ORDER : NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA, J. Petitioner challenges the Award dated 20.08.2014 in I.D.No. 73 of 2002 whereby and whereunder the 3 rd respondent Tribunal modified the dismissal order as compulsory retirement. A consequential direction is sought to the Corporation to treat petitioner as retired from service on 31.03.2014 on reaching the superannuation age along with consequential benefits of continuity of service, attendant benefits and back wages. 2. Petitioner while working as Junior Assistant faced allegations leading to suspension on 18.02.1997. The allegations were based on an Audit Report dated 10.02.1997, which resulted in a charge memo dated 18.03.1997. A subsequent charge memo dated 21.06.1997 followed. Despite repeated requests, petitioner was not provided with relevant records to defend himself. It is contended that charges were baseless and that he was wrongfully implicated for faults committed by others. Moreover, a police complaint was filed against him at P.S. Humayunnagar, Hyderabad, with charges overlapping those in the departmental inquiry. The petitioner requested a stay on the departmental inquiry until the criminal case's resolution, which was denied. The departmental inquiry was conducted in violation of the service regulations, resulting in his dismissal from service without an opportunity to present comments on the inquiry report. It is the complaint of petitioner that no subsistence allowance was paid during his suspension period, rendering the entire proceedings procedurally flawed. Consequently, he raised I.D. No. 108 of 2000 before the Labour Court-I, Hyderabad, which was subsequently, renumbered as I.D. No. 73 of 2002 upon transfer to the 3 rd respondent Industrial Tribunal. It is also stated, petitioner’s suspension on 18.02.1997 culminated in his dismissal from service on 03.04.1998. The Tribunal passed Award dated 19.08.2003 directing respondents to reinstate petitioner with all benefits and 50% back wages. The said Award was challenged in Writ Petition No. 22649 of 2003. This Court remanded the matter for fresh decision regarding validity of the domestic inquiry. On 06.10.2005, the Tribunal invalidated the domestic inquiry which resulted in filing Writ Petition No. 22971 of 2005 by respondents. The said Writ Petition was allowed, challenging the said petitioner filed Writ Appeal No. 84 of 2006, which was allowed on 20.09.2011, remitting the matter to the Tribunal while holding the inquiry as invalid. On remand, respondents examined N. Vijay Kumar, Divisional Manager (MW1) and B. Saidaiah, Auditor (MW2) and marked Exs.M1 to M60, whose report formed the basis of the charges. On remand, respondents examined N. Vijay Kumar, Divisional Manager (MW1) and B. Saidaiah, Auditor (MW2) and marked Exs.M1 to M60, whose report formed the basis of the charges. Petitioner was examined as WW1 and marked Ex.W1. During cross-examination, MW1 and MW2 admitted that charges in Ex.M6 and Ex.M18 were the subject of criminal case (C.C. No. 28 of 1999) wherein petitioner was acquitted on 26.11.2000, as per Ex.M60. Despite the acquittal and inability of respondents to prove the charges, the Tribunal modified the dismissal order to compulsory retirement, prompting the petitioner to file this Writ Petition. Learned counsel for petitioner Sri V. Narsimha Goud mainly submits that the Tribunal erred in relying on Ex.M2 (Audit Report), which was found to have been prepared without physical stock verification. It is submitted that letter dated 31.03.1997 was obtained while petitioner was in custody, even though it was neither part of the inquiry report nor referenced in dismissal order, the Tribunal relied on the same. Learned counsel points out the other employees who involved in similar allegations, including T.P. Ranganatham, K. Venkatesham, and Rama Rao Jaggatah, faced no action, hence, the action against petitioner would amount to victimization and vindictiveness. It is submitted that since petitioner was acquitted in criminal case and as the charges in departmental enquiry and criminal case are identical, witnesses being the same, the Tribunal ought to have held in favour of petitioner. Learned counsel, in support of his arguments, relied on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan , [ (2024) 1 SCC 175 ] , G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat , [ (2006) 5 SCC 446 ] Sulekh Chand & Salek Chand v. Commissioner of Police , [1994 Supp (3) SCC 674] State of Uttaranchal v. Kharak Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 236 , Rajendra Yadav v. State of Madhya Pradesh , [ (2013) 3 SCC 73 ] , Man Singh v. State of Haryana, (2008) 12 SCC 331 and Makhan Singh v. Narainpura Co-operative Agricultural Service Society Limited , [ (1987) 3 SCC 571 ] 3. Heard learned Government Pleader for Services III who submits that the Tribunal, after thoroughly analysing the evidence and material before it, passed the Award impugned which does not require any interference at the hands of this Court. 4. Heard learned Government Pleader for Services III who submits that the Tribunal, after thoroughly analysing the evidence and material before it, passed the Award impugned which does not require any interference at the hands of this Court. 4. From a perusal of the Award of the Tribunal, it is evident that petitioner was alleged to have caused stock deficit which resulted in financial loss to the respondent Corporation. In this connection, based on the complaint given by the 2nd respondent, a case was booked at Humayunnagar Police Station which was registered as C.C.No. 28 of 1999 for the offences under Sections 409 and 466 IPC. The said case ultimately ended in acquittal on 16.11.2000. It is the argument of learned counsel for petitioner that charges in departmental enquiry and criminal case are identical, the witnesses being the same, the Tribunal ought to have held in favour of petitioner. He places strong reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Lal’s case (supra) . The said judgment considered the effect of acquittal in the criminal proceeding on the order of dismissal passed in the departmental enquiry. The Supreme Court held that expressions like ‘benefit of doubt’ and ‘honourably acquitted’ used in judgments are not to be understood as magic incantations. A court of law will not be carried away by the mere use of such terminology. The conclusion that acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge can only be arrived at after a reading of the judgment in its entirety. The Court in judicial review is obliged to examine the substance of the judgment and not go by the form of expression used. Admittedly, in C.C.No. 28 of 1999, learned Presiding Officer recorded that prosecution failed to bring home the guilt of accused for the offences alleged and accused has not committed any offence. In this context, it is necessary to look into the well- settled law that ‘in criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of ‘preponderance of probability’. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of ‘preponderance of probability’. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. (see Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ) Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. (2005) 7 SCC 764 . ). In view of the same, the contention of learned counsel cannot be countenanced. 5. Coming to the merits of the matter, the Tribunal in the light of the evidence and contentions placed before it, observed that there is no dispute or a denial from the petitioner about discrepancy of the records and stocks; Ex.M2 Audit Report and the relevant entries under Ex.M3 at pages 337 to 377 would show the reference of cancellation of invoices and discrepancies; M.W.2 categorically stated that he has not physically verified the existing stocks, being an Auditor and when it is the allegation of misappropriation, it is the duty of M.W.2 to physically verify the stocks and tally and compare them with the entries incorporated to in the Registers. M.W.1 also admitted that he was also found fault along with other persons for the discrepancy of these stocks and earlier years also there was a discrepancy in these stocks. M.W.1 on the one hand claimed that he regularly verified the stocks and on the other, stated that he has not verified the stocks periodically. The Audit reports clearly show that failure of supervision and verification of stocks led to deficiency and resulting in misappropriation. The Tribunal observed that failure to make physical verification of the stocks goes to the root of the case and it is a serious lapse on the part of M.Ws.1 and 2. The Audit reports clearly show that failure of supervision and verification of stocks led to deficiency and resulting in misappropriation. The Tribunal observed that failure to make physical verification of the stocks goes to the root of the case and it is a serious lapse on the part of M.Ws.1 and 2. At the same time, the Tribunal took into consideration the letter addressed by petitioner to the Secretary to Government, Social Welfare Department and the Regional Manager, Girijan Cooperative Corporation Limited dated 31.03.1997 requesting to drop charges against him, wherein it is submitted that his trade voucher bills for the period July 1995 to February 1997 are to be cleared and amounts are due to him and he is ready to pay the balance amounts to the Corporation which comes to Rs.45,015/-. The Tribunal observed that the said letter was in the course of functioning of the government officers and it cannot be said that it is created and fabricated. Further, W.W.1 i.e. petitioner in his own cross-examination admitted that all the amounts collected by him were not remitted. His admission in the cross-examination supports Ex.M.11, in view of the same, it is clear that petitioner is guilty of misappropriating some amount. Though learned counsel urges that since charges were not completely proved, the Tribunal ought to have granted the relief of reinstatement with all benefits, the said contention cannot be accepted in view of admission of petitioner in the letter stated supra. 6. Learned counsel further contends that M.Ws.1 and 2 gave evidence in criminal case admitting that stocks were not physically verified resulting in acquittal of petitioner as misappropriation was not clearly established and M.W.1 and other co-workers who are clerks and senior Assistants are also guilty but action was not initiated against them which shows victimization and vindictiveness. He also relied on in support of the said contention, the judgments in Rajendra Yadav’s case (supra) and Man Singh’s case (supra) . He also relied on in support of the said contention, the judgments in Rajendra Yadav’s case (supra) and Man Singh’s case (supra) . However, it is to be seen here that there may be lapses on the part of other employees and respondents might not have initiated action against them but that does not absolve petitioner of the charges alleged, particularly in view of the admission made by him in his cross-examination in the criminal case to the effect that he had not remitted the amounts collected on credit sales and obtained receipts from the corporation and also the admission made by him in the letter dated 31.03.1997 requesting to drop charges against him, wherein it is submitted that his trade voucher bills for the period July 1995 to February 1997 are to be cleared and after deducting the amount due to him, he is ready to pay the balance amount to the Corporation which comes to Rs.45,015/- Learned counsel for petitioner submits that the said letter was obtained by coercion, the same cannot be accepted for no animosity was attributed to the Corporation’s officials. Since, as per the affidavit of WW1, petitioner crossed the age of retirement by March, 2012 as he was born on 07.03.1954 and by March, 2014, petitioner crossed the age of 60 years, modifying the punishment of removal and issuing a direction for reinstatement is not possible, the Tribunal modified the same to that of compulsory retirement with entitlement to retirement benefits accruable to him on the date of imposing the punishment. Further, as petitioner did not work all those days, he was denied back wages. This Court does not find any infirmity in the Award of the Tribunal, hence, of the opinion that Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed. 7. The Writ Petition is therefore, dismissed. No costs. 8. Consequently, miscellaneous Applications, if any shall stand closed.