JUDGMENT : MURALEE KRISHNA S., J. 1. The respondents in W.P.(C)No.26067 of 2025 filed this writ appeal under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act , 1958, being aggrieved by the interim order dated 18.08.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in that writ petition. 2. The respondents herein approached this Court with the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India , seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P16 order dated 21.06.2025 of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Ernakulam, (Special Court for the Trial of Criminal Cases against Sitting and Former MPs/MLAs of the State) in CMP No.2430 of 2025 in MC No.797 of 2022, contending that the said order is one issued without jurisdiction. In the writ petition, the respondents sought an interim relief to stay all further proceedings pursuant to Ext.P16 order dated 21.06.2025 of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Ernakulam, pending disposal of the writ petition. 3. On 18.07.2025, when the writ petition came up for admission, the learned Single Judge passed an interim order, which reads thus: “The respondent Bank is directed to file a counter meeting the allegations in the writ petition. There will be an interim stay as prayed for, for a period of one month. Post on 18.08.2025.” 4. Challenging the above interim order, the appellants approached this Court by filing Writ Appeal No.1802 of 2025. By the judgment dated 11.08.2025, this Court disposed of that writ appeal setting aside the interim order dated 18.07.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge, on the sole ground that it is not supported by reasons. Paragraphs 8, 9 and the last paragraph of that judgment read thus: “8. In LIC Housing Finance Ltd. v. Nagson and Company, 2025 KHC OnLine 7406 , a decision relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants-respondents, the Apex Court noticed that despite the said Court in a series of judgments – United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110 being one among them – having cautioned the High Courts to exercise writ jurisdiction judicially while entertaining challenges to the actions by secured creditors under Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act , 2002 to enforce their security interest in view of the scheme, purpose and object of the enactment, some of the High Courts took the other way and grant interim relief on the mere asking. The Apex Court still come across cases where, without just and sufficient reason being recorded, proceedings taken by secured creditors have been interdicted by the High Courts, with or without imposition of conditions, amounting to great disservice of institutional credibility. 9. Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, conclusion is irresistible that, in the absence of reasons recorded in the interim order dated 18.07.2025, the said order of the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained in law. In the result, this writ appeal is disposed of, by setting aside the interim order dated 18.07.2025 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.26067 of 2025 on the sole ground that it is not supported by reasons. Such an order cannot be sustained in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the decisions referred to supra. It is made clear that this judgment will not stand in the way of the learned Single Judge considering the interim relief sought for in W.P.(C)No.26067 of 2025 afresh, after considering the legal and factual contentions raised by both sides, including the question of maintainability. So as to enable the respondents-petitioners to bring up the writ petition before the learned Single Judge, status quo as on today, in respect of the secured assets, shall be maintained for a period of two days.” 5. After the disposal of the writ appeal, when the matter again came up for consideration before the learned Single Judge on 18.08.2025, the learned Single Judge passed the impugned order. The said interim order reads thus: “The pleadings in the writ petition show that the figure stated by the bank as due from the petitioners, when disposing of W.P(C) No. 18034/2024 on 24.06.2024, was Rs. 85 lakhs. The said figure was sought to be varied at the instance of the bank by filing an R.P., after the writ petitioners had allegedly paid the entire amount mentioned earlier. Orders were passed in R.P. 157/2025 on 18.03.2025, wherein the bank raised a contention that as of 20.05.2024, the outstanding amount would be Rs. 1,29,03,944/-. Even then, the petitioners had objected to the figure suggested by the bank. The judgment in R.P. No. 157 of 2025 dated 18.03.2025 reads as follows; “The Standing Counsel submits that what was submitted by the Standing Counsel is incorrect and the actual amount is Rs.1,29,03,944/-. 1,29,03,944/-. Even then, the petitioners had objected to the figure suggested by the bank. The judgment in R.P. No. 157 of 2025 dated 18.03.2025 reads as follows; “The Standing Counsel submits that what was submitted by the Standing Counsel is incorrect and the actual amount is Rs.1,29,03,944/-. Since it is an error on the part of the Counsel, I am of the view that the said amount can be corrected. But it is made clear that this will not be treated as an amount admitted by the petitioners or computed by this Court. The actual amount will be as adjudicated by the appropriate Tribunal. The Review Petition is, therefore, allowed to the extent of substituting the figure Rs.1,10,00,000/- appearing in paragraph 7 of the judgment as Rs.1,29,03,944/-. The figure Rs.85,00,000/- shown in paragraph11(i) shall also stand substituted as Rs.1,04,03,944/-.” 2. It is submitted by both sides that the matter is pending consideration before the tribunal, and the amount, if any, due from the petitioners or payable by the bank in the counterclaim, has not been quantified. 3. That apart, the petitioners contends that the first application preferred by the bank under S.14 of the SARFAESI Act was dismissed, and later the same was allowed without citing any reason. 4. The judgments cited on behalf of the bank are of no help to them in a case where the amount payable by the petitioners have not yet been decided by the Tribunal, as directed by this Court. In the nature of the disputes raised in this writ petition, the statutory actions of the bank can certainly be called in question in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India , and no judgment forecloses that. The argument/ understanding that a writ petition is not maintainable is certainly flawed. 5. Given the above, I am inclined to entertain this writ petition. The parties are directed to complete the pleadings. Meanwhile, there will be an interim stay as prayed for, pending the writ petition. Post on 18.09.2025.” 6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants-respondents and also the learned counsel for the respondents-petitioners. 7. 5. Given the above, I am inclined to entertain this writ petition. The parties are directed to complete the pleadings. Meanwhile, there will be an interim stay as prayed for, pending the writ petition. Post on 18.09.2025.” 6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants-respondents and also the learned counsel for the respondents-petitioners. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the Bank has already filed a detailed counter affidavit before the learned Single Judge raising the issue of maintainability of the writ petition, which was not at all addressed by the learned Single Judge while granting the interim order. The reason stated by the learned Single Judge that the Bank has to wait until the amount due is quantified in the original proceedings in the O.A. before proceeding under the Securitisation Act cannot be sustained in view of the law declared by the Apex Court. As far as the maintainability of the writ petition is concerned, the learned counsel relied on several judgments of the Apex Court, starting from United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110. 8. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents would submit that there is a procedural violation on the part of the Bank, and hence the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate lacks jurisdiction to consider the matter. Ext.P16 order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate is under challenge before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. Therefore, there is no illegality in the order of the learned Single Judge. 9. Law is well settled regarding the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the proceedings initiated by the Bank under the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (‘ SARFAESI Act ’ in short) in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India . 10. In Satyawati Tondon (2010) 8 SCC 110 the Apex Court held thus: 24. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If respondent No. 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under S.13(4) or action taken under S.14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under S.17(1). The expression ’any person’ used in S.17(1) is of wide import. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If respondent No. 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under S.13(4) or action taken under S.14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under S.17(1). The expression ’any person’ used in S.17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under S.13(4) or S.14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under S.17 and S.18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc., the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Art.226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute”. 11. In Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and Another v. Mathew K.C. 2018 (1) KHC 786 , the Apex Court held that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can entertain a writ petition only under exceptional circumstances and that it is a self imposed restraint by the High Court. 11. In Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and Another v. Mathew K.C. 2018 (1) KHC 786 , the Apex Court held that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can entertain a writ petition only under exceptional circumstances and that it is a self imposed restraint by the High Court. The four exceptional circumstances such as, where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, were re iterated in paragraph 6 of the said judgment by relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax and Others v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603. 12. This position was reiterated by the Apex Court in M/s. South Indian Bank Ltd. v. Naveen Mathew Philip, 2023 (4) KLT 29 and after discussing the various judgments on the point as well as the circumstances in which the High Court can interfere with in matters pertaining to the SARFAESI Act , held as under: “Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi - judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Art.226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute”. 13. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Art.226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute”. 13. In PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank, 2024 (3) KHC SN 3 the Apex Court held that it is more than a settled legal position of law that in matters arising out of RDB Act and SARFAESI Act , the High Court should not entertain a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India , particularly when an alternative statutory remedy is available. 14. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Jasmin K. v. State Bank of India, 2024 (3) KHC 266 reiterated the position of law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments. 15. From the materials on record, we notice that the appellants have filed a detailed counter affidavit dated 30.07.2025 in the writ petition, producing therewith Ext.R1A document. The maintainability of the writ petition itself is challenged in that counter-affidavit. It is also evident from the judgment dated 11.08.2025 in Writ Appeal No.1802 of 2025 passed by this Court that the interim order dated 18.07.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge was set aside by this Court on the sole ground that it is not supported by reasons. Even then, while going through the impugned order dated 18.08.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge, we find no sufficient reasoning therein to say that the learned Single Judge has taken into consideration the issue of maintainability raised by the appellants in its proper perspective. Though in paragraph 4 of that order, it is stated that the judgments cited on behalf of the Bank are of no help to them in a case where the amount payable by the respondents/petitioners has not yet been decided by the Tribunal, the details of the judgments held by the Court as not applicable are nowhere stated in that order. Moreover, why the writ petition is maintainable and on which ground stated in Mathew K.C. 2018 (1) KHC 786 and the subsequent pronouncement of the Apex Court, the present writ petition will fall, are also not discernible from the impugned order. In such circumstances, we have no hesitation to hold that the impugned order dated 18.08.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge is liable to be set aside. In such circumstances, we have no hesitation to hold that the impugned order dated 18.08.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge is liable to be set aside. In the result, the writ appeal is allowed by setting aside the impugned order dated 18.08.2025 in W.P.(C)No.26067 of 2025. We are sure that before passing any further interim orders, the learned Single Judge will surely consider the legal and factual contentions raised by the parties to the lis regarding the maintainability of the writ petition itself. In order to enable the respondents to bring up the writ petition before the learned Single Judge, status quo as on today, in respect of the secured assets shall be maintained for a period of two days.