Sudheer Kumar-I, S/o. P. Kumara Menon v. State Of Kerala
2025-08-26
ANIL K.NARENDRAN, MURALEE KRISHNA S.
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Muralee Krishna, J. The petitioner in W.P.(C)No.25761 of 2025 filed this writ appeal under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act , 1958, challenging the judgment dated 15.07.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in that writ petition. The appellant-writ petitioner approached this Court with the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the 2 nd respondent Joint Registrar (General), Co-operative Societies to forthwith consider Ext.P3 representation dated 07.07.2025 submitted by him under Section 69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act , and also a writ of mandamus directing the 4 th respondent Chief Executive Officer of Irinjalakuda Town Co-operative Bank to furnish complete particulars and documents relating to the sale proceedings pursuant to Ext.P1 sale notice dated 17.01.2022 issued by the 3 rd respondent Irinjalakuda Town Co-operative Bank, including whether any further steps or sale of notified property were initiated or concluded thereafter. 2. According to the appellant, the 3 rd respondent Bank issued Ext.P1 sale notice dated 24.01.2022 for multiple plots with a reserve price of Rs.6.75 Crores, scheduling sale on 28.02.2022. The appellant is interested in acquiring 14 Acres of land for establishing a Hospital. Therefore, he is interested in the sale notice published by the Bank. But the sale did not take place on the scheduled date. The 3 rd respondent refused to disclose details to the appellant, despite his enquiries. Ext.P2 representation dated 01.07.2025 and Ext.P3 subsequent representation dated 07.07.2025 submitted under Section 69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act by the appellant remained unaddressed. Hence, the appellant filed the writ petition. 3. The learned Single Judge, on perusal of the documents and pleadings, dismissed the writ petition by the impugned judgment dated 15.07.2025. Paragraphs 3 to 5 of that judgment read thus: “3. The petitioner approached the Bank by filing Ext.P2 on 01.07.2025, seeking the proposed date of sale of the property. The learned Government Pleader submitted that the petitioner has no cause of action to institute this Writ Petition, as there is nothing to show that the property is proposed to be sold in any proceedings under the Co-operative Societies Act.
The petitioner approached the Bank by filing Ext.P2 on 01.07.2025, seeking the proposed date of sale of the property. The learned Government Pleader submitted that the petitioner has no cause of action to institute this Writ Petition, as there is nothing to show that the property is proposed to be sold in any proceedings under the Co-operative Societies Act. The learned Government Pleader further submitted that Ext.P3 representation, which appears to have been filed under Section 69 of the Co-operative Societies Act, is not sustainable in view of the fact that the petitioner is not a member of the Co-operative Society. 4. On a perusal of the pleadings and the documents produced, it appears that there is nothing to show that respondent No.3 Bank has scheduled any sale in respect of the property involved. This Court is of the view that the petitioner has no locus standi to insist the authorities of the Bank or the Registrar to give any information regarding the proposed sale of the property. The learned Government Pleader submits that if the property is to be auctioned, the same will be published on the Bank’s notice board. 5. It is evident from the pleadings of the petitioner that, after 17.01.2022, the Bank has not offered this property for sale in a public auction. As rightly submitted by the learned Government Pleader, the petitioner has no cause of action as of now to institute this Writ Petition seeking the date of sale of the property. If the bank or any other competent authority proposes to sell the property in public auction, it will be duly notified as per the statutory formalities. The petitioner will be at liberty to participate in any such proposed auction.” 4. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned Senior Government Pleader and the learned counsel for the Bank. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that, as per Rule 8 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 , the sale of a secured asset by a private treaty is also possible and hence refusal to provide the details by the Bank is incorrect and therefore the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge is liable to be set aside. 6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the Bank would submit that it is true that the property was scheduled for sale on 28.02.2022.
6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the Bank would submit that it is true that the property was scheduled for sale on 28.02.2022. Thereafter, the Bank did not proceed with the same and did not intend to conduct the sale by a private treaty without following the procedure. There is no illegality in the judgment of the learned Single Judge, and hence no interference is warranted by this Court exercising appellate jurisdiction. 7. It is true that, by Ext.P1, the Bank has published the details of the property to be auctioned in public sale on 28.02.2022. Though the appellant says that the sale was not held on 28.02.2022, the reason for the same is not mentioned by the appellant in his pleadings. The appellant is claiming his right to know the details of the property put up for sale and the further steps taken by the Bank, by relying on Rule 8 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 , which reads thus: “ 8. Sale of immovable secured assets.-- (1) Where the secured asset is an immovable property, the authorised officer shall take or cause to be taken possession, by delivering a possession notice prepared as nearly as possible in Appendix IV to these rules, to the borrower and by affixing the possession notice on the outer door or at such conspicuous place of the property. (2) The possession notice as referred to in sub-rule (1) shall also be published, as soon as possible but in any case not later than seven days from the date of taking possession, in two leading newspapers, one in vernacular language having sufficient circulation in that locality, by the authorised officer. (2-A) All notices under these rules may also be served upon the borrower through electronic mode of service, in addition to the modes prescribed under sub-rule (1) and sub-rule (2) of Rule 8. (3) In the event of possession of immovable property is actually taken by the authorised officer, such property shall be kept in his own custody or in the custody of any person authorised or appointed by him, who shall take as much care of the property in his custody as a owner of ordinary prudence would, under the similar circumstances, take of such property.
(4) The authorised officer shall take steps for preservation and protection of secured assets and insure them, if necessary, till they are sold or otherwise disposed of. (5) Before effecting sale of the immovable property referred to in sub -rule (1) of Rule 9, the authorised officer shall obtain valuation of the property from an approved valuer and in consultation with the secured creditor, fix the reserve price of the property and may sell the whole or any part of such immovable secured asset by any of the following methods: -- (a) by obtaining quotations from the persons dealing with similar secured assets or otherwise interested in buying the such assets; or (b) by inviting tenders from the public; (c) by holding public auction including through e-auction mode; or (d) by private treaty: Provided that in case of sale of immovable property in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the provisions of Jammu and Kashmir Transfer of Property Act, 1977 shall apply to the person who acquires such property in the State. (6) the authorised officer shall serve to the borrower a notice of thirty days for sale of the immovable secured assets, under sub-rule (5): Provided that if the sale of such secured asset is being effected by either inviting tenders from the public or by holding public auction, the secured creditor shall cause a public notice in the Form given in Appendix IV-A to be published in two leading newspapers including one in vernacular language having wide circulation in the locality.
(7) every notice of sale shall be affixed on the conspicuous part of the immovable property and the authorised officer shall upload the detailed terms and conditions of the sale, on the web-site of the secured creditor, which shall include,-- (a) the description of the immovable property to be sold, including the details of the encumbrances known to the secured creditor; (b) the secured debt for recovery of which the property is to be sold; (c) reserve price of the immovable secured assets below which the property may not be sold; (d) time and place of public auction or the time after which sale by any other mode shall be completed; (e) deposit of earnest money as may be stipulated by the secured creditor; (f) any other terms and conditions, which the authorized officer considers it necessary for a purchaser to know the nature and value of the property. (8) Sale by any methods other than public auction or public tender, shall be on such terms as may be settled between the secured creditor and the proposed purchaser in writing.” 8. A reading of the above provisions would show that the Bank is entitled to proceed with the secured asset by private treaty also. But in order to sell the property by a private treaty, the Bank has to first exhaust the remedy of public sale. In Rajiv Subramanian J. and Another v. Pandiyas and Others [2012 KHC 2063 : AIR 2012 Mad. 12 ] , the High Court of Madras, while dealing with the said issue, held that in order to invoke the right to sell the property by a private treaty, the presence of the debtor and his willingness in writing are essential. Paragraph 33 of that judgment reads thus: “33. The first question for our consideration is as to what are the formalities to be adopted when invoking private treaty and effecting a sale on that basis. In this connection, it would be worthwhile to refer to R.8(5) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2000 which reads thus: "5.
Paragraph 33 of that judgment reads thus: “33. The first question for our consideration is as to what are the formalities to be adopted when invoking private treaty and effecting a sale on that basis. In this connection, it would be worthwhile to refer to R.8(5) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2000 which reads thus: "5. Before effecting the sale of the immovable property referred to in sub-rule (1) of R.9, the authorised officer shall obtain valuation of the property from an approved valuer and in consultation with the secured creditor, fix the reserve price of the property and may sell the whole or any part of such immovable secured asset by any of the following methods: a). by obtaining quotations from the persons dealing with similar secured assets or otherwise interested in buying the such assets; or b). by inviting tenders from the public; c). by holding public auction; or d). by private treaty." As per the private treaty, other than public auction or public tender, it can be settled between the parties invoking as per R.8(8) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 . The sale of properties by private treaty is also permissible in law. The only condition is that it shall be on such terms as settled between all the parties in writing. From this, it is clear that the presence of debtor and his willingness in writing are essential. But, in this case, availability of such a document is neither forthcoming nor produced before this Court by the appellants or bank officials. Therefore, from this, it could be safely concluded that the procedure as contemplated under the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 , has neither been followed nor been attempted to be followed. Also, in this case, incidentally, they have mentioned as if the writ petitioners have been represented by their agents viz., GE - WINN MANAGEMENT & CO. and it is one of the partner’s signature also has been affixed. Even though the said document carries the signature of one GE - WINN MANAGEMENT & CO., he is neither connected with the case nor with the writ petitioners. The bank authorities have miserably failed to prove as to how GE - WINN MANAGEMENT & CO. is connected with the debtors / writ petitioners.
Even though the said document carries the signature of one GE - WINN MANAGEMENT & CO., he is neither connected with the case nor with the writ petitioners. The bank authorities have miserably failed to prove as to how GE - WINN MANAGEMENT & CO. is connected with the debtors / writ petitioners. From the document produced by the bank authorities, it is seen that on 08.12.2006, the writ petitioners themselves had appeared before the bank authorities. After mentioning so in that letter by the third respondent - bank itself, we are at a loss to understand as to how and why the bank authorities have relied on GE - WINN MANAGEMENT & CO. to represent the writ petitioners and this has also not been properly explained either by the appellants or by the third respondent bank. Further this aspect is silent in the counter statement also. Even the writ petitioners are represented through their agent, it is not valid in the eye of the law. Therefore, we are of the considered view that in this regard, proper procedure has not been followed by the third respondent bank and this deviation from the procedure, undoubtedly, goes to the root of the matter. It is very painful to note that the writ petitioners have given a letter for private negotiation. Under such circumstance, a Nationalised Bank sold one’s property under the guise of treaty without any written treaty from the debtors. It is also not known under what authority the Bank Manager has sold the mortgaged property just for Rs.10,000/- higher than the upset price to satisfy S.9(2) of the Act believing that this Court will not generally interfere in the DRT cases. The Bank Manager has exceeded his authority for the reasons best known to him. Hence, in this case, the third respondent bank, a quasi judicial authority, has miserably failed to exercise the powers as contemplated under the SARFAESI Act as expected by the law. When such is the case, the Writ Court has every jurisdiction to exercise its power under Art.226 of the Constitution of India . In such view of that matter, we are of the considered view that the Writ Court has the power to deal with this matter and the same has been rightly exercised by learned Single Judge.
When such is the case, the Writ Court has every jurisdiction to exercise its power under Art.226 of the Constitution of India . In such view of that matter, we are of the considered view that the Writ Court has the power to deal with this matter and the same has been rightly exercised by learned Single Judge. Hence, we have no hesitation to hold that the ground agitated by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that the writ petitioners cannot invoke Art.226 of the Constitution of India challenging the sale certificate inasmuch as there is an alternative remedy available, has no force and accordingly, this contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants / Auction Purchasers is rejected.” 9. In the instant case, the appellant has no case that there is any agreement entered into between or in other words, it was consented by the borrower to sell the property by a private treaty. It is also not the case of the appellant that the remedy of public sale is exhausted by the Bank. The learned counsel for the Bank submitted that the Bank has not proceeded with the matter further, and if the Bank intends to sell the property, then definitely the same will be published in accordance with the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. In such circumstances, we find no illegality in the finding of the learned Single Judge that the cause of action has not arisen for the appellant to approach this Court with the writ petition. Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and the submissions made at the Bar, we find no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge. In the result, the writ appeal stands dismissed.