JUDGMENT : Raja Vijayaraghavan, J. This appeal is preferred by the sole accused in S.C.No. 531 of 2014 on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge-III, Palakkad, challenging the finding of guilt, conviction, and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge. 2. In the above appeal, the appellant was charged for having committed offence punishable under Sections 302, and 201 of the IPC. By the impugned judgment dated 12.04.2018, he was found guilty under Section 302 of the IPC and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.50,000/- with a default clause. He was also convicted and sentenced to undergo RI for five years and to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/- for the offence under Section 201 of the IPC. Both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 3. The allegation against the appellant as per the charge are as under: The deceased Leena was married to one Thomas and she had two children in her marriage. Leena developed an affair with the appellant while her husband was working overseas. In the year 2003, Leena left her husband and children and eloped with the appellant. They went to Palakkad and started residing in a house owned by one Rema Devi on rent. Leena secured employment in an establishment by the name ‘M.S.Traders’ situated in Manjakulam at Palakkad. While they were residing together, their relationship became strained. The prosecution alleges that the appellant suspected the chastity of his live-in partner. On 26.07.2007, after a brief quarrel, Leena decided not to go to work. It is alleged that at about 3.15 p.m. on 26.7.2007, the appellant brutally manhandled Leena and thereafter, tied a cloth around her neck and strangulated her. In order to cause the disappearance of evidence, the appellant is alleged to have dismembered the body of Leena and thereafter, packed pieces of the body parts in cardboard boxes and disposed of the same in various places in and around Palakkad and elsewhere. The registration of various crimes: 4. On 28.07.2007, a body part of a human being was sighted in an agricultural field at Chalady by one Janardhanan (PW21). The registration of various crimes: 4. On 28.07.2007, a body part of a human being was sighted in an agricultural field at Chalady by one Janardhanan (PW21). He rushed to the police and lodged Ext.P18 FI Statement to the Police Officer based on which, Ext.P18(a) FIR was registered as Crime No.117 of 2007 of the Kottayi Police Station under Section 174 of the Cr.P.C. On the same day itself, another body part was sighted 1 km away from the earlier spot. Ext.P19 inquest report was prepared in respect of a lower limb and Ext.P20 inquest report was prepared in respect of a thigh of a human body. 4.1 On 29.07.2007, the trunk portion was found in a cardboard box placed on a stone in a canal near the house of Ramdas (PW1). Based on the information furnished by PW1, Crime No.236 of 2007 of the Town South Police Station was registered under Section 174 of the Cr.P.C. Ext.P4 inquest report was prepared in respect of the trunk of a lady, with the lower and upper limbs and the head severed off. 4.2 On 31.07.2007, another portion of a human body was sighted at Kottayi-Kalikavu-Cherukulam Sathram within the jurisdiction of Kottayi Police Station. Ext.P22 inquest report was prepared in respect of the thigh portion of the body found at the spot. 4.3 Later, on 05.08.2007, another portion of the dead body was sighted at the banks of the Koranattu River within the jurisdiction of Town South Police Station, Palakkad. Ext.P5 inquest report was prepared in respect of the feet portion, found at the spot. 4.4 The identity of the person was not known to any person. 4.5 While so, Mohanan (PW2) appeared before the Ottappalam Police Station and lodged a complaint stating that one Leena, a person with whom she was having acquaintance, had been missing for a few days. He also expressed an apprehension that the bodies that were found from various places were the body parts of the aforesaid Leena. He disclosed that Leena had been residing with the accused in a rented house. Based on the said information, the police party went to Puthoor, Palakkad, where the accused had resided with Leena. However, the house was found locked. The inquiry revealed that Leena was missing from 27.07.2007. On 11.08.2007, on receipt of information that the appellant had landed in the house, the police reached the spot. Based on the said information, the police party went to Puthoor, Palakkad, where the accused had resided with Leena. However, the house was found locked. The inquiry revealed that Leena was missing from 27.07.2007. On 11.08.2007, on receipt of information that the appellant had landed in the house, the police reached the spot. On questioning, the police came to the definite conclusion that the appellant was involved in the disappearance and murder of Leena, and accordingly, he was arrested at 7 a.m. on 11.8.2007 as per Ext.P36 arrest memo. Based on the information furnished by the appellant, MO2 and MO3 knives were seized as per Ext.P3 Mahazar. The police went to the scene of the crime and prepared Ext.P15 scene mahazar and seized certain items after securing the presence of Forensic and Fingerprint experts. The clothes allegedly worn by the accused were seized as per Ext.P15 mahazar. MO29 series clothes which were allegedly used by the accused for cleaning the floor after the commission of the offence were seized. In addition, plastic ropes, perfumes, and a half-sleeved shirt which were found in the room were seized by the Forensic expert as per Ext.P6 mahazar. Based on the information furnished by the accused that he had come to Ernakulam to dispose of the head portion of the body and he had stayed at A.S Tourist Home near KSRTC bus stand, the accused was taken to the Tourist Home, and the registers were seized. The Tourist Home Manager is alleged to have identified the appellant. It also came out that the appellant had taken the room by giving a false address and identity. 4.6 The accused had also disclosed that he had stayed at the Santhi Tourist Home in Thrissur. Based on this information, the accused was taken to the said Tourist Home, and MO6 register was seized. The Manager identified the accused as the person who had taken the room. He also identified the handwriting of the accused found in the register and stated that the entries were made by the appellant. 4.7 The samples of blood taken by the Forensic Surgeon for the purpose of DNA analysis and for forensic examination were seized as per Exts.P23 and P24 mahazar. The scalp hair of the accused was seized as per Ext.P17 mahazar. 4.7 The samples of blood taken by the Forensic Surgeon for the purpose of DNA analysis and for forensic examination were seized as per Exts.P23 and P24 mahazar. The scalp hair of the accused was seized as per Ext.P17 mahazar. Ext.P2 rent deed of the house in which the appellant had been residing with the deceased was seized as per Ext.P16 mahazar. After concluding the investigation, final report was laid before the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class-III, Palakkad. 5. The learned Magistrate took the case on file and initiated committal proceedings. After complying with the legal formalities, the case was committed to the Court of Session for trial and disposal. 6. After considering the prosecution records and after conducting the preliminary hearing, the learned Additional Sessions Judge framed charges under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC. When the charge was read over and explained to the accused, he pleaded not guilty and claimed that he be tried. 7. The prosecution examined 36 witnesses as PWs 1 to 36. Exts.P1 to P52 were exhibited and marked. MO1 to MO43 were produced and identified. After the close of the prosecution evidence, the incriminating materials arising out of the prosecution evidence were put to the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. He denied all the incriminating circumstances brought against him and maintained his innocence. On the side of the defence, DW1 was examined. 8. The learned Sessions Judge, after evaluating the evidence, came to the conclusion that the evidence adduced by the prosecution established that the deceased was earlier married to one Thomas, and during the subsistence of the said marriage, she had eloped with the appellant and that they started living together in the rented house belonging to PW4 (Rema Devi) bearing Door No. 5/144(1) at Puthur, Palakkad. Relying on the evidence of PWs 2 and 3, the court concluded that Leena was employed in a shop by the name ‘M.S.Traders’ run by Mohanan. The court also concluded that Leena was last seen in the company of Mohanan on 25.07.2007 at 5.30 p.m. After evaluating the forensic evidence, the court concluded that the blood stains found on the articles seized from the room in the building where the appellant had been staying with the deceased clearly showed that the act of dismembering the body had taken place in the said room. The fact that the DNA evidence established beyond doubt that the body parts found in various places were that of Leena and that she had faced a brutal death was also found in favour of the prosecution. The recovery of MO2 and MO3 knives pursuant to the information furnished by the accused and the evidence of the Surgeon that the above knives could be used for dismembering the body of the deceased was taken as an additional circumstance against the appellant. The court concluded that the prosecution was able to establish that the accused had stayed in A.S. Tourist Home in the early hours on 29.7.2007 by furnishing a false address. The post-occurrence conduct of the accused was also taken to show his involvement in the murder of Leena. The court finally concluded that the established circumstances coupled with the other evidence available on record unerringly pointed to the guilt of the accused and the same was totally incompatible with his innocence. The court went on to hold that the circumstances established by the prosecution formed a complete chain which were sufficient to conclude that the accused had committed the murder of Leena, mutilated the dead body, and had thrown it away at various places to cause the disappearance of evidence. 9. Sri. John S. Ralph, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence to prove its case against the accused. One of the circumstances is that the deceased was seen in the company of the accused on 25.07.2007 as spoken to by PW2. It is pointed out by the learned counsel that this vital fact was stated for the first time by the witness only when he was examined before the court and the same was brought out as an omission. Though the investigating officer attempted to explain that this was a routine practice for the past few years, the fact remains that no reliance could be placed on the evidence tendered by the witness to employ the theory of “last seen” and link the accused with the murder. It is further submitted that the 2nd circumstance is the recovery of the alleged weapon which was seized as per Ext.P3 Mahazar. It is further submitted that the 2nd circumstance is the recovery of the alleged weapon which was seized as per Ext.P3 Mahazar. It is pointed out by the learned counsel that when PW5, the witness to the recovery of the knives was examined before court, he had stated that the recovery was effected at 7.00 a.m. However, this was a near impossibility as Ext.P3 would reveal that the accused was arrested at 7.00 a.m. and the recovery was effected from a place about 10 km away from the place of arrest. It is submitted that the evidence tendered by PW5 and the investigating officer is discrepant in material particulars. It is further submitted that the prosecution has not established that any fingerprints or blood were found on the murder weapon. It is further submitted that one of the major circumstances relied on by the learned Sessions Judge against the appellant is that he had stayed at A.S. Tourist Home, Ernakulam, and Santha Tourist Home, Thrissur under a false address. It is submitted that though the prosecution has a case that the entries in MO6A and MO14A were entered by the appellant himself, no attempt was made to send the document for analysis to an expert to establish that the entries were made by the appellant, and no one else. The failure of the prosecution to trace the mobile phone and track the movements of the appellant on the date of the incident is also highlighted as a serious flaw by the learned counsel. It is urged by the learned counsel that it is ludicrous to believe that the appellant would carry a 3-day-old decaying head to Ernakulam, place it in the reception, and forget about it for half an hour as stated by PW17 in his evidence. It is further submitted that the learned Sessions Judge found the appellant guilty on the premise that his version as to the absence of the deceased was inconsistent. According to the learned counsel, 3-4 days after the alleged incident, PW3 is admitted to have called one Sasi as suggested by the appellant to enquire into the whereabouts of the deceased. Sasi had stated to the witness that the deceased was unwell and was bedridden. However, no attempt was made to trace out Sasi though PW3 had deposed that he had provided the number of Sasi to the investigating officer. Sasi had stated to the witness that the deceased was unwell and was bedridden. However, no attempt was made to trace out Sasi though PW3 had deposed that he had provided the number of Sasi to the investigating officer. The learned counsel would then urge that the prosecution had failed to prove that the accused entertained a definite motive to do away with Leena. No credible evidence was adduced to substantiate the same. It is further submitted that much reliance was placed by the learned Sessions Judge on the presence of blood in certain clothes and from the scene. Placing reliance on the report from the Forensic Science Lab, it is submitted that the prosecution thoroughly failed to establish the origin of the blood found in and around the scene of the crime. According to the learned counsel, in view of Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. r/w. Article 20 of the Constitution of India, the accused has a constitutional and statutory right to remain silent. Given these constitutional and statutory guarantees, an accused cannot be compelled under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act to provide an explanation for the various circumstances found against him. The learned counsel would rely on the observations made by the Apex Court in Subramanya v. State of Karnataka [ (2023) 11 SCC 255 ] and it is urged that it is the duty of the prosecution to establish and prove the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn. He would urge that the prosecution has a bounden duty to prove all links in the chain of evidence so as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused. In the case on hand, the prosecution has miserably failed to show that within all human probabilities, the act must have been done by the accused and him alone. 10. Smt.Neema, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the learned Sessions Judge had delineated as many as 13 circumstances. After a detailed evaluation of the evidence, the court came to the conclusion that the prosecution had cogently succeeded in establishing the circumstances and the chain of evidence furnished by those circumstances was complete so as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused. After a detailed evaluation of the evidence, the court came to the conclusion that the prosecution had cogently succeeded in establishing the circumstances and the chain of evidence furnished by those circumstances was complete so as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused. The established circumstances also revealed without any semblance of doubt that within all human probability, the act was committed by the appellant. Relying on the principles laid down in Naseem Ahmed v. Delhi Administration [1974) 3 SCC 668] and Gade Lakshmi Mangaraju @ Ramesh vs State Of Andhra Pradesh AIR 2001 SC 2677 , it is submitted that a mere absence of a link or two in the chain of circumstances adduced by the prosecution evidence or defence evidence apparently inconsistent with guilt or apparently consistent with innocence may not be material if their apparent effect is sufficiently dispelled by the other links in the chain of evidence adduced by the prosecution. She would submit that the appellant has not disputed the fact that he was in a live-in relationship with Leena and if that be the case, when her mutilated body was found from various places, he should have come out with an explanation. The failure to do so is an additional incriminating circumstance. Blood was found on the floor, furniture, and other parts of the building wherein the appellant had been residing with Leena. However, he has not furnished any explanation as to the presence of blood. The recovery of the weapon used by the accused for dismembering Leena is another additional circumstance. The recovery at his instance is additionally another relevant fact under Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act. 11. We have carefully considered the submissions advanced and have gone through the entire evidence. 12. The finding of guilt of the appellant is grounded entirely in circumstantial evidence. Before proceeding to analyze and assess the circumstances that have influenced the decisions of the learned Sessions Judge, it would only be appropriate to refer to the precedents that may provide guidance on the handling and evaluation of cases based on circumstantial evidence. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [ (1984) 4 SCC 116 ], a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court has laid down five golden principles that constitute the “panchsheel” in respect of a case based on circumstantial evidence. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [ (1984) 4 SCC 116 ], a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court has laid down five golden principles that constitute the “panchsheel” in respect of a case based on circumstantial evidence. Referring to the decision in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra [ (1973) 2 SCC 793 ], it was opined that it is a primary principle that the accused “must be” and not merely “may be” guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between “may be” and “must be” is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. Thereafter, the Bench proceeded to lay down that the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; that the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; that they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and that there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. The very same principles were reiterated in Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. 1989 Supp (2) SCC 706. 13. We shall now endeavor to determine from the evidence whether the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt has been drawn have been fully and conclusively proved and whether those circumstances are sufficient to connect the appellant to the crime. It is essential that the conscience of the Court is satisfied that the various circumstances highlighted by the prosecution in the chain of events have been clearly established. This chain must be complete and unbroken, ruling out any reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the appellant. In conducting this exercise, we shall ensure not to allow suspicion to substitute for legal proof and avoid being influenced by emotional considerations, however compelling they may be, in place of objective evidence. The live-in relationship: 14. We shall first consider whether the prosecution has succeeded in establishing that the appellant was living in a live-in relationship with Leena. To establish this circumstance, the prosecution has examined certain witnesses, and we shall evaluate their evidence. 15. The live-in relationship: 14. We shall first consider whether the prosecution has succeeded in establishing that the appellant was living in a live-in relationship with Leena. To establish this circumstance, the prosecution has examined certain witnesses, and we shall evaluate their evidence. 15. PW2 (Mohanan) testified that his brother-in-law, Suresh, is the owner of M.S. Traders in Palakkad, where he has been managing the shop for the past eight years. Leena had worked in his shop for about four years, during which time he also became acquainted with the appellant. According to PW2, the appellant used to regularly drop Leena at the shop at 9:30 a.m. and pick her up at 5:30 p.m. Leena last attended work on 25-07-2007 when the appellant came to pick her up at 5:30 p.m. The following day, Leena did not report to work, and when PW2 attempted to contact her on her mobile phone, he found it switched off. At around 12:30 p.m. on 26-07-2007, the appellant called PW2, informing him that he had a quarrel with Leena and requested PW2 to come to his residence to resolve the issue. PW2, accompanied by an employee named Ramkumar, went to Puthoor, where the appellant and Leena resided on the upper floor of a residential building. Upon reaching there, they found the appellant sitting on the stairs outside the house, wearing a shirt with snapped buttons. The appellant told PW2 that he had an argument with Leena, during which she damaged his mobile phone, CD player, and other items. He claimed that Leena pushed him out of the house and locked the door. Despite knocking, Leena refused to open the door. PW2 then returned to the shop with Ramkumar. On their way back, they saw a person named Sunil heading to the appellant’s residence. PW2 later informed PW3 Manikandan about the incident and asked him to inquire further. He stated that Leena did not return to work after that day. When PW2 contacted the appellant again, the appellant claimed that Leena was pregnant and had gone to Ernakulam to stay with his sister. On 31-07-2007, the appellant came to PW2’s shop and informed him that Leena had been admitted to the hospital due to her pregnancy and would be on leave for four months. The appellant further stated that Leena could not be reached by phone and asked PW2 to contact him directly if needed. On 31-07-2007, the appellant came to PW2’s shop and informed him that Leena had been admitted to the hospital due to her pregnancy and would be on leave for four months. The appellant further stated that Leena could not be reached by phone and asked PW2 to contact him directly if needed. During cross-examination, it was brought out that PW2 had not explicitly mentioned to the police that the appellant had picked up Leena on his motorbike on 25-07-2007. He also stated that the police had questioned him about a week after 26-07-2007. While denying the defense suggestion that he had no acquaintance with the appellant, PW2 maintained that the appellant occasionally visited the shop to meet Leena. Notably, the appellant did not contest the fact that Leena had been employed at M.S. Traders or that they were living together as husband and wife. 16. PW3 (Manikandan), a former employee of M.S. Traders from 2002 to 2006, corroborated that Leena worked as an accountant at the shop and was routinely dropped off and picked up by the appellant. PW3 stated that on 26-07-2007, after being informed by PW2 about the quarrel, he visited the appellant’s residence at around 6:00 p.m. Upon reaching there, he saw the appellant pushing his scooter out of the narrow lane leading out of his house to go elsewhere. The appellant suggested they talk elsewhere and took PW3 to the highway, where he explained that he and Leena had resolved their differences after a fight earlier that morning. When PW3 asked about Leena’s whereabouts, the appellant claimed that she had gone to a beauty parlor and would return late after watching a movie. About 4-5 days later, the appellant informed PW3 that Leena had been admitted to Lisie Hospital, Ernakulam, due to her pregnancy and required four months of bed rest. The appellant also requested PW3 to store some of his furniture, but when PW3 visited the appellant’s house, he found it was not feasible. During his visit, he was introduced to Sunil, whom the appellant described as a friend. The appellant provided PW3 with the contact number of one Sasi, claiming he was Leena’s brother. When PW3 called the number, Sasi informed him that Leena was unwell and unable to speak. The next day, PW3 informed the appellant about his conversation with Sasi. During his visit, he was introduced to Sunil, whom the appellant described as a friend. The appellant provided PW3 with the contact number of one Sasi, claiming he was Leena’s brother. When PW3 called the number, Sasi informed him that Leena was unwell and unable to speak. The next day, PW3 informed the appellant about his conversation with Sasi. A week later, PW3 disclosed these details to the Town South Police Station during questioning. 17. PW4 (Rema Devi), the landlord of the house rented by the appellant, testified that the appellant and Leena moved into the property on 20-03-2006 under Ext. P2 lease agreement. The couple continued to reside there even after the lease expired, until early 2007. She stated that the appellant claimed to run a fruit shop and that Leena worked at a shop in Manjakulam. While both often visited her to pay the rent, in the last two months, only the appellant came to make payments. When Leena went missing, PW4 attempted to contact her at work but was unsuccessful. She also recalled that the appellant informed her that Leena was pregnant and had been taken to Ernakulam for treatment. 18. PW7 (Rajan) gave evidence that he is acquainted with PW4 Rema Devi, the owner of the residential building where the appellant and Leena resided. He stated that he was a witness to Ext. P2 lease agreement, executed between PW4 and the appellant when the upper floor of the two-storeyed building was rented out to the appellant on 20-03-2006. Rajan confirmed that the appellant and Leena lived together on the upper floor of the building for over a year. He stated that although the lease period was for 11 months, the appellant and Leena continued to reside in the house even after the lease had expired. Rajan also confirmed seeing the appellant and Leena traveling together on a scooter several times. During cross-examination, he denied the suggestion that the appellant and Leena had not resided in the house. 19. PW10 (Simon), the brother of the deceased Leena, provided crucial testimony to establish her identity and relationship with the appellant. Simon stated that Leena was initially married to one Thomaskutty, with whom she had two children. After 10 years of marriage, when Thomaskutty went abroad for employment, Leena fell in love with the appellant and eloped with him. Following this, a complaint was lodged by Thomaskutty. Simon stated that Leena was initially married to one Thomaskutty, with whom she had two children. After 10 years of marriage, when Thomaskutty went abroad for employment, Leena fell in love with the appellant and eloped with him. Following this, a complaint was lodged by Thomaskutty. Simon stated that Leena and the appellant stayed at the house of Sasi, the appellant's uncle, before moving to Palakkad. Simon stated that he remembered Leena having a distinct circular scar on her left knee, which he had seen since her childhood. He further stated that the police had summoned him to identify the dismembered body parts of Leena, and he provided blood samples, along with Leena’s son, for DNA analysis at the Rajiv Gandhi Centre for Biotechnology. Simon’s testimony confirmed the familial relationship between Leena, himself, and her son, which was scientifically corroborated through DNA evidence. 20. PW15 (Johny Joseph), a driver at Holy Trinity School, testified about his acquaintance with the appellant and Leena. Johny stated that he had previously worked with the appellant in a real estate business and had also lent him a sum of Rs. 10,000, which was later repaid. He recounted an instance when he visited M.S. Traders to meet Leena. During his visit, the appellant was informed that Leena was not attending work. Johny also testified that Leena had once confided in him about the appellant’s relationships with other women, which had caused significant tension between them. In cross-examination, Johny denied the defense's suggestion that his testimony was motivated by business rivalry with the appellant. 21. PW16 (Mohandasan) testified that he knew both the appellant and PW4 (Rema Devi). He confirmed that the appellant had rented the upper floor of PW4's residential building and lived there with Leena. Mohandasan also stated that he had seen the couple together on several occasions and was aware that they resided in the same house. He further testified that he had signed the Ext. P15 Scene Mahazar prepared during the investigation of the crime scene. 22. PW31 (Prakasan), a resident of the ground floor of the building rented by the appellant, provided corroborative evidence about the appellant and Leena’s residence. He stated that the appellant and Leena had been living in the upstairs portion of the house when he moved into the ground floor. P15 Scene Mahazar prepared during the investigation of the crime scene. 22. PW31 (Prakasan), a resident of the ground floor of the building rented by the appellant, provided corroborative evidence about the appellant and Leena’s residence. He stated that the appellant and Leena had been living in the upstairs portion of the house when he moved into the ground floor. Prakasan confirmed seeing the appellant and Leena together on numerous occasions, including traveling on a scooter that was often parked near the house. He also testified that he had not observed any unusual activity prior to the incident. In cross-examination, Prakasan denied suggestions from the defense that the appellant and Leena were not residing together or that his testimony was fabricated. 23. From an evaluation of the evidence of the above witnesses, it is clear that the appellant and Leena, the sister of PW10, had resided together for just over one year on the first floor of the residential building owned by PW4 Remadevi. The testimonies of PW2 (Leena’s employer), PW3 (Leena’s co-worker), PW4 (the landlord), PW7, PW16, and PW31 (nearby residents), PW15 (an associate of the appellant), and PW10 (Leena’s brother) collectively establish that the appellant and Leena were living together during this period. It was a regular practice for the appellant to drop Leena at her workplace in the morning and pick her up in the evening. The appellant has failed to undermine or discredit the consistent and corroborative evidence provided by these witnesses regarding their cohabitation. PW2 and PW3, though had come in search of Leena on 26-07-2007, were not permitted to see her. The appellant has also given an indication to the witnesses that Leena was pregnant and had gone to Ernakulam to secure treatment. An overall assessment of the witnesses' testimonies further reveals that Leena was last seen on 25-07-2007, and no one has seen her alive thereafter. 24. The prosecution examined several witnesses to establish that various parts of a human body were discovered at different locations. It was based on the information provided by these witnesses, that crimes were registered, and the law was set in motion. 25. PW1 (Ramdas) came across the trunk portion of a body in a cardboard box placed on a stone in a canal near his residence on 29-07-2007. It was based on the information provided by these witnesses, that crimes were registered, and the law was set in motion. 25. PW1 (Ramdas) came across the trunk portion of a body in a cardboard box placed on a stone in a canal near his residence on 29-07-2007. He promptly reported the matter to the Town South Police Station, resulting in the registration of Crime No. 236/2007 under Section 174 Cr.PC. This discovery was documented in Ext. P1 FI Statement and Ext.P4 inquest over the body part was recorded. PW6 (Kailas), a resident of Kaduthuruthy-Thottupalam, corroborated PW1’s testimony and stated that he witnessed the police recovering the headless body of a woman in a cardboard box, with the arms and legs severed. PW21 (Janardhanan) gave evidence that he found a plastic cover containing body parts on the northern side of his paddy field at Chaladi on 28-07-2007. He reported the same to the Kottayi Police Station, leading to the registration of Crime No. 117/2007 under Section 174 Cr.PC. Ext.P20 inquest of the body parts was conducted as per law. PW8, Krishnadas, gave evidence that he accidentally came across the left foot of a human body in the Koranattupuzha River. He informed a local ward member, who subsequently alerted the police. The inquest of the left foot was documented in Ext.P5. PW28 (P. Vahid), who held additional charge as Circle Inspector of Alathur on 28-07-2007, conducted an inquest of another body portion found 1 km from the location of PW21’s discovery. This inquest was recorded in Ext.P19 Inquest. On 31-07-2007, he conducted another inquest for a body portion discovered at Kalikavu Sathram as documented in Ext. P22. Discovery and Identification of Body Parts: 26. The prosecution examined several witnesses to establish that various parts of a human body were discovered at different locations. Based on the information provided by these witnesses, crimes were registered, and the investigative process was initiated. 27. As stated earlier, PW1 (Ramdas) had discovered the trunk portion of a body in a cardboard box placed on a stone in a canal near his residence on 29-07-2007. He immediately reported the matter to the Town South Police Station, leading to the registration of Crime No. 236/2007 under Section 174 Cr.PC. This discovery was documented in Ext. P1 (FI Statement), and the inquest over the body part was recorded in Ext. P4. He immediately reported the matter to the Town South Police Station, leading to the registration of Crime No. 236/2007 under Section 174 Cr.PC. This discovery was documented in Ext. P1 (FI Statement), and the inquest over the body part was recorded in Ext. P4. PW6 (Kailas), a resident of Kaduthuruthy-Thottupalam, corroborated the testimony of PW1. He stated that he witnessed the police recovering the headless body of a woman in a cardboard box, with the arms and legs severed. 28. PW21 (Janardhanan) testified that on 28-07-2007, he found a plastic cover containing body parts on the northern side of his paddy field at Chaladi. He promptly reported this to the Kottayi Police Station, resulting in the registration of Crime No. 117/2007 under Section 174 Cr.PC. The inquest of these body parts was conducted and documented in Ext. P20. 29. PW8 (Krishnadas) gave evidence that he accidentally discovered the left foot of a human body in the Koranattupuzha River. He informed a local ward member, who then alerted the police. The inquest of the left foot was recorded in Ext. P5. 30. PW28 (P. Vahid), who held additional charge as Circle Inspector of Alathur on 28-07-2007, conducted an inquest of another body portion found 1 km away from the location of PW21’s discovery. This was documented in Ext.P19 (Inquest Report). On 31-07-2007, he conducted another inquest for a body portion discovered at Kalikavu Sathram, which was recorded in Ext.P22. The testimonies of these witnesses and the corresponding documentary evidence firmly establish the discovery of body parts in different locations, providing crucial leads in the investigation. Establishing the Identity of the body parts as that of Leena: 31. The next question to be addressed is whether the recovered body parts belonged to Leena. The prosecution endeavored to establish this fact through the testimonies of Leena's close relatives and scientific evidence. PW10 (Simon), Leena's brother, identified the headless trunk portion at the mortuary by recognizing a distinct scar mark on the left leg, which he stated had been present since Leena’s childhood. The recovered body parts were sent for postmortem examination to the District Hospital, Palakkad, where PW12 (Dr. P.B. Gujral), the District Police Surgeon, conducted the examination. Dr. Gujral confirmed that the body parts belonged to a single female, approximately 40 years of age, and opined that the cause of death was homicidal, resulting from manual strangulation. These findings remain undisputed. The recovered body parts were sent for postmortem examination to the District Hospital, Palakkad, where PW12 (Dr. P.B. Gujral), the District Police Surgeon, conducted the examination. Dr. Gujral confirmed that the body parts belonged to a single female, approximately 40 years of age, and opined that the cause of death was homicidal, resulting from manual strangulation. These findings remain undisputed. Blood samples were collected from the deceased, as well as from PW10 (Simon) and PW32 (Eby K. Thomas), Leena’s son. PW26 (Manikyan) corroborated the chain of custody for the DNA evidence, testifying that he witnessed the doctor handing over two packets, presumably containing biological samples from the body parts, to the police for DNA analysis. PW29 (Sanil George), a Scientist from the Rajiv Gandhi Centre for Biotechnology, Trivandrum, conducted a DNA analysis on the body parts alongside the blood samples of PW10 and PW32. The findings were documented in the Ext.P14 DNA report, which conclusively established that the DNA profiles from the body parts, labeled as Exts. A1 to A5, matched those of PW10 (Simon) and PW32 (Eby K. Thomas), confirming a biological relationship. Through this combination of evidence—visual identification by her brother (PW10), the postmortem findings confirming the parts belonged to a single female, and the conclusive DNA analysis establishing a biological relationship with Leena’s brother and son—the prosecution effectively and firmly established that the deceased was Leena. 32. The next piece of evidence is the scientific evidence linking the appellant with the crime. By examining PW4 and the neighbors, the prosecution has established that the appellant had been residing on the upper floor of the house of PW4. PW13 (Annamma John), Senior Instructor of Forensic Science at the Kerala Police Academy, entered the box and gave evidence on 11-08-2007, during an inspection of the house bearing Door No. V/144(1)), wherein the appellant had been residing with Leena, bloodstains were detected at various spots in the room. Ext. P52, the report from the Assistant Director of Serology at the Forensic Science Laboratory, Trivandrum, confirmed the presence of blood on multiple items seized from the scene, which include MO29: Cloth, MO30: Torn skirt, MO32: Bed sheet, MO35 series: Eleven white polythene covers, MO13: Two white cotton gauzes. Two pieces of two-ply coir rope and jute thread found together and pieces of blue synthetic cords. Two pieces of two-ply coir rope and jute thread found together and pieces of blue synthetic cords. While the FSL report confirmed the presence of blood, it did not conclusively establish whether the blood was of human origin. It needs to be remembered at this juncture that the appellant had enough time to clean up the premises and what remained was mere traces. Sri.Ralph, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant pointed out that the failure to detect the origin of blood would be fatal in the facts and circumstances. He would urge that the possibility of the blood found in the clothes being of animal origin cannot be ruled out. 33. We are unable to accept the argument advanced before us. PW13 (Annamma John), the Scientific Assistant, inspected the building where the appellant and Leena resided on 11-08-2007, specifically examining the room identified by the prosecution as the scene of the alleged murder. During her inspection, she collected various items, including a floor swab, a comb with hair (MO11), a soap with hair (MO12), gloves (MO13), and samples of the bloodstains found in the room. Notably, this examination was conducted and the swabs were taken on the 16th day after the alleged commission of the offence. Despite this lapse in time, she detected the presence of blood in multiple areas, including the legs of the cot, the handles of the almirah, and other parts of the room. The question that arises, therefore, is whether a contention questioning the validity of such findings can reasonably be raised, especially after efforts to conceal the offence for over two weeks. 34. In State Of Rajasthan vs Teja Ram (1999) 3 SCC 507 , the Apex Court had occasion to observe as under in similar circumstances. “25. Failure of the Serologist to detect the origin of the blood, due to disintegration of the serum in the meanwhile, does not mean that the blood stuck on the axe (in that case) would not have been human blood at all. Sometimes it happens, either because the stain is too insufficient or due to hematological changes and plasmatic coagulation that a Serologist might fail to detect the origin of the blood but it does not mean that the blood might be of some other origin? Sometimes it happens, either because the stain is too insufficient or due to hematological changes and plasmatic coagulation that a Serologist might fail to detect the origin of the blood but it does not mean that the blood might be of some other origin? Such a guess work that blood on the other axe would have been animal blood is unrealistic and far-fetched in the broad spectrum of this case. The effort of the criminal court should not be to prowl for imaginative doubts and unless the doubt is of a reasonable dimension which a judicially conscientious mind entertains with some objectivity no benefit can be claimed by the accused.” 35. In Gura Singh v. State Of Rajasthan 2001 (2) SCC 205 , relying on the observations in Prabhu Babaji Navle v. The State of Bombay, AIR 1956 SC 51 , Raghav Prapanna Tripathi v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 74 , Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. State of Maharashtra, (1981) 2 SCC 35 , Kansa Behera v. State of Orissa, (1987) 3 SCC 480 , it was contended that for the failure on the part of the prosecution to determine the origin of the blood, the accused there was entitled to be acquitted. Repelling the contentions and placing reliance on Teja Ram (supra) the Apex Court observed that it was due to the lapse of time that the classification of the blood could not be determined. It was held that no bonus could be conferred upon the accused to claim any benefit on the strength of such an argument. Hotel Stays after the incident : 36. The prosecution has let in evidence to show that Shajan rented rooms at tourist homes in Ernakulam and Thrissur, indicating that he has travelled to various places to dispose of the head portion of the body. PW17, the manager of A.S. Tourist Home in Ernakulam, testified that Shajan checked into a room at the lodge in the early hours of 29.7.2007 at 1:40 a.m., under the false name "Santhosh P. John." He arrived carrying a suitcase and a plastic cover. PW17 further stated that, after occupying the room, the accused immediately exited, carrying the plastic cover. On noticing beat police officers standing outside the tourist home, Shajan placed the plastic cover at the reception counter and returned to his room, claiming he had forgotten his phone. PW17 further stated that, after occupying the room, the accused immediately exited, carrying the plastic cover. On noticing beat police officers standing outside the tourist home, Shajan placed the plastic cover at the reception counter and returned to his room, claiming he had forgotten his phone. Shortly thereafter, the accused came back to the reception, retrieved the plastic cover, and left the premises. He returned approximately 30 to 45 minutes later without the plastic cover. Subsequently, the police brought Shajan to the tourist home and seized MO15, the room allotment register. MO15(a), entry number 2728 on page 9 of the register, confirmed the accused's presence at the tourist home on July 29, 2007, at 1:40 a.m. Though an attempt was made to trace out the body part dumped in a dumpster, the attempt was not fruitful. 37. PW18, the manager of Shanthi Tourist Home in Thrissur, gave evidence that the accused checked into a room on 29/7/2007, at 7:15 p.m., using the name "Santhosh." About 10 minutes after occupying the room, the accused complained of a foul odor and requested an air freshener. PW18 sent a room boy to spray an air freshener in the room. After his arrest, the police took Shajan to the tourist home and seized MO6, the room register. MO6(a), the relevant entry, corroborated the accused’s stay at the tourist home on July 29, 2007. PW20, the room boy at Shanthi Tourist Home, confirmed that Shajan had stayed at the tourist home a few days before the police arrived with him. 38. Sri. John S. Ralph, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that without subjecting the handwriting for the review of an expert, no reliance can be placed on the same. It is also submitted that the evidence tendered by the Managers of the respective tourist homes cannot be relied upon. We find that PW18 in his evidence stated in unequivocal terms that the entries in the register were made by the appellant himself. A comparison of the handwriting in MO15(a) and MO6(a) would clearly reveal that the handwriting in both registers displays consistent patterns in letter formation, spacing, alignment, and other individual characteristics. Both the witnesses have given specific reasons as to why they were able to remember the appellant when he was taken to them exactly a month after he had taken a room in the hotel. Both the witnesses have given specific reasons as to why they were able to remember the appellant when he was taken to them exactly a month after he had taken a room in the hotel. We find that the evidence of the witnesses are credible and there is no reason to disbelieve them. The fact that the appellant used a false identity for his stay at these places goes a long way in pointing the finger of suspicion towards him. Conduct of the appellant: 39. The prosecution has successfully established that Leena, the live-in partner of the appellant, went missing on 25-07-2007, and a few days later, parts of her body were discovered in various locations across the district. To prove that Leena was murdered on 26-07-2007, the learned Sessions Judge primarily relied on the evidence of PW2 to PW4 and PW12, the Doctor who conducted the postmortem examination. PW2 (Mohanan) testified that he last saw Leena on 25-07-2007, at 5:30 p.m., when the appellant picked her up from work. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that PW2 had not explicitly stated in his earlier statement that the appellant picked up Leena in the evening. However, a comprehensive reading of the evidence of PW2 and PW3 (Manikandan) demonstrates that they both testified that it was usual practice for the appellant to pick up Leena after work. While there is no explicit mention of this occurring on 26-07-2007, the overall evidence clearly indicates otherwise. Both PW2 and PW3 appeared to have a close relationship with Leena as an employee and had genuine concern for her welfare. Their testimonies confirm that Leena attended work on 25-07-2007 but did not report to work the following day. Her phone was switched off thereafter. Despite their efforts to visit the appellant’s residence where Leena was living, they were denied access to meet or speak with her. Ext.P11 postmortem report, prepared by PW12, indicates that the time of death was more than two days and less than five days before the trunk portion of the body was placed in a freezer at 8:00 p.m. on 29-07-2007. This evidence is in tune with the prosecution’s case that Leena was murdered by strangulation sometime on 26-07-2007 and her body was dismembered thereafter. If this timeline is accurate, the appellant's behavior raises critical questions. This evidence is in tune with the prosecution’s case that Leena was murdered by strangulation sometime on 26-07-2007 and her body was dismembered thereafter. If this timeline is accurate, the appellant's behavior raises critical questions. To PW2 Mohanan, Leena's employer, the appellant initially claimed that Leena was pregnant and had gone to Ernakulam with his sister. Later, he stated that she needed rest due to her pregnancy. To PW3 Manikandan, the appellant gave inconsistent accounts, initially stating that Leena had quarreled with him and was staying in her room. He later claimed she had gone to a beauty parlor and would return late. Subsequently, he said she was hospitalized due to her pregnancy and required four months of rest. He even provided PW3 with a phone number for Sasi, claiming he was Leena’s brother. However, evidence tendered by PW10 (Simon) and DW1, the brother of the appellant revealed that Sasi was, in fact, the appellant’s maternal uncle. When questioned by PW3, Sasi also gave false information about Leena’s whereabouts. Though the witnesses wanted to meet Leena, the appellant successfully managed to thwart their attempts. When PW4 Remadevi, the landlord, enquired about Leena, the appellant claimed that Leena was pregnant and had been taken to Ernakulam. Why would the appellant fabricate false accounts of Leena’s whereabouts to individuals genuinely concerned about her and who would have seen her if she were alive? If Leena had gone missing, the appellant, as her live-in partner, would have been the first person expected to make an attempt to trace her whereabouts or to set the law in motion. Instead, the appellant engaged in deliberate deception to mislead Leena’s employer and colleagues. The appellant’s inconsistent and fabricated statements regarding Leena’s absence demonstrate a calculated and deliberate effort to conceal the crime. These falsehoods not only point to his consciousness of guilt but also significantly strengthen the prosecution's case. 40. Sri. Ralph, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the right to silence of the accused is enshrined in various statutory provisions. He would refer to Section 313 (2) and (3) of the Cr.P.C. and it was urged that the Code provide the accused with the dual rights to remain silent or to make statements without being under oath. According to him, no adverse inference can be drawn from his refusal to testify. He would refer to Section 313 (2) and (3) of the Cr.P.C. and it was urged that the Code provide the accused with the dual rights to remain silent or to make statements without being under oath. According to him, no adverse inference can be drawn from his refusal to testify. He would urge that given the constitutional and statutory guarantees, an accused cannot be compelled under Section 106 of the Evidence Act to provide explanations for the circumstances against him. 41. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the instant case, we are unable to accept the submissions of the learned counsel. Section 106 of the Evidence Act reads as follows: “106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.— When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (a) When a person does an act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him. (b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without a ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.” 42. Section 106 of the Evidence Act referred to above provides that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. The word “especially” means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within the knowledge of the accused. The ordinary rule that applies to criminal trials that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused is not in any way modified by the rule of facts embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act. Section 106 of the Evidence Act is an exception to Section 101 of the Evidence Act. Section 101 with its illustration (a) lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish the facts which are, “especially within the knowledge of the accused and which he can prove without difficulty or inconvenience”. [See: Anees v The State Govt. of NCT 2024 INSC 368 ] 43. [See: Anees v The State Govt. of NCT 2024 INSC 368 ] 43. In Tulshiram Sahadu Suryawanshi v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 10 SCC 373 , the Apex Court while elucidating the law under Sections 106 and 114 of the Indian Evidence Act observed as under: “23. It is settled law that presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above position is strengthened in view of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process, the courts shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct, etc. in addition to the facts of the case. In these circumstances, the principles embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act can also be utilised. We make it clear that this section is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but it would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, failed to offer any explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference. It is useful to quote the following observation in State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar [ (2000) 8 SCC 382 ]: “38. Vivian Bose, J., had observed that Section 106 of the Evidence Act is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible for the prosecution to establish certain facts which are particularly within the knowledge of the accused. In Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer [ AIR 1956 SC 404 : 1956 Cri LJ 794] the learned Judge has stated the legal principle thus: ‘11. This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish facts which are “especially” within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The word “especially” stresses that. It means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge.’ 44. In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 10 SCC 681 , the Apex Court, in the facts of the said case had observed that where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the offence takes place in the dwelling home where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the accused does not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime. The following observations made therein would be relevant in the facts of the present case: 14. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the courts. A judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. (See Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecutions [[1944] A.C. 315] — quoted with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh [ (2003) 11 SCC 271 ) The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (b) appended to this section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision and it reads: “(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.” 15. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation.” 45. After referring to all past precedents, the Apex Court in Anees (supra) had laid down the principles as under: “43. Thus, from the aforesaid decisions of this Court, it is evident that the court should apply Section 106 of the Evidence Act in criminal cases with care and caution. It cannot be said that it has no application to criminal cases. The ordinary rule which applies to criminal trials in this country that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused is not in any way modified by the provisions contained in Section 106 of the Evidence Act. 44. Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked to make up the inability of the prosecution to produce evidence of circumstances pointing to the guilt of the accused. 44. Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked to make up the inability of the prosecution to produce evidence of circumstances pointing to the guilt of the accused. This section cannot be used to support a conviction unless the prosecution has discharged the onus by proving all the elements necessary to establish the offence. It does not absolve the prosecution from the duty of proving that a crime was committed even though it is a matter specifically within the knowledge of the accused and it does not throw the burden on the accused to show that no crime was committed. To infer the guilt of the accused from absence of reasonable explanation in a case where the other circumstances are not by themselves enough to call for his explanation is to relieve the prosecution of its legitimate burden. So, until a prima facie case is established by such evidence, the onus does not shift to the accused. 45. Section 106 of the Evidence Act obviously refers to cases where the guilt of the accused is established on the evidence produced by the prosecution unless the accused is able to prove some other facts especially within his knowledge, which would render the evidence of the prosecution nugatory. If in such a situation, the accused offers an explanation which may be reasonably true in the proved circumstances, the accused gets the benefit of reasonable doubt though he may not be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the truth of the explanation. But, if the accused in such a case does not give any explanation at all or gives a false or unacceptable explanation, this by itself is a circumstance which may well turn the scale against him…. xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx 54. Cases are frequently coming before the courts where the husband, due to strained marital relations and doubt as regards the character, has gone to the extent of killing his wife. These crimes are generally committed in complete secrecy inside the house and it becomes very difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence. No member of the family, like in the case at hand, even if he is a witness of the crime, would come forward to depose against another family member. 55. These crimes are generally committed in complete secrecy inside the house and it becomes very difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence. No member of the family, like in the case at hand, even if he is a witness of the crime, would come forward to depose against another family member. 55. If an offence takes place inside the four walls of a house and in such circumstances where the accused has all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at a time and in the circumstances of his choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead direct evidence to establish the guilt of the accused. It is to resolve such a situation that Section 106 of the Evidence Act exists in the statute book. In the case of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan (supra), this Court observed that a Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. The Court proceeded to observe that a Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character, which is almost impossible to be led, or at any rate, extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence, which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. 46. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 , it was held that false explanations by the accused are an incriminating circumstance that strengthens the chain of circumstantial evidence. It was held in Paragraph Nos. 159 and 160 of the judgment as under: “159. It will be seen that this Court while taking into account the absence of explanation or a false explanation did hold that it will amount to be an additional link to complete the chain but these observations must be read in the light of what this Court said earlier viz. before a false explanation can be used as additional link, the following essential conditions must be satisfied: (1) various links in the chain of evidence led by the prosecution have been satisfactorily proved, (2) the said circumstance points to the guilt of the accused with reasonable definiteness, and (3) the circumstance is in proximity to the time and situation. 160. before a false explanation can be used as additional link, the following essential conditions must be satisfied: (1) various links in the chain of evidence led by the prosecution have been satisfactorily proved, (2) the said circumstance points to the guilt of the accused with reasonable definiteness, and (3) the circumstance is in proximity to the time and situation. 160. If these conditions are fulfilled only then a court can use a false explanation or a false defence as an additional link to lend an assurance to the court and not otherwise. 47. 1n Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 10 SCC 681 , it was observed as under: “16. In a case based on circumstantial evidence where no eye-witness account is available, there is another principle of law which must be kept in mind. The principle is that when an incriminating circumstance is put to the accused and the said accused either offers no explanation or offers an explanation that is found to be untrue, then the same becomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances to make it complete. This view has been taken in a catena of decisions of this Court. [See State of Tamil Nadu v. Rajendran (1999) 8 SCC 679 (para 6); State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal AIR 1992 SC 2045 (para 40); State of Maharashtra v. Suresh (2000) 1 SCC 471 (para 27); Ganesh Lal v. State of Rajasthan (2002) 1 SCC 731 (para 15) and Gulab Chand v. State of M.P. (1995) 3 SCC 574 (para 4)]”. 48. The contention that he can remain silent despite the applicability of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act does not withstand scrutiny when assessed in light of the legal framework and precedents applicable to cases of this nature. While the accused indeed possesses the right to silence under statutory and constitutional protections, including under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, these rights are not absolute and must be understood in the context of the facts and circumstances of each case. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act operates in circumstances where the facts are specifically within the knowledge of the accused. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act operates in circumstances where the facts are specifically within the knowledge of the accused. When a crime such as murder is committed within the privacy of a house, and the accused is an occupant of that house, the law imposes a corresponding obligation on the accused to provide a cogent explanation of how the crime occurred or, at the very least, account for the absence of the deceased. The Apex Court underscored that in cases where an offence occurs in secrecy inside a house, the prosecution's burden of proof is lighter, and a duty shifts to the accused under Section 106 to explain circumstances peculiarly within their knowledge. The accused cannot rely solely on the right to silence to evade this burden. The appellant's conduct, specifically his fabricated and inconsistent explanations regarding Leena’s whereabouts, reflects a calculated effort to mislead those who inquired about her. These false statements cannot be reconciled with the claim of mere silence. Instead, they demonstrate consciousness of guilt and an attempt to evade accountability. Section 313(2) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provide the accused with the right to remain silent or make a statement without being under oath. However, these provisions do not grant immunity from adverse inferences in situations where the facts of the case warrant such inferences. In State of Maharashtra v. Suresh (2000) 1 SCC 471 , the Court held that while the right to silence is constitutionally guaranteed, it does not preclude courts from drawing adverse inferences from the failure of the accused to explain facts within their special knowledge, particularly under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. In a case where the crime occurred within the rented premises, and where the accused had the opportunity and duty to explain the circumstances, complete reliance on silence would obstruct justice. The right to silence must be balanced with the principle that a guilty person should not escape accountability, as emphasized in Trimukh Maroti Kirkan (supra). 49. In the case on hand, the prosecution has succeeded in proving the following foundational facts to justify the trigger for the application of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. a. The appellant had been living with the deceased as partners in the residential home taken on rent from PW4. b. The deceased had attended work on 25.7.2007 and had gone back home as usual. a. The appellant had been living with the deceased as partners in the residential home taken on rent from PW4. b. The deceased had attended work on 25.7.2007 and had gone back home as usual. She was never seen thereafter c. Though PW2 and PW3 attempted to get in touch and contact the deceased, the appellant thwarted their efforts by providing false information and by practicing deception. d. Leena was found murdered and dismembered and presence of blood was found in numerous places inside the room of the house where they were staying together and in clothes. e. Forensic evidence revealed that the deceased was murdered by strangulation and she was dismembered thereafter. f. Recovery of murder weapons at the instance of the appellant and the presence of blood therein which constitute a relevant fact. g. The appellant immediately after the murder travelled to Ernakulam and Thrissur and took rooms under proxy names for disposing off the body parts. h. There were strains in the relationship between the appellant and the deceased. Though from the trend of cross examination, the accused does not dispute the fact that he had been residing with Leena in the house of PW4 and that she was employed in the establishment managed by PW2, in his 313 statement he has pleaded ignorance of the entire facts. He even distanced himself from Leena and stated that he was falsely implicated by the police at the instance of his partner Johnny Joseph, with whom he had carried out real estate business. The failure of the appellant to explain the circumstances especially within his knowledge demonstrate consciousness of guilt and an attempt to evade responsibility. The possibility of the crime being perpetrated in the manner claimed: 50. The contention raised by the defence counsel regarding the impossibility of the alleged incident occurring in the house, based on the claim that a fully grown woman being dismembered would result in a significant flow of blood of approximately four litres and noticeable signs such as stench of blood, cannot be accepted. The heart is the primary driver of active blood flow in the body, and after death, once the heart stops pumping, there is no active circulation of blood. Post-mortem injuries do not result in significant blood flow because the vascular system loses pressure. The heart is the primary driver of active blood flow in the body, and after death, once the heart stops pumping, there is no active circulation of blood. Post-mortem injuries do not result in significant blood flow because the vascular system loses pressure. Any blood flow observed in such injuries is due to passive leakage from severed vessels, as the blood begins to settle due to gravity by a process known as livor mortis. In contrast, antemortem injuries result in active and profuse bleeding, provided the heart is still pumping. This is dependent on the location and severity of the wounds. In the case on hand, the accused had murdered the deceased by ligature strangulation which the prosecution estimates was at about 3 pm, and it was much later that the body was sliced into pieces. The antemortem injuries noticed are only some contusions on the chest. Any blood present at the scene would be limited to residual blood in the tissues and vessels near the injury site. Ante-mortem injuries exhibit signs of inflammation, blood clotting, or other tissue reactions, indicating the body was alive at the time of injury. Post-mortem injuries, on the other hand, lack these reactions and result in minimal blood loss. The defence contention of significant blood loss, therefore, cannot be sustained in the absence of cut injuries ante-mortem. 51. A contention was raised that the dismemberment of a human body could not have been carried out by a single individual using the knives that were produced as MO2 and MO3. It was further argued that only a person with substantial knowledge of human anatomy could execute such dismemberment. However, the doctor refuted this contention, stating that the head, right upper limb, and both lower limbs were removed using a "cut-dislocate-cut" method. This technique involves cutting through the soft tissues, dislocating the joint, and then completing the cut through the remaining tissues and bone. 52. As per the post-mortem report, the dismemberment of various organs was carried out in the following manner: A. Head: An oblique incision was used to decapitate the head, with a wound measuring 14x11 cm. It was located 6 cm above the sternal notch in the front and 3 cm above the root of the neck at the back. From the front, the wound sliced through the subcutaneous tissues and muscles on the front and sides of the neck. It was located 6 cm above the sternal notch in the front and 3 cm above the root of the neck at the back. From the front, the wound sliced through the subcutaneous tissues and muscles on the front and sides of the neck. The thyroid cartilage was severed just below its prominence in the midline, cutting the larynx obliquely through the vocal cords. From the back, the wound sliced through the subcutaneous tissues and muscles at the back of the neck. The cervical spinal column was severed between the 4th and 5th cervical vertebrae, with the cut passing through the intervertebral disc from back to front. The esophagus was cut from back to front, and the severed end extended beyond the lower half of the intervertebral disc between the 5th and 6th cervical vertebrae by approximately 0.5 cm. B. Right Upper Limb: An oblique incision removed the right upper limb along with part of the shoulder. The wound measured 14x13 cm and sliced through subcutaneous tissues and muscles to the joint capsule of the humerus with the scapula. The skin and soft tissues over the acromioclavicular joint and bones remained inside the amputation wound. This was achieved through an 8x5.5 cm oval incision around the acromion and the acromioclavicular joint. The joint capsule and cartilage were severed in a circular manner, and the limb was detached using the cut-dislocate-cut method. C. Right Lower Limb: An oblique incision removed the right lower limb and part of the buttock from the hip. The wound, measuring 23x22 cm, cut through subcutaneous tissues and muscles to the joint capsule of the femur with the right pelvic bone. The joint capsule and cartilage were severed in a circular manner, and the limb was removed using the cut-dislocate-cut method. D. Left Lower Limb: An oblique incision removed the left lower limb and part of the buttock from the hip. The wound measured 24x21 cm and sliced through subcutaneous tissues and muscles to the joint capsule of the femur with the left pelvic bone. The joint capsule and cartilage were severed in a circular manner, and the limb was removed using the cut-dislocate-cut method. The report concluded that all these cuts were postmortem, as there was no evidence of bleeding into the body cavities. 53. The joint capsule and cartilage were severed in a circular manner, and the limb was removed using the cut-dislocate-cut method. The report concluded that all these cuts were postmortem, as there was no evidence of bleeding into the body cavities. 53. A specific query was posed to the Doctor, suggesting that the pattern of dismemberment observed could only have been executed by a person experienced in cutting the body parts of living animals. The doctor disagreed, stating that the pattern of dismemberment noted suggested otherwise. He gave reasons to a pointed question about whether MO2 and MO3 could have been used for such dismemberment, the Doctor affirmed that they could. He further elaborated that the person responsible for the dismemberment had sliced out chunks of soft tissue around the joints and severed the joint capsule using the cut-dislocate-cut method. After having carefully considered the evidence of the Forensic Surgeon, we find no reason to reject the conclusions that he has arrived at. Recovery of the weapons: 54. Based on Ext.P3(a) disclosure statement furnished by the accused, PW34, recovered MO2 and MO3 knives, from a bushy area beneath the Narakampully bridge at 7:15 am on 11.8.2007. PW5 Ibrahim, an attesting witness to the seizure, gave evidence that he was present when the police seized the knives and that the accused was also present. Sri Ralph, the learned counsel submitted that no reliance can be placed on the same since there is a serious discrepancy in the evidence let in by the prosecution. We find that in Exhibit P3 mahazar, the accused is seen to have been arrested at 7 am at Puthoor. PW5 had also stated that he witnessed the recovery at 7 am. However, it has come out in evidence that the recovery was effected from a place about 10 km away. Furthermore, in Ext.P3 mahazar, it is stated that the time of preparation of the Mahazar is 14.00 hours. We agree with the learned counsel, that in view of this discrepancy, we will not be justified in giving full credence to the recovery of the knife. We however find that the knives were sent for analysis and blood was found on the same. However, the analyst has reported that the blood found on the knives was insufficient to determine its origin. 55. However, that is not the end of the matter. We however find that the knives were sent for analysis and blood was found on the same. However, the analyst has reported that the blood found on the knives was insufficient to determine its origin. 55. However, that is not the end of the matter. In A.N. Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka (2005) 7 SCC 714 , the Apex Court has held that even while discarding the evidence in the form of discovery panchnama, the conduct of the accused would be relevant under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. It was observed as under: “9. By virtue of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, the conduct of the accused person is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact. The evidence of the circumstance, simpliciter, that the accused pointed out to the police officer, the place where the dead body of the kidnapped boy was found and on their pointing out the body was exhumed, would be admissible as conduct under Section 8 irrespective of the fact whether the statement made by the accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of Section 27 or not as held by this Court in Prakash Chand v. State (Delhi Admn.) [ (1979) 3 SCC 90 ]. Even if we hold that the disclosure statement made by the accused-appellants (Ex. P-15 and P-16) is not admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, still it is relevant under Section 8.” 56. In the State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan Guru ( 2005) 11 SCC 600, Sections 8 and 27 of the Evidence Act were elucidated in detail with reference to the case law on the subject and with reference to Section 8 of the Evidence Act it was observed as under: “206. We have already noticed the distinction highlighted in Prakash Chand case (supra) between the conduct of an accused which is admissible under Section 8 and the statement made to a police officer in the course of an investigation which is hit by Section 162 Cr. We have already noticed the distinction highlighted in Prakash Chand case (supra) between the conduct of an accused which is admissible under Section 8 and the statement made to a police officer in the course of an investigation which is hit by Section 162 Cr. P.C. The evidence of the circumstance, simpliciter, that the accused pointed out to the police officer, the place where stolen articles or weapons used in the commission of the offence were hidden, would be admissible as “conduct” under Section 8 irrespective of the fact whether the statement made by the accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct, falls within the purview of Section 27, as pointed out in Prakash Chand case. In Prakash Chand v. State (Delhi Admn.) [ (1979) 3 SCC 90 this Court held that “Even apart from the admissibility of the information under Section 27, the evidence of the investigating officer and the panchas that the accused had taken them to PW 11 (from whom he purchased the weapon) and pointed him out and as corroborated by PW 11 himself would be admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act as conduct of the accused.” However, in Anees (supra), the Apex Court has sounded a caution that though the conduct of an accused may be a relevant fact under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, yet the same, by itself, cannot be a ground to convict him or hold him guilty and that too, for a serious offence like murder. Like any other piece of evidence, the conduct of an accused is also one of the circumstances which the court may take into consideration along with the other evidence on record, direct or indirect. Motive : 57. The prosecution examined several witnesses who testified about frequent arguments between Leena and Shajan, stating that Leena harbored suspicions about Shajan's faithfulness. PW2 (Mohanan), Leena's employer, testified that Shajan informed him about a quarrel with Leena, after which she locked herself in their room. PW3 (Manikandan) stated that PW2 had asked him to inquire about the argument, and during their conversation, Shajan admitted that Leena had accused him of having affairs with other women. PW15 (Johny Joseph) testified that Shajan had told him about frequent quarrels with Leena concerning his alleged relationships with other women. PW15 further mentioned that Leena had personally confided in him about these suspicions and the resulting arguments. PW15 (Johny Joseph) testified that Shajan had told him about frequent quarrels with Leena concerning his alleged relationships with other women. PW15 further mentioned that Leena had personally confided in him about these suspicions and the resulting arguments. The defence highlighted that some of these statements were presented in court for the first time. However, it remains undisputed that the deceased was a married woman who had left her husband and children to live with the appellant. What transpired within the four walls of their home cannot be known to any outsider. In a case of this nature, it is inherently difficult, if not impossible, for the prosecution to establish a definitive and strong motive for the murder. Conclusion 58. As stated earlier, it is a well-settled proposition of law that when the case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests: (1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability, the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence. [See: State Of U.P v. Satish (2005) 3 SCC 114 , Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P (supra), Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (supra), Gambhir v. State Of Maharashtra (1982) 2 SCC 351 and Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State Of M.P., AIR 1952 SC 343 ] 59. We have already delineated the foundational facts presented by the prosecution to convincingly establish that the offence was committed by the appellant. We have no doubt in our mind the proven facts unerringly point towards the guilt of the accused and in all human probability, the crime was committed by the accused and none else. 60. We have already delineated the foundational facts presented by the prosecution to convincingly establish that the offence was committed by the appellant. We have no doubt in our mind the proven facts unerringly point towards the guilt of the accused and in all human probability, the crime was committed by the accused and none else. 60. In view of the discussion above, we are of the view that the judgment rendered by the learned Sessions Judge, in S.C.No. 531 of 2014 on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge-III, Palakkad, finding the appellant/accused guilty for the offence punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC, does not warrant any interference. This appeal will stand dismissed, confirming the conviction and sentence.