Preeti Bansal W/O-Deepak Bansal v. State of Rajasthan
2025-02-06
BHUWAN GOYAL, INDERJEET SINGH
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
Order : 1. This habeas corpus petition has been filed on behalf of the petitioner who is mother of the corpus i.e. two children; Maulik Bansal (son) aged about ten years and Khushi Bansal (daughter) aged about seven years. 2. The petitioner has stated in the writ petition that respondent no.6 (father of the corpus) has taken away the corpus without the permission of the petitioner-mother. It has been further stated in the writ petition that both the children are living with the mother for the last about two years and they are studying in a school at Jaipur. It has been further stated in the writ petition that earlier there was a family dispute on account of which a consent decree of divorce was granted by the concerned Family Court at Ludhiana, Punjab vide order dated 30.10.2018. Lastly, prayed for handing over the custody of the minor children to her. 3. Reply to the writ petition has been filed on behalf of the respondent no.6 (husband of the petitioner and father of two minor children) wherein it has been stated that the consent decree of divorce was granted by learned Additional District Judge, Ludhiana vide order dated 30.10.2018. In the said decree of divorce, it was specifically mentioned that the custody of the boy namely Maulik Bansal shall remain with the respondent no.6- father and custody of the daughter namely Khushi Bansal shall remain with the petitioner-mother. Thereafter, in separate proceedings under Section 6 of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act , 1956 before the Court of Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Ludhiana, the custody of the minor girl namely Khushi Bansal was also handed over to respondent no.6 on 24.09.2019. It has been further stated in the reply that wife (petitioner- mother), without informing respondent no.6 (her husband) came to Jaipur along with two minor children and started living in Jaipur. Thereafter, respondent no.6 (father) filed application under Section 97 of Cr.P.C before the competent authority in which the petitioner-mother has given an undertaking that she will appear before the concerned authority along with her children on 10.11.2023. The said undertaking was given by the petitioner on 07.11.2023. Counsel for respondent submits that both the children are residing with respondent no.6 (father) and with their grandparents in a lawful manner, and therefore, he prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 4.
The said undertaking was given by the petitioner on 07.11.2023. Counsel for respondent submits that both the children are residing with respondent no.6 (father) and with their grandparents in a lawful manner, and therefore, he prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 4. We have heard counsel for the parties and perused the record. 5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in the matter of ‘ Col. Ramneesh Pal Singh versus Sugandhi Aggarwal ’, reported in 2024 6 SCR 259 , in paragraphs no.10 and 11 held as under:- “10. In this context, it would be appropriate to refer to a decision of this Court in Nil Ratan Kundu (Supra) wherein parameters of ‘welfare’ and principles to be considered by courts whilst deciding questions involving the custody of minor children came to be enunciated. The relevant paragraph(s) are reproduced as under: “52. In our judgment, the law relating to custody of a child is fairly well settled and it is this: in deciding a difficult and complex question as to the custody of a minor, a court of law should keep in mind the relevant statutes and the rights flowing therefrom. But such cases cannot be decided solely by interpreting legal provisions. It is a human problem and is required to be solved with human touch. A court while dealing with custody cases, is neither bound by statutes nor by strict rules of evidence or procedure nor by precedents. In selecting proper guardian of a minor, the paramount consideration should be the welfare and well being of the child. In selecting a guardian, the court is exercising parens patriae jurisdiction and is expected, nay bound, to give due weight to a child’s ordinary comfort, contentment, health, education, intellectual development and favourable surroundings. But over and above physical comforts, moral and ethical values cannot be ignored. They are equally, or we may say, even more important, essential and indispensable considerations. If the minor is old enough to form an intelligent preference or judgment, the court must consider such preference as well, though the final decision should rest with the court as to what is conducive to the welfare of the minor. Xxx 55. We are unable to appreciate the approach of the courts below.
If the minor is old enough to form an intelligent preference or judgment, the court must consider such preference as well, though the final decision should rest with the court as to what is conducive to the welfare of the minor. Xxx 55. We are unable to appreciate the approach of the courts below. This Court in a catena of decisions has held that the controlling consideration governing the custody of children is the welfare of children and not the right of their parents. 56. In Rosy Jacob [ (1973) 1 SCC 840 ] this Court stated: (SCC p. 854, para 15) “15. … The contention that if the husband [father] is not unfit to be the guardian of his minor children, then, the question of their welfare does not at all arise is to state the proposition a bit too broadly and may at times be somewhat misleading.” It was also observed that the father’s fitness has to be considered, determined and weighed predominantly in terms of the welfare of his minor children in the context of all the elevant circumstances. The father’s fitness cannot override considerations of the welfare of the minor children. 57. In our opinion, in such cases, it is not the “negative test” that the father is not “unfit” or disqualified to have custody of his son/daughter that is relevant, but the “positive test” that such custody would be in the welfare of the minor which is material and it is on that basis that the court should exercise the power to grant or refuse custody of a minor in favour of the father, the mother or any other guardian.” 11. Furthermore, this Court in Gaurav Nagpal (Supra) undertook a comprehensive and comparative analysis of laws relating to custody in the American, English, and Indian jurisdiction(s) and observed that the Court must construe the term ‘welfare’ in its widest sense i.e., the consideration by the Court would not only extend to moral and ethical welfare but also include the physical well-being of the minor children.” 6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in the matter of ‘ Rajeswari Chandrasekar Ganesh versus The State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.’ , in Writ Petition (Criminal) No.402 of 2021, decided on July 14, 2022, in paragraphs no.91 and 115 held as under:- “91.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in the matter of ‘ Rajeswari Chandrasekar Ganesh versus The State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.’ , in Writ Petition (Criminal) No.402 of 2021, decided on July 14, 2022, in paragraphs no.91 and 115 held as under:- “91. Thus, it is well established that in issuing the writ of Habeas Corpus in the case of minors, the jurisdiction which the Court exercises is an inherent jurisdiction as distinct from a statutory jurisdiction conferred by any particular provision in any special statute. In other words, the employment of the writ of Habeas Corpus in child custody cases is not pursuant to, but independent of any statute. The jurisdiction exercised by the court rests in such cases on its inherent equitable powers and exerts the force of the State, as parens patriae, for the protection of its minor ward, and the very nature and scope of the inquiry and the result sought to be accomplished call for the exercise of the jurisdiction of a court of equity. The primary object of a Habeas Corpus petition, as applied to minor children, is to determine in whose custody the best interests of the child will probably be advanced. In a Habeas Corpus proceeding brought by one parent against the other for the custody of their child, the court has before it the question of the rights of the parties as between themselves, and also has before it, if presented by the pleadings and the evidence, the question of the interest which the State, as parens patriae, has in promoting the best interests of the child.” 115. We would therefore hold that in the case at bar the dominant consideration to which all other considerations must remain subordinate must be the welfare of the child. This is not to say that the question of custody will be determined by weighing the economic circumstances of the contending parties. The matter will not be determined solely on the basis of the physical comfort and material advantages that may be available in the home of one contender or the other. The welfare of the child must be decided on a consideration of these and all other relevant factors, including the general psychological, spiritual and emotional welfare of the child.
The matter will not be determined solely on the basis of the physical comfort and material advantages that may be available in the home of one contender or the other. The welfare of the child must be decided on a consideration of these and all other relevant factors, including the general psychological, spiritual and emotional welfare of the child. It must be the aim of the Court, when resolving disputes between the rival claimants for the custody of a child, to choose the course which will best provide for the healthy growth, development and education of the child so that he or she will be equipped to face the problems of life as a mature adult.” 7. We have also interacted with both the minor children viz. Maulik Bansal (son) aged about ten years and Khushi Bansal (daughter) aged about seven years in the Court itself. Both the children have stated that they are happily leaving with their father (respondent no.6) and their grand-parents. They have also stated before us that they have taken admission in a school and they want to live with their father (respondent no.6) and grand parents. 8. We have also interacted with parents of the petitioner who are residing in the city of Chauth Ka Bawara, Swai Madhopur and regularly not residing with the petitioner-mother. 9. We have also considered the fact that petitioner is residing alone in the city of Jaipur and she works in a garment factory from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. We have also considered the fact that respondent no.6 (father) is living with his parents in the city of Ludhiana and in his absence, grandparents of the children are their to look after them after school hours. 10. In that view of the matter, this writ petition filed on behalf of the petitioner deserves to be dismissed for the reasons; firstly, we see that welfare of the children is in living with their father (respondent no.6) as the father, who is a businessman, is living with his parents and in his absence children can be looked after very well by their grandparents; secondly, in proceedings before competent Court of law at Ludhiana, wife (petitioner) agreed to hand over the custody of children to the father (respondent no.6).
Therefore, it cannot be said that the custody of the children, with the father (respondent no.6), is illegal in any manner, and lastly; in view of Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act , 1956 both the children are above five years of age, therefore, the father turns out to be the natural guardian for both the children. 11. Hence, this writ petition is dismissed. The concerned SHO is directed that no harm is caused by anyone to both the children while going with their father (respondent no.6). However, the petitioner is at liberty to take appropriate remedy available to her under the law for custody of children if so advised.