JUDGMENT : S.MANU, J. Since common issues are involved in these writ petitions they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. Reference to the parties in this judgment is as per the cause title in W.P.(C)No.14360/2011. 2. First petitioner claims to be the absolute owner of 31.12 Ares of property comprised in Re.Sy.Nos.306/9, 306/22, 307/3 and 307/4 in Kanjiramkulam Village, Neyyattinkara Taluk. Second petitioner is the wife of the first petitioner. She claims to be the absolute owner of the property comprised in Re.Sy.No.307/15 having an extent of 4.25 Ares in the same Village. The said properties were originally owned by one Nadesan Nadar, Syamalakumari and one Antony. They executed sale deeds in favour of the petitioners on an understanding that their liabilities arising out of a loan transaction with the 7 th respondent Co-operative Bank will be cleared by the petitioners. They had availed a loan of Rs.2,000/- on 26.6.1968 from the Bank. Properties were transferred to the petitioners on 1972. 3. The dues arising from the loan transaction were not repaid. The Bank proceeded against the property and in the public auction it was bid in the name of the Bank. However, mutation was not effected and physical possession was not taken. The first petitioner approached the 7 th respondent to set aside the sale and to convey the property to the petitioners. According to the petitioners, they were instructed by the 7 th respondent, on the basis of a decision taken on the request of the petitioners, to remit an amount of Rs.30,000/- for settlement of the loan account and return of the property by executing appropriate deeds. They claim that as evident from Ext.P4 receipt dated 19.9.1996 an amount of Rs.30,000/- was paid which was kept in a suspense account. However, the property was not conveyed to the petitioners. Later, they came to know that the 7 th respondent was attempting to get the property mutated in its favour. 4. Petitioners approached the 2 nd respondent and requested to intervene in the matter by directing the 7 th respondent to annul the sale and to register the property in the name of the petitioners. They also sought a direction to refund excess amounts after calculating the interest for the loan amount. 4. Petitioners approached the 2 nd respondent and requested to intervene in the matter by directing the 7 th respondent to annul the sale and to register the property in the name of the petitioners. They also sought a direction to refund excess amounts after calculating the interest for the loan amount. The 2 nd respondent, after considering the issue comprehensively, issued Ext.P6 directing the 7 th respondent to appropriate double the loan amount with interest from the amount kept in the suspense account and to return the balance to the petitioners. The bank was also directed to register the property in favour of the petitioners. The bank approached the Government against Ext.P6 issued by the Registrar of Co- operative Societies. Government rejected the appeal of the bank by order dated 27.5.2013. In W.P.(C)No.14360/2011 petitioners are seeking implementation of Ext.P6. In W.P. (C)No.15724/2013 the bank is challenging the order of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies and the order passed by the Government upholding the same. 5. Heard Sri.Siddharth.R., learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P.(C)No.14360/2011 and Sri.G.S.Raghunath, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P. (C)No.15724/2013. Sri.Tony Augustine, the learned Government Pleader appearing for the State and its officers also addressed the court. 6. Sri.Siddharth submitted that the properties were purchased by the petitioners in 1972. Petitioners are still in possession and enjoyment of the properties. He relied on the report dated 11.1.2023 of the Advocate Commissioner appointed by this Court in this regard. He submitted that the report clearly shows that the property is in possession of the petitioners and the same is essential for access to their residence. He also submitted that the Advocate Commissioner has noted various significant aspects which would prove beyond doubt that the properties are under possession and enjoyment of the petitioners. He further submitted that as evident from Ext.P4 receipt dated 19.9.1996 an amount Rs.30,000/- was received from the 1 st petitioner by the 7 th respondent bank and was kept in suspense account. The learned counsel heavily relied on the said document to contend that the bank had offered to convey the properties to the petitioners and as suggested the said amount was paid as early as in 1996. He submitted that the bank however did not proceed further and hence the 1 st petitioner approached the 2 nd respondent. The learned counsel heavily relied on the said document to contend that the bank had offered to convey the properties to the petitioners and as suggested the said amount was paid as early as in 1996. He submitted that the bank however did not proceed further and hence the 1 st petitioner approached the 2 nd respondent. The 2 nd respondent after analysing the relevant aspects issued Ext.P6 directing the bank to register the property in favour of the petitioners and also to return excess amounts from the amount kept in the suspense account. However, the bank, instead of complying with the directions issued by the 2 nd respondent approached the Government. The matter was elaborately considered by the Government. Government, after hearing the officers and counsel for the 7 th respondent bank as well as officers of the department, concurred with the 2 nd respondent and issued order dated 27.5.2013 rejecting the appeal. The learned counsel submitted that all relevant factual aspects were considered by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies as well as by the competent authority of the Government. Conclusions of both authorities are concurrent. He submitted that in exercise of the powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution this Court will not sit as an appellate authority over the decisions taken by the competent authorities. Therefore, as long as there is no arbitrariness, illegality or perversity involved no interference is warranted in judicial review. The learned counsel also submitted that the petitioners remitted a considerable amount in 1996 as suggested by the 7 th respondent bank and the said amount still remains with the bank. By referring to the statement given by a former president of the 7 th respondent bank to the Assistant Registrar mentioned in Ext.P12 report, the learned counsel submitted that the General Body of the 7 th respondent bank which is the highest authority under the Rules had decided to return the property to the petitioner. The then Secretary gave statement to the Assistant Registrar as discernible from Ext.P12 that the petitioner had deposited Rs.30,000/- on the basis of instructions given by the director board members of the 7 th respondent bank. The then Secretary gave statement to the Assistant Registrar as discernible from Ext.P12 that the petitioner had deposited Rs.30,000/- on the basis of instructions given by the director board members of the 7 th respondent bank. The learned counsel also pointed out that there is no explanation for not taking steps to get the property mutated in favour of the bank for a long time and this shows that there was a decision to convey the property to the petitioners. The learned counsel submitted that the petitioners are now aged and they had been waiting for getting the matter settled for the past several decades. The learned counsel also submitted that the Registrar of Co-operative Societies while issuing Ext.P6 has exercised the power under Rule 83 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules. Therefore, the directions issued are lawful. The learned counsel also submitted that the petitioners have been paying basic tax with respect to the properties. He therefore prayed that the 7 th respondent society may be directed to comply with the directions issued by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, as confirmed by the Government. 7. Sri.G.S.Raghunath, learned counsel appearing for the Co-operative Bank submitted that the reliefs sought in W.P. (C)No. 14360/2011 are strange and not sustainable. He submitted that the petitioners have sought a negative declaration and a direction to register sale deed in their names. He also submitted that the reliefs sought for refund of the amount is also not sustainable as the amounts were already withdrawn by the petitioners. On merits the learned counsel submitted that the property was mortgaged on 26.6.1968 and the borrowers committed default. The bank proceeded for recovery of the dues and arbitrator passed the award. Though statutory remedies were available to the borrowers no effort was made by them to challenge the award in accordance with law. Sale was conducted and the property was bid by the bank. Sale certificate was also issued and the sale became concluded. He submitted that though there was some delay in approaching the authorities under the Transfer of Registry Rules for effecting mutation the same was not a reason to deny the rights of the bank over the property. The learned counsel asserted that the amount deposited by the petitioners in suspense account was withdrawn as contended in the counter affidavit and therefore they cannot make any claims on the basis of the said deposit. The learned counsel asserted that the amount deposited by the petitioners in suspense account was withdrawn as contended in the counter affidavit and therefore they cannot make any claims on the basis of the said deposit. The learned counsel also pointed out that suit filed by the petitioners as O.S.No.610/1996 before the Munsiff Court, Neyyattinkara was dismissed. The request made by the bank for transfer of registry was intentionally delayed by the revenue authorities. He disputed the contention of the petitioners that they have possession of the properties. The learned counsel further contended that the Registrar of Co-operative Society has absolutely no jurisdiction to issue an order in the nature of that contained in Ext.P6. Learned counsel further contended that the Registrar is vested with powers only under Rule 176 of the Co- operative Societies Rules to interfere with the affairs of the Co- operative Societies. However, the said power is confined to rescind resolutions of the Societies. He further submitted that the petitioners cannot seek any benefit out of Ext.P6 which is issued without any authority of law. He further submitted that the Government seriously erred in upholding Ext.P6 issued by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. He further contended that the order dated 27.5.2013 which is under challenge in W.P. (C)No.15724/2013 along with the order issued by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies on 26.3.2011 is not sustainable and therefore the orders are liable to be set aside by this Court. He also submitted that this Court may issue a direction to the Tahsildar to effect transfer of registration of the property in favour of the Co-operative Bank. 8. I have appreciated the rival contentions. Case of the petitioners is that though the sale was concluded in favour of the bank, the petitioners requested the bank to revoke the sale and convey the property to them. They contend that this was agreed by the bank and pursuant to the said decision they deposited Rs.30,000/- in a suspense account as evident from Ext.P4 receipt dated 19.9.1996. Petitioners contend that the said amount was deposited so that the entire amount actually due to the bank with interest regarding the loan transaction could be appropriated and the property conveyed to the petitioners. They assert that the property was in their possession at the time of sale and there was no interruption in their possession. Petitioners contend that the said amount was deposited so that the entire amount actually due to the bank with interest regarding the loan transaction could be appropriated and the property conveyed to the petitioners. They assert that the property was in their possession at the time of sale and there was no interruption in their possession. Further, the fact that mutation was not effected in favour of the bank is pointed out in support of the contention that the property did not absolutely vest in the possession and ownership of the bank. They also point out that the Registrar of Co-operative Societies and the Government found that the property was liable to be conveyed to them after adjusting the dues with interest and other charges from the amount deposited with the bank. The bank on the other hand contended that the amount deposited was withdrawn. There is a specific assertion to that effect in the counter affidavit. Petitioners have denied this assertion of the bank by stating in their reply affidavit that the amount was never withdrawn. The bank has not produced any evidence to show that the amount was withdrawn by the petitioners. If the amount was actually withdrawn by the petitioners the bank should have produced documents in support of their case in view of the assertion of the petitioners in the writ petition as well as in the reply affidavit. Having not done so case of the petitioners in this regard needs to be accepted. It is discernible from Ext.P12 report that a former president and secretary of the bank had stated before the Assistant Registrar that a decision was taken by the General Body of the Co-operative Bank to convey the property to the petitioners. The secretary stated that an amount of Rs.30,000/- was deposited by the petitioners on 19.9.1996 as suggested by the director board members. This is not specifically denied by the bank. Therefore it appears that at one point of time the highest authority of the co-operative bank, its general body, had taken a decision to return the property to the petitioners with the concurrence of the department. Ext.P6 was issued by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies taking into account these facts. While issuing the order rejecting the appeal filed by the bank Government considered the entire issue in detail and addressed all contentions of the bank. Ext.P6 was issued by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies taking into account these facts. While issuing the order rejecting the appeal filed by the bank Government considered the entire issue in detail and addressed all contentions of the bank. Ultimately the Government concluded that the order of the Registrar is to be upheld. Reading of the order issued by the Government on 27.5.2013 reveals that factual aspects were analysed in detail and the contentions raised by the bank were found to be without any merits by the Government. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case which show that at one point of time the general body of the bank had resolved to convey the property to the petitioners and permitted the petitioners to deposit an amount more than sufficient for discharging the entire liability arising out of the loan transaction with interest and all other charges, I don't find any impropriety or illegality in the Registrar directing the bank to convey the property to the petitioners. Proper analysis of the entire gamut of facts was undertaken by the Government also in the appeal and the Government concurred with the views of the Registrar. Under such circumstances, I do not find that any interference is warranted. 9. Learned counsel for the bank had relied on the judgment of this Court in Thomas Mathew v. The Secretary to Government [ 1999 (2) KLT 882 ] and contended that the Registrar had not heard the parties and he issued Ext.P6 on the basis of report from the Assistant Registrar. It was the Assistant Registrar who heard the parties and inquired into the issue. Therefore, the decision taken by another authority, the Registrar was improper. However, the judgment cited by the learned counsel is distinguishable as in the case at hand the Assistant Registrar conducted the inquiry, heard the parties and submitted the report to the Registrar and the Registrar on analysis of the entire materials issued Ext.P6. It is the outcome of an institutional decision. In institutional decision making process it is not essential that the same officer who heard the parties shall take the decision also. I rely on judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Baby Girija.S. v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited [ 2025 (2) KLT 17 ] in support of the said conclusion. The Division Bench held thus; “12. In institutional decision making process it is not essential that the same officer who heard the parties shall take the decision also. I rely on judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Baby Girija.S. v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited [ 2025 (2) KLT 17 ] in support of the said conclusion. The Division Bench held thus; “12. Respondent Corporation has explained the decision-making process followed by it in the case of terminating agencies. Appellant has not disputed the submission of the Corporation in this regard. Without doubt, the decision in the matter of terminating an agency is an institutional decision as per the procedure followed by the Respondent Corporation. It is not a decision taken by an individual officer or a designated authority. Several officers are involved in the process. Appraisal at various levels is also involved. In such a situation, the officer conducting the hearing need not be the authority to take the final call. ‘Institutional hearing’ is a well-recognised exclusion to the general rule - ‘one who heard should decide’ We refer to the following observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kalinga Mining Corporation v. Union of India & Ors. (2013 (1) KLT Suppl. 44 (SC) = (2013) 5 SCC 252 ) :- “70. We also do not find much substance in the submission made by Mr.Krishnan that the Order dated 27-9-2001 is vitiated as it has been passed by an officer who did not give a hearing to the parties. This is clearly a case of an institutional hearing. The direction has been issued by the High Court for a hearing to be given by the Central Government. There was no direction that any particular officer or an authority was to give a hearing. In such circumstances, the orders are generally passed in the relevant files and may often be communicated by an officer other than the officer who gave the hearing. 71. The legality of institutional hearing has been accepted in England since Local Govt. Board v. Arlidge (1915 AC 120 : (1914-15) All ER Rep 1 (HL)). The aforesaid judgment was quoted with approval by this Court in Pradyat Kumar Bose ( AIR 1956 SC 285 = (1955) 2 SCR 1331 ). 71. The legality of institutional hearing has been accepted in England since Local Govt. Board v. Arlidge (1915 AC 120 : (1914-15) All ER Rep 1 (HL)). The aforesaid judgment was quoted with approval by this Court in Pradyat Kumar Bose ( AIR 1956 SC 285 = (1955) 2 SCR 1331 ). This Court approved the following passage from the speech of the Lord Chancellor in the aforesaid case: (Arlidge case (1915 AC 120 : (1914-15) All ER Rep 1 (HL)), AC p. 133) “My Lords, I concur in this view of the position of an administrative body to which the decision of a question in dispute between parties has been entrusted. The result of its inquiry must, as I have said, be taken, in the absence of directions in the statute to the contrary, to be intended to be reached by its ordinary procedure. In the case of the Local Government Board it is not doubtful what this procedure is. The Minister at the head of the Board is directly responsible to Parliament like other Ministers. He is responsible not only for what he himself does but for all that is done in his department. The volume of work entrusted to him is very great and he cannot do the great bulk of it himself. He is expected to obtain his materials vicariously through his officials, and he has discharged his duty if he sees that they obtain these materials for him properly. To try to extend his duty beyond this and to insist that he and other members of the Board should do everything personally would be to impair his efficiency. Unlike a Judge in a court he is not only at liberty but is compelled to rely on the assistance of his staff.” In view of the aforesaid settled position of law, it is difficult to accept the submissions of Mr.Krishnan that the Order dated 27-9-2001 suffers from any legal or procedural infirmity.” Institutional hearings are followed by many institutions in India for several decades and Hon’ble Supreme Court has approved it in plethora of judgments. In the Indian context of Administrative Law also, the practice of institutional hearing is thus accustomed and accepted. In the Indian context of Administrative Law also, the practice of institutional hearing is thus accustomed and accepted. Unless any serious prejudice caused in the process is established, hearing offered by an institution as part of its decision-making procedure cannot be held as vitiated solely for the reason that the final decision was not taken by the authority who heard the party directly. Applying the principles of natural justice instinctively without analysing whether any prejudice was actually caused may lead to flawed fallouts. In the instant case the Appellant has not established any such precise case of genuine prejudice on account of the procedure adopted by the Respondent Corporation.” 10. The learned counsel also relied on judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Radhakrishna Kurup v. Nadakkal Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. No.1874, Kollam and others [ 2018 (3) KLT 214 ] in support of his contention that the Government has no power under the Co-operative Societies Act to direct a Co-operative Bank to part with the property after accepting the loan amount, interest and expenses incurred from the defaulter. In the said judgment Division Bench of this Court considered a case in which the Government issued an order requesting the managing committee of the bank to take a decision resolving to return the property to the borrowers on repayment of the loan. The managing committee resolved not to accede to the request. However, in the instant case, as noted above, the highest authority of the bank, the general body had taken a decision to convey the property to the petitioners, a fact which has not been disputed by the bank. Hence, the factual situation in the case at hand is totally different and therefore the dictum laid down by the Division Bench in Radhakrishna Kurup's case (supra) cannot be followed in these cases. The contention of the learned counsel that the Registrar has no power other than provided under Rule 176 of the Co-operative Societies Rules is also not correct. Under Rule 83, the Registrar has powers to set aside sale. Moreover, in the case at hand, as revealed from the report of the Assistant Registrar the highest authority of the bank as per Section 27 of the Kerala Co- operative Societies Act, 1969, the general body, had taken a decision in favour of the petitioners and the Registrar had only directed to implement the same. 11. Moreover, in the case at hand, as revealed from the report of the Assistant Registrar the highest authority of the bank as per Section 27 of the Kerala Co- operative Societies Act, 1969, the general body, had taken a decision in favour of the petitioners and the Registrar had only directed to implement the same. 11. The Registrar had issued some other directions also apart from directing to convey the property to the petitioners while issuing Ext.P6. The directions issued for proceeding against the borrower, the then secretary and office bearers of the bank for the failure to get the property mutated in favour of the bank were unwarranted as the report of the Assistant Registrar reveals that a decision was taken by the general body to convey the property to the petitioners. There might have been a delay in moving to get the registry transferred in favour of the bank. However, the said lapse occurred long ago and at this distant point of time, proceeding against the then secretary and office bearers may not be feasible and equitable too. 12. Hence, I dispose of these writ petitions as under:- 1. W.P.(C)No.14360/2011 is allowed. The respondent bank is directed to implement the direction in Ext.P6 to convey the property to the petitioners within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. 2. The amount deposited in the suspense account on 19.9.1996 shall be dealt with as directed in Ext.P6. 3. The expenses for conveying the property in favour of the petitioners shall be borne by the petitioners. 4. W.P.(C)No.15724/2013 is dismissed; however, the directions in the order dated 26.3.2011 of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies other than the direction to convey the property to the petitioners in W.P. (C)No.14360/2011 and the direction regarding appropriation of the amount remaining in the suspense account are set aside.