whatsapp messages are as under:- 24. Thus, perusal of aforesaid Whatsapp messages reveals that only Whatsapp messages dated 21.05.2023 and 22.05.2023 contain relevant information pertaining to offence under the Act 2012 and Whatsapp messages dated 23.05.2023 to 29.05.2023 do not contain any material information pertaining to offence under the Act 2012. 25. Perusal of submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner as well as letters dated 30.05.2023, 31.05.2025 and 09.06.2023 written by the petitioner clearly show that it is not the case of the petitioner that no offence under the Act 2012 was committed and that’s why, no information was provided. Learned counsel for the petitioner has himself contended that it is only on the basis of information/letters written by petitioner that offence/FIR against Divendra Daniel has been registered. It is also not in dispute that aforesaid FIR has been registered against Divendra Daniel on the basis of Whatsapp chats/message as reproduced in preceding paras. Further, aforesaid FIR has been registered on the basis of letter written by the Manager of Aadharsheela Bal Dekhrekh Sanstha, Damoh M.P. and along with aforesaid letter dated 30.05.2023, sent by petitioner, Assistant Director, Department of Women and Children Development, Damoh has also been attached. 26. Thus, from discussion in the forgoing paras and documents available in the case diary as well as submissions of learned counsel for the parties, especially petitioner, it is clearly evident that from the facts mentioned in the Whatsapp chats/messages dated 21.05.2023 and 22.05.2023 as reproduced in the preceding paras, offence under the Act, 2012 stands constituted. It is also not in dispute that petitioner himself has informed the Head/Superintendent of Aadharsheela Bal Dekhrekh Sanstha, Damoh M.P./Special Juvenile Police Unit, Damoh through letters dated 30.05.2023, 31.05.2023 and 09.06.2023 respectively to take necessary action under the Act 2012 as offence under the Act, 2012 has been committed by Divendra Daniel. 27. It is also not in dispute that petitioner himself has informed the Head/Superintendent of Aadharsheela Bal Dekhrekh Sanstha, Damoh M.P./Special Juvenile Police Unit, Damoh through letters dated 30.05.2023, 31.05.2023 and 09.06.2023 respectively to take necessary action under the Act 2012 as offence under the Act, 2012 has been committed by Divendra Daniel. 27. Hence, in view of aforesaid factual matrix, sole issue before this Court is whether from the facts/evidence available in the case diary, at this stage, prima facie, offence under Section 19(1) of the Act 2012 is made out against the petitioner i.e. ingredients constituting offence under Section 19(1) of the Act 2012 are established from the evidence available in the case diary or not. 28. Evidently, out of Whatsapp chats/messages dated 21.05.2023 to 30.05.2023, only Whatsapp chats/messages dated 21.05.2023 and 22.05.2023 contain relevant information/facts constituting offence under the Act 2012. Remaining chats/messages dated 23.05.2023 to 30.5.2023 do not contain any such material facts or information pertaining to constituting any offence under the Act 2012. 29. It is also evident from record of the case that petitioner had informed Head/Superintendent of Aadharsheela Bal Dekhrekh Sanstha, Damoh MP on 30.05.2023 for the first time. Section 19(1) of the Act of 2012 mandates that information about the offence has to be provided either to Special Juvenile Police Unit or Local Police Unit only. In Section 19(1) of the Act, 2012, it is not mentioned that information may be given to any other person/authorities/institutions. Hence, information provided by the petitioner to Head/Superintendent of Aadharsheela Bal Dekhrekh Sanstha, Damoh MP vide letter dated 30.05.2023 does not come within the purview of Section 19(1) of the Act of 2012. Resultantly, aforesaid letter dated 30.5.2023 cannot be considered to be compliance of provisions of Section 19 (1) of the Act, 2012. 30. Thus, with respect to offence committed under the Act, 2012, petitioner provided information to Incharge Special Juvenile Police Unit, Damoh for the first time on 31.05.2023 and not before. Whereas petitioner had already received information about the offence through Whatsapp chats/messages on 21.05.2023 and 22.05.2023. Thus, petitioner had information about the offence on 21/22.05.2023 and petitioner had provided the aforesaid information to Special Juvenile Police Unit on 31.05.2023 for the first time. Whereas petitioner had already received information about the offence through Whatsapp chats/messages on 21.05.2023 and 22.05.2023. Thus, petitioner had information about the offence on 21/22.05.2023 and petitioner had provided the aforesaid information to Special Juvenile Police Unit on 31.05.2023 for the first time. Therefore, it cannot be said that petitioner had provided information as mandated under Section 19(1) of the Act, 2012 to any of the agencies/authorities as mentioned in Section 19(1) of the Act, 2012 promptly/immediately/forthwith and without any undue delay. 31. Hence, in this Court’s considered opinion, in the instant case, from evidence available on record at this stage, clearly prima facie, offence under Section 19(1) and 21 of the Act, 2012 is made out and ingredients constituting aforesaid offence under the Act 2012 prima facie stands established. 32. In view of aforesaid, it is immaterial whether National Commission for Protection of Child Rights had jurisdiction or not to direct for registration of FIR. Further, in the instant case, it is also evident from the FIR itself that it has been registered against the petitioner on 12.10.2023 on the basis of enquiry report dated 11.10.2023 submitted by Additional S.P., Damoh and Enquiry Officer, after examining the documents submitted by the petitioner, came to the conclusion that as per law, action is required to be initiated against the petitioner. Therefore, it cannot be said that aforesaid FIR has been registered solely on the basis of letter written by National Commission for Protection of Child Rights. 33. Accordingly, in view of discussion in the forgoing paras, petition filed by the petitioner cannot be allowed and FIR dated 12.10.2023 and all consequential proceedings arising thereto cannot be quashed. Petitioner is not entitled to any relief claimed in the petition. 34. Resultantly, petition filed by the petitioner is dismissed. 35. Petition filed by the petitioner is disposed off accordingly.