JUDGMENT : Anil K. Narendran, J. The petitioner is the applicant in O.A.No.1959 of 2016 on the file of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal at Thiruvananthapuram, which is one filed invoking the provisions under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking an order to quash Annexure A3 proceedings dated 05.05.2014 of the 2 nd respondent Commissioner for Rural Development publishing the final integrated seniority list of Joint Block Development Officers/Extension Officers (Housing) Grade I, Extension Officers (WW)/Extension Officers (Housing) Grade II/General Extension Officers, Village Extension Officers Grade I and Grade II; Annexure A4 extract of the final integrated seniority list of Extension Officers appended to Annexure A3; and Annexure A5 order dated 14.03.2016 issued by the 1 st respondent State, whereby the seniority claim made by the petitioner-applicant stands rejected. The applicant has also sought for a declaration that Annexure A1 to the extent it prescribes assessment of seniority in the cadre of Village Extension Officer Grade-I in terms of date of promotion instead of date of advice is arbitrary, illegal and unsustainable; and to direct the respondent to prepare seniority list of Village Extension Officer Grade-I based on the date of advice in the post of Lady Village Extension Officer Grade-II and Village Extension Officer Grade-II respectively, and grant due seniority to the applicant in the cadre of Village Extension Officer Grade-I over the 3 rd respondent, who is junior to the applicant in terms of the date of advice, and grant the promotions due to the applicant in terms of the revised seniority. 2. In the original application, Ext.P3 reply statement dated 18.11.2016 has been filed on behalf of the 2 nd respondent Commissioner for Rural Development. The 3 rd respondent has also filed Ext.P4 reply statement dated 16.01.2017, producing therewith Annexures R3(a) and R3(b) documents. The learned Senior Government Pleader filed Ext.P5 adoption memo dated 06.12.2018 for adopting the reply statement filed by the 2 nd respondent treating it as the contentions of the 1 st respondent. 3. After considering the rival contentions, the Tribunal by Ext.P1 order dated 13.12.2024 dismissed O.A.No.1959 of 2016. Paragraphs 2 to 5 and also the last paragraph of that order read thus; “2. The claim of the applicant is that seniority shall be reckoned on the basis of Rule 27(c) of Part II KS&SSR, i.e., from the date of advice. 3. After considering the rival contentions, the Tribunal by Ext.P1 order dated 13.12.2024 dismissed O.A.No.1959 of 2016. Paragraphs 2 to 5 and also the last paragraph of that order read thus; “2. The claim of the applicant is that seniority shall be reckoned on the basis of Rule 27(c) of Part II KS&SSR, i.e., from the date of advice. The revised seniority list has been prepared in accordance with Annexure A1 Special Rules, according to which, seniority is to be reckoned in the cadre of Village Extension Officer Grade I on the basis of date of promotion, instead of the date of advice. The grounds in the Original Application in support of the contention that the Special Rules are to be set aside is that there was no effective discussion with the Employees’ Union. 3. In the reply statement filed by the 2 nd respondent, it is stated that the integrated seniority list of Village Extension Officers and Lady Village Extension Officers is prepared in accordance with the date of promotion of the incumbents to the respective posts as per the amendment to the Special Rules in Annexure A1. It is also pointed out that the Special Rules were amended as early as in 2008 and there was no objection with respect to the procedural irregularities at the relevant time. 4. When it is stated that seniority list is prepared and published in accordance with the Special Rules and the Special Rules are challenged on the ground of lack of discussion with the Employees’ Union, it cannot be said that the Special Rules are unconstitutional on that ground. It is settled law that Rules can be interfered with only if it is ultra vires the parent Act, it is opposed to fundamental rights or it is opposed to plenary laws as held in Pankajakshy Amma v. George Mathew [1987 (2) KLT 723] . No such grounds are raised in the Original Application effectively. 5. Moreover, it is seen that the Original Application was filed as early as in 2016, at a time when the applicant was aged 50 years. The seniority list was published on 05.05.2014. There was no interim order also. In the circumstances, the applicant cannot be granted any relief. Accordingly, the Original Application is dismissed.” 4. 5. Moreover, it is seen that the Original Application was filed as early as in 2016, at a time when the applicant was aged 50 years. The seniority list was published on 05.05.2014. There was no interim order also. In the circumstances, the applicant cannot be granted any relief. Accordingly, the Original Application is dismissed.” 4. Feeling aggrieved by Ext.P1 order dated 13.12.2024 of the Tribunal in O.A.No.1959 of 2016, the petitioner-applicant is before this Court in this original petition, invoking the original jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 5. On 10.04.2025, when this original petition came up for admission, the matter was admitted on file. The learned Government Pleader took notice for respondents 1 and 2 and notice by speed post was ordered to the 3 rd respondent. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner-applicant, the learned Senior Government Pleader for respondents 1 and 2 and the learned counsel for the 3 rd respondent. 7. The issue that requires consideration in this original petition is as to whether any interference is warranted in Ext.P1 order dated 13.12.2024 of the Tribunal in O.A.No.1959 of 2016. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner-applicant would contend that Ext.P1 order of the Tribunal is per se arbitrary and illegal. The legal and factual contentions raised by the applicant were not properly considered by the Tribunal while passing the said order. 9. On the other hand, the learned Senior Government Pleader for respondents 1 and 2 and also the learned counsel for the 3 rd respondent would submit that valid reasons have been stated by the Tribunal in Ext.P1 order to decline the relief sought for in the original application. The reasoning of the Tribunal in the said order is neither perverse nor patently illegal, warranting interference of this Court in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 10. In L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India [(1997) 3 SCC 261] the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that clause 2(d) of Article 323A and clause 3(d) of Article 323B of the Constitution of India, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and the ‘exclusion of jurisdiction’ clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles 323A and 323B of the Constitution would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. 11. In L. Chandra Kumar [ (1997) 3 SCC 261 ] the Constitution Bench held that the Tribunals created under Article 323A and Article 323B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislation (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. 12. As held by the Apex Court in Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana [ (1988) 4 SCC 534 ] when a point which is ostensibly a point of law is required to be substantiated by facts, the party raising the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition and if he is the respondent, from the counter affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or to the counter affidavit, as the case may be, the Court will not entertain the point. There is a distinction between a pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and a writ petition or a counter affidavit. There is a distinction between a pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and a writ petition or a counter affidavit. While in a pleading, i.e., a plaint or a written statement, the facts and not evidence are required to be pleaded, in a writ petition or in the counter affidavit not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it. 13. The Tribunal has stated valid reasons in Ext.P1 order to decline the relief sought for in the original application. In paragraph 3 of the order, the Tribunal noticed the stand taken by the 2 nd respondent in the reply statement that the integrated seniority list of Village Extension Officers and Lady Village Extension Officers is prepared in accordance with the date of promotion of the incumbents to the respective posts as per the amendment to the Special Rules in Annexure A1. The Special Rules were amended as early as in 2008 and there was no objection with respect to the procedural irregularities at the relevant time. When it is stated that the seniority list is prepared and published in accordance with the Special Rules and the Special Rules are challenged on the ground of lack of discussion with the Employees’ Union, it cannot be contended that the Special Rules are unconstitutional on that ground, as it is well settled that the rule made under a statute by an authority delegated for the purpose can be interfered with only if it is ultra vires the parent Act, it is opposed to fundamental rights or it is opposed to plenary laws as held by a Division Bench of this Court in Pankajakshy Amma v. George Mathew [1987 (2) KLT 723] . As rightly noticed by the Tribunal, no such grounds are raised in the original application effectively. 14. Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. 15. 14. Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. 15. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [ (2010) 8 SCC 329 ] the Apex Court, while analysing the scope and ambit of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, held that the object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. 16. In Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [ (2010) 9 SCC 385 ] , while considering the nature and scope of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court held that, undoubtedly the High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts, as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well established principles of law. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well recognised constraints. It cannot be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. 17. It cannot be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. 17. In K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation [ (2015) 12 SCC 39 ] the Apex Court held that, in exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere with the order of the court or tribunal only when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. 18. In Sobhana Nair K.N. v. Shaji S.G. Nair [2016 (1) KHC 1] a Division Bench of this Court held that, the law is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that in proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the lower court or tribunal and the jurisdiction of this Court is only supervisory in nature and not that of an appellate court. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is called for, unless this Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law. 19. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the Administrative Tribunal. The supervisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised to correct all errors in the order of the Administrative Tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. The correctional jurisdiction under Article 227 can be exercised only in a case where the order of the Administrative Tribunal has been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. The correctional jurisdiction under Article 227 can be exercised only in a case where the order of the Administrative Tribunal has been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 is called for, unless the High Court finds that the Administrative Tribunal has committed a manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the Tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. 20. In the instant case, the reasoning of the Tribunal in Ext.P1 order is neither perverse nor patently illegal, warranting an interference in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In such circumstances, we find absolutely no grounds to interfere with Ext.P1 order dated 13.12.2024 of the Tribunal in O.A.No.1959 of 2016. The original petition fails and the same is accordingly dismissed.