ORDER : C.PRATHEEP KUMAR, J. The review petitioners are appellants 5 to 14 in A.S. No. 132 of 2003, on the file of this court. They are the legal heirs of the 2nd plaintiff in OS No. 79 of 1989, on the file of the Subordinate Judge's court, Tirur, who was the 1st appellant who died during the pendency of the appeal. The above suit was filed for partition of the suit property, having an extent of 66.5 cents. The respondents 1 to 10 in the review petition are defendants 2 and 4 and persons claiming under the 3rd defendant. Respondents 11 and 12 are the legal representatives of deceased appellant no. 3. Respondent Nos. 13 to 19 are the legal representatives of the deceased 2nd appellant, the 3rd plaintiff in the suit. 2. The plaint schedule property originally belonged to the father of the plaintiff and the 1 st defendant. After the death of the father, the property was held by the plaintiff, his brother Bhavachi and mother Pathoma Umma, by virtue of the release deeds executed by the other siblings including the first defendant. Subsequently, mother Pathoma Umma, as per Ext.A3 released her right in the scheduled property in favour of the plaintiff and his brother Bhavachi. Accordingly, the plaintiff and his brother Bhavachi became absolute owners of the property. Thereafter, Bhavachi died without any issues and the right of Bhavachi over the scheduled property devolved upon the plaintiff and his sister, the first defendant, in the proportion 2:1, as the mother and all other siblings have died in the meanwhile. Therefore, the share of the plaintiff and the first defendant over the entire plaint scheduled property was 5/6 and 1/6 respectively. In the year 1937, the plaintiff, his deceased brothers Bhavachi and Chekkutty, together with the deceased mother executed Exhibit B1 mortgage with respect to the scheduled property in favour of the 1 st defendant. According to the plaintiff, though Exhibit B1 mortgage deed was executed, it was never intended to be acted upon and such a document was executed only to save the property from being proceeded against, in execution of a decree obtained by a third party. The plaintiff also contended that, in spite of Exhibit B1 mortgage, possession of the scheduled property was not handed over to the first defendant. The plaintiff also contended that, in spite of Exhibit B1 mortgage, possession of the scheduled property was not handed over to the first defendant. When the plaintiff’s request for partitioning the scheduled property was rejected by the first defendant, the present suit was filed. 3. The trial court found that Exhibit B1 is a valid mortgage. Ext.B1 is dated 21.06.1937. The period prescribed in Exhibit B1 mortgage deed was 2 years. The plaintiffs filed the suit for partition only on 25.08.1989. The trial court found that since the period of the mortgage as stipulated in Exhibit B1 is 2 years, the suit ought to have been filed within a period of 30 years from 21.06.1939, that is, on or before 21.06.1969. Since the suit was filed only on 25.08.1989, the trial court held that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation and accordingly, dismissed the suit, as per judgment dated 26.6.1992. Aggrieved by the above judgment and decree of the trial court, the plaintiff preferred A.S. No. 168 of 1993 before this Court. 4. In appeal, the plaintiffs have taken two additional contentions. One of the contentions is that, on the death of Bavachi, the 1 st defendant obtained 1/6 share in the right of equity of redemption and thereby there was merger of her mortgage right with 1/6 right of equity of redemption and that, therefore the mortgage is not subsisting. The other contention taken is that Exhibit B1 is an anomalous mortgage, though it is titled as an usufructory mortgage. As per judgment dated 19.10.2001, this court found that Ext.B1 is an anomalous mortgage. Regarding the contention of merger of the right of the first defendant with her right in the equity of redemption, this Court found that there was no evidence regarding the date of death of Bavachi, to ascertain whether she died before 21.6.1969, the date of expiry of 30 years. Therefore, the matter was remanded for fresh consideration, after giving opportunity to both sides to adduce evidence especially with regard to the fact whether Bavachi died before 21.6.1969 or not. 5. After the remand, the plaint was amended incorporating a prayer that there was merger of the right in the equity of redemption with the mortgage right of the 1 st defendant. 5. After the remand, the plaint was amended incorporating a prayer that there was merger of the right in the equity of redemption with the mortgage right of the 1 st defendant. The defendants filed additional written statement contending that the suit is barred by limitation and also that, without a prayer for redemption, the suit for partition alone is unsustainable. After the remand, one more witness was examined as PW2. It was contended by the defendants that Bavachi died before the expiry of 30 years provided for the redemption of the mortgage on 21.6.1969 and as such, her death has no relevance in the facts of this case. 6. The trial court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove that Bavachi died before 1969. Further, the trial court found that the prayer for redemption was barred by limitation and again the suit was dismissed, as per judgment dated 6.9.2002. Aggrieved by the above judgment and decree, the plaintiffs preferred A.S. 132 of 2003. A learned single judge of this court, as per judgment dated 21.06.2022, dismissed the appeal, holding that it is not at all necessary to go into the question of the date of death of Bavachi, as to whether it is prior to 1969 or not, as in either case, the mortgage of 1937 was barred by limitation before the suit was filed in 1989. Therefore, by applying Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 , the learned single judge dismissed the appeal. Alleging that there are apparent errors in the above judgment dismissing the appeal, the present Review Petition was filed. 7. Now the point that arises for consideration is the following: Whether the judgment dated 21.06.2022 passed by the learned single Judge is liable to be reviewed in the light of the grounds raised in the review petition ? 8. Heard Sri S.V. Balakrishna Iyer, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the review petitioners and Sri. T. Krishnanunni, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents. 9. The point :- One of the arguments advanced by the learned Senior counsel for the review petitioners is that Exhibit B1 is an anomalous mortgage and as such, there is no period of limitation for redeeming the plaint schedule property. The learned Senior Counsel would argue that Section 98 of the Transfer of Property Act has an overriding effect over Section 67 (a) of the said Act. The learned Senior Counsel would argue that Section 98 of the Transfer of Property Act has an overriding effect over Section 67 (a) of the said Act. Another contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel is that, on the death of Bavachi, there was merger of the share in the equity of redemption of 1st defendant with her mortgage right and hence the suit is not barred by limitation. Therefore, it was argued that the learned Single Judge was not correct in sustaining the judgment of the trial court that the suit is barred by limitation. 10. On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the respondents, would argue that Article 61(a) of the Limitation Act applies to all mortgages including Exhibit B1 mortgage, especially when its period was stipulated as 2 years and the right of redemption and recovery of money thereon. Therefore, it was argued that the trial court was justified in dismissing the suit and the learned Single Judge was justified in dismissing the appeal. Therefore, according to him, there is no merit in this review petition. 11. Section 67 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act states that, nothing in section 67 shall be deemed- “(a) to authorise any mortgagee other than a mortgagee by conditional sale or a mortgagee under an anomalous mortgage by the terms of which he is entitled to foreclose, to institute a suit for foreclosure, or an usufructuary mortgagee as such or a mortgagee by conditional sale as such to institute a suit for sale.” 12. Section 98 of the Transfer of Property Act dealing with rights and liabilities of parties to anomalous mortgages reads as follows :- Rights and liabilities of parties to anomalous mortgages.— In the case of an anomalous mortgage the rights and liabilities of the parties shall be determined by their contract as evidenced in the mortgage-deed, and, so far as such contract does not extend, by local usage. 13. In Ext.B1, no express provision was made for foreclosure. At the same time, the mortgagee was permitted to institute a suit for sale of the mortgaged property for realising the mortgage money. Personal liability is also there in Ext.B1. It was in the above context, the learned counsel for the appellant claims that Ext.B1 is an anomalous mortgage. The fact that Exhibit B1 is an anomalous mortgage is not disputed at the time of arguments. Personal liability is also there in Ext.B1. It was in the above context, the learned counsel for the appellant claims that Ext.B1 is an anomalous mortgage. The fact that Exhibit B1 is an anomalous mortgage is not disputed at the time of arguments. 14. The learned counsel for the review petitioner has relied upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ganga Dhar v. Shankar Lal and others, 1958 KHC 481, Harbans v. Om Prakash and Others, 2006 KHC 13 and Panchanan Sharma v. Basudeo Prasad Jaganani and others, 1995 KHC 621 in support of his argument. In the decision in Ganga Dhar (supra), relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, the period of the mortgage was 85 years and there was a clause in the mortgage deed that the mortgagor must redeem the mortgage within a period of 6 months after the mortgage period and thereafter he could not redeem the mortgage. The Apex Court held that such a condition to the effect that unless the mortgagor redeems the mortgage within a period of 6 months from the date of expiry of the period of mortgage, is a clog on redemption and that such a condition is not legally sustainable. The above decision has no application in the facts of this case. 15. In the decision in Panchanan Sharma (Supra), the Apex Court held that if the deed gives time for redemption or adjustment of the rent or profits and liabilities in terms of the contract read with the relevant provisions of the Act stood discharged, the limitation for redemption would run from the date fixed in the mortgage deed. The court further states that, otherwise there is no limitation for redemption of usufructuary mortgage. The usufructuary mortgagor does not lose his title to the property or right to redemption by lapse of time. In Harbans (supra) also the court held that when there is no stipulation regarding the period of limitation, it can be redeemed at any time. Relying upon the above decisions, the learned Senior counsel would argue that since in the instant case also no period is prescribed, the suit is not barred by limitation. 16. As per Article 61(a) of the Limitation Act, 1963 , the period of limitation for redemption is 30 years when the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues. Relying upon the above decisions, the learned Senior counsel would argue that since in the instant case also no period is prescribed, the suit is not barred by limitation. 16. As per Article 61(a) of the Limitation Act, 1963 , the period of limitation for redemption is 30 years when the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues. As per the terms of Ext.B1, the mortgagor can pay and the mortgagee can claim mortgage money only after a period of two years. In other words, as per Ext.B1, right to claim redemption as well as claim mortgage money accrued anytime after 2 years. Going by the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the review petitioners in Harbans (supra) and in Panchanan Sharma (supra) also, the period of limitation starts from the date of expiry of the period specified therein. Hence, those decisions will not in any way substantiate the case of the review petitioners. 17. In the decision in Muhammad Sher Khan v. Raja Seth Swami Dayal , AIR 1922 PC 17 relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, the mortgage dated 9.6.1908 was for a period of 5 years. As per the stipulations in the mortgage deed, at the end of the 5 years provided therein, the mortgagor shall pay the entire principal, interest and compound interest and redeem the mortgaged property. There is a further clause in the mortgage deed that, in case the mortgagor fails to redeem the mortgaged property on the expiry of 5 years, the mortgagee is to be put in possession of the mortgaged property for a period of 12 years and the mortgagor will not have the right of redemption during the above 12 years. The mortgagor failed to comply with the terms of the mortgage deed within the stipulated period of 5 years. The mortgagee instituted suit No.234 of 1913 for recovery of possession of the mortgaged property and possession was also obtained by him on 14.2.1915. On 08.06.1915, the mortgagor instituted a suit for redemption. The said suit was dismissed on the ground that the suit was premature and the said decision was upheld by the appellate court also. 18. The special leave petition filed by the mortgagor was allowed by the Privy Council. While allowing the appeal, the Privy Council held in paragraph 17 that: “..... The said suit was dismissed on the ground that the suit was premature and the said decision was upheld by the appellate court also. 18. The special leave petition filed by the mortgagor was allowed by the Privy Council. While allowing the appeal, the Privy Council held in paragraph 17 that: “..... An anomalous mortgage enabling a mortgagee after a lapse of time and in the absence of redemption to enter and take the rents in satisfaction of the interest would be perfectly valid if it did not also hinder an existing right to redeem. But is this that the present mortgage undoubtedly purports to effect ? It is expressly stated to be for five years, and after that period the principal money became payable. This, under Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act , is the event on which the mortgagor had a right on payment of the mortgage-money to redeem.” 19. It was further held by the Privy Council that the rights and liabilities of the litigants must depend on the terms of the instrument as controlled by the Transfer of Property Act , for, even if it were an anomalous mortgage, its provisions offend against the statutory right of redemption conferred by Section 60, and the provisions of the one Section cannot be used to defeat those of another unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them. Accordingly the Privy Council held that the above suit for redemption is maintainable. 20. In the decision in Singh Ram v. Sheo Ram , AIR 2014 SC 3447 also the Apex Court held that, right to redeem will continue till the mortgage money is paid for which there is no time limit, in the following words :- “We need not multiply reference to other judgments, Reference to above judgments clearly spell out the reasons for conflicting view. In cases where distinction in usufructuary mortgagor's right Under Section 62 of the T.P.Act has been noted, right o redeem has been held to continue till the mortgage money is paid for which there is no time limit while in other cases right to redeem has been held to accrue on the date of mortgage resulting in extinguishment of right of redemption after 30 years. We, thus, hold that special right of usufructuary mortgagor under Section 62 of the T.P.Act to recover possession commences in the manner specified therein, ie., when mortgage money is paid out of rents and profits or partly out of rents and profits and partly by payment or deposit by mortgagor. Until then, limitation does not start for purposes of Article 61 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. A usufructuary mortgagee is not entitled to file a suit for declaration that he had become an owner merely on the expiry of 30 years from the date of the mortgage. We answer the question accordingly.” 21. From the recitals in Ext.B1 mortgage it can be seen that Ext.B1 is an anomalous mortgage with the characteristics of an usufructuary mortgage. It is true that, when no particular period is provided in the mortgage deed, there is no limitation for the redemption of an usufructuary mortgage. However, Ext.B1 stipulates a period of two years for redemption, as well as for demanding mortgage money. Therefore, the period of limitation for redemption of Ext.B1 as provided under Article 61(a) of the Limitation Act is 30 years and it expired on 21.6.1969. In the above circumstance, the suit filed in 1989, more than 20 years after the expiry of the period of limitation for redemption is barred by limitation. 22. The last part of Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act relating to redemption of portion of mortgaged property states as follows :- “Redemption of portion of mortgaged property.—Nothing in this section shall entitle a person interested in a share only of the mortgaged property to redeem his own share only, on payment of a proportionate part of the amount remaining due on the mortgage, except only where a mortgagee, or, if there are more mortgagees than one, all such mortgagees, has or have acquired, in whole or in part, the share of a mortgagor. “ 23. Even if it is assumed that Bavachi died before the expiry of the period of limitation on 21.6.1969, the same will only enable the plaintiff to redeem his share alone (5/6) from the scheduled property. Merely for the reason that the mortgage got disintegrated, the same will not give rise to a fresh period of limitation or extension of the period of limitation fixed under section 60(a) of the Limitation Act. Merely for the reason that the mortgage got disintegrated, the same will not give rise to a fresh period of limitation or extension of the period of limitation fixed under section 60(a) of the Limitation Act. At the same time, as held by the trial court, in this case there is no evidence to prove the date of death of Bavachi. Though after the remand PW2 was examined, he has no direct knowledge in that respect. In either case, the right of redemption expired on 21.6.1969 and as such, the present suit filed on 25.8.1989 is barred by limitation. In the above circumstance, the learned Single Judge was perfectly justified in dismissing the appeal, holding that in this case the date of death of Bavachi has no relevance. Therefore, I find no grounds to review the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 21.6.2022, and as such this Review Petition is liable to be dismissed. The point is answered accordingly. In the result, the Review Petition stands dismissed.