JUDGMENT : C. JAYACHANDRAN, J. The Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEF & CC) in the Central Government issued a notification, S.O. 1807(E) dated 12.04.2022 extending the validity period of the Environmental Clearance ('E.C.', for short) for certain projects and activities. A clarification, in the nature of an Official Memorandum ('O.M.', for short) dated 13.12.2022 followed. As many as 66 Writ Petitions have been filed seeking the benefit of that notification, read with the above O.M. However, one Writ Petition, W.P.(C) No.44547/2024, is filed challenging its constitutional vires. The learned Amicus appointed leans in favour of that numero uno. It appears that the petitioners in the genus are in trouble. The notification S.O.1807(E) and the clarificatory O.M, produced at Exts.P8 and P9 respectively in W.P(C) No.44547/2024, are under challenge. Treating the said Writ Petition as the leading case, the impugned documents under challenge are hereinafter referred to as Ext.P8 notification and Ext.P9 O.M, respectively. - 2. Background Facts: It is necessary to record the genesis of introducing an additional requirement of Environmental Clearance for certain projects and activities, for which solitary purpose, the Environment Impact Notification, 2006, was issued in accord with the powers conferred under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986 ('E.P. Act' and 'E.P. Rules', for short). 3. Prior to the EIA Notification of 27 January 1994 issued under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, there was no statutory requirement for environmental clearance. The 1994 Notification mandated prior environmental clearance for specified categories of projects, including mining of major minerals over five hectares, with the MoEF & CC as the sole authority. By EIA Notification, 2006 (Notification dated 14.09.2006), State Level Environment Impact Assessment Authorities (SEIAA) and State Level Expert Appraisal Committees (SEAC) were constituted, with SEAC empowered to screen Category B projects into B1 (requiring EIA and public consultation) and B2 (exempting both). By EIA Notification, 2006 (Notification dated 14.09.2006), State Level Environment Impact Assessment Authorities (SEIAA) and State Level Expert Appraisal Committees (SEAC) were constituted, with SEAC empowered to screen Category B projects into B1 (requiring EIA and public consultation) and B2 (exempting both). In Deepak Kumar v. State of Haryana , [ 2012 (4) SCC 629 ], the Hon’ble Supreme - Court directed the Central Government to implement the Minor Minerals Conservation and Development Rules, 2010, and directed States and Union Territories to frame rules under Section 15 of the M.M.D.R. Act, 1957, in line with the MoEF & CC guidelines, further directing that, until such rules were implemented, all minor mineral leases, including renewals and those below five hectares, shall be granted only after obtaining prior environmental clearance from the MoEF & CC. 4. Consequently, in the year 2012, as per O.M. dated 18.05.2012, it was decided that, in view of the Supreme Court judgment in Deepak Kumar (supra), all mining projects of minor minerals including their renewal, irrespective of the size of the lease, would thenceforth require prior E.C. Subsequently, O.Ms dated 24.06.2013 and 24.12.2013 were issued, of which the latter provided guidelines regarding category ‘B’ projects/activities into category ‘B1’ and ‘B2’. 5. Thereafter, the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015, was brought in, extending the tenure of mining leases to fifty years. Pursuant thereto, the Central Government, by Notification dated 15.01.2016, 135 brought in amendment to the EIA Notification, 2006, introducing Clause 3A, constituting District Level Environment Impact Assessment Authorities (DEIAA) and District Level Expert Appraisal Committees (DEAC) to deal with small-scale activities, including mining of areas below five hectares. The notification also provided in Appendix X, the procedure for preparing the District Survey Report (DSR), and in Appendix XI, the procedure for granting environmental clearance for mining of minor minerals, including cluster situations. Thereafter, on 25.04.2016, O.A.No.200/2016 and connected matters ( Rajeev suri v. Union of India and connected matters ) were filed before the National Green Tribunal, challenging the said Notification dated 15.01.2016. 6. In furtherance of the directions in Deepak Kumar (supra), the MoEF & CC issued Notification dated 01.07.2016, mandating that all formalities applicable for the grant of E.C. by State Level Authorities would equally apply to E.Cs granted by District Level Committees, making such adherence obligatory. - 7. 6. In furtherance of the directions in Deepak Kumar (supra), the MoEF & CC issued Notification dated 01.07.2016, mandating that all formalities applicable for the grant of E.C. by State Level Authorities would equally apply to E.Cs granted by District Level Committees, making such adherence obligatory. - 7. The notification dated 15.01.2016 constituting the DEIAA - and DEAC was challenged before the Principal Bench of the National Green Tribunal in O.A.No.186/2016 ( Satendra Pandey v MoEF & CC and Another ). By Order dated 13.09.2018, the Tribunal found that the procedure for grant of E.C. by DEIAA for areas between 0 to 5 Hactares falling under category B2 is inconsistent with the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Deepak Kumar (supra). Accordingly, directions were issued by the Tribunal to bring the said notification dated 15.01.2016 in consonance with the directions in Deepak Kumar (supra). The Order further directed that E.Cs be granted by the SEIAA on the recommendation of SEAC, instead of the DEIAA/DEAC. As per paragraph 25 of the said Order, the MoEF & CC was directed to take appropriate steps to revise the procedure prescribed in the Notification dated 15.01.2016. Pursuant thereto, the MoEF & CC issued an O.M. dated 12.12.2018 in compliance with the said Order. Thereafter, in 2019, the Union of India filed Civil Appeal Nos.3799– 3800/2019 titled ‘Union of India v. Rajiv Suri’ before the Hon’ble Supreme Court challenging the NGT’s directions. In 2020, against the same Orders of the NGT, the Quarry Environmental Clearance Holders Association [the additional 14 th respondent in W.P.(C) No.44547/2024] also filed Civil Appeal No.6611 of 2020. By Order dated 31.01.2020 in Civil Appeal Nos.3799–3800/2019, the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed that coercive steps in execution be deferred. 8. In the meantime, the validity period of five years fixed by SEIAA in the E.Cs were challenged in T. Mathew Abraham v. State Level Environment Impact Assessment Authority [ 2020 (6) KHC 596 ]. A learned single Judge of this Court held that the SEIAA, being a body constituted to exercise the powers of the Central Government under the 2006 Notification, cannot act contrary to its provisions and that environmental clearances must be issued for the 'project life'. 9. A learned single Judge of this Court held that the SEIAA, being a body constituted to exercise the powers of the Central Government under the 2006 Notification, cannot act contrary to its provisions and that environmental clearances must be issued for the 'project life'. 9. In the context of re-appraisal of E.Cs directed by the NGT, several O.Ms were issued by the Ministry, which are not germane for consideration, having regard to the scope of the challenge posed in this Writ Petition and hence not referred to. Ultimately, the impugned Ext.P8 notification, S.O.1807(E), was issued, followed by the impugned clarification, vide Ext.P9 O.M. - 10. In the context of re-appraisal of E.Cs directed by the NGT, several O.Ms were issued by the Ministry, which are not germane for consideration, having regard to the scope of the challenge posed in this Writ Petition and hence not referred to. Ultimately, the impugned Ext.P8 notification, S.O.1807(E), was issued, followed by the impugned clarification, vide Ext.P9 O.M. - 10. Ext.P8 notification: With the above introduction, the subject notification, in full, is extracted herebelow: “S.O. 1807(E) .—WHEREAS, the Central Government in the erstwhile Ministry of Environment and Forests, in exercise of its powers under sub-section (1) and clause (v) of sub- section (2) of section (3) of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 has published the Environment Impact Assessment Notification, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the said notification), vide number S.O.1533 (E), dated the 14th September, 2006 for mandating prior environmental clearance for certain category of projects; And whereas, based on the past experiences, it is noted that Nuclear Power Projects and Hydro Power Projects have high gestation period due to various issues such as geological surprises, delay in Forest Clearance, land acquisition, local issues, rehabilitation and resettlement, etc., which are often beyond the control of project proponent and in this context, the Central Government deems it necessary to extend the validity of Environmental Clearance (EC) for such projects; And whereas, for other projects also, considering the time taken for addressing local concerns including environmental issues related to the implementation of such projects, the Central Government deems it necessary to extend the validity of such ECs; And whereas, as per the provisions of Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (67 of 1957), on and from the date of commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015, all mining leases are being granted for a period of fifty years, and accordingly, the Central Government deems it necessary to align the validity of mining ECs which is currently permissible up to a maximum duration of thirty years, subject to review and appropriate environmental safeguards; Now therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) and clause (v) of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (29 of 1986), read with sub-rule (4) of rule 5 of the Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986, the Central Government, after having dispensed with the requirement of notice under clause (a) of sub-rule (3) of rule 5 of the said rules in public interest, hereby makes the following further amendments in the notification of the Government of India, in the erstwhile Ministry of Environment and Forests, number S.O. 1533 (E), dated the 14th September, 2006, namely:- In the said notification,- (i) in paragraph 9,- (a) for sub paragraphs (i) and (ii), the following sub- paragraphs shall be substituted, namely:- (i) The “Validity of Environmental Clearance” is meant the period from which a prior Environmental Clearance is granted by the regulatory authority, or may be presumed by the applicant to have been granted under sub-paragraph (iii) of paragraph 8, to the start of production operations by the project or activity; or completion of all construction operations in case of construction projects relating to item 8 of the Schedule, to which the application for prior environmental clearance refers: Provided that in the case of mining projects or activities, the validity shall be counted from the date of execution of the mining lease. (ii) The prior environmental clearance granted for an existing or new project or activity shall be valid for a period of,- (a) thirteen years in the case of River Valley projects or activities [item 1(c) of the Schedule]; (b) fifteen years in the case of Nuclear power projects or activities and processing of nuclear fuel [item 1(e) of the Schedule]; (c) ten years in the case of all other projects and activities other than the Mining projects and River Valley Projects and Nuclear power projects referred to in clauses (a) and (b). (iii) In the case of Area Development projects and Townships [item 8(b)], the validity period of ten years shall be limited only to such activities as may be the responsibility of the applicant as a developer: Provided that the period of validity of Environmental Clearance with respect to the Projects and Activities listed in this sub- paragraph and sub-paragraphs (ii) may be extended in respect of valid Environmental Clearance, by the regulatory authority concerned by a maximum period of two years in the case of River Valley projects, five years in the case of Nuclear power projects and processing of nuclear fuel and one year in the case of all other projects, if an application is made in the laid down proforma to the regulatory authority by the applicant within the validity period of the existing Environment Clearance: Provided further that the regulatory authority may also consult the concerned Expert Appraisal Committee before grant of such extension. (iv) The prior Environmental Clearance granted for mining projects shall be valid for the project life as laid down in the mining plan approved and renewed by competent authority, from time to time, subject to a maximum of thirty years, whichever is earlier: Provided that the period of validity of Environmental Clearance with respect to projects or activities included in this sub-paragraph may be extended by another twenty years, beyond thirty years, subject to the condition that the adequacy of the existing environmental safeguards laid down in the existing Environmental Clearance shall be examined by concerned Expert Appraisal Committee every five years beyond thirty years, on receipt of such application in the laid down proforma from the Project Proponent within the maximum validity period of Environmental Clearance of thirty years, and subsequently on receipt of such application in the laid down proforma from the Project Proponent within the validity period ofthe extended Environment Clearance, every five years for incorporating such additional environment safeguards in the Environmental Management Plan, as may be deemed necessary, till the validity of the mining lease or end of life of mine or fifty years, whichever is earlier.”; (b) for the brackets, figures and words “(iii) Where the application for extension under sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) has been filed”, the following shall be substituted, namely:- “(v) Where the application for extension under sub- paragraphs (ii), (iii) and (iv) has been filed in the laid down proforma”. (Underlined, for emphasis). 11. Ext.P9 O.M.:- Ext.P8 notification is clarified by Ext.P9 Office Memorandum dated 13.12.2022, which is also extracted here below, in full. “Subject: Clarification on the amendment to EIA Notification 2006 issued vide S.O. No. 1807(E) dated 12/04/2022 with regard to validity of Environment Clearance - regarding. The Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEF&CC) vide notification no. S.O. No. 1807(E) dated 12/04/2022 amended the provisions of EIA Notification, 2006 regarding validity of Environment Clearance as mentioned below: Type of Project Earlier E.C. validity (Years) (A) Further extendable for (Years) (B) Increased E.C. validity (Years) (C) Further extendabl e for (Years) (D) River Valley projects 10 3 13 2 Nuclear projects 7 3 15 5 Projects other than River 7 3 10 1 Valley, Nuclear and Mining Projects 7 3 10 1 Mining Projects 30 30 (Subject to adequacy of EIA/EMP to be reviewed every 5 years after 30 Years) 20 2. The Ministry is in receipt of representations from different stakeholders seeking clarification on the validity of Environment Clearance for different developmental projects in pursuance to the aforementioned Notification. The matter has been examined and it is to clarify that the applicability of the Notification is as under: i. The validity of the Environmental Clearances, which had not expired as on the date of publication of Notification i.e. 12/04/2022, shall stand automatically extended to respective increased validity as mentioned at para no. 1 column (C) above: Provided that the period of validity of Environmental Clearance with respect to the type of Projects and Activities listed at Para 1 above may be extended in respect of valid Environmental Clearance, by the regulatory authority concerned, by a maximum period of years as indicated at Para No. 1 Column (D) above, if an application is made in the laid down proforma to the regulatory authority by the applicant as per the provisions of EIA Notification 2006: Provided further that the regulatory authority may also consult the concerned Expert Appraisal Committee before grant of such extension. ii. The Environment Clearances for which the project proponents have submitted the application for extension of validity as per the provisions of the EIA Notification 2006 as on the date of publication of Notification i.e. 12/04/2022, shall stand automatically extended to respective increased validity as mentioned at Para no. 1 column (C) above. 3. This is issued with the approval of Competent Authority." (Underlined, for emphasis) Thus, in the light of the impugned Ext.P8 notification, as clarified by the impugned Ext.P9 O.M, the petitioners claim that the E.Cs granted to them have a validity period of 30 years though the period stipulated in those E.Cs were only 5 years. 12. The compass of controversy: In the 66 Writ Petitions preferred claiming the benefit of the Ext.P8 notification, the issue is one pertaining to the interpretation and the effect of the said notification. According to the petitioners, the Environmental Clearance granted for mining projects shall be valid for the 'project life as laid down in the mining plan' as per the above referred amendment brought in to clause no.9 of the EIA Notification and the term 'project life' means the 'mine life', subject to a maximum of 30 years, whichever is earlier. 13. According to the petitioners, the Environmental Clearance granted for mining projects shall be valid for the 'project life as laid down in the mining plan' as per the above referred amendment brought in to clause no.9 of the EIA Notification and the term 'project life' means the 'mine life', subject to a maximum of 30 years, whichever is earlier. 13. As already indicated, in the solitary Writ Petition, W.P(C) No. 44547 of 2024, the subject matter of challenge is the constitutional vires of the Ext.P8 notification and Ext.P9 O.M, on various counts. It is noteworthy that the petitioner in that Writ Petition had posed the challenge to the subject notification, only in the context of the E.C. issued to the 9 th respondent quarry, primarily. The E.Cs issued by DEIAA, for mining projects, are also generally under challenge. The petitioner seeks a declaration that Ext.P8 notification and Ext.P9 O.M. are ultra vires the Constitution and inconsistent with the provisions of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. Several grounds are raised to challenge the constitutional validity of the subject notification, about which detailed reference will be made during the course of the judgment. 14. Having regard to the complexity of the issues involved in these Writ Petitions, this Court appointed Advocate Ramola Nayanpally as Amicus Curiae. 15. W.P.(C) No.44547/2024 :- Heard Smt. Ramola Nayanpally , the learned Amicus; Sri. V. Harish , learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P(C) No.44547/2024; Sri.K.S.Bharathan , Senior Panel Counsel on behalf of the Union of India, as also, the MoEF & CC; Sri. M.P. Sreekrishnan , on behalf of the SEIAA; Sri. S. Kannan Senior Government Pleader, on behalf of the Director of Geology of the State, as also, the Geologist; Sri. T. Naveen for the State Pollution Control Board and Sri. Ranjith Thamban , learned Senior Counsel, duly instructed by Sri. B.M. Krishnakumar, on behalf of the 9 th respondent. 16. It may, in this context, to be pointed out that additional R10 to R13 and additional R14 filed two separate petitions for impleading themselves in this Writ Petition, on the premise that they are vitally affected if the Writ Petition is allowed. The impleading petitions were allowed, vide separate Order. Adv. Philip J. Vettickattu , on behalf of R10 to R13 and Adv.Saritha Thomas and Adv.Usha Nandini on behalf of Additional 14 th respondent, were heard. 17. The impleading petitions were allowed, vide separate Order. Adv. Philip J. Vettickattu , on behalf of R10 to R13 and Adv.Saritha Thomas and Adv.Usha Nandini on behalf of Additional 14 th respondent, were heard. 17. W.P(C) No.23150/2023 and connected matters:- Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the respondents in the respective Writ Petitions. The names are not referred to since there are 66 cases altogether. However, their arguments will be referred to during the course of discussion. 18. Arguments of Sri.V.Harish, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P(C) No. 44547/24:- The petitioner styles himself as an affected party due to the illegal and unscientific mining conducted by the 9 th respondent entity, which is being done at a distance of 400 metres only from the petitioner’s place of residence, with his family. Petitioner along with his aged mother and family is residing at Rajagiri, in Pulingome Village, a very peaceful area near to a wildlife sanctuary and forest. According to the petitioner, the area is identified as a landslide prone area by the authorities. Ext.P20 E.C. in favour of 9 th respondent expired on 06.11.2022, reckoning the 5 years validity period stipulated therein. COVID-19 exemption was given for 1 year by virtue of Ext.P7 notification, which extends the validity period of the E.C. upto 06.11.23. But for Ext.P8 impugned notification and Ext.P9 O.M, the 9 th respondent's activities ought to have been stopped, on the expiry of Ext.P20 E.C. Ext.P8 notification, 147 according to the petitioner, is issued in gross violation of the legal provisions; and the retrospective operation given to Ext.P8, as clarified by Ext.P9 O.M. is all the more illegal. The 9 th respondent is also one among the petitioners, who approached this Court and obtained Ext.P18 interim Order on the strength of Ext.P8 notification and Ext.P9 O.M, so as to continue mining. The following arguments were advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner to challenge Ext.P8 subject notification: - 1. Ext.P8 notification amended clause no.9 of the EIA notification, as per which, the powers of the expert body [State Level Expert Appraisal Committee ('SEAC', for short)] - to estimate the project life and thus to stipulate the validity period of the E.C. - has been taken away and the power is virtually seen given to a different authority under the M.M.D.R Act. 2. 2. There is violation of Rule 5(3)(a) to (d) of the Environment (Protection) Rules. Recourse seen taken to Rule 5(4) of that Rules is not justified at all. There is no 'public interest', so as to avoid public consultation, as mandated by Rule 5(3)(a) of the E.P. Rules. The subject notification is squarely in the teethof the dictum laid on by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Noble M. Paikada v. Union of India [2024 SCC Online SC 369]. 3. Before issuance of the subject notification/Ext.P8, there was no consultation, whatsoever, with the States, as also, with the State Level Environment Impact Assessment Authorities. 4. When the powers of SEAC are taken away in the matter of fixation of validity period of E.Cs, the overriding effect of the Environment (Protection) Act over the M.M.D.R Act has been overlooked, and hence, the subject notification is bad on that count as well. 5. The impugned Ext.P8 notification cannot be retrospective. The amendments under the EIA notification, 2006 are only prospective in application, unless clarificatory in nature, as held by the Apex Court in Bengaluru Development Authority v. Sudhakar Hegde and Others [2020 KHC 6285]. The word 'existing' as used in sub-paragraph no.2 is missing in sub-clause no.4 of clause no.9 of Ext.P8 notification, wherefore, the subject notification/Ext.P8 cannot apply to the existing E.Cs. 6. The subject notification/Ext.P8 cannot be construed as one issued in furtherance of safeguarding the interests of environment and hence, cannot be treated as one issued under Section 3 of the E.P. Act. 7. The subject notification/Ext.P8 is so vague and uncertain. Neither 'project life' nor 'life of mine' is defined under any of the enactments concerned. Clause 9(iv) and its proviso of the subject Ext.P8 notification is vague, unclear and ambiguous and hence, liable to be declared as arbitrary, violative of Article 14. 8. The necessity to review the environmental impact of mining projects in every 5 years and to issue E.Cs accordingly has been done away with by virtue of the subject notification. 19. Submissions made by Smt.Ramola Nayanpally, the learned Amicus:- Two fold submissions are made by the learned Amicus. 8. The necessity to review the environmental impact of mining projects in every 5 years and to issue E.Cs accordingly has been done away with by virtue of the subject notification. 19. Submissions made by Smt.Ramola Nayanpally, the learned Amicus:- Two fold submissions are made by the learned Amicus. One pertaining to the issue as to whether the subject notification is liable to be struck down as constitutionally invalid; and the second, whether the notification is liableto be interfered with - even if it is found to be constitutionally valid - for reason of being thoroughly vague and uncertain, especially with respect to sub-clause(iv) to clause 9 of the impugned Ext.P8 notification. 20. The following submissions are made with respect to the first issue. The subject notification was issued without following the procedure prescribed under the Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986. Section 3(2)(v) of the E.P. Act empowers the Central Government to take measures restricting the areas where industries, operations or processes shall not be carried out; or be carried out, subject to safeguards. Rule 5(3)(a) of the E.P. Rules mandates the Central Government to give notice of its intention to impose prohibition or restriction on the locations of industry/processes/operations. This has to be done by notifying in the official gazette, and in such other manner as the Central Government may deem necessary. As per Rule 5(3)(c), any person interested can file an objection against the imposition of prohibition or restriction. Rule 5(3)(d) enjoins the Central Government to consider all the objections. Rule 5(4) enables the Central Government todispense with the requirement of notice under Rule 5(3)(a), if it appears to the Central Government that it is in public interest to do so. Admittedly, there was no compliance of Rule 5(3)(a), in so far as the subject notification is concerned and the same is issued by invoking the powers under Section 5(4). As to what was the public interest, which compelled the Central Government to dispense with the requirement of notice under Rule 5(3)(a), is neither decipherable from Ext.P8 notification, nor from the counter affidavit filed by the MoEF & CC. Therefore, Ext.P8 is squarely in the teeth of Noble M. Paikada (supra) is the argument advanced. Learned Amicus also relies on the judgment in Hanuman Laxman Aroskar v. Union of India [ (2019) 15 SCC 401 ]. Therefore, Ext.P8 is squarely in the teeth of Noble M. Paikada (supra) is the argument advanced. Learned Amicus also relies on the judgment in Hanuman Laxman Aroskar v. Union of India [ (2019) 15 SCC 401 ]. It is the further contention raised by the learned Amicus that the 'public interest' referred to in Rule 5(4), must have a direct nexus to environmental protection; and waiver of notice - harping under Rule 5(4)- will have to be justified by the need to protect the environment, for public good. Reliance in this regard is placed on Kashinath Jairam Shetye and Others v. Union of India and Others [MANU/MH/2406/2021]. The learned Amicus also relies on the principle of procedural legitimate expectation. In cases where a clear assurance is given by the public authority to give notice and a hearing before changing a substantive policy, departure requires an overriding legal duty or a countervailing public interest (Rajeev Suri v. Delhi Development Authority [ 2022 (11) SCC 1 ] ) , is the argument advanced by the learned Amicus. 21. The next point raised by the learned Amicus is an extension of the first point, but in the context of change of regime, so as to remove the role of SEAC in the matter of prescribing the validity period of E.Cs. This consequence brought in by the amendment makes it all the more necessary to have a public consultation with the stakeholders, before bringing the subject amendment, is the submission. Under clause 9 of the EIA notification, an E.C. issued for mining projects is valid for the project life, as estimated by the Expert Appraisal Committee, subject to a maximum of 30 years. Now, by virtue of the amendment, the role of the expert body has been eliminated and the validity is determined on the basis of the mining plan approved by the authority under the M.M.D.R Act. This serious departure, denuding the powers of the expert body, certainly warrants a public consultation, 153 and the failure in this regard renders the subject notification illegal and unconstitutional. This serious departure, denuding the powers of the expert body, certainly warrants a public consultation, 153 and the failure in this regard renders the subject notification illegal and unconstitutional. As a sequel to this argument, it was emphasized that the Expert Appraisal Committee comprise of the domain experts in various fields relating to environment, wherefore, denuding such expert authority of the power to determine the project life and shifting it to the authority under the M.M.D.R Act, which approves the mining plan, is an issue highly concerning, according to the Amicus. According to the Amicus, this step, by any yardstick, does not further environmental protection. - 22. The third aspect highlighted by the learned Amicus is in the context of the purpose of Section 3 of the Environment (Protection) Act. Section 3 confers powers on the Central Government to take all measures necessary for the purpose of protecting and improving the quality of environment and to prevent, control and abate environmental pollution. The EIA notification, 2006, serves both the above purposes. Therefore, any amendment brought in to such notification should also be consistent with and satisfy the above jurisdictional parameter. Referring to paragraph no. 4 of the subject notification, it is the submission of the learned Amicus that extending the validity period of E.C, so as to align the same with mining lease, hardly serves any environmental interest. Learned Amicus then pointed out that a subordinate legislation does not enjoy the same immunity as a statute and the same is liable to be struck down, if it does not conform to its parent statute or fails to reflect the legislative intent. Reliance in this regard is placed on Kerala Samsthana Chethu Thozhilali Union v. State of Kerala and Others [ 2006 (4) SCC 327 ]. 23. The learned Amicus then pointed out that Ext.P8 notification is vague, unreasonable, unworkable and uncertain, which will be referred to later, when that issue is considered. 24. On Ext.P9 O.M, learned Amicus would point out that the same is issued without reference to any provision, either of the E.P. Act or the E.P. Rules. The subject O.M. is merely an executive instruction, with no statutory force. Besides, the O.M. oversteps the purpose of Ext.P8 notification. 24. On Ext.P9 O.M, learned Amicus would point out that the same is issued without reference to any provision, either of the E.P. Act or the E.P. Rules. The subject O.M. is merely an executive instruction, with no statutory force. Besides, the O.M. oversteps the purpose of Ext.P8 notification. While the subject notification stipulates by virtue of clause 9(iv), that the E.Cs for mining projects shall be valid for the project life in the mining plan (subject to a maximum of 30 years), the O.M. goes far beyond, to stipulate that E.Cs will automatically be valid for 30 years, thus supplanting the Ext.P8 notification itself. A clarification/explanation cannot expand or alter the scope of the original notification (see Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit and Others v. Dr. Manu and Others [ (2023) 19 SCC 30 ]). Ext.P9 O.M. is bad in law also for the reason of its stipulation that the subject notification will operate retrospectively, which intention is not manifest from Ext.P8 notification, insofar as mining projects are concerned. The same is also in the teeth of the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in Vanashakthi v. Union of India [MANU/SC/0726/2025]. Thus, Ext.P8 notification and Ext.P9 O.M, both, are liable to be struck down as illegal, is the final submission of the learned Amicus. 25. Arguments advanced by Sri.K.S.Bharathan for respondents 1 and 2:- Refuting the above contentions, Sri.K.S.Bharathan, learned Senior Panel Counsel on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 would primarily canvass the contention that the Writ Petition challenging Ext.P8 notification is not maintainable, in view of Section 14 of the National Green Tribunal Act ('N.G.T. Act', for short). Referring to Section 14 and Section 2(m) of the N.G.T. Act, learned Senior Panel Counsel would submit that Ext.P8 Notification is issued in terms of the Environment (Protection) Act - an enactment specified in Schedule 1 - and a substantial question with respect to its interpretation has arisen for consideration. The National Green Tribunal, being an expert body having vast powers to consider and adjudicate the issues involved in the Writ Petition, the present Writ Petition is not liable to be considered under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this regard, the learned Counsel relied upon the following judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court: (i) Bhopal Gas Peedith Mahila Udyog Sangathan and Others v. Union of India and Others [ (2012) 8 SCC 326 ]. In this regard, the learned Counsel relied upon the following judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court: (i) Bhopal Gas Peedith Mahila Udyog Sangathan and Others v. Union of India and Others [ (2012) 8 SCC 326 ]. (ii) Mantri Techzone Pvt. Ltd. v. Forward Foundation and Others [ (2019) 18 SCC 494 ] (iii) Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Ankita Sinha and Others [ (2022) 13 SCC 401 ]In addition to the question of maintainability, the following points are also canvassed. (a) The reason for dispensation of public notice under Rule 5(3)(a) is mentioned in Ext.P29 (internal file of the Ministry), specifically at page nos.24 and 43 to 50. Under Section 3 of the E.P. Act, the powers are not merely to take prohibitive and preventive measures only. Such powers encapsulates the measures for regulation of activities and processes, keeping the objective of sustainable development. (b) The reason for issuance of Ext.P8 is stated therein itself, that is to say, to align with life of the mining lease, pursuant to the amendment to the M.M.D.R. Act in the year 2015. (c) Ext.P8 notification is not confined to mining projects, but regulates projects of various sectors, having nation wide application, for which reason, Ext.P8 cannot be interfered with, since it may result in regulatory uncertainty. (d) Rule 5(4) of the E.P. Rules empowers the Central Government to dispense with the requirement of notice under Rule 5(3)(a), in public interest. - (e) The facts and issues in Noble M. Paikada (supra) are completely different and hence the dictum laid down cannot be applied. (f) The validity of E.Cs for mining projects in the E.I.A. Notification 2006, prior to the impugned Ext.P8 notification, was also 'project life' or 30 years, whichever is earlier. The amendment brought in by Ext.P8 only provided for extension of validity by another 20 years, subject to the existing environmental safeguards, which cannot be held to be unreasonable, by any yardstick. (g) The longer the mine life/mining lease period, more scientific and systematic the mining will be, which ensures proper mineral exploration, as held in Deepak Kumar and Others v. State of Haryana and Others [ 2012 (4) SCC 629 ]. A lesser mine lease would lead to rapid exploration of minerals, without adequate measures for reclamation and rehabilitation of the mined out area. A lesser mine lease would lead to rapid exploration of minerals, without adequate measures for reclamation and rehabilitation of the mined out area. (h) 'Project life' and 'life of mine' are not the same, as is discernible from the impugned notification itself. (i) Ext.P9 O.M. is not merely an administrative circular. Non-mention of the provision under which it is issued is inconsequential, since the authority which made the Order had the statutory power to make such Order ( Pournami Oil Mills and Others v . State of Kerala and Another [ (1986) Supp. SCC 728 ]). Ext.P9 is traceable to the power conferred under Section 3, read with Section 5 of the E.P. Act. 26. While recording the contentions of respondents 1 and 2, it requires to be noticed that the initial counter affidavit, itself, was filed after the matter being scheduled for hearing. The same is seen filed on 17.06.2025. When arguments were advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Amicus based on Noble M. Paikada (supra), an additional statement was filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 on 02.07.2025. On the date when the case was finally heard and reserved for judgment, a further request was made by the learned Senior Panel Counsel seeking time to place on record yet another counter affidavit, which was declined by this Court by virtue of a separate Order, taking stock of the fact that several Writ Petitions in this batch were filed, as far back as, 2023 and W.P.(C.) No.44547/2024 challenging Ext.P8 notification was filed in the year 2024. This Court alsonotice that some of the arguments incorporated in the notes of submission filed by the learned Senior Panel Counsel are neither traceable to pleadings, nor argued before the Court. 27. Arguments advanced by Sri.M.P.Sreekrishnan, learned counsel for the 4 th respondent/SEIAA:- As per Clause 9 of the E.I.A. Notification, 2006, the validity period of an E.C, prior to the introduction of Ext.P8 notification was the 'project life', as estimated by the Expert Appraisal Committee, subject to a maximum of 30 years for mining projects, and 7 years for other projects and activities while estimating project life, SEAC assess the feasibility of the entire project and recommends conditions for sustainable extraction of minerals. By the impugned Ext.P8, it was amended, so as to fix the validity period of E.C. for the project life, as laid down in the mining plan approved and renewed by the competent authority from time to time, subject to a maximum of 30 years, whichever is earlier. Thus, the power of the expert body, SEAC, to estimate the project life has been taken away by Ext.P8; and the same has been bestowed upon the authority under a different statute, 161 i.e. the M.M.D.R. Act. Arguments were advanced based on the Kerala Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 2015 (‘K.M.M.C. Rules’, for short). Rule 54 was pointed out to submit that a mining plan has to be prepared by a Recognised Qualified Person (R.Q.P.). As regards the contents of a mining plan, reference is made to Rule 55, whereby the precise area showing the nature and the extent of the mineral deposit, where excavation is to be done for the first 5 years has to be shown. A tentative scheme of mining for quarrying for the second 5 years is also to be shown, in the case of quarrying lease. An annual program and plan for excavation of the precise area from year to year, for 5 years in the case of quarrying lease, is also to be shown. It was emphasized that the K.M.M.C. Rules contains no provision for estimation of project life, or for that matter, the mine life. The term 'life of mine' finds a place in the mining plan and it is accordingly that the project proponents contend that the project life and mine life are synonymous. - 28. Project life, as prescribed in Clause 9 of the E.I.A. Notification, 2006, has to be estimated by the Expert Appraisal Committees concerned and fixed as part of the overall assessment of the entire project/activity, having due regard to the project in hand, the concept of sustainable extraction of minerals, precautionary principles and environmental parameters of the proposed quarrying site. Referring to Section 3(i) of the M.M.D.R. Act, specifically to the explanation thereto, it was pointed out that a mine continues to be a mine, till exhaustion of its mineable mineral reserve; and a mine can have different owners during different times, from the grant of first mining lease, till exhaustion of such mineable mineral reserve. Referring to Section 3(i) of the M.M.D.R. Act, specifically to the explanation thereto, it was pointed out that a mine continues to be a mine, till exhaustion of its mineable mineral reserve; and a mine can have different owners during different times, from the grant of first mining lease, till exhaustion of such mineable mineral reserve. Thus, a mine, for which a life has been estimated, can undergo a number of projects by different project proponents, which may employ different methodologies of expansion and each project will have to obtain prior E.C. Therefore, project life is not synonymous to the life of mine, is the argument advanced. 29. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the counter affidavit filed by the MoEF & CC in W.P.(C.) No.7516/2024, wherein it is coined that 'project life' and 'mine life' are not synonymous. The same is the stand taken by SEIAA in its statement filed in W.P.(C.) No.25208/2023. In Ext.R6(a) minutes of SEIAA dated 30.06.2022 filed in W.P.(C.) No.25208/2023, its concern over the consequences of non- involvement of SEAC in estimating the project life has been raised. Non-consultation with the stakeholders while issuing S.O.1807(E), in fact, occasioned Ext.R6(a) minutes and Ext.R6(n) communication. The present batch of Writ Petitions involves E.Cs granted by DEIAAs and SEIAAs. E.C. granted by DEIAAs was for a fixed period of 5 years, the validity period of which, have already expired. Once the E.Cs issued by DEIAAs are found to be bad on reappraisal by SEIAAs, the benefit of the amendment notification cannot be extended to them, is the final submission. 30. Arguments advanced by Sri.Ranjith Thamban, learned Senior Counsel for the contesting 9 th respondent:- The following arguments were advanced on behalf of the 9 th respondent by the learned Senior Counsel. (i) The Writ Petition, as framed, is not maintainable since there exists an alternative and efficacious remedy available before the National Green Tribunal, a specialized body. Since that alternative remedy is barred by limitation, a Writ Petition under Article 226 is also barred. - (ii) The prayers made in the Writ Petition affect a large number of persons throughout the Nation. In the absence of the affected parties, atleast in the representative capacity as respondents, the instant Writ Petition is not maintainable. Since that alternative remedy is barred by limitation, a Writ Petition under Article 226 is also barred. - (ii) The prayers made in the Writ Petition affect a large number of persons throughout the Nation. In the absence of the affected parties, atleast in the representative capacity as respondents, the instant Writ Petition is not maintainable. (iii) This Writ Petition is actually not a private interest litigation, but a public interest one; and hence, not liable to be considered by this Court, as per roster. (iv) Ext.P8 notification is issued in public interest under Rule 5(3)(a) of the E.P. Rules and hence, legally valid. (v) After undergoing the stages involved in the process of issuance of E.C, including the existence of an approved mining plan, scoping, appraisal etc, the State Level Expert Appraisal Committee would consider the entire aspects including the 'project life' as approved in the mining plan and recommends grant of E.C. However, both SEIAA and DEIAA, without any reason, grants E.C. for 5 years only, which has been deprecated by this Court in Mathew Abraham (supra). There is no provision for the grant of a fresh E.C. in respect of a project, for which E.C. is granted, once. Thus, E.Cs are liable to be granted for the life of the project, as estimated by the Expert Appraisal Committee concerned. In Mathew Abraham (supra), this Court directed the Expert Appraisal Committee to appraise the project life. (vi) Going by the purpose for which the impugned Ext.P8 notification was issued, that is to say, to align the validity period of E.Cs in tune with the period of mining lease, it is idle to submit that Ext.P8 is only prospective in nature. On such premise, the 9 th respondent seeks the Writ Petition to be dismissed. 31. Arguments advanced by Sri.Philip J. Vettickattu, learned counsel for additional respondents 10 to 13 in W.P.(C) No.44547/2024 and the petitioners in W.P.(C) No.23150/2023 and connected Writ Petitions:- These respondents sought for impleadment in W.P.(C.) No.44547/2024 (the solitary Writ Petition challenging the vires of Ext.P8 notification and Ext.P9 O.M.) when the final hearing had substantially progressed. The impleading petitions were, however, allowed enabling those respondents to advance arguments against the challenge posed in the Writ Petition. The impleading petitions were, however, allowed enabling those respondents to advance arguments against the challenge posed in the Writ Petition. Though impleaded, the arguments of the learned counsel was focused on the merits of the Writ Petitions filed for the petitioners, but not answering the merit of W.P.(C) No.44547/2024. Sri. Philip J.Vettikkat, who appears for the petitioners in W.P.(C) No.23150/2023 would first submit that in view of the declaration made in Mathew Abraham (supra), the period of 5 years stipulated in the environmental clearance issued, has no legs in law. The SEIAA stands duty bound to estimate the project life and to issue environmental clearance for the period of such project life, even as per the unamended Clause 9 of EIA notification, 2006. Coming to the impugned Ext.P8 notification, it is the contention of the learned counsel that the 'project life', as employed in Clause 9(iv), is the same as 'mine life' indicated in the approved mining plan. It was submitted that by virtue of the impugned Ext.P8 notification, the SEAC lost its jurisdiction to estimate the project life. Thus, E.Cs granted will stand valid for the remaining period of mine life, as laid down in the mining plan, approved by the competent authority. Learned counsel made reference to the Kerala Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2015, to contend that mining plans are prepared by qualified persons, namely, R.Q.Ps; and that the process of approval of the mining plan is also provided therein. The period for which a quarrying lease can be granted is scientifically ascertained and determined by the process approving the mining plan. The various aspects, like geological reserve, mineable reserves, annual production, total production etc. are taken into account during the process of approval of mining plan. The period thus determined and approved in the mining plan will be the project life, according to the learned counsel. Relying on Rule 67(1) of the K.M.M.C. Rules, 2015, it was submitted that a mining plan is valid for the duration of the quarrying lease. The Proviso to Clause 9(iv) of the impugned Ext.P8 notification also states that an environmental clearance granted is valid till the expiry of the quarrying lease. Thus, the various phrases like 'mine life' and 'project life' represents the same idea and purpose, is the argument advanced. The Proviso to Clause 9(iv) of the impugned Ext.P8 notification also states that an environmental clearance granted is valid till the expiry of the quarrying lease. Thus, the various phrases like 'mine life' and 'project life' represents the same idea and purpose, is the argument advanced. When the mining plan is accepted in toto and acted upon, the SEIAA cannot turn around and contend that the mine life, laid down in the mining plan, cannot be approved or acted upon. In short, it is the contention of the learned counsel that the petitioners in the Writ Petitions afore- referred are entitled to have their respective E.Cs reckoned valid for the entire period of life of mine and accordingly, 168 they have the right to conduct quarrying operations in their respective premises. - 32. Arguments advanced by Smt.Usha Nandini, learned counsel for the additional 14 th respondent:- This respondent – the Quarry E.C. Holders Association - also sought for impleadment after the hearing progressed substantially. However, learned counsel for the 14 th respondent advanced arguments in detail and filed notes. 33. Learned counsel invited the attention of this Court to the various events pursuant to the introduction of the E.I.A notification, 2006, the various litigations and Orders passed therein. That apart, it was submitted that Ext.P8 notification was issued strictly following the procedures established by law, without any arbitrariness. The notification does not modify the conditions of approval of the project and does not exclude public participation in the grant of specific clearances, for which reason, dispensing with public hearing requirement is constitutionally valid. Only those notifications which dilute the environmental protection, without due justification, alone require public hearing. Learned counsel also stressed on the necessity to align the validity period of E.C. with the mining lease period of 50 years, as per the amendment to the M.M.D.R. Act of the year 2015. Secondly, it was canvassed that the prior E.C. issued is valid for the entire duration of the project/activity and there is no concept of renewal/revalidation of prior E.C. in the EIA Notification, 2006. Arguments were advanced to point out the delay in challenging the vires of the notification which was issued on 12.04.2022, by filing a Writ Petition only on 11.12.2024. Arguments were advanced to point out the delay in challenging the vires of the notification which was issued on 12.04.2022, by filing a Writ Petition only on 11.12.2024. A contention was raised to the effect that the larger issue is pending consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, wherefore, it would be improper for this Court to consider the validity of the impugned Ext.P8 notification. This Court put a specific query, as to whether the validity of the impugned Ext.P8 notification is the subject matter of challenge in any of the pending proceedings before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The answer to that query was in the negative by all the Counsel concerned. 34. Learned Counsel coined that the 'project life' means the life of the project and so far as mining/quarrying activity is concerned, it is the mining project. The terms project life and mine life are to be understood with reference to the approved mining plan. Thus, the life of mine mentioned by the R.Q.P. in the mining plan and approved by the competent authority will be the life of that particular mining/quarrying project. On such premise, the additional R14 seeks dismissal of the Writ Petition. 35. Arguments advanced by Sri.Jobi Jose Kondody, learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P.(C) Nos. 4990/2023, 5877/2023, 8639/2023 and 18053/2023:- Learned counsel would submit that the project life and the mine life are not defined in the K.M.M.C. Rules, as also, in the EIA Notification, 2006. It is by treating the mine life indicated in the approved mining plan, as project life, that environmental clearances are granted by SEIAA. The mine life is approved by the competent authority under the K.M.M.C. Rules in accordance with the Chapter-VI of the K.M.M.C. Rules. The mining plan is an integral part of quarrying operations. The practice of granting environmental clearance for a period of five years is beyond the powers granted to SEIAA by EIA Notification, 2006. Clause 9 of the EIA notification, 2006, does not bestow any power on SEIAA to restrict the E.Cs for a period of five years. The SEIAA cannot take a different stand from the subject Ext.P8 notification. The 'project life' and 'mine life' are one and the same, rather synonymous. Otherwise, the competent authority ought to have directed the project proponents to specify the project life, instead of the mine life, in the mining plan. The SEIAA cannot take a different stand from the subject Ext.P8 notification. The 'project life' and 'mine life' are one and the same, rather synonymous. Otherwise, the competent authority ought to have directed the project proponents to specify the project life, instead of the mine life, in the mining plan. On such premise, the petitioner wants the benefit of the impugned Ext.P8 notification to be extended to the respective petitioners. 36. Arguments advanced by Sri.Enoch David Simon Joel, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 6535/2025:- The term 'project life' is not defined in any statute or notification and in the mining industry, the terms 'mine life' and 'life of mine' are used interchangeably. The term project life is scarcely used in mining industry. In Ext.P8 EIA Notification itself, the term 'life of mine', 'mine life' and 'project life', are being used synonymous to each other. When project life is not defined, it has to be understood in the common parlance, as used in the industry. The E.Cs issued after the judgment in Mathew Abraham (supra) prescribes a validity period of 'the life of mine' as mentioned in the proposed plan. It is the learned counsel's contention that the concept of project life is liable to be understood in the context of a mining plan being prepared in terms of the K.M.M.C. Rules, 2015. The period which is determined by the R.Q.P. for the purpose of mining in a particular area is the life of mine/mine life/project life. R.Q.P. essentially assess the period for which a particular applicant can mine the area based on the lease applied for and the geological reserves in the area. On such premise, learned counsel seeks the Writ Petition to be allowed extending the benefit of the impugned Ext.P8 notification to the petitioner. 37. Arguments advanced by Sri.Jacob P.Alex, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.33551/2024:- Learned counsel would also canvass the same proposition that the expression 'project life' essentially means the 'mine life', as stipulated in the approved mining plan. In the mining plan prepared as per the K.M.M.C. Rules, what is estimated is the mine life and not the project life. Whereas, 173 under the EIA notification, 'mine' or 'mining' is categorized either as a project or activity. Thus, the expression project life in clause 9(iv) of the EIA notification is nothing, but the mine life. In the mining plan prepared as per the K.M.M.C. Rules, what is estimated is the mine life and not the project life. Whereas, 173 under the EIA notification, 'mine' or 'mining' is categorized either as a project or activity. Thus, the expression project life in clause 9(iv) of the EIA notification is nothing, but the mine life. There is no authority conferred on SEIAA under the EIA Notification to fix the mine life, after calling it as project life. Learned counsel also relied upon Mathew Abraham (supra) to point out that SEIAA cannot arbitrarily restrict the validity of E.C. to 5 years. Finally, learned counsel point out that as per the EIA notification, issuance of prior E.C. takes place only once, and there is no provision for repeated issuance of prior E.C. for a project. On such premise, learned counsel seeks the benefit of the impugned Ext.P8 notification to the petitioner therein. - 38. Having referred to the arguments of the respective parties, the following points arise for consideration:- 1) Whether dispensing public consultation required as per Rule 5(3)(a) to (d) of the E.P. Rules, by placing purported reliance on Rule 5(4), has vitiated Ext.P8 notification? 2) (a) Whether Ext.P8 notification promotes and further environmental and public interest? (b) Whether Ext.P8 notification militates against the fundamental purpose of EIA Notification, 2006? (c) Whether it is desirable to extend the validity period of an E.C. to a larger period, as Ext.P8 notification and Ext.P9 O.M. contemplate? 3) Whether Ext.P9 O.M. is ultra vires and bad in law? 4) (a) Whether Ext.P8 notification is bad for being thoroughly vague, ambigous and unworkable, thus resulting in arbitrariness? (b) Whether the 66 Writ Petitions seeking the benefit of the impugned Ext.P8 notification is liable to be dismissed for reason of Ext.P8 being vague and unworkable? Whether their contention that project life is equivalent to an synonymous with mine life is legally tenable? 5) Whether the notification is only prospective in nature, applicable only to the E.Cs issued after the date of notification? 6) Jurisdiction / Maintainability / Entertainability? 7) Whether a Writ Court can suo moto consider the vires of a notification, even in the absence of a complete challenge to the same? 8) Whether there is adequate representation for the project proponents – in the peculiar facts and circumstances – in the context of considering the vires of the notification? 39. 6) Jurisdiction / Maintainability / Entertainability? 7) Whether a Writ Court can suo moto consider the vires of a notification, even in the absence of a complete challenge to the same? 8) Whether there is adequate representation for the project proponents – in the peculiar facts and circumstances – in the context of considering the vires of the notification? 39. Court's Analysis Point No.1 – Whether dispensing with public consultation vitiates the notification:- Ext.P8 notification starts with a reference to Sections 3(1) and 3(2)(v) of the E.P. Act, 1986. Paragraph no.5 of Ext.P8 notification refers to Rule 5(4) of the E.P. Rules, 1986. It is therefore profitable to refer to those provisions, as also, to the general scheme of the E.P. Act to have a correct understanding of the issues involved. The preamble of the E.P. Act, 1986, treats the Act as one to provide for the protection and improvement of the environment and for matters connected therewith. Section 3(1) bestows powers on the Central Government to take measures as deemed necessary for the purpose of protecting and improving the quality of environment; and preventing, controlling and abating the environmental pollution. Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred under sub-section (1), Section 3(2) specifies the measures which could be taken; and Section 3(2) (v) provides for a measure imposing restriction of areas in which industries, operation or processes shall not be carried out; or shall be carried out, subject to certain safeguards. Section 5 deals with the powers to give direction in writing to any person, officer or authority, in exercise of the powers and performance of its function by the Central Government under the Act. The rule making power of the Central Government is contemplated in Section 6 of the Act. Section 6(2)(e) inter alia confers power on the Central Government to make rules with respect to the prohibitions and restrictions on the location of industries and the carrying on of process and operations in different areas. Section 24 contemplates the overriding effect of the E.P. Act, by prescribing that its provisions shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other enactment. Apart from the power of the Central Government to make rules to regulate environmental pollution in terms of Section 6, Section 25 contemplates the general power of the Central Government to make rules. 40. Now, reference can be made to the E.P. Rules, 1986. Apart from the power of the Central Government to make rules to regulate environmental pollution in terms of Section 6, Section 25 contemplates the general power of the Central Government to make rules. 40. Now, reference can be made to the E.P. Rules, 1986. The rules are framed, drawing powers from Section 6 and Section 25 of the E.P. Act. Corresponding to the power under Section 3(2)(v), as regards restriction of areas of industries, operations and processes, Rule 5 of the E.P. Rules prescribes the matters which could be taken into account by the Central Government, while prohibiting or restricting the location of industries and the carrying on of process and operations. Rule 5(2) mandates that the procedure laid down shall be followed while prohibiting or restricting the location of industries, etc. The word employed is 'shall' in Rule 5(2). Rule 5(3)(a) is important in the present context, which is extracted herebelow: “ 5.(3)(a) Whenever it appears to the Central Government that it is expedient to impose prohibition or restrictions on the location of an industry or the carrying on of processes and operations in an area, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette and in such other manner as the Central Government may deem necessary from time to time, give notice of its intention to do so.” - 41. Sub-rule (c) to Rule 5(3) enables an interested person to file objection against the imposition of prohibitions or restrictions within 60 days from the date of publication of the notification. Clause (d) of Rule 5(3) mandates the Central Government to consider all the objections received against the notification. Rule 5(4), which operates as an exemption to Rule 5(3), is the fulcrum of controversy in the instant facts, which is extracted herebelow: “ 5.(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- rule (3), whenever it appears to the Central Government that it is in public interest to do so, it may dispense with the requirement of notice under clause (a) of sub-rule(3).” 42. Ext.P8 notification [S.O.1807(E)] reveals that the notification is issued by virtue of the enabling provisions under Section 3(1) and 3(2)(v) of the Environment (Protection) Act. Paragraph no.5 of the subject notification refers to Rule 5(4), for the purpose of dispensing with the requirement of public notice and consideration of objections by a person interested. Ext.P8 notification [S.O.1807(E)] reveals that the notification is issued by virtue of the enabling provisions under Section 3(1) and 3(2)(v) of the Environment (Protection) Act. Paragraph no.5 of the subject notification refers to Rule 5(4), for the purpose of dispensing with the requirement of public notice and consideration of objections by a person interested. The solitary reason stated in Ext.P8 notification to dispense with public notice/consultation is ' public interest '; the very terminology of the requirement stipulated in Rule 5(4). What was the compelling public interest to dispense with the requirements of Section 5(3), is not decipherable from the subject notification. 43. It is noteworthy that, what is under challenge is the provisions of Ext.P8 notification, insofar as it is applicable to mining projects and activities, alone. By virtue of the subject notification, Clause 9 of the EIA notification has been amended. In this regard, it is also necessary to refer to the EIA notification of the year 2006. A reference to the preamble to EIA notification, 2006, would indicate that the same is issued in accord with the powers under Rule 5(3) of the Environment (Protection) Rules, after issuing a draft notification in the official gazette inviting objections and suggestions from all persons likely to be affected, and after considering the same. Accordingly, the EIA notification mandates prior environmental clearance from the Central Government or by the State Level Environment Impact Assessment Authority (SEIAA) for new projects or activities, or for the expansion or modernization of existing projects or activities, listed in the schedule. - 44. Coming back to Ext.P8 notification, this Court will first refer to the necessity and the purpose for which the amendment has been brought in. Paragraph no.2 of Ext.P8 notification referring to nuclear power projects and hydropower and paragraph no.3 referring to certain 'other projects', both, are not the subject matter of challenge in the Writ Petition concerned and hence it is not necessary to dilate much on the reasons stated for extension of E.Cs in respect of those projects. The reason for extension of E.Cs in respect of mining project is contained in paragraph no.4 of Ext.P8 notification. The fact that the mining leases are being granted for a period of 50 years, pursuant to the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015, is taken stock of. The reason for extension of E.Cs in respect of mining project is contained in paragraph no.4 of Ext.P8 notification. The fact that the mining leases are being granted for a period of 50 years, pursuant to the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015, is taken stock of. The specific reason for the amendment, insofar as mining projects are concerned, is to align the validity of mining E.Cs with the period of the mining lease. Paragraph no.4 specifically take note of the fact that as per the pre-amended provisions, the maximum period of duration of an E.C. is 30 years. In view of the terms employed, that is 'to align the validity of mining ECs', the obvious purpose is that the validity of E.Cs are to be extended upto 50 years, the same being the period of mining lease, after the Amendment Act of the year 2015. 45. For easy reference, I shall now refer to a comparative table showing the unamended Clause 9; and Clause 9, as amended by the subject notification, insofar as it pertains to mining activities as concerned. Unamended Clause 9 Amended Clause 9 as per the present S.O. 9. Validity of Environmental Clearance (EC) : [(1)] The "Validity of Environmental Clearance" is meant the period from which a prior environmental clearance is granted by the regulatory authority, or may be presumed by the applicant to have been granted under sub paragraph (iv) of paragraph 7 above, to the start of production operations by the project or activity, or completion of all construction operations in case of construction projects (item 8 of the Schedule), to which the application for prior environmental clearance refers. The prior environmental clearance granted for a project or activity shall be valid for a period of ten years in the case of River Valley projects (item I(c) of the Schedule), project life as estimated by [Expert Appraisal Committee or State Level Expert Appraisal Committee or District Level Expert Appraisal Committee) subject to a maximum of thirty years for mining projects and (seven years in the case of all other projects and activities] "[(ii) In the case of Area Development projects and Townships [item 8 (b)], the validity period shall be limited only to such activities as may be the responsibility of the applicant as a developer: Provided that this period of validity may be extended by the regulatory authority concerned by a maximum [period of three years] if an application is made to the regulatory authority by the applicant within the validity period, together with an updated Form 1, and Supplementary Form IA, for Construction projects or activities (item 8 of the Schedule): Provided further that the regulatory authority may also consult the [Expert Appraisal Committee or State Level Expert Appraisal Committee, as the case may be, for grant of such (i) The “Validity of Environmental Clearance” is meant the period from which a prior Environmental Clearance is granted by the regulatory authority, or may be presumed by the applicant to have been granted under sub-paragraph (iii) of paragraph 8, to the start of production operations by the project or activity; or completion of all construction operations in case of construction projects relating to item 8 of the Schedule, to which the application for prior environmental clearance refers: Provided that in the case of mining projects or activities, the validity shall be counted from the date of execution of the mining lease. (ii) xxx (iii) xxx (iv) The prior Environmental Clearance granted for mining projects shall be valid for the project life as laid down in the mining plan approved and renewed by competent authority, from time to time, subject to a maximum of thirty years, whichever is earlier: Provided that the period of validity of Environmental Clearance with respect to projects or activities included in this sub- paragraph may be extended by another twenty years, beyond thirty years, subject to the condition that the adequacy of the existing environmental safeguards laid down in the existing Environmental Clearance shall be examined by concerned Expert Appraisal Committee every five years beyond thirty years, on receipt of such application in the laid down proforma from the Project Proponent within the maximum validity period of Environmental Clearance of thirty years, and subsequently on receipt of such application in the laid down proforma from the Project Proponent within the validity period of the extended Environment Clearance, every five years for incorporating such additional environment safeguards in the Environmental Management Plan, as maybe deemed necessary, till the validity of the mining lease or end of life of mine or fifty years, whichever is earlier. (underlined for emphasis) 46. It could be seen from the above comparative table that, as per the unamended Clause 9 of EIA notification, 2006, the prior E.C. granted for a mining project was valid for the 'project life', as estimated by EAC or SEIAA or DEIAA, subject to a maximum of of 30 years; whereas, in the amended Clause 9 of the EIA notification, the prior E.C. granted for the mining projects is stipulated to be valid for 'project life', as laid down in the mining plan, approved and renewed by the competent authority from time to time, subject to a maximum of 30 years, whichever is earlier. 47. The essential difference noticeable is that the power of the expert body constituted under EIA Notification, 2006, to estimate the 'project life' has been given a go-bye completely. Instead, the project life is stipulated to be as the one laid down in the mining plan, approved and renewed by the competent authority from time to time. Needless to say that, the mining plan is approved by the competent authority under the M.M.D.R. Act. 48. Instead, the project life is stipulated to be as the one laid down in the mining plan, approved and renewed by the competent authority from time to time. Needless to say that, the mining plan is approved by the competent authority under the M.M.D.R. Act. 48. Coming back to the subject Ext.P8 notification, in the context of the requirements of Rule 5(4) of the E.P. Rules, there is absolutely no clue as to what was the paramount public interest to dispense with the requirement of a public notification calling for objections in terms of Rule 5(3)(a) of the E.P. Rules. As already indicated, Ext.P8 notification is completely silent as to what is the public interest. Misfortunately, the same is the situation in the counter affidavit, as also, the additional statement filed on behalf of the 1 st respondent Central Government, and the 2 nd respondent Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEF & CC). Initially, the 2 nd respondent/Ministry filed a counter affidavit on 17.06.2025. There is absolutely no reference, whatsoever, in the said counter as regards the necessity to dispense with the public consultation in terms of Section 5(3)(a) of the E.P. Rules. Even the enabling provision under Section 5(4) of the E.P. Rules is not seen referred to in the original counter. Thereafter, a statement was filed by the counsel for respondents 1 and 2, which is dated 01.07.2025. This was filed after completion of arguments of the petitioner and the learned Amicus - harping on Noble M. Paikada (supra). Even in that statement, there is absolutely no reference as to why the public consultation was dispensed with. All what is seen highlighted in the additional statement dated 01.07.2025 is the requirement for a longer period of mine lease, and consequently, the E.Cs. This concept is rooted on the principles of sustainability. The point urged is that a longer lease period ensures a proper and progressive development of the greenbelt/plantation within the mining lease area. The above aspect has nothing to do with the reason, if any, for dispensing public consultation. Thereafter, respondents 1 and 2 have produced Ext.P29, which is File no.1A3-22/10/2022- IA.III[E-177258], the note file of the MoEF & CC. Page no.21 of Ext.P29 refers to increasing the validity of mining projects to be made 50 years, in line with the validity of a lease period of 50 years. Thereafter, respondents 1 and 2 have produced Ext.P29, which is File no.1A3-22/10/2022- IA.III[E-177258], the note file of the MoEF & CC. Page no.21 of Ext.P29 refers to increasing the validity of mining projects to be made 50 years, in line with the validity of a lease period of 50 years. There, as a justification for the same, what is seen stated is the amendment introducing Section 8A of the M.M.D.R. Act and also the necessity to align the validity of E.Cs to the mining lease period of 50 years. The same is seen reiterated in serial no.5 at page no.41 of Ext.P29. Ext.P29 also does not contain even a whisper as to why public consultation was dispensed with. In this regard, it is relevant to point out that Ext.P29 itself was produced pursuant to an interim application filed by the petitioner, and the same being allowed by this Court. Therefore, the argument that the notes of the Ministry, as contained in Ext.P29, would explain the necessity for dispensing with the public consultation in the public interest, also crumbles to the ground. It is thus concluded that the respondent MoEF & CC, the author of Ext.P8 notification, offers no explanation, whatsoever, for dispensing with public notice and consultation. 49. Significance of Rule 5(3) and Scope of Rule 5(4) of E.P. Rules:- In this regard, this Court may have to dilate the significance of the E.P. Rules mandating a notification to the public, so as to call for objections in terms of Rule 5(3)(a) of the E.P. Rules. The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, itself is the outcome of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held at Stockholm, in June, 1972, to which India is a State Party. The very powers of the Central Government under Section 3 is to take measures for protecting and improving the quality of the environment on the one hand; and to prevent, control and abate environmental pollution on the other. As already indicated, the power to make rules to regulate environmental pollution is contained in Section 6, and the general power to make rules is contained in Section 25, and it is in exercise of both the powers that the E.P. Rules have been made. Rule 5(2) of the E.P. Rules mandates that the procedure laid down in the Rules shall be followed, while imposing prohibition or restriction, as regards the location of industries, etc. Rule 5(2) of the E.P. Rules mandates that the procedure laid down in the Rules shall be followed, while imposing prohibition or restriction, as regards the location of industries, etc. It is one of the mandatory procedures to be followed in terms of Rule 5(3)(a) that the Central Government has to give notice of its intention to impose a prohibition or restriction, inviting objections from any person interested, in terms of Rule 5(3)(c). Rule 5(3)(d) mandates the Central Government to consider all the objections received. As against these peremptory, mandatory, requirements in terms of Rule 5(3), Rule 5(4) operates as an exemption to dispense with the requirement of notice under Rule 5(3)(a), 'in public interest'. 50. This Court is of the definite opinion that, being an exemption, Rule 5(4) is liable to be interpreted strictly, and the paramount public interest to dispense with the mandatory requirement under Rule 5(3), has to be demonstrated, ideally in the notification itself; and at any rate, from the overall facts and circumstances as culled out from the counter affidavit or the statement of the authority, which introduces the notification. It needs no emphasis that the requirement of Section 5(4) of the E.P. Rules is definitely not to merely refer the term 'public interest'. Instead, the legal requirement is to state the real and actual facts constituting such public interest, justifying dispensation of public consultation, which is otherwise mandatory. In other words, there should be a fully convincing reason to do away with the requirement of notice in terms of Rule 5(3)(a). Say for example, a situation where an emergent measure or step is necessary to prevent the environmental interest due to a natural calamity or the like, for which, it is not expedient to give public notice, to call for their objections and to consider all such objections, for a paucity of time; or for any other reason of a convincing nature, that it is thoroughly not feasible in public interest to resort to the requirements of Rule 5(3)(a) of the E.P. Rules, possibly the requirement of public consultation can be dispensed with under Rule 5(4). In the absence of such a convincing reason, the exceptional provision under Rule 5(4) cannot be invoked and such invocation, if any, cannot survive the test of law. 51. In the absence of such a convincing reason, the exceptional provision under Rule 5(4) cannot be invoked and such invocation, if any, cannot survive the test of law. 51. Why a public consultation:- In this regard, this Court may also have to take into account the purpose as to why a unique opportunity has been statutorily mandated to a person interested to file objections to the measure/restriction/prohibition sought to be introduced, which is otherwise not stipulated, if we take the power of the Central Government to introduce a Rule under a general statute. It is because of the peculiar significance of the subject, namely, environmental protection, that such a stipulation is made, so as to give public notice, so that any person interested - his interest may sometimes be localized on account of his residence near the project; or it can be a broad environmental concern - can propound an objection, which the Central Government is mandatorily bound to consider in terms of Section 5(3)(d). Having regard to the significance of that public notice as spelt out above, this Court can only reiterate that adherence to Clauses (a) to (d) of Rule 5(3) is pivotal, if not sacrosanct; and any deviation thereof should necessarily be in genuine public interest, not a rhetoric, for the sake of reproduction of the term 'public interest' in the notification. 52. Noble M. Paikada – The ' Lead, Kindly Light ':- The legal position is no more res integra and the same has been fully expatiated in Noble M. Paikada v. Union of India [2024 SCC Online SC 369], a case which arose with respect to the dispensation of the requirements of Rule 5(3) of the E.P. Rules. The factual premise is strikingly similar, where a notification issued vide S.O.1224(E) was the subject matter. There, again, the issue stemmed from an amendment to the M.M.D.R Act with effect from 10.01.2020, introducing a new Section 8B. The impugned notification therein [S.O.1224(E)] specifically refers, in paragraph no.4, that the Central Government deems it necessary 'to align' the relevant provisions of the EIA Notification S.O.1533(E), with the above referred amendment introduced to the M.M.D.R. Act. Paragraph 5 of that notification refers to representations received for waiver of the requirement of the prior E.C. for borrowing ordinary earth for roads; and manual extraction of lime shells, etc. Paragraph 5 of that notification refers to representations received for waiver of the requirement of the prior E.C. for borrowing ordinary earth for roads; and manual extraction of lime shells, etc. It is in the above backdrop that the notification impugned therein was issued, relying on Rule 5(4) dispensing the requirements of Rule 5(3)(a) of the E.P. Rules. In paragraph 21 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court took stock of Ground J before the NGT, that there was no public interest, whatsoever, involved; and that the notification was issued to further the private interest of miners and contractors. The issue is seen addressed from paragraph nos. 22 to 25, which are extracted hereinafter: “ 22. We have carefully perused the counter affidavit filed by the MoEF&CC before the NGT. The said affidavit does not deal with Ground J at all. It does not specify or set out reasons for concluding that in the public interest, the requirement of publication of prior notice was needed to be dispensed with. It is pertinent to note that before the issue of the second EC notification by which Appendix-IX was incorporated, the procedure of inviting objections to the draft notification was followed, and the objections were considered. There is no reason to dispense with this important requirement before publishing the impugned notification. Article 21 guarantees a right to live in a pollution-free environment. The citizens have a fundamental duty to protect and improve the environment. Therefore, the participation of the citizens is very important, and it is taken care of by allowing them to raise objections to the proposed notification. After all, 192 citizens are major stakeholders in environmental matters. Their participation cannot be prevented by casually exercising the power under sub-rule (4) of Rule 5. - 23. In the present appeals, the questions of law (e) and (f) have been incorporated regarding the illegal invocation of the power under sub-rule (4) of Rule 5 of the EP Rules. In the grounds of the challenge, ground EE has been taken explicitly on this aspect. We have perused the counter affidavit filed by the MoEF&CC in these appeals. We find from the counter affidavit that the contention raised regarding the illegal invocation of power under sub-rule (4) of Rule 5 has not been dealt with. In the grounds of the challenge, ground EE has been taken explicitly on this aspect. We have perused the counter affidavit filed by the MoEF&CC in these appeals. We find from the counter affidavit that the contention raised regarding the illegal invocation of power under sub-rule (4) of Rule 5 has not been dealt with. We are not going into the question of whether it was necessary for the Central Government to specify reasons in the impugned notification itself why it came to the conclusion that in the public interest, the requirement of public notice should be dispensed with. However, the reasons for the said conclusion ought to have been set out in the counter affidavit filed before the NGT or, at least, in the counter affidavit filed before this Court. The document recording the satisfaction of the competent authority about the existence of public interest and the nature of the public interest ought to have been produced by the Ministry. But, no such document was produced. Only one conclusion can be drawn. The drastic decision to invoke sub-rule (4) of Rule 5 was made without any application of the mind. Hence, the decision-making process has been vitiated. 24. The impugned notification was issued two days after the nationwide lockdown was imposed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. At that time, the work of linear projects, such as roads, pipelines, etc., had come to a grinding halt. So, there was no tearing hurry to modify the EC notifications. Apart from the fact that no reasons have been assigned in the counter affidavit filed by the Central Government for coming to the conclusion that in the public interest, the requirement of prior publication of notice was required to be dispensed with, we fail to understand the undue haste shown by the Central Government in issuing the impugned notification during the nationwide lockdown. Therefore, the inclusion of item 6 of the substituted Appendix-IX will have to be held illegal. We have already given reasons for not dealing with the challenge to item 7 of the impugned notification.” 53. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also dealt with the issue of arbitrariness in paragraph 25, 26 and 27, which may be germane for consideration while considering the other batch of Writ Petitions, seeking the benefit of Ext.P8 notification, S.O.1807(E). 54. We have already given reasons for not dealing with the challenge to item 7 of the impugned notification.” 53. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also dealt with the issue of arbitrariness in paragraph 25, 26 and 27, which may be germane for consideration while considering the other batch of Writ Petitions, seeking the benefit of Ext.P8 notification, S.O.1807(E). 54. It could be seen from the above that the Supreme Court has emphasized on the paramount right under Article 21 to live in a pollution-free environment, for which reason, the participation of the citizens is very important, which is duly taken care of by permitting them to raise objections to the notifications to be issued under the E.P. Rules. The fact that the citizens are major stakeholders in environmental matters has been reiterated. On such premise, the casual exercise of the power under Rule 5(4) has been deprecated. The fact that the so-called 'public interest' is neither dealt with in the notification, nor demonstrated in the counter affidavit of the Central Government was also highlighted, a situation quite similar to that of the facts before this court, as well. Finding non-application of mind in resorting to Rule 5(4) of the E.P. Rules, the decision making process was held to be vitiated. On the facts before the Supreme Court, it was noticed that there was no tearing hurry to modify the E.C. notifications. 55. Juxtaposed with the facts of the instant case, as already indicated, the facts are strikingly similar. The purpose of the impugned notification is to align with the amendment to the M.M.D.R. Act in both the cases. As to what is the environmental interest to be safeguarded by such alignment is not ascertainable from the materials on record. When a significant change is sought to be introduced by a notification, whereby the power to estimate the project life has been taken away from the expert body, and conferred upon the body approving the mining plan (obviously not involving experts from various domains, as is available in the case of EAC, SEIAA or DEIAA constituted in terms of the EIA notification), the compelling necessity to do away with the public notice and consideration of objections is far to seek, since there is no clue in the subject notification. The situation is similar in the case before the Supreme Court, as also, the case before this Court that the counter affidavit offers no help, whatsoever, in demonstrating the public interest to resort to Rule 5(4). Finally, as held by the Supreme Court, there was no tearing hurry to dispense with public consultation, when Ext.P8 notification, was introduced with the object of aligning with the period of lease, brought in by an amendment to the M.M.D.R. Act. It is noteworthy that the M.M.D.R. Act was amended in the year 2015, whereas the impugned notification is introduced only in the year 2022. If the Central Government could afford to wait for a period of 7 years, it could have waited for 3 or 4 months more, so as to comply with the mandate of Rule 5(3)(a) to (d). In the light of the above discussion, this Court holds that the dispensation of public notice and consideration of objection in terms of Rule 5(3)(a) to (d) of the E.P. Rules, by placing purported reliance on Rule 5(4) is illegal and ultravires. The same smacks of non-application of mind, rendering the decision making process vitiated. 56. Point No.2 (a) & (b):- a) Whether Ext.P8 notification promotes and further environmental and public interest? b) Whether Ext.P8 notification militates against the fundamental purpose of EIA Notification, 2006? Whether the change of the authority to estimate the 'project life' from an expert body constituted under the EIA notification, to the competent authority under the M.M.D.R. Act is legally valid, having regard to the purposes, scope and object of the E.P. Act, the E.P. Rules and the EIA notification, 2006, is the essential issue to be considered under this Point. Consequently, the question whether Ext.P8 notification promotes and further the environmental and public interest; and whether it militates against the fundamental purpose of EIA Notification, 2006, also falls for consideration? 57. For a correct understanding of the issue, it is necessary to look into the purpose of introduction of the Environmental Impact Assessment Notification. The first Environmental Impact Assessment Notification was issued in the year 1994, under Rule 5(3) of the E.P. Rules, which mandated that, all new projects listed in Schedule-I of the notification shall not be undertaken, unless they have been accorded environmental clearance by the Central Government. The first Environmental Impact Assessment Notification was issued in the year 1994, under Rule 5(3) of the E.P. Rules, which mandated that, all new projects listed in Schedule-I of the notification shall not be undertaken, unless they have been accorded environmental clearance by the Central Government. The E.C. was mandated also for expansion or modernization of any activity, if the pollution load is to exceed the pre-existing one then. However, mining projects pertaining to major minerals, with leases more than 5 hectares, alone were required to obtain E.C. as per the said notification. In the year 2006, by virtue of S.O.1533(E) dated 14.09.2006, the Environmental Impact Assessment Notification was re-introduced, which provided for categorisation of projects as 'A' and 'B', based on the potential impact on human health and other natural and man-made resources. The E.I.A. notification also provided for the constitution of Expert Appraisal Committees (EACs) at the Central Government; and State Level Expert Appraisal Committees (SEACs) at the State or Union Territory level. Detailed stages of processing applications for prior environmental clearance have been stipulated in the EIA notification vide Clause 7, consisting of screening, scoping, public consultation, and finally, appraisal. Clause 7 specifically empowers the SEAC to undertake the said four stages for grant of prior E.C, insofar a category 'B' projects or activities are concerned. Upon completion of four stages and after due consideration, the Expert Appraisal Committee at the Central level or the State level, as the case may be, will decide on the due diligence necessary, including preparation of EIA and public consultations, and the application shall be appraised accordingly for grant of environmental clearance, in terms of Clause 7(ii) of the EIA notification. The SEIAA, namely the Regulatory Authority, will consider the recommendations of EAC or SEAC and convey its decision to the applicant within the prescribed period. It is thereafter that Clause 9 speaks about the validity of an E.C, so issued under the EIA notification. - 58. Suffice to notice that, prior to the introduction of the Environmental Impact Assessment Notification, there was no mandate to obtain an E.C. in respect of various projects and activities, including mining activities. The felt necessity to introduce an additional requirement to insist environmental clearance, after assessing the impact of the project on the environment, resulted in the introduction of the EIA notification, for that sole purpose. The felt necessity to introduce an additional requirement to insist environmental clearance, after assessing the impact of the project on the environment, resulted in the introduction of the EIA notification, for that sole purpose. As already seen, expert bodies, consisting of domain experts, were constituted by way of SEAC and SEIAA for that purpose. The constitution of SEIAA is stipulated in Clause 3 of EIA notification 2006, which would establish, beyond the shadow of any doubt, that the body is constituted of experts, especially when it comes to SEAC. 59. Now, coming to unamended Clause 9, it has to be noticed that, except in respect of mining activities, a specified period is stipulated as the validity of an environmental clearance. For example, in the case of river valley projects, a specified period of 10 years is stipulated. For all other projects and activities, the period stipulated is 5 years for the validity of E.C. However, in the case of mining projects alone, the statute makers deemed it appropriate to leave the validity period of E.C. to be that of the 'project life' as estimated by the EAC or the SEIAA, subject to a maximum of 30 years. The obvious purpose was to enable estimation of project life by the expert body, and to make the validity period of an E.C. commensurate to that project life. Without much ado, it can be concluded that the job requires scientific ' handlin g' in the hands of experts. 60. Now, by virtue of the impugned notification/amendment, the determination/estimation of the project life has been taken away from the hands of the expert body, say EAC or SEAC. Instead, it has been provided that the prior E.C. granted will be valid for the 'project life', as laid down in the mining plan approved and renewed by the competent authority. In substance, it has gone into the hands of the authority under the M.M.D.R. Act, which authority cannot be considered as an expert body constituted of domain experts in the fields concerned. 61. This Court may elucidate with the help of an example as to why it is pivotal that the authority to determine the validity period of E.C. should necessarily be the expert body, as envisaged by the unamended Clause 9(iv). Assume a case, where the mine life is 50 years and the period of lease is 25 years. 61. This Court may elucidate with the help of an example as to why it is pivotal that the authority to determine the validity period of E.C. should necessarily be the expert body, as envisaged by the unamended Clause 9(iv). Assume a case, where the mine life is 50 years and the period of lease is 25 years. However, when the environment impact study was conducted by the expert body SEAC, it was revealed that the impact, which is being created by the activity/project cannot be borne or absorbed by the environment for the entire lease period of 25 years, because of the peculiar geographical and other conditions of the locality. In such situation, the expert body may have to limit the Environmental Clearance to, say 10 years or 15 years, as the case may be; and to review whether E.C. can be issued for the remaining period, later. Taking away this right of the expert body and giving it to a body under the M.M.D.R. Act, which is incompetent to assess the environmental impact, is certainly not in the interest of the environment or in furtherance thereof. 62. When the requirement of prior E.C. has been introduced by the EIA notification and a separate body of experts have been constituted for that purpose by the same notification, this Court is of the definite opinion that all matters pertaining to the E.C, including the question as to the validity of such E.C, has to be determined by such expertbody; and not by anybody else. Shifting of such powers from the hands of the expert body to an authority under another Act, the M.M.D.R. Act, certainly works against the purpose of introduction of the EIA notification. An amendment which negates - or at least, inconsistent with - the very purpose of the EIA notification, can hardly be sustained in law. Such shifting of power from the expert body to determine the project life and consequently, the validity of the E.C. cannot be said to be an act in furtherance of the purposes of the EIA notification. The Rule making authority has exceeded its powers granted under the E.P. Rules. This Court, therefore, finds that the impugned amendment by virtue of the subject notification S.O.1807(E), is bad in law on that count as well. 63. The Rule making authority has exceeded its powers granted under the E.P. Rules. This Court, therefore, finds that the impugned amendment by virtue of the subject notification S.O.1807(E), is bad in law on that count as well. 63. Point No.2(c) – Desirability of extending the validity of E.Cs to a longer period:- As per explanation to Section 3(i) of the M.M.D.R. Act, a mine can have a longer life depending upon the availability of the mineable reserve therein. Whereas, there could be different projects and phases of quarrying in respect of the same mine. Therefore, there could be various project proponents as well for various projects, until the end of the life of mine. In respect of large mines especially outside Kerala, the mine life can be more than 100 or 150 years. As taken note of in the subject notification, by virtue of the amendment to the M.M.D.R. Act in the year 2015, mining leases are being granted for a period of 50 years. Now, by virtue of the impugned notification, the validity period of E.Cs have been extended to the 'project life', as laid down in the mining plan approved by the competent authority, subject to a maximum of 30 years, which, by virtue of the proviso to clause 9(iv) of the impugned notification, can further be extended for a period of 5 years each, until the validity of the mining lease; or the end of life of mine; or 50 years, whichever is earlier. 64. To pinpoint the undesirability of granting an environmental clearance for such a longer period, this Court may elucidate with the help of an example. Assume a case, where the environmental parameters at the time of assessment of the project for the purpose of environmental clearance by the expert body were conducive for grant of E.C. Accordingly, 204 E.C. was granted, say for a period of 5 years or 10 years. Thereafter, due to a subsequent development - say a natural disaster or otherwise - the environmental parameters in the area of quarrying has become vulnerable, for which reason, it was not any more advisable to continue quarrying operations in that locality. This situation was not pre-existing and contemplated at the time of grant of initial lease, but is created on account of a subsequent event, like a natural disaster. This situation was not pre-existing and contemplated at the time of grant of initial lease, but is created on account of a subsequent event, like a natural disaster. If the environmental clearance is given for a period of 30 years or more and there being a mining lease of 50 years, a most undesirable situation will be created, obstructing the enforcement of a check and balance mechanism. In Kerala, we have seen such a situation in a village by name Chooralmala, Wayanad, where there was an extensive landslide in the year 2024, taking the lives of more than 420 persons and wiping off an area of approximately 86,000 m 2 in the torrential flow of water, along with the earth. If a quarry was functioning in that area for which E.C. was granted, the necessity and the requirement to review the environmental parameters based on such huge landslide will not be available, if the impugned Ext.P8 notification is given effect to. Perceived in that angle too, it could be held without the slightest hesitation that the notification to bring in the amendment is not in furtherance of the requirements of the environmental protection, the very purpose envisaged in the E.P. Act and Rules; and hence, the notification becomes unconstitutional for being inconsistent with and contrary to the purpose of the parent enactment. 65. Point No.3 - Whether Ext.P9 O.M. is ultra vires and bad in law? The point pertains to the legality and validity of Ext.P9 Office Memorandum. From the face of it, Ext.P9 appears to be a clarification to Ext.P8 notification. In paragraph no.2, Ext.P9 refers to representations having been received from various stakeholders seeking clarification on the validity of E.Cs and accordingly, paragraph no.2(i) and 2(ii) stipulates that all E.Cs which had not expired as on the date of Ext.P8 notification, 12.04.2022, will stand automatically extended to the respective increased validity period given in the column in paragraph no.1 of Ext.P9. The column insofar as mining projects are concerned, refers to a validity period of 30 years. Thus, by virtue of the operation of Ext.P9, validity of E.Cs, which have not expired as on 12.04.2022, 206 automatically stood extended to a period of 30 years. - 66. Illegalities galore with respect to Ext.P9. Primarily, the validity period of E.Cs for mining leases, as taken note of in the column in paragraph no.1 in Ext.P9, is erroneous. Thus, by virtue of the operation of Ext.P9, validity of E.Cs, which have not expired as on 12.04.2022, 206 automatically stood extended to a period of 30 years. - 66. Illegalities galore with respect to Ext.P9. Primarily, the validity period of E.Cs for mining leases, as taken note of in the column in paragraph no.1 in Ext.P9, is erroneous. Purportedly, what has been recorded in that column is the validity period of E.Cs in terms of Ext.P8 notification. Ext.P8 stipulates that the validity period of the prior E.Cs for the mining project shall be the project life, as laid down in the mining plan, subject to a maximum of 30 years, whichever is earlier. The period of 30 years as per Ext.P8 is only an upper limit, and what is important is the project life, which, however, is made subject to a maximum of 30 years, whichever is earlier, as per Ext.P8. Under the guise of the clarification, this provision of Ext.P8 has been interfered with, so as to stipulate that the validity period of an E.C. for mining projects is a definite 30 years. Thus, the basic emphasis on the project life, to determine the validity period of E.Cs, has been given a complete go-by. 67. The second illegality is something which flows from the first one as narrated above, whereby the validity of all E.Cs, which were valid as on 12.04.2022, has been automatically extended for the period mentioned in the column in paragraph no.1, that is 30 years. 68. The third infirmity is in the legal context that Ext.P9 O.M. does not refer to the E.P. Act, or for that matter, the E.P. Rules. Therefore, it can at best be construed in law as an administrative circular, which cannot stipulate contrary to a notification issued in terms of the E.P. Act and Rules. Nor can such a clarificatory circular expand or alter the scope of the original provision, as brought in by Ext.P8 notification. (See in this regard (1) Vanasakthi and Others (supra), (2) Goel Ganga Developers India Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, through Secretary, Ministry of environment and forests [ 2018 (3) KLT 782 (SC)] and (3) Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit and others v. Dr.Manu and another [ (2023) 19 SCC 30 ]). 69. (See in this regard (1) Vanasakthi and Others (supra), (2) Goel Ganga Developers India Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, through Secretary, Ministry of environment and forests [ 2018 (3) KLT 782 (SC)] and (3) Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit and others v. Dr.Manu and another [ (2023) 19 SCC 30 ]). 69. The last illegality to be assigned to Ext.P9 O.M. is the retrospective operation sought to be given to the E.Cs valid as on the date of Ext.P8 notification. However, in this regard, this Court does not approve the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.44547/2024, supported by the learned Amicus. This Court is rejecting petitioner's contention that Ext.P8 is only prospective and that it will not apply to the existing E.Cs, vide a separate point raised herebelow. If that be so, all the E.Cs which were valid as on the date of issuance of Ext.P8 notification will get the benefit of Ext.P8 notification. Therefore, it cannot be said that Ext.P9 O.M. seeks to grant retrospective operation to Ext.P8. The legal vice in Ext.P9 lies in its direction that all E.Cs will stand automatically extended to a period of 30 years, thus virtually supplanting the concept of project life for estimating the validity period of an E.C. Ext.P9 O.M. is thus ultravires the E.P. Act, E.P. Rules and the EIA Notification. Point concluded accordingly. 70. Point No.4(a) & (b)- Whether the impugned Ext.P8 notification is bad for reason of being vague and uncertain, rendering it unworkable, thus resulting in arbitrariness? While analyzing this issue, this Court cannot escape noticing that even the unamended Clause 9 to EIA notification, which provides for determination of 'project life' by the expert body, itself, is a bit unclear, especially when it comes to the practical modalities. Unamended Clause 9 stipulates that, insofar as mining projects are concerned, the prior E.C. granted shall be valid for the 'project life' as estimated by the expert body. As already indicated earlier in this judgment, the term 'project life' is not defined anywhere, either in the EIA notification or in other cognate statutes. The approved mining plan in terms of the M.M.D.R. Act also does not speak of the project life, on the practical scenario. Instead, a mining plan, as prepared by a Recognized Qualified Person (R.Q.P.), only speaks about the life of mine; and not 'project life'. The approved mining plan in terms of the M.M.D.R. Act also does not speak of the project life, on the practical scenario. Instead, a mining plan, as prepared by a Recognized Qualified Person (R.Q.P.), only speaks about the life of mine; and not 'project life'. Explanation to Section 3(i) of the M.M.D.R Act is relevant in the context of understanding the mine life. Section 3(i) is extracted herebelow: “3(i) the expressions, “mine” and “owner”, have the meaning assigned to them in the Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, 2020 (37 of 2020). Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause,—(i) a mine continues to be a mine till exhaustion of its mineable mineral reserve and a mine may have different owners during different times from the grant of first mining lease till exhaustion of such mineable mineral reserve; (ii) the expression "mineral reserve" means the economically mineable part of a measured and indicated mineral resource." Thus, the mine, or life of mine, continues till exhaustion of mineable reserve; and there can be different owners during different times from the grant of first mining lease, till such exhaustion. It is, therefore, obvious that there can be different mining leases in respect of the same mine, during the life of mine. This interpretation is in sync with the averments in paragraph no.6 of the counter affidavit filed by 2 nd respondent/Ministry. At any rate, the unamended Clause 9 speaks of an estimation of the 'project life' by the expert body, which, if reckoned - uninfluenced by the mine life - is a practicable proposition, performable by the expert body, having regard to all the attendant facts and circumstances, including the impact of the project on the environment. 71. Now, by virtue of the amendment as per the impugned Ext.P8 notification, the expert body is out of the picture, and the validity period of an E.C. has been made co-extensive with the project life, as laid down in the mining plan approved and renewed by the competing authority. The above direction Ext.P8 notification is vague, ambiguous and unworkable for the following reasons: i) The mining plan does not contain any reference to the 'project life'. It only speaks about the life of mine. Therefore the validity period of an E.C. cannot be made equivalent to the project life, as laid down in the mining plan. The above direction Ext.P8 notification is vague, ambiguous and unworkable for the following reasons: i) The mining plan does not contain any reference to the 'project life'. It only speaks about the life of mine. Therefore the validity period of an E.C. cannot be made equivalent to the project life, as laid down in the mining plan. ii) The argument of the petitioners in the Writ petitions seeking the benefit of Ext.P8 notification that project life, for all practical purposes, means the mine life, is legally unsustainable in toto. (a) The first reason for the same is in the light of the explanation to Section 3(i) of the M.M.D.R. Act, which has already been dealt with in the immediately preceding paragraph. There can be different projects during the whole life of a mine and, therefore, project life cannot be synonymous to mine life. (b) Secondly, Ext.P8 impugned notification, itself, would indicate that project life is different from mine life. In sub-clause (iv) to clause 9 of Ext.P8, it is laid down that the prior E.C. will be valid for the project life. The Proviso thereunder is quite significant, which speaks of extension of the above referred validity of the E.Cs. The E.Cs are liable to be extended for another 20 years, beyond the 30 years stipulated in Clause 9(iv). However, the extension for the said period of 20 years will be made in every five years for incorporating additional safeguards until (i) the validity of the mining lease, or (ii) the end of life of mine, or (iii) 50 years, whichever is earlier. Thus, if the project life can be extended to a maximum period upto the life of mine by virtue of the above proviso, it does not stand to logic that 'project life' and 'mine life' signifies one and the same, and that they are synonymous. iii) The indication in clause 9(iv) of Ext.P8 that mining plan is approved and renewed from time to time by the competent authority does not appear to be wholesome. It appears that the relevant statute does not contemplate renewal of mining plan from time to time. In this regard, attention of this Court was invited to Rule 67 of the K.M.M.C. Rules. It appears that the relevant statute does not contemplate renewal of mining plan from time to time. In this regard, attention of this Court was invited to Rule 67 of the K.M.M.C. Rules. Firstly, this Court is of the opinion that the ambit and scope of a notification issued by the Central Ministry under the E.P. Act and E.P. Rules, and also, the EIA notification, 2006, cannot be adjudged in the light of State Rules issued under the M.M.D.R. Act. That apart, Section 67(1) provides that the mining plan approved under these Rules shall be valid for the entire duration of lease. Review to the mining plan, as contemplated in every 5 years as per Rule 67(2), has to be read and understood in the context of Rule 55 of the K.M.M.C. Rules, which speaks about the submission of mining plan and approval. There, it is expressly stipulated that the mining plan shall include, among other things, the precise area, showing the extent of mineral deposit, where excavation is to be done in the first five years, in the case of quarrying lease, and for the entire period, in case of quarrying permit. Rule 55(i)(c) also speaks about a tentative scheme of quarrying for the second five year period of the quarrying lease. That apart, an annual programme and plan for excavation of the precise area from year to year, for a period of five years, is also contemplated. It is in this backdrop that Rule 67 speaks of review of mining plan. If the petitioners contend that the fixation of five year period is bad in law, on the strength of Mathew Abraham (supra), the provision for review in the State Rules will become otiose. The proposition laid down in Mathew Abraham (supra) that, when the EIA notification, 2006, mandates to determine the project life by the expert body, the same cannot be limited en bloc to five years for all mining activities, is a solid proposition. However, it cannot be claimed by the petitioners, who seek the benefit of Ext.P8, that 'project life' should be taken as 'mine life' for the purpose of interpretation of Ext.P8 notification. Such an interpretation will make the grant of E.C, a one time affair. However, it cannot be claimed by the petitioners, who seek the benefit of Ext.P8, that 'project life' should be taken as 'mine life' for the purpose of interpretation of Ext.P8 notification. Such an interpretation will make the grant of E.C, a one time affair. (iv) If the purpose of the impugned notification was to align the validity period of E.Cs with the period of mining leases - which is 50 years in all cases after the 2015 amendment - the term which could have been easily employed in sub-clause 4 of Clause 9, was the 'period of mining lease', instead of 'project life'. The project life, as coined in the unamended Clause 9 of EIA notification, has been retained as such. However, the estimation of such project life by the expert has been done away with, by substituting the project life, as laid on in the mining plan; whereas, the mining plan does not lay down any such project life. The purpose of the amendment to align the validity of E.Cs with the period of mining leases also does not appear to have been served, since the validity of E.Cs has been made co-extensive with the project life; and not the mining leases. This is all the more so, when the author of Ext.P8, the 2 nd respondent Ministry, has not propounded such a case that the project life has to be taken as the term of mining lease. Even if the project life is liable to be interpreted as the period of lease, the same does not figure a place in the mining plan, so that the direction in Ext.P8 notification that the prior E.Cs granted to be valid for the project life as laid down in the mining plan, will still remain unworkable. 72. The above aspects are referred to herein only for the purpose of espousing the utter chaos, confusion and uncertainty created by the impugned Ext.P8 notification. The confusion created has gone to such an extent that the mechanism for fixing the validity of E.C. has become practically unworkable. This Court is of the opinion that, being vague and completely uncertain, verging on arbitrariness, the impugned notification is also liable to be interfered with on that count, as well. On the facts of Noble M. Paikada (supra) also, this issue arose, which is seen discussed in paragraph no. This Court is of the opinion that, being vague and completely uncertain, verging on arbitrariness, the impugned notification is also liable to be interfered with on that count, as well. On the facts of Noble M. Paikada (supra) also, this issue arose, which is seen discussed in paragraph no. 25, whereby the subject notification therein was held to be very vague. For want of clarity, by giving unguided and blanket exemption, the notification was held to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14. The dictum is on all fours to the present fact situation as well. - 73. On the strength of the above discussion, it is found that the 66 Writ Petitions seeking the benefit of Ext.P8 notification are liable to be dismissed. 74. Point No.5 - Whether Ext.P8 is only prospective in nature, applicable only to fresh E.Cs to be issued. Learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.44547/2024 raised an argument that Ext.P8 notification is only prospective in nature, insofar as, the amended sub clause 4 of clause 9 of the EIA notification is concerned. Learned counsel would submit that, in clause 9(ii), the word 'existing' is employed, while stipulating the validity period of projects, other than mining projects, as laid down by virtue of sub-clauses a, b and c therein; whereas such a term 'existing' is not available in clause 9(iv) of the amended notification. The expression 'prior environmental clearance granted' is similar to the unamended provision, which provides for grant of E.Cs; and the same cannot be considered as used in the past tense, so as to include the E.Cs already granted. Thus, fresh E.Cs to be issued after the introduction of Ext.P8 notification alone will be guided by the amended provision, in so far as the validity of the E.C. is concerned. Learned counsel would canvass an argument that Ext.P8 notification is sought to be given a retrospective effect by Ext.P9 O.M, which makes it all the more illegal, which, however, is rejected whole considering the legality of Ext.P9 O.M. 75. This Court is not in a position to endorse the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The clauses referred to by the learned counsel cannot be read and understood in isolation. This Court will have to look into the purpose of issuance of the subject notification. In paragraph no. This Court is not in a position to endorse the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The clauses referred to by the learned counsel cannot be read and understood in isolation. This Court will have to look into the purpose of issuance of the subject notification. In paragraph no. 2 of the notification, the fact that nuclear power projects and hydro power projects have high gestation period, beyond the control of the project proponent is taken stock of. Therefore, the Central Government deems it necessary to extend the validity of environmental clearance for such projects, is recorded in Ext.P8. The fact that the Central Government deems it necessary to extend the validity of E.Cs to other projects as well, considering the time taken for addressing local concerns, is taken stock of in paragraph no. 3 of the subject notification. The requirement to align the validity period of E.Cs in accord with the period of mining lease of 50 years, is also stated in paragraph no. 4 of the subject notification. Paragraph no.4 also takes stock of the fact that the validity of the mining E.Cs is 'currently' permissible upto a maximum of 30 years. It is thus clear that the notification was issued to extend the validity period of the E.Cs. The above referred facts referred to in paragraph nos. 2 to 4 of the subject notification leaves no room for any doubt that the purpose sought to be served by virtue of the notification is to extend the period of the existing E.Cs; and not to guide and govern the validity period of prospective E.Cs. The said contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner will, therefore, stand rejected. 76. Point No.6 – Jurisdiction/Maintainability/Entertainability? It was seriously canvassed by the 1 st respondent Ministry, 2 nd respondent Secretary and also by the 9 th Respondent, that the instant Writ Petition, challenging the notification is not maintainable before this Court, inasmuch as an efficacious remedy is available to the petitioner before the National Green Tribunal. Extensive arguments were advanced in this regard by the said respondents by placing reliance upon various decisions, which dilates on the scope of the NGT's jurisdiction. The attention of this Court was invited to the various provisions in the NGT Act, especially to Section 14 thereof. Extensive arguments were advanced in this regard by the said respondents by placing reliance upon various decisions, which dilates on the scope of the NGT's jurisdiction. The attention of this Court was invited to the various provisions in the NGT Act, especially to Section 14 thereof. According to the Senior Panel Counsel, Section 14(1), read with Section 16(h), is a complete answer to the petitioner’s challenge, insofar as the jurisdiction of NGT is concerned, especially when it is a specialized body constituted for that purpose. The decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 1. Mantri Techzone Private Limited v. Forward Foundation and Others [ 2019 (18) SCC 494 ], 2. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Ankita Sinha and Others [ 2022 (13) SCC 401 ], etc. were relied upon to contend that the NGT even has suo moto power to take cognizance in respect of a matter falling within its jurisdiction. Inasmuch as the subject notification is one emanating from the Environment (Protection) Act, and the allegation is to the effect that Ext.P8 notification, if remain, will damage the environment, certainly the body competent to consider is the NGT; and not by invocation of the writ jurisdiction of this Court. Learned senior counsel for the 9 th respondent also canvassed that the declaration sought for, in W.P(C) no. 44547/2024 is one liable to be sought for in terms of Section 40 of the Specific Relief Act, for which reason, a suit can be filed in terms of Section 113 of the C.P.C, read with Section 9, to declare that the S.O. is unconstitutional. When an alternate and efficacious remedy is available, a writ will not lie, is the specific contention urged by the learned Senior Counsel for the 9 th respondent. 77. As against the above submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the National Green Tribunal has no power to issue a writ, quashing Ext.P8 notification and P9 O.M. Issuance of prerogative writs can only be done in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, by the High Court; and not by the Tribunal. Inasmuch as the impugned Ext.P8 notification is sought to be quashed by issuance of a Writ of Certiorari, the contention that there is an equivalent and efficacious alternate remedy available is grossly erroneous, is the submission made by the learned counsel. Inasmuch as the impugned Ext.P8 notification is sought to be quashed by issuance of a Writ of Certiorari, the contention that there is an equivalent and efficacious alternate remedy available is grossly erroneous, is the submission made by the learned counsel. Learned Amicus would fully support the contentions of the petitioner in this regard. In the notes submitted by the learned Amicus, this issue is seen dealt with in paragraph no. 6, at page no. 10, wherein relying on Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board v Sterlite Industries (I) Ltd. and Others [ (2019) 19 SCC 479 ], it is canvassed that the NGT has no power under Section 16 of the Act to strike down the Rules or regulations and does not possess general powers of judicial review, comparable to the High Courts under Article 226. Learned Amicus would submit that whether the NGT can set aside a notification, is presently a matter pending before the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal no.2522/2018, for which reason also, the High Court's jurisdiction in respect of the captioned subject cannot be doubted. 78. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties, this Court fully endorses the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Amicus. The legal position is not res integra in view of the judgment in Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board (supra). When the specific prayer sought for vide relief no.2 is to quash the subject notification by issuance of a Writ of Certiorari, the jurisdiction of this Court cannot be doubted at all, for, such a relief cannot be granted by the National Green Tribunal. It is also settled, by now, that the existence of an alternate remedy, by itself, - assuming an alternate remedy is available - is not a ground in all cases to hold that the High Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. By the nature of the challenge posed to the impugned notification in the Writ Petition, it is only appropriate that the High Court exercises its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Point concluded accordingly. 79. By the nature of the challenge posed to the impugned notification in the Writ Petition, it is only appropriate that the High Court exercises its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Point concluded accordingly. 79. Point No.7 - Suo moto power of Writ Court to consider the vires of a Notification:- The next issue to be considered is a jurisdictional one pertaining to the competence of a writ court to suo moto consider the constitutional vires of an amendment notification, even in the absence of a complete challenge to the same. As already indicated earlier, in W.P(C) no. 44547 of 2024, the constitutional vires of the subject notification is very much under challenge. However, the challenge is in the context of the E.C. issued to the 9 th respondent particularly, and the E.Cs issued by DEIAA, generally. The prayer sought for is, of course, a declaration that Ext.P8 notification and Ext.P9 O.M. are ultra vires the Constitution and the provisions of the Environment (Protection) Act and Rules. But such declaration is sought only to the extent of extending the validity of the existing environmental clearance of mining projects granted by DEIAAs. The subject notification/Ext.P8 is sought to be quashed by issuance of a Writ of Certiorari. It is in this regard that the present issue of the competence of a Writ Court to suo moto consider the constitutional vires of Ext.P8 subject notification arises. 80. Before addressing the legal issue in this regard, it will have to be explained as to why such an exercise is necessary in the given facts. There are as many as 66 Writ Petitions claiming the benefit of the impugned Ext.P8 notification, which extended the validity of all existing E.Cs to the project life, as laid down in the mining plan, subject to a maximum of 30 years, which stands clarified by Ext.P9 Office Memorandum, as per which, the validity period of the E.C. stands extended to 30 years automatically. It has come out in the arguments that not only the 66 writ petitioners/project proponents, several other project proponents are also presently functioning on the strength of the subject notification, but for which, the validity period of the E.Cs issued to them by DEIAA/SEIAA, as the case may be, would have expired. It has come out in the arguments that not only the 66 writ petitioners/project proponents, several other project proponents are also presently functioning on the strength of the subject notification, but for which, the validity period of the E.Cs issued to them by DEIAA/SEIAA, as the case may be, would have expired. Thus, a substantive relief, which goes to the root of continuance of the operations in all the quarries, is founded on the subject notification. In such circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that, if the constitutional vires of the notification is ex-facie, at doubt, that a Writ Court, not only has the right to look into the legality and validity of such notification from the constitutional perspective, but also has a duty to do so. In the instant case, there is an apparent non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Rule 5(3)(a) to (d) and recourse has been made to Rule 5(4) of the Environment (Protection) Rules, which is stated, in unmistakable terms, in the notification itself. Therefore, if the exercise undertaken relying upon Rule 5(4) is not constitutionally justified, no relief can be granted to the 66 petitioners before this Court, especially when such reliefs are sought by invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Secondly, the issue is with respect to the protection of environment, as well as the protection of right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, it is all the more imperative upon a constitutional court to look into the legal validity and constitutionality of the subject notification based upon which only, reliefs are sought for. When Ext.P8 notification read with the subject O.M, extends the validity of environmental clearance to 30 years, without there being a check or review of the situation and circumstances in the meanwhile, it is a matter of serious concern, which may involve irreparable environmental harm. Therefore, this Court, is impelled, on facts, to look into the constitutional validity of the subject notification, dehors and independent of the absence of a complete challenge made to the same in W.P.(C) No. 44547 of 2024. 81. The legal position in this regard is clear as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 1. Raju Ramsing Vasave v. Mahesh Deorao Bhivapurkar and Others [ (2008) 9 SCC 54 ], 2. 81. The legal position in this regard is clear as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 1. Raju Ramsing Vasave v. Mahesh Deorao Bhivapurkar and Others [ (2008) 9 SCC 54 ], 2. Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee and Another v. C.K. Rajan and Others [ (2003) 7 SCC 546 ], 3. Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi (DR) and Others [ (1987) 1 SCC 227 ] and 4. Bihar Rajya Dafadar Chaukidar Panchayat (Magadh Division) v State of Bihar and Others [MANU/SCOR/ 33868/2025]. The point is concluded accordingly. 82. Point No.8 – Whether there is adequate representation for the project proponents? The issue is with respect to the adequacy of the representation of the Project Proponents, in the context of considering the vires of the notification, which issue requires to be addressed in the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in these cases. The point was raised by almost all the respondents in the leading Writ Petition, by contending that all the project proponents be given notice of the relief sought for in W.P.(C) No.44547/2024, at least in a representative capacity, since all the project proponents will be vitally affected by the outcome of the said Writ Petition. 83. The contention is found to be untenable for the following reasons: (1) This Writ Petition is considered along with 66 other Writ Petitions filed by the project proponents, wherein they seek the benefit of the self-same Ext.P8 notification. - (2) Secondly, an association of quarry owners - by name 'Quarry E.C. Holders Association, Kerala State Committee,' - a registered body, sought for impleadment in the above said W.P.(C) No.44547/2024 and the interim application, I.A. No.5/2025, was allowed. Accordingly, a representative body of the Quarry E.C. Holders was impleaded and they were heard, at length. Detailed arguments were addressed by that respondent. Besides, a compilation of various Orders and precedents and argument notes were filed by the said 14 th respondent. Similarly, four other project proponents, additional respondents 10 to 13 also sought for impleadment vide I.A. No.1/2025, which was also allowed. Arguments were advanced by their counsel on behalf of the said additional respondents. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the project proponents were not adequately represented, or for that matter heard, by this Court. Similarly, four other project proponents, additional respondents 10 to 13 also sought for impleadment vide I.A. No.1/2025, which was also allowed. Arguments were advanced by their counsel on behalf of the said additional respondents. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the project proponents were not adequately represented, or for that matter heard, by this Court. (3) Thirdly, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anoop M. v. Gireeshkumar T.M [ 2024 (7) KHC 88 - paragraph 11] is on all fours to the fact situation herein. The purpose of Rule 148 of the Kerala High Court Rules is adequately served in the instant facts, as well. Besides, the numerous petitioners in the connected batch of Writ Petitions cannot feign ignorance of the challenge to Ext.P8 notification. Both the above criteria taken note of in Anoop (supra) are very much live to the instant facts as well. (4) Fourthly, this Court notice that a challenge to the constitutional vires of a notification has to be essentially answered by its author, which in the instant case is the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEF & CC). The Ministry is very much a party and elaborate arguments were advanced by it. That being so, every affected party cannot raise a claim of audi alteram partem. [see Gopalakrishnan Nair and Others v. State of Kerala and Others – 1992 KHC 577(D.B)] (5) Finally, it is an impracticable proposition to contend that all the project proponents should be heard. All what can be conceived, at best, is a right in favour of the project proponents in their representative capacity, which has adequately been done by impleading additional respondents 10 to 13 and 14, especially when respondent no.14 is an association of the Quarry E.C. owners. In this regard it is noteworthy that, barring the above- referred additionally impleaded respondents, none out of the 66 project proponents have not chosen to come forward seeking impleadment, dehors the fact that the said 66 Writ Petitions were heard along with W.P.(C) No.44547/2024, conjointly. 84. Therefore, the contention that the challenge to the subject notification S.O.1807(E) cannot be considered in the absence of all the project proponents in the party array cannot be countenanced and is, therefore, hereby repelled. 85. CONCLUSION :- In the light of the above discussion W.P.(C) No.44547/2024 is allowed. 84. Therefore, the contention that the challenge to the subject notification S.O.1807(E) cannot be considered in the absence of all the project proponents in the party array cannot be countenanced and is, therefore, hereby repelled. 85. CONCLUSION :- In the light of the above discussion W.P.(C) No.44547/2024 is allowed. The impugned Ext.P8 notification dated 12.04.2022 – insofar as it is applicable to mines and mining operations as provided in clause 9(iv) - is declared ultra vires the Environment (Protection) Act, the Environment (Protection) Rules, and also, the EIA notification, 2006 and hence struck down as unconstitutional. Ext.P9 Office Memorandum is also declared illegal and ultra vires the Environment (Protection) Act, the Environment (Protection) Rules and the EIA notification, 2006, insofar as it pertains to mines and mining operations. Consequently, the 6 th respondent will stand directed, by a writ of mandamus, to take action in accord with law regarding the quarrying operations of the 9 th respondent, treating Ext.P20 E.C. to have expired. 86. Consequentially, the 66 Writ Petitions filed, claiming the benefit of Ext.P8 notification and Ext.P9 Office Memorandum, will stand dismissed. All the interim orders will stand vacated. Interlocutory applications, if any, pending in all the 67 Writ Petitions will stand closed. Since the constitutional vires of Exts.P8 and P9 have been considered suo moto – beyond the scope of the challenge in W.P.(C) No.44547/2024 – and struck down as unconstitutional, appropriate action by the 6 th respondent shall follow in respect of the quarries run by the petitioners in the said 66 Writ Petitions, depending upon the validity of the E.Cs issued to such quarry project. This Court places on record its sincere appreciation to the commendable efforts taken by the learned Amicus, Smt.Ramola Nayanpally. Appreciation is due for the valuable assistance given by the various counsel appearing for the respective parties.