JUDGMENT : EASWARAN S., J. These two appeals arise out of the concurrent findings rendered by the Munsiff Court, Attingal in O.S. Nos. 14 and 204 of 2000 which was confirmed by the Sub Court, Attingal in A.S. Nos. 61 and 62 of 2010. 2. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these appeals are as follows: 2.1. The 2 nd plaintiff purchased the property as per Sale Deed No. 411/1996 dated 19.02.1996 from one Ramachandran (1 st defendant). Subsequently, it is alleged that on 30.06.1999, the 1 st defendant executed Rent Deed in favour of the 2 nd plaintiff in respect of the building in the property. On 20.08.1999 vide Sale Deed No. 1735/1999, the 2 nd plaintiff transferred her right, title and interest of the property in favour of the 1 st plaintiff. The suit, O.S. No. 14 of 2000, was filed for the limited relief to evict the 1 st defendant from the building scheduled in the plaint. The 1 st defendant resisted the suit by contending that the Rent Deed executed on 30.06.1999 is a fabricated document. It appears that the suit was decreed ex parte and subsequently, at the request of the 1 st defendant, the suit was restored. It appears that during the pendency of the suit, the 1 st plaintiff transferred her right title and interest over the plaint schedule property in favour of the 1 st defendant. Later, the 1 st defendant sold the property covered by Sale Deed No. 3924 of 2002 in favour of defendants 5 to 7 by Sale Deed No. 2322 of 2008 dated 20.10.2008. At this point of time, the plaintiffs sought amendment to O.S. No. 14 of 2000, requiring the defendants to vacate the building in the plaint schedule property after seeing that document No. 3924 of 2002 of SRO, Chirayinkeezhu and document No. 2322 of 2008 of SRO, Murukkumpuzha are ab initio void and liable to be ignored. The facts further disclose that during the pendency of OS No 14 of 2000, the plaintiffs instituted yet another suit, O.S. No. 204 of 2000 seeking a prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from trespassing into the plaint schedule property. The defendants 5 to 7 were impleaded subsequently and then the plaintiffs also sought for an amendment seeking declaration of title and prior possession of the plaintiffs over the plaint schedule property and to recover possession. The defendants 5 to 7 were impleaded subsequently and then the plaintiffs also sought for an amendment seeking declaration of title and prior possession of the plaintiffs over the plaint schedule property and to recover possession. Both the suits were tried together. Exts. A1 to A6 documents were marked on the side of the plaintiffs and PW1 was examined. Exts. B1 to B30(a) documents were marked on the side of the defendants and DW1, DW2 and DW3 were examined. Ext. C1 is the report of the Advocate Commissioner and C1(a) is the rough sketch. The Trial Court on the basis of the pleadings framed the following issues in both the suits as under; O.S. No. 14 of 2000 7. On the basis of the above pleadings the following issues are settled for consideration: 1. Is 1 st defendant tenant of the 2 nd plaintiff? 2. Is the plaintiff entitled to get vacant possession of the building with arrears of rent as claimed? 3. Is the plaintiff entitled to get damages as claimed? 4. Relief and cost? O.S. No. 204 of 2000 14. On the basis of the above pleadings the following issues are settled for consideration: 1. Whether the prayer for prohibitory injunction by plaintiff is allowable? 2. Whether the prayer in the counter claim for reconveyance of document allowable? 3. Reliefs and costs? 2.3. The Trial Court took up the plea of forgery of the plaintiffs by comparing the signatures in the registered sale Deed No. 3924 of 2002 with that of the signatures of the plaint Vakalath and came to the conclusion that the Sale Deed is a forged document. Consequently, Sale Deed No. 2322 of 2008 was ignored and proceeded to decree the suit as follows: “In the result, O.S. No. 14/2000 Suit decreed allowing the following reliefs; (1) The plaintiffs are allowed to recover the possession of the plaint schedule property and the building therein after evicting the defendants. (2) The plaintiffs are allowed to realise a sum of Rs. 400/- per month as damages for use and occupation from the defendants from the date of suit till the vacant possession is surrendered. (3) The plaintiffs are allowed to realise the entire costs of litigation from the defendants. (2) The plaintiffs are allowed to realise a sum of Rs. 400/- per month as damages for use and occupation from the defendants from the date of suit till the vacant possession is surrendered. (3) The plaintiffs are allowed to realise the entire costs of litigation from the defendants. O.S. No. 204/2000, counter claim dismissed and suit decreed allowing the following reliefs: (1) The defendants are restrained from taking usufructs from the plaint schedule property and thereby interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaintiffs over the plaint schedule property. They are further restrained from committing any waste. (2) Sale deed No. 1924/2002 of S.R.O., Chirayinkeezh and sale deed No. 2322/2008 of S.R.O., Murukkumpuzha are void documents and they will not affect the rights of the plaintiffs over the plaint schedule property. (4) The plaintiffs are allowed to relaise the entire costs of litigation from the defendants.” 2.4. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the Munsiff Court, Attingal, defendants 5 to 7 preferred A.S. Nos. 61 and 62 of 2010 before the Sub Court, Attingal. The First Appellate Court affirmed the findings of the Trial Court and dismissed the Appeal. Hence, these appeals. 3. Though the defendants in these appeals raised several questions of law, this Court while admitting the appeals on 30.08.2024, framed the following substantial questions of law which are common in these appeals; “i. Whether the Trial Court is justified in granting the reliefs which are not prayed for in the suits? ii. Whether the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court has wrongly shifted burden of proof with respect to Ext.B22 registered document on the defendants.” 4. Heard Sri. Ramnath M. P., the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants and Sri. N. Nandakumara Menon, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents/plaintiffs assisted by Smt. Smitha S. Pillai. 5. Sri. Ramnath M. P., the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants primarily contended that the Courts below erred egregiously in shifting the burden for proving Ext. B22 document on to the 1 st defendant. It is the plaintiffs who alleged impersonation and forgery in execution of Ext. B22 sale deed. The plaintiffs, apart from examining themselves, did not adduce any independent evidence. Ext. B22, being a registered document, the primary burden was on the plaintiffs to establish that it is vitiated by fraud. B22 document on to the 1 st defendant. It is the plaintiffs who alleged impersonation and forgery in execution of Ext. B22 sale deed. The plaintiffs, apart from examining themselves, did not adduce any independent evidence. Ext. B22, being a registered document, the primary burden was on the plaintiffs to establish that it is vitiated by fraud. It is further submitted that, even assuming for arguments sake that the plaintiffs are entitled to maintain a suit for declaration, the valuation of suit is improper and that the Trial Court did not consider the said question in its correct perspective. It is further contended that the reliefs granted by the Trial Court are not consonant with the reliefs sought for in the plaint. Findings rendered by the Trial Court on the validity of Ext. B22 and B23 documents were not raised on specific issues framed and, therefore, the Trial Court erred in decreeing the suit and the said irregularities were carried forward when the First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal. 6. Per contra, Sri. Nandakumara Menon, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs contended that the concurrent findings of fact rendered by the Courts below cannot be interfered in exercise of the power vested in this Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure . Both the Courts have found that Ext. B22 document is a forged document. The Trial Court was empowered to compare the signatures in Ext. B22 as well as the admitted signature of the plaintiffs in exercise of its powers conferred under Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 . If, as a matter of fact, Ext. B22 document is found to be invalid for the reason that the same is a forged document, no consequences can be attached to the execution of the sale deed in favour of the defendants 5 to 7. Lastly it is pointed out that the findings in the suit as regards the 1 st defendant have since become final and, therefore, the appeal at the instance of the defendants 5 to 7 cannot be entertained by this Court. 7. I have considered the submissions raised across the Bar and perused the judgments rendered by the Courts below and also the records of the present case. 8. 7. I have considered the submissions raised across the Bar and perused the judgments rendered by the Courts below and also the records of the present case. 8. Though, on the basis of the rival submissions raised across the Bar and also on the basis of the pleadings in the suit as well as in the present appeal, prima facie, this Court is of the opinion that there arises substantial questions of law other than those which has been framed by this Court while admitting these appeals, for the purpose of considering the appeals, at this point of time, decision on the merits of the matter may not be required for the reasons which are attributed in the preceding paragraphs. 9. The thrust of the findings rendered by the Courts below hinges upon the validity of Ext. B22 Sale Deed. The plea raised by the plaintiffs that Ext. B22 is a forged document found favour with the Trial Court. Surprisingly, the learned Munsiff adopted a circuitous way of verifying the signatures of the plaintiffs with the admitted signatures in the Vakalath as well as in the plaint and came to the conclusion that the signature of the plaintiffs in Ext. B22 is a forged one. Though the course of action adopted by the learned Munsiff is permissible in terms of Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, the said recourse is riddled with the certain infirmities. 9.1. Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 reads as under; “73. Comparison of signature, writing or seal with others admitted or proved . In order to ascertain whether a signature, writing, or seal is that of the person by whom it purports to have been written or made, any signature, writing, or seal admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court to have been written or made by that person may be compared with the one which is to be proved, although that signature, writing, or seal has not been produced or proved for any other purpose. The Court may direct any person present in Court to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare the words or figures so written with any words or figures alleged to have been written by such person.” 9.2. The power of courts to compare the signature when the same is disputed cannot be doubted. The Court may direct any person present in Court to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare the words or figures so written with any words or figures alleged to have been written by such person.” 9.2. The power of courts to compare the signature when the same is disputed cannot be doubted. However, it must be remembered that the court cannot act as an expert while exercising this power. How far the power under Section 73 can be exercised is highly debatable issue. 9.3. In State of Gujarat v. Vinaya Chandra Chhota Lal Pathi [ AIR 1967 SC 778 ] the Supreme Court held that the court is not competent to record a finding about a person’s writing in a document merely on the basis of comparison of disputed writing with admitted or proved writing of the person. However, the court is competent to compare disputed writing with admitted or proved writing to appreciate properly the evidence produced to prove the writing 9.4. In State of Maharashtra v. Sukdev Singh [ (1992) 3 SCC 700 ] it was held that although Section 73 empowers the court to compare the disputed writing with the admitted writing, prudence demands that the courts should be slow in venturing an opinion on the basis of mere comparison more so when the quality of evidence in respect of specimen/ admitted writing is not high standard. 9.5. Moreover, the evidence in this case discloses that before undertaking the exercise under Section 73 , the Court should have directed the person to be present in the Court and write any figures, words for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare the signature. It is indisputable that such a recourse was not adopted by the Munsiff Court. Still further, the recourse adopted by the trial court by invoking Section 73 , was certainly farfetched especially since, the Court did not consider the scope of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which reads as under: “92. Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement. It is indisputable that such a recourse was not adopted by the Munsiff Court. Still further, the recourse adopted by the trial court by invoking Section 73 , was certainly farfetched especially since, the Court did not consider the scope of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which reads as under: “92. Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement. –– When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its terms: Proviso (1). –– Any fact may be proved which would invalidate any document, or which would entitle any person to any decree or order relating thereto; such as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want of capacity in any contracting party, [want or failure] of consideration, or mistake in fact or law. Proviso (2). ––The existence of any separate oral agreement as to any matter on which a document is silent, and which is not inconsistent with its terms, may be proved. In considering whether or not this proviso applies, the Court shall have regard to the degree of formality of the document. Proviso (3). ––The existence of any separate oral agreement, constituting a condition precedent to the attaching of any obligation under any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved. Proviso (4). ––The existence of any distinct subsequent oral agreement to rescind or modify any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved, except in cases in which such contract, grant or disposition of property is by law required to be in writing, or has been registered according to the law in force for the time being as to the registration of documents. Proviso (5). –– Any usage or custom by which incidents not expressly mentioned in any contract are usually annexed to contracts of that description, may be proved: Provided that the annexing of such incident would not be repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the express terms of the contract. Proviso (6). Proviso (5). –– Any usage or custom by which incidents not expressly mentioned in any contract are usually annexed to contracts of that description, may be proved: Provided that the annexing of such incident would not be repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the express terms of the contract. Proviso (6). –– Any fact may be proved which shows in what manner the language of a document is related to existing facts.” 10. Admittedly, Ext. B22 Sale Deed is a registered document. A registered document, prima facie, carries a presumption regarding execution. In Prem Singh and Others v. Birbal and Others [ (2006) 5 SCC 353 ], the Supreme Court held that, there is a presumption attached to the registered document as one that is validly executed. Therefore, prima facie the registered document would be valid in law and that, the onus of proof would be on the person who gives the evidence to rebut the presumption. Of course, it is possible for a person, who executed the registered document, to dispel the suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution by adducing sufficient evidence. But the question is, whether the plaintiffs have discharged the burden in the present case in order to shift the said burden to the shoulders of the 1st defendant consequently to defendants 5 to 7? However, this court is afraid that, the quality of evidence adduced by the plaintiffs is not sufficient to discharge the burden on them as regards the suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of Ext.B22 document. The defendants 5 to 7 had derived right, title and interest from the 1 st defendant. Therefore, at no stretch of imagination, it can be concluded that it is the burden of defendants 5 to 7 to disprove the suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of Ext. B22. Neither is it the burden of the 1 st defendant to prove the same especially since it is a registered document. Of course, as rightly contended by the Senior Counsel Sri. N. Nanadakumara Menon, the defendants 5 to 7, cannot have a better case than that of the 1 st defendant and that if the sale deed in favour of the 1 st defendant is found to be void, then the consequence has to follow. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the plaintiffs miserably failed to discharge the initial burden to prove that Ext. B22 sale deed is fraudulently executed. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the plaintiffs miserably failed to discharge the initial burden to prove that Ext. B22 sale deed is fraudulently executed. 11. Pertinently, the First Appellate Court found that the Ext. B22 document has been executed after following the due process of law and, therefore, it attaches a presumption under Section 114(e) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 . That be so, necessarily the burden was on the shoulders of the 1 st plaintiff to prove that Ext. B22 was not executed by her. The Consequential reliefs against defendants 5 to 7 would necessarily depend upon her successfully proving the allegation of forgery in execution of Ext. B22 without which, she may not be in a position to sustain a claim against defendants 5 to 7. 12. Equally so, this Court finds that the course of action adopted by the learned Munsiff on the allegation of the 1 st defendant that Ext. A2 is a forged document is not acceptable. When an allegation was raised, the learned Munsiff again took recourse to Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which was impermissible at the first instance. In a case where the allegation of forgery is raised in execution of the documents, it is always expedient to follow the due process of law by sending the disputed signatures to an expert and thereafter to take recourse to other provisions of law. 13. In the light of what is discussed above, this Court cannot subscribe to the findings rendered by the Trial Court as confirmed by the First Appellate Court. The further question is, what should be the relief that should be in the present appeal? Normally, the consequences of finding especially touching upon the question of valuation and sustainability of the second suit, should entail the dismissal of both the suits especially since the learned Munsiff had exceeded in his jurisdiction in granting reliefs which were not claimed in the suit. However, this Court is not prepared to non-suit the plaintiffs because of the irregularity committed in the procedural law by the Courts below. Therefore, this Court finds itself unable to subscribe to the findings rendered by the Courts below. Hence, the judgments of the Courts below are liable to be set aside. However, this Court is not prepared to non-suit the plaintiffs because of the irregularity committed in the procedural law by the Courts below. Therefore, this Court finds itself unable to subscribe to the findings rendered by the Courts below. Hence, the judgments of the Courts below are liable to be set aside. However, the plaintiffs in both the suits are entitled to have the suits restored to the file for a fresh consideration in order to take recourse to the appropriate procedure for disproving the signatures in Ext. B22. At the same time, the 1 st defendant if so advised may take recourse to appropriate measures to test the validity of Ext.A2. The other questions regarding the valuation and appropriate reliefs and also the maintainability of the second suit will all depend upon the consequences of the finding of validity of Ext.A2 Rent Deed as well as Ext. B22 Sale Deed. Resultantly, answering the questions of law framed in the appeals in favour of the appellants, this court holds that the Trial Court erred egregiously in granting reliefs which were not sought for in the plaint and that the courts below wrongly shifted burden of proof with respect to Ext.B22 registered documents on the defendants. Accordingly, the appellants are entitled to succeed and thus the appeals are allowed by setting aside the judgment dated 11.03.2010 in O.S. Nos. 14 of 2000 and 204 of 2000 of the Munsiff Court, Attingal and judgment dated 23.03.2024 in A.S. Nos. 61 of 2010 and 62 of 2010 of the Sub Court, Attingal. Consequently, O.S. No. 14 of 2000 and O.S. No. 204 of 2000 will stand restored to the files of Munsiff Court, Attingal. The parties shall appear before the Munsiff Court, Attingal on 17.09.2025. On appearance, the plaintiffs shall be given an opportunity to send Ext. A2 as well as Ext. B22 to an expert and the Trial of the suit shall commence after receipt of the report from the Forensic Authorities. Both parties are granted liberty to adduce such evidence as they require to prove their case. It is made clear that Defendants 5 to 7 are free to raise the question of valuation before the Munsiff Court, Attingal and if such a question of valuation is raised, the Munsiff Court, Attingal shall decide the same at the first instance and thereafter depending upon such decision, sent Exts. It is made clear that Defendants 5 to 7 are free to raise the question of valuation before the Munsiff Court, Attingal and if such a question of valuation is raised, the Munsiff Court, Attingal shall decide the same at the first instance and thereafter depending upon such decision, sent Exts. A2 and B22 for expert opinion. At any rate, if defendants 5 to 7 raise the question of valuation, the Munsiff Court shall decide the same within 3 weeks from the date on which the question is raised. As a consequence of the said exercise, if the Munsiff Court finds that, it has the jurisdiction to try the suit, considering the fact that the suit is of the year 2000, the suit shall be expedited and finally disposed of before 31.3.2026. On the other hand, on consideration of the question of valuation, if the Court finds that it lacks pecuniary jurisdiction, the plaint has to be returned enabling the plaintiffs to present it before the appropriate Court and the said Court shall thereafter proceed in terms of the directions as above. Defendants 5 to 7 are directed to maintain status quo as regards the plaint schedule property till the suit is disposed of.