ORDER : NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA, J. Petitioner is stated to have joined the respondent –State Bank of Hyderabad (now merged with State Bank of India) as Clerk-cum-Typist in 1983; he got promotion as Deputy Manager in Middle Management Cadre Scale:II on 01.12.2007. He was transferred to Chennai, Tirupathi and Tarnaka Branch of Hyderabad. While working thereat, during 09.06.2008 and 01.03.2010, on the ground that petitioner committed several misconducts more particularly in respect of rent reimbursement and making outside borrowings without permission of the bank, he was suspended on 01.03.2010. The case of petitioner in this connection is that while working at Chennai in 2001, he took residential accommodation belonging to Dr. Vimal Joseph Devadas after completing formalities and documentation between landlord and the 1 st respondent bank. While so, the bank provided to its officers to retain the leased residential accommodation at the last place of work or at place convenient for the sake of family as the children’s education should not suffer. As petitioner was transferred to Tarnaka Branch, his children’s education was still continuing at Chennai, he retained the leased accommodation by renewing it periodically and as usual the bank was remitting rents to the landlord and for more than eight years, there has been no issue. Vide disciplinary proceedings, dated 18.12.2010, the 4 th respondent– disciplinary authority & Deputy General Manager served a charge memo on petitioner framing as many as eight charges, for which, on 08.04.2011, he is stated to have submitted written statement, denying the charges. The 4th respondent, not satisfying with the same, appointed the 5 th respondent as Inquiry Officer vide letter dated 11.02.2011. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 14.05.2011 holding charges 1 to 5 proved and 6 to 8 not proved. On 07.07.2011, the 3rd respondent – Appointing Authority & Deputy General Manager issued a show cause notice to petitioner indicating punishment of ‘reduction to lower grade from MMGS-II to JMGS-I and placing him at a starting basic pay of JMGS-I i.e. Rs.14,500/- and further, the period of suspension was not treated as duty. The increments in the suspension period was cut and the period of suspension of duty has not been counted as service. Petitioner submitted explanation on 18.07.2011 stating that enquiry was not conducted as per rules and documents were not shown or given as required to submit the explanation. The increments in the suspension period was cut and the period of suspension of duty has not been counted as service. Petitioner submitted explanation on 18.07.2011 stating that enquiry was not conducted as per rules and documents were not shown or given as required to submit the explanation. Further, he had stated that landlord who is the prime evidence was not examined and Sri K. Venugopal, whose report was taken into consideration for establishing the charges was not examined in the enquiry and petitioner was not given opportunity to rebut the evidence of Sri Venugopal. However, the 3 rd respondent vide impugned proceedings dated 23.07.2011 imposed penalty of ‘reduction to lower grade from MMGS-II to JMGS-I and placed petitioner at starting basic pay of JMGS-I i.e.Rs.14,500/-. The petitioner will earn regular increment after completion of every year from the date of such placement. The period of suspension will be treated as off-duty whereby he will not be eligible for any payment other than the subsistence allowance already paid to him. He will not be eligible for any increment during the period of suspension and the period of suspension will not be counted for service. Petitioner preferred Appeal on 08.09.2011 to the 2 nd respondent - Appellate Authority, which, after considering the entire disciplinary proceedings, by order dated 24.01.2012, reduced the punishment to that of ‘reduction to lower grade from MMGS- II to JMGS-I and place him at the basic pay of Rs.17,500/- in JMGS-I. He shall earn his regular increment after completion of every year from the date of such placement. He will be eligible for promotion after one year from the date of the order of pendency. Other terms of the penalty shall remain unchanged’. Aggrieved thereby, petitioner is before this Court. 2. Sri Y.V. Satyanarayana, learned counsel for petitioner submits that charges levelled against petitioner are vague, not specific and not in conformity with the disciplinary regulations. He submits that crucial documents were not supplied so as to enable his client to submit reply during the course of enquiry nor principal witness was examined on whose report, charges 1 to 3 were held proved in the enquiry as also the defence witness Dr. Vinod Joseph Devadass who signed the lease agreement as GPA of land owner which is fatal to the case of respondents. Vinod Joseph Devadass who signed the lease agreement as GPA of land owner which is fatal to the case of respondents. According to learned counsel, enquiry report was not supplied at the first instance before accepting the said report by the disciplinary authority which is in clear violation of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Finally, it is urged that the 2 nd respondent - appellate authority passed non-speaking order, impugned in this Writ Petition, without assigning any reasons. In support of his submissions, learned counsel placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surat Chandra Chakrabarthy v. State of West Bengal , [ AIR 1971 SC 752 ], Government of A.P. v. A. Venkata Raidu, (2007) 1 SCC 338 , State of Uttaranchal v. Khark Singh , [(2008) 2 SCC L & S 698] , State of M.P. v. Chintaman Sadashiva Vishampayan , [ AIR 1961 SC 1623 ] , Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police , [ (1999) 2 SCC 10 ] , State of Uttar Pradesh v. C.S. Sharma , [AIR 1968 158] , Oryx Fisheries Private Limited v. Union of India , [ (2010) 13 SCC 427 ] and Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank , [ (2009) 2 SCC 570 ] 3. Sri Ch. Siva Reddy, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the respondent bank, based on the counter affidavit filed by the Deputy General Manger, submits that as per the bank rules, any officer, who is transferred in the middle of the academic year would be provided with reimbursement of accommodation at the place where from he has been transferred. Accordingly, petitioner was permitted for rent reimbursement at Chennai from where he was transferred. After his transfer to Tarnaka, he misused the payment of rents to the landlords at Chennai from 17.10.2008 to 02.02.2010. He made the payment of rent in different methods which are unknown to the bank. Most of the payment vouchers were not made available in the bank. The misconduct committed by petitioner was specified clearly in charge Nos. 1 to 5. It is submitted further that during the departmental enquiry, petitioner was given ample opportunities to defend his case and all the documents relied upon by the management were served on petitioner and there were no allegations with regard to holding of enquiry and the findings of the Enquiry Authority. 1 to 5. It is submitted further that during the departmental enquiry, petitioner was given ample opportunities to defend his case and all the documents relied upon by the management were served on petitioner and there were no allegations with regard to holding of enquiry and the findings of the Enquiry Authority. He submits that the Appointing Authority / Disciplinary Authority sent letter dated 07.07.2011 to petitioner along with the findings of Enquiry Officer dated 14.05.2011 and the orders of Disciplinary Authority dated 08.06.2011 proposing the punishment and sought for his submissions, if any. If any documents are not provided to petitioner which were not relied by the bank, that cannot prejudice his interests. Learned counsel submits that bank need not examine landlord during the departmental enquiry but the burden to prove that house taken for rent belongs to a particular landlord and the rent was paid to him, was on petitioner who failed to establish the same. It was not the issue whether he stayed in the rented accommodation or not, but he misled the management in utilizing the facility of the leased accommodation. Petitioner also has not established that money transactions between the landlord and the tenant on account of alleged repairs and also the adjustment of monthly rents with the consent of landlord for 13 months as he alleged; in view of the misconduct committed by petitioner there was loss to the bank to the tune of Rs.2,27,700/- towards rent. According to learned Senior Counsel, it is well-settled that departmental enquiry is not a criminal proceeding to establish the charges beyond all reasonable doubts. The preponderance of possibilities is a guiding principle to establish the misconduct in the departmental enquiries. When the records clearly speak that payment of rent was made by irregular methods and against the regular practice of the bank, the question of examining the landlord does not arise. He submits that in respect of departmental enquires, the principles are well-settled more particularly with regard to intervention of the Courts and Tribunals. When the records clearly speak that payment of rent was made by irregular methods and against the regular practice of the bank, the question of examining the landlord does not arise. He submits that in respect of departmental enquires, the principles are well-settled more particularly with regard to intervention of the Courts and Tribunals. In this regard, he relied on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh , [ AIR 1977 SC 1512 ] , State of Karnataka v. M. Gangaraj , [ (2020) 3 SCC 423 ] , GM Operations S.B.I. v. R. Periyaswami , [ (2015) 3 SCC 101 ] , Union of India v. Dorai Swami (dated 19.04.2022), Boloram Bordoloi v. Lakhimi Gaolia Bank , [(2021) 1 SCR 858] , Chairman LIC of India v. A. Masilamani , [AIR Online 2012 SC 426] . Finally, learned Senior Counsel submits that departmental enquiry was conducted in accordance with the provisions of law and the bank rules. The Enquiry Authority has categorically held that charges 1 to 5 were established by the management and by following the rules of the bank, the competent authority awarded the punishment. The Appellate Authority, after considering the material on record, reduced the punishment awarded by the Appointing Authority, hence, the same need no interference at the hands of this Court. 4. Having heard learned counsel on either side, perused the record. 5. The first contention raised by learned counsel for petitioner is that charges are vague and inconsistent. According to petitioner, no evidence was led to show that he was not staying in the leased accommodation during the disputed period nor was there any evidence to show that rents were not received by the landlord for the said period. He submits that charges 1 to 3 could be proved by examining the landlord Dr. Vimal Joseph Devadas or his father Dr. Jamesh Joseph. However, learned Senior Counsel submits that petitioner admitted that he understood the charges mentioned in the charge sheet during the enquiry; even though he is entitled for leased accommodation, he failed to give the correct particulars of the landlord and he entered into an agreement of lease with one person and remitted the rent to some other person which fact was established in the departmental enquiry. When the record clearly shows that lease agreement was entered with Dr. When the record clearly shows that lease agreement was entered with Dr. Vimal Joseph Devadas, the real owner was Dr. James Joseph and in the application, the address of the house was mentioned as Door No. 21, Old No. 131, Vanniar, 1st street, whereas he has taken permission to take on lease H.No. 134, Vanniar Street, Choolaimeda, Chennai-94 belonging to Dr. Vimal Joseph Devadas, hence, the burden is on petitioner to prove that house taken for rent belongs to particular landlord and rent was paid to him. Further, petitioner failed to establish that the entire amount received from the bank towards the leased accommodation was paid to the correct landlord. 6. In view of the rival contentions, it is to be seen that to substantiate charges 1 to 5, no documentary evidence was produced by the respondent bank. The allegations were made based on vouchers, but they failed to produce the same during enquiry and no voucher was marked in the findings of the Enquiry officer. The respondent bank except stating that charges are clear and unambiguous and that petitioner also stated in the enquiry that he understood the charges, have not stated how charges are clear and distinct from each other, in conformity with Regulation 68(2) (ii) of the State Bank of Hyderabad (Officers) Disciplinary Regulations on which charges were framed. In this connection, Regulation 68(2)(iii) gains importance. It postulates that ‘where it is proposed to hold an enquiry, the Disciplinary Authority shall frame definite and distinct charges on the basis of the allegations against the officer and the articles of charge, together with a statement of allegations, list of documents relied on along with copy of such documents and list of witnesses along with copy of Statement of witnesses, if any on which they are based shall be communicated in writing to the Officer, who shall be required to submit, within such time as may be specified by the Disciplinary Authority.’ In this case, admittedly, no list of witnesses and documents is furnished. In the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for petitioner in Surat Chandra Chakrabarthy’s case (supra), it is held that ‘in this connection, reference may be made to Fundamental Rule 55 which provides, inter alia, that without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants Enquiry Act, 1850, no order of dismissal removal or reduction shall be passed on a member of service unless he is informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed, to take action and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action have to be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges which have to be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and any other circumstance which it is proposed to be taken into consideration in passing orders has also to be stated. This rule embodies a principle which is one of the basic contents of a reasonable or adequate opportunity for defending oneself. If a person is not told clearly and definitely what the allegations are on which the charges preferred against him are founded, he cannot possibly, by projecting his own imagination, discover all the facts and circumstances that may be in the contemplation of the authorities to be established against him’. In the absence of such particulars, this Court finds some force in the contention of learned counsel that charges are vague. 7. As regards the other contention that crucial documents were not supplied to petitioner for giving reply to the charges during the course of enquiry and crucial witnesses were not examined, is concerned, it is to be observed that petitioner addressed the Enquiry Officer for supply of documents and his defence witnesses to be called during the course of enquiry dated 11.03.2011. According to petitioner, no document including lease agreement was supplied to him; further, vouchers and other documents, which were referred to in the charge memo including lease agreement were not supplied. Whereas learned Senior Counsel submits that documents relevant and required to establish the charges were filed by the bank and petitioner was given opportunity, however, he failed to rebut the evidences, hence, he has no right to claim now that the bank has not produced the documents sought by him. Whereas learned Senior Counsel submits that documents relevant and required to establish the charges were filed by the bank and petitioner was given opportunity, however, he failed to rebut the evidences, hence, he has no right to claim now that the bank has not produced the documents sought by him. In this regard, it is to be observed that when petitioner made a specific request for supply of documents by the letter dated 11.03.2011, no documents were supplied but imputations were read out and exhibits were marked. Though respondents contend that they supplied documents, no proof in support of the said contention was filed. Hence, the contention of learned counsel for petitioner cannot be brushed aside. 8. Further, the charge memo was issued based on the report of Sri K. Venugopal. The said report was also not furnished to petitioner at the time of issuing the charge memo nor before proceeding with the enquiry. However, it was placed as MR 2/2 during the course of enquiry and marked as Ex.ME 1/1 and the author of the said document was also not examined which is contrary to the procedure and Regulations of the bank. Though respondents contend that in the departmental enquiry strict rules of evidence are not applicable but preponderance of probabilities is the guiding principle, the basic principle that when a report is filed to establish the charge which was produced behind the back of petitioner and which was only the basis for establishing the charge, examining Sri K. Venugopal is must and he has to be produced as evidence and an opportunity ought to have been given to petitioner to cross-examine him. Not only that, respondents failed to examine the defence witness s Dr. Vimal Joseph Devadas, S/o Jamers Joseph, landlord who is the signatory to the lease agreement and charges 1 to 4 are based on the lease agreement signed by Dr. Vimal Joseph Devadas. In the charge memo dated 18.12.2010, the original owner of the house was shown as Dr. James Joseph but not Dr. Vimal Joseph Devadas and a wrong lease agreement was submitted and rents were paid through various methods to Dr. Vimal Joseph Devadas and caused loss to the bank. Petitioner therefore, requested through letter dated 11.03.2011 to examine Dr. Vimal Joseph Devadas as defence witness No.2, but the Enquiry Officer did not consider the said request. James Joseph but not Dr. Vimal Joseph Devadas and a wrong lease agreement was submitted and rents were paid through various methods to Dr. Vimal Joseph Devadas and caused loss to the bank. Petitioner therefore, requested through letter dated 11.03.2011 to examine Dr. Vimal Joseph Devadas as defence witness No.2, but the Enquiry Officer did not consider the said request. Failure to examine the material witness is fatal to the case of respondents. 9. In this connection, it is relevant to notice the law laid down on the subject. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chintaman Sadashiva Waishampayan’s case (supra) , held as under: “Then as to the file of the Razakars it is really surprising that this file should be reported to have been lost. The respondent's case was that the Razakars in question for whose release he is alleged to have accepted the bribe were released on the recommendation of the District Superintendent of Police and under the orders of the Civil Administrator of Adilabad. The file was therefore relevant and, according to the respondent, the suggestion that the file had been lost was untrue and it was not produced because it was apprehended that, if produced, it would support his defence. It is true that the enquiry officer stated that he had made a search in his office but it could not be traced and that he was enquiring from the Collector and trying to find out whether the file could be found in the Collector's office. Apparently the respondent was given a letter addressed to the Collector wherein he was requested to show the file to the respondent if available. He was, however, told that the file was not traceable. It is in connection with the alleged loss of this file that the criticism made by Mr Justice Sen about the indecent haste made in the enquiry becomes relevant. If only more diligent efforts had been made to discover the file the enquiry officer would have been able to see whether the plea made by the respondent on the strength of the said file was genuine or not. It is in the light of these facts that the High Court has held that the enquiry was not satisfactory, and that in substance the respondent had been denied a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges framed against him. It is in the light of these facts that the High Court has held that the enquiry was not satisfactory, and that in substance the respondent had been denied a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges framed against him. There is no dispute that under Article 311(2) the respondent is entitled to have such a reasonable opportunity. A proper opportunity must be afforded to him at the stage of the enquiry after the charge is supplied to him as well as at the second stage when punishment is about to be imposed on him. If the first enquiry was materially defective and denied the respondent an opportunity to prove his case it is impossible to hold that a reasonable opportunity guaranteed to a public servant by Article 311(2) had been afforded to the respondent in the present case. 10. In Khark Singh’s case (supra) , it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as under: “ A reading of the enquiry report also shows that the respondent herein was not furnished with the required documents. The Department's witnesses were not examined in his presence. Though the respondent who was the writ petitioner specifically stated so in the affidavit before the High Court in the writ proceedings, those averments were specifically controverted in the reply-affidavit filed by the Department. Mere denial for the sake of denial is not an answer to the specific allegations made in the affidavit. Likewise, there is no evidence to show that after submission of the report by the enquiry officer to the disciplinary authority, the respondent herein was furnished with the copy of the said report along with all the relied upon documents. When all these infirmities were specifically pleaded and brought to the notice of the appellate authority (i.e Forest Conservator), he rejected the same but has not pointed out the relevant materials from the records of the enquiry officer and disciplinary authority to support his decision. Hence, the appellate authority has also committed an error in dismissing the appeal of the respondent. 11. In Kuldeep Singh’s case (supra) , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “ The original complaint was not placed on the record and it was the statement, recorded by SHO D.D Sharma, which was produced before the enquiry officer. Hence, the appellate authority has also committed an error in dismissing the appeal of the respondent. 11. In Kuldeep Singh’s case (supra) , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “ The original complaint was not placed on the record and it was the statement, recorded by SHO D.D Sharma, which was produced before the enquiry officer. The absence of the original complaint, therefore, indicates that there was, in fact, no complaint in existence which further supports the statement of the Department's own witness, Smt Meena Mishra that no payment was made by her on 22-2-1990. The enquiry officer did not sit with an open mind to hold an impartial domestic enquiry which is an essential component of the principles of natural justice as also that of “reasonable opportunity”, contemplated by Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The “bias” in favour of the Department had so badly affected the enquiry officer's whole faculty of reasoning that even non-production of the complainants was ascribed to the appellant which squarely was the fault of the Department. Once the Department knew that the labourers were employed somewhere in Devli Khanpur, their presence could have been procured and they could have been produced before the enquiry officer to prove the charge framed against the appellant. He has acted so arbitrarily in the matter and has found the appellant guilty in such a coarse manner that it becomes apparent that he was merely carrying out the command from some superior officer who perhaps directed “fix him up”. 12. In C.S. Sharma’s case (supra) , the Hon’ble Court observed thus: 6. The first question is whether this inquiry was made under sub-rule (1) or (3) of Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. It is an admitted fact that Sharma was a temporary employee and therefore his case would fall to be governed by sub-rule (3) of Rule 55 if it could be said that the enquiry which was being made was for a specific fault or on account of his unsuitability for service. It is an admitted fact that Sharma was a temporary employee and therefore his case would fall to be governed by sub-rule (3) of Rule 55 if it could be said that the enquiry which was being made was for a specific fault or on account of his unsuitability for service. Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 55 is a general rule for enquiries where the conduct of a person is inquired into for misconduct but sub-rule (3) says that that sub-rule shall not apply where it is proposed to terminate the employment of a probationer, or to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank a temporary government servant for any specific fault or on account of his unsuitability for the service. Sub-rule (3) says that in such cases, the probationer or temporary government servant concerned shall be apprised of the grounds of such proposal, given an opportunity to show cause against the action to be taken against him, and his explanation in this behalf, if any, shall be duly considered before orders are passed by the competent authority. If the third sub-rule applied, it is obvious that the kind of enquiry made complied with its requirements. The first sub- rule, however, provides for a full-blooded enquiry which is the counterpart of a regular trial: witnesses have to be examined in support of the allegations, opportunity has to be given to the delinquent officer to cross-examine them and to lead evidence in his defence. In our judgment the present case was governed by the first sub-rule and not the third sub-rule. The third sub-rule deals with the unsuitability of an officer for the service or with a charge for any specific fault. This fault means a fault in the execution of his duties and not a misconduct such as taking bribe etc. which are charges of a more serious nature, affecting the character of the individual concerned. The collocation of the words “any specific fault” or “on account of unsuitability for service” give the clue of the distinction between the third sub-rule and the first sub-rule. An officer who is, for example, habitually lazy or makes mistakes frequently or is not polite or decorous may be considered unsuitable for the service. The collocation of the words “any specific fault” or “on account of unsuitability for service” give the clue of the distinction between the third sub-rule and the first sub-rule. An officer who is, for example, habitually lazy or makes mistakes frequently or is not polite or decorous may be considered unsuitable for the service. Another officer who makes a grievous default in the execution of his work may be charged for the specific individual fault, that is a dereliction or defect in the execution of that duty. Where there is an allegation that an officer is guilty of a misconduct such as accepting bribe or showing favours, the matter is not one of specific fault in the execution of his work but something more. That matter will fall to be governed by the first sub-rule because you cannot charge a man with criminal conduct without affording him adequate opportunity to clear his character. Mr Aggarwal fairly pointed out that the Government had appointed the enquiring officer to take action under Rule 55(1) and it is thus quite clear that the Government viewed the matter also in this light. It, therefore, follows that if the procedure under the first sub-rule had to be followed, adequate opportunity had to be given to Sharma to lead evidence on his own behalf to clear himself of serious charges which were levelled against him and give evidence on his own behalf. It is obvious that he has not been able to lead his defence or to give evidence on his own behalf. The question is whether he has to thank himself or the omission proceeded because of some action on the part of the enquiring officer. Considering the whole matter we are satisfied that the enquiring officer was to blame and we shall now show why we think so. Throughout the enquiry, as late as February 24, 1954, Sharma had again and again given indication that he would lead evidence in his defence. At first he had given a list of three witnesses which he later amplified to four leaving out one from the original list and adding two new names. He had also stated that he wanted to examine himself in his defence. At first he had given a list of three witnesses which he later amplified to four leaving out one from the original list and adding two new names. He had also stated that he wanted to examine himself in his defence. The learned Commissioner who was holding the enquiry on more than one occasion stated that he would be afforded this opportunity and also that a date would be fixed for the examination of the defence witnesses. It is true that Sharma was playing for time and on the 2nd of February (before the date of hearing came) he put in an application that he would like an adjournment of 20 days before he submitted a final list of witnesses with their addresses. This application was rejected on February 6 but between February 6 and April 8, when the report was made, two long months passed and it was possible for the Commissioner to have fixed a date, on which, if he was so minded, Sharma could bring his witnesses in support of his case or tender himself for examination. No action was taken between February 6, 1954 and April 8, 1954 to enable Sharma to lead his defence, if any, in support of his part of the case. This omission in our judgment was sufficient to vitiate the whole proceeding because no enquiry of this type in which there are charges of a criminal nature can be said to be properly conducted when the defence of the officer is either frustrated or ruled out. It was submitted by Mr Agarwal, that the witnesses were being summoned by him to clear himself of the charge of owning a car without having the visible means to afford it and this charge was not accepted by the State Government. This is true enough, but the State Government came on the scene much later. In so far as the enquiring officer was concerned, he had accepted the allegation against Sharma and even if the original list be considered, Sharma was entitled to lead evidence with regard to the car itself. It is possible that if a date had been fixed, he would, not only have led evidence with regard to the car, but would have brought witnesses to clear himself of other charges, but no such opportunity was clearly afforded to him. It is possible that if a date had been fixed, he would, not only have led evidence with regard to the car, but would have brought witnesses to clear himself of other charges, but no such opportunity was clearly afforded to him. Further before the case closed, the Commissioner had before him a list of four witnesses and fair play demanded that he should have fixed a date and left it to Sharma to procure attendance of his witnesses on that date, but if no date was fixed, Sharma was not expected to bring his witnesses day after day in the hope that the Commissioner would examine them any day. The enquiry cannot be said to comply with the elementary principles of natural justice and therefore we have no hesitation in accepting the decision of the High Court that the enquiry was vitiated. 13. In view of the discussion supra, in particular, the law extracted, this Court is in complete agreement with learned counsel for petitioner that enquiry was conducted without following the Regulations of the bank. 14. Learned counsel for petitioner also contends that enquiry report was not supplied to his client at the first instance before accepting the enquiry report. It is submitted that wherever disciplinary authority is not the Enquiry Authority, then the enquiry report has to be given at the first place before accepting the same by the Disciplinary Authority to the delinquent officer is the law declared by the Hon’ble Apex Court in ECIL v. Karunakar, (2005) 5 SCC 532 . In the said judgment, it is held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as under: “What are the duties of the enquiry officer appointed by the disciplinary authority to conduct the inquiry, is the next question and this Court in A. N. D'Silva v. The Union Of India . 1962 Supp (1) SCR 968, AIR 1962 SC 1130 has in terms held that the question of imposing punishment can only arise after inquiry is made and the report of the enquiry officer is received. It is for the punishing authority to propose the punishment and not for the inquiring authority to do so. The latter has, when so required, to appraise the evidence, to record its conclusion and if it thinks proper to suggest the appropriate punishment. It is for the punishing authority to propose the punishment and not for the inquiring authority to do so. The latter has, when so required, to appraise the evidence, to record its conclusion and if it thinks proper to suggest the appropriate punishment. But neither the conclusion on the evidence nor the punishment which the inquiring authority may regard as appropriate, is binding upon the punishing authority. In that case, the charge served upon the delinquent officer by the enquiry officer itself incorporated the proposed punishment. Hence it was also observed that in the communication addressed by the enquiry officer the punishment proposed to be imposed upon the appellant if he was found guilty of the charges, could not properly be set out. Two things, therefore, emerge from this decision, viz., that it is not the function of the enquiry officer to propose any punishment even after he records findings of guilt against the delinquent employee. Much less can the enquiry officer do so at the stage of serving the charges on the employee. Secondly, it is for the disciplinary authority to propose the punishment after receipt of the report of the enquiry officer which suggests that before the authority proposes the punishment, it must have applied its mind to the evidence and the findings recorded by the enquiry officer”. 15. In the present case, admittedly, the disciplinary authority is not the Enquiry Officer and further, he has accepted the enquiry report and held that charges are proved and recommended major penalty without supplying the enquiry report at the first instance, however, at the time of issuing show cause notice proposing punishment, the report was supplied by which time, enquiry report was already accepted and a decision was taken to impose a major penalty. Added to this, as contended by learned counsel, the 2 nd respondent passed the order impugned without assigning any reasons. The said Authority simply reduced the punishment but it has not stated on what ground, it arrived to such a conclusion. In this regard, learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Oryx Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. case (supra), wherein it is held as under: “ It is of course true that the show-cause notice cannot be read hypertechnically and it is well settled that it is to be read reasonably. In this regard, learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Oryx Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. case (supra), wherein it is held as under: “ It is of course true that the show-cause notice cannot be read hypertechnically and it is well settled that it is to be read reasonably. But one thing is clear that while reading a show-cause notice the person who is subject to it must get an impression that he will get an effective opportunity to rebut the allegations contained in the show-cause notice and prove his innocence. If on a reasonable reading of a show-cause notice a person of ordinary prudence gets the feeling that his reply to the show-cause notice will be an empty ceremony and he will merely knock his head against the impenetrable wall of prejudged opinion, such a show-cause notice does not commence a fair procedure especially when it is issued in a quasi-judicial proceeding under a statutory regulation which promises to give the person proceeded against a reasonable opportunity of defence. 41. In the instant case the appellate order contains reasons. However, absence of reasons in the original order cannot be compensated by disclosure of reason in the appellate order”. 16. In Roopsingh Negi’s case (supra), it has been observed as under: “ Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority are not supported by any reason. As the orders passed by them have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the confession made by the appellant, there was no reason as to why the order of discharge passed by the criminal court on the basis of selfsame evidence should not have been taken into consideration. The materials brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the enquiry officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn by the enquiry officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the enquiry officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn by the enquiry officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof. 17. Taking into consideration the circumstances stated supra and the law laid down, as extracted above, this Court is of the opinion that petitioner is entitled to the relief sought and Writ Petition deserves to be allowed. 18. The Writ Petition is accordingly, allowed, setting aside the impugned orders dated 23.07.2011 of the 3 rd respondent and the one dated 24.01.2012 of the 2 nd respondent. Consequently, it is directed that respondents shall issue all consequential benefits to petitioner, as is admissible, as per Rules. No costs. 19. Consequently, miscellaneous Applications, if any shall stand closed.