ORDER : 1. Accused Nos.6 and 7 in C.C.No.32/2010 on the files of the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Thrissur, have preferred this criminal revision petition under Sections 438 and 442 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita , 2023, challenging order dated 12.12.2024 in Crl.M.P.No.214/2024 in the above case, whereby the plea of discharge at the instance of the revision petitioners was negatived by the Special Court. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioners, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State of Kerala and the learned counsel appearing for the additional 2 nd respondent who got impleaded on his request. 3. As per the final report, the prosecution case is that the Malabar Cements Ltd. a wholly public sector undertaking, sustained a loss of Rs.26,61,394/- out of Rs.32,00,000/-, which was given as an interest free advance by the Malabar Cements Ltd. to M/s. Crescent Mines & Minerals, Lalgudi, Trichy, of which the 5 th accused was the Proprietor, towards development of infrastructure facilities, and since the said amount became irrecoverable, the 5 th accused obtained a corresponding pecuniary gain. Accused Nos. 1 to 4 in the F.I.R were the officers of the MCL (Malabar Cement Ltd) the 1 st accused was the Managing Director and the 2 nd accused was the General Manager of MCL. Similarly, the 3 rd accused was the Geologist and 4 th accused was the Chief Chemist of M.C.L at the relevant time, viz., during 2004 to 2007. They conspired together and created an artificial demand for sweetener Grade limestone, which was already being continuously supplied by Tamin, Tamil Nadu, and issued notification inviting tender. As per that, the 5 th accused came into picture and was given the tender for supplying the limestone. The demand of the 5 th accused to give interest free advance was allowed and an amount of Rs. 32,00,000/- was made against recoverable bank guarantee in 32 equal instalments. Subsequently, it was revealed that leased out mines did not have requisite quantity and quality of limestones which resulted in the termination of agreement. The Chairman was arrayed as accused No.6 and 2 other Directors are arrayed as accused Nos. 7 and 8 since they happened to be the chairman and directors, who participated in the meetings of the Board of Directors, when the issue of payment of advance free loan to the 5 th accused was discussed. The Chairman was arrayed as accused No.6 and 2 other Directors are arrayed as accused Nos. 7 and 8 since they happened to be the chairman and directors, who participated in the meetings of the Board of Directors, when the issue of payment of advance free loan to the 5 th accused was discussed. It is further alleged that accused Nos.6 to 8 had also participated in the meeting of the Board of Directors, held on 21-5-2005, in which the Board ratified the recommendation of the Sub Committee headed by the M.D (A1) regarding payment of interest free loan of Rs.32 lakh to the 5 th accused. It is alleged that accused committed criminal misconduct and by illegal means, caused pecuniary advantage to accused Nos.5 and 9 and corresponding loss to Malabar cements Ltd, Walayyar a wholly public sector undertaking, Government of Kerala with the active connivance of other accused. On the above basis, it is alleged that the accused have committed offences punishable under Section 13 (1)(c) &) d) r/w 13 (2) of Prevention of Corruption, Act 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘ PC Act’ for short) and Sections 409 , 420 and 120 (B) of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’ for short). 4. While assailing Annexure-I order, whereby the Special Judge disallowed the prayer for discharge at the instance of the revision petitioners, who are accused Nos.6 and 7, the learned senior counsel appearing for the revision petitioners argued at length by referring various documents in this case. It is pointed out by the learned senior counsel that, in this matter, FIR was registered as on 13.05.2008, alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 409 , 420 r/w 120B of IPC as well as under Section 13 (1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act. According to the learned senior counsel, the allegation in the FIR was that, on 07.01.2006, the Malabar Cements Limited (MCL) paid Rs.32 lakh as interest free advance to M/s. Crescent Mines and Minerals for the development of infrastructure facilities at the AKLS mines. Later, it was proved that the lease out mines did not have the requested quantity and quality of limestone, which resulted in termination of the agreement. In the process, only an amount of Rs.5 lakh was recovered from the interest free advance paid to the 5 th accused. Later, it was proved that the lease out mines did not have the requested quantity and quality of limestone, which resulted in termination of the agreement. In the process, only an amount of Rs.5 lakh was recovered from the interest free advance paid to the 5 th accused. Therefore, the balance comes to Rs.27 lakh become irrecoverable and loss to the MCL and thereby corresponding gain obtained by the 5 th accused. 5. According to the learned senior counsel for the revision petitioners, even though investigation was started based on the said allegation, the allegation found to be baseless and accordingly, the investigating agency diverted the investigation and now, the crux of the allegation is that, by executing a new contract with M/s. Crescent Mines and Minerals, to supply limestone at the rate of Rs.689.87/MT from October, 2005 as against a prevailing order, whereby M/s. Parveen Mines and Minerals, agreed to supply the same items for Rs.621/MT. According to the learned senior counsel or the revision petitioners, as per the document, which would suggest the rate, during 01.05.2005 to 14.08.2005 the rate, for which M/s. Parveen Mines and Minerals supplied limestone at the time of execution of the agreement is similar to that of the agreed rate with M/s. Crescent Mines and Minerals. The learned Senior Counsel taken the board decisions in this regard and also pointed out that accused Nos.6 and 7 are the officials, who attended the meeting, and what they have done is their duty as per law. It is also pointed out that, since as per the agreement in dispute, there was agreement to supply limestone at the rate of Rs.689/- throughout without any increase. In fact, M/s. Malabar Cement Limited gained a profit of Rs.3,25,472/- during the period and thus, taking into the consideration of the price difference between 621 and 689.87, the allegation of misappropriation alleged against the accused, including the revision petitioners would not stand. 6. The learned Public Prosecutor vehemently opposed this contention and submitted that, the prosecution records in no way would justify the contention that during March, 2005, limestone was received from M/s. Parveen Mines and Minerals, at the rate of Rs.689.87/MT and the veracity of the document produced by the learned senior counsel for the revision petitioners in a plea seeking discharge could not be considered otherwise the same is a matter proved by evidence. It is pointed out by the learned Public Prosecutor further that, as per item 32, it is discernible that during March, 2021, the price paid is only Rs.621/MT without any addition. Therefore, this contention could not be believed or justified. The learned Public Prosecutor further pointed out that, apart from the price difference, the quality and the quantity of limestone supplied by M/s. Crescent Mines and Minerals are very poor than that of M/s. Parveen Mines and Minerals and in this regard, report of the Mines and Geology Department is available. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the additional 2 nd respondent supported the prosecution case and it is submitted that, the status of accused Nos.6 and 7 could not be found as mere members who only participated in the meeting, since the 6 th accused held the post of Chairman for a period of 10 years and during his tenure, he had given many contracts which would favour Sri.Radhakrishnan and under his interference the present agreement and other similar agreements were executed. Accordingly, M/s. Malabar Cement Limited sustained huge loss and thereby, corresponding illegal gratification obtained by the contractors on the other end. 8. According to the learned counsel for the 2 nd respondent, in the instant case, the prosecution materials would show a prima facie case warranting trial and therefore, the Special Court rightly disallowed the petition. 9. The learned Senior counsel appearing for the revision petitioners placed decision of the Apex Court in Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1972 SC 545 , to contend that while considering the plea of discharge, If, on this material, the Court comes to the conclusion that there is no ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it can appropriately consider the charge to be groundless and discharge the accused. The argument that the Court at the stage of framing the charges has not to apply its judicial mind for considering whether or not there is a ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused is not supportable either on the plain language of the section or on its judicial interpretation or on any other recognised principle of law. The order framing the charges does substantially affect the person's liberty and it is not possible to countenance the view that the Court must automatically frame the charge merely because the prosecuting authorities, by relying on the documents referred to in Section 173, consider it proper to institute the case. The responsibility of framing the charges is that of the Court and it, has to judicially consider the question of doing so. Without fully adverting to the material on the record it must not blindly adopt the decision of the prosecution. Similarly, another decision of the Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. Muniswamy and Others, (1977) 2 SCC 699 , with reference to paragraph Nos.7 to 10, also has been referred, while dealing with the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In paragraph Nos.7 to 10, the Apex Court held as under: “7. The second limb of Mr. Mookerjee's argument is that in any event the High Court could not take upon itself the task of assessing or appreciating the weight of material on the record in order to find whether any charges could be legitimately framed against the respondents. So long as there is some material on the record to connect the accused with the crime, says the learned counsel, the case must go on and the High Court has no jurisdiction to put a precipitate or premature end to the proceedings on the belief that the prosecution is not likely to succeed. This, in our opinion, is too broad a proposition to accept. Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 2 of 1974, provides that: If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing. This section is contained in Chapter XVIII called "Trial Before a Court of Session". It is clear from the provision that the Sessions Court has the power to discharge an accused if after perusing the record and hearing the parties he comes to the conclusion, for reasons to be recorded, that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is clear from the provision that the Sessions Court has the power to discharge an accused if after perusing the record and hearing the parties he comes to the conclusion, for reasons to be recorded, that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The object of the provision which requires the Sessions Judge to record his reasons is to enable the superior court to examine the correctness of the reasons for which the Sessions Judge has held that there is or is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The High Court therefore is entitled to go into the reasons given by the Sessions Judge in support of his order and to determine for itself whether the order is justified by the facts and circumstances of the case. Section 482 of the New Code, which corresponds to Section 561-A of the Code of 1898, provides that: Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court of other wise to secure the ends of justice. In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction. 8. Let us then turn to the facts of the case to see whether the High Court was justified in holding that the proceedings against the respondents ought to be quashed in order to prevent abuse of the process of the court and in order to secure the ends of justice. We asked the State counsel time and again to point out any data or material on the basis of which a reasonable likelihood of the respondents being convicted of any offence in connection with the attempted murder of the complainant could be predicated. A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution proposes to rely are woefully inadequate for connecting the respondents with the crime, howsoever skilfully one may attempt to weave those bits into a presentable whole. There is no material on the record on which any tribunal could reasonably convict the respondents for any offence connected with the assault on the complainant. It is undisputed that the respondents were nowhere near the scene of offence at the time of the assault. What is alleged against them is that they had conspired to commit that assault. This, we think, is one of those cases in which a charge of conspiracy is hit upon for the mere reason that evidence of direct involvement of the accused is lacking. We have been taken through the statements recorded by the police during the course of investigation and the other material. The worst that can be said against the respondents on the basis thereof is that they used to meet one another frequently after the dismissal of accused 1 and prior to the commission of the assault on the complainant. Why they met, what they said, and whether they held any deliberations at all are matters on which no witness has said a word. Why they met, what they said, and whether they held any deliberations at all are matters on which no witness has said a word. In the circumstances, it would be a sheer waste of public time and money to permit the proceedings to continue against the respondents. The High Court was therefore justified in holding that for meeting the ends of justice the proceedings against the respondents ought to be quashed. 9. Learned counsel for the State Government relies upon a decision of this Court in R.P. Kapur v. The State of Punjab in which it was held that in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561A of the Code of 1898. the High Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in the case is reliable or not. That may be so. But in the instant case the question is not whether any reliance can be placed on the veracity of this or that particular witness. The fact of the matter is that there is no material on the record on the basis of which any tribunal could reasonably come to the conclusion that the respondents are in any manner connected with the incident leading to the prosecution. Gajendragadkar, J., who spoke for the Court in Kapur's case observes in his judgment that it was not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of the High Court's inherent jurisdiction. The three instances cited in the judgment as to when the High Court would be justified in exercising its inherent jurisdiction are only illustrative and can in the very nature of things not be regarded as exhaustive. Considerations justifying the exercise of inherent powers for securing the ends of justice naturally vary from case to case and a jurisdiction as wholesome as the one conferred by Section 482 ought not to be encased within the strait-jacket of a rigid formula. 10. On the other hand, the decisions cited by learned counsel for the respondents in Vadilal Panchal v. D.D. Ghadigaonkar and Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. v. State of Maharashtra show that it is wrong to say that at the stage of framing charges the court cannot apply its judicial mind to the consideration whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. v. State of Maharashtra show that it is wrong to say that at the stage of framing charges the court cannot apply its judicial mind to the consideration whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. As observed in the latter case, the order framing a charge affects a person's liberty substantially and therefore it is the duty of the court to consider judicially whether the material warrants the framing of the charge. It cannot blindly accept the decision of the prosecution that the accused be asked to face a trial. In Vadilal Panchal's case, Section 203 of the old Code was under consideration, which provided that the Magistrate could dismiss a complaint if after considering certain matters mentioned in the section there was in his judgment no sufficient ground for proceeding with the case. To an extent Section 327 of the new Code contains an analogous power which is conferred on the Sessions Court. It was held by this Court, while considering the true scope of Section 203 of the old Code that the Magistrate was not bound to accept the result of an enquiry or investigation and that he must apply his judicial mind to the material on which he had to form his judgment. These decisions show that for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against an accused the court possesses a comparatively wider discretion in the exercise of which it can determine the question whether the material on the record, if unrebutted, is such on the basis of which a conviction can be said reasonably to be possible. 10. Another decision of the Apex Court in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal and Another, AIR 1979 SC 366 has been placed with reference to paragraph Nos.10 and 24 and it is submitted that the test to determine a prima facie case while considering discharge would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large, however, if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. 11. By and large, however, if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. 11. Having addressed the rival contentions, the entire dispute centers on the allegation that by misusing the official position, the accused, including accused Nos.6 and 7, made supply order to get limestone from M/s. Crescent Mines and Minerals for a highest price at the rate of Rs.689/MT as against Rs.621/MT, the price by which M/s. Parveen Mines and Minerals supplied the same item with the required quality. In this connection, it is pointed out by the learned senior counsel that, as per Annexures, appended with the purchased order MT/02/PR/26219 dated 02.06.2003, under clause (3), it has been provided as under: “03. PRICE : You will be paid at the rate of Rs.621.00 per MT inclusive of Royalty, CST @ 4% against C Form, loading and transportation charges as per break up price mentioned. The price shall be kept firm during the pendency of the contract, however, in case of any increase in statutory levies and in the price of diesel, same will be considered by us against documentary proof. It any increases is effected in the price of TAMIN Limestone the same will be considered to you also. Similarly, in case of any reduction in the above terms, the same is to be passed on to us. In the event of suspension of Limestone from Tamin even after enhancing the rates by TAMIN, in such an event, periodical review (every 2 years) shall be made and revised rates and other terms and conditions shall be settled after mutual discussion between MCL and Parveen Mines. 12. It is pointed out further that on reading the above clause, the supply of limestone earlier also was not for Rs.621/MT and the same is inclusive of the price of diesel and statutory levies. So, as on the date of the new agreement, the amount would come to more than Rs.689/MT. He also would submit that as per the Board meeting, the matter was discussed to avoid loss to the company. 13. While disallowing the discharge plea at the instance of accused Nos.6 and 7, the special court observed reasons for disallowing the discharge. So, as on the date of the new agreement, the amount would come to more than Rs.689/MT. He also would submit that as per the Board meeting, the matter was discussed to avoid loss to the company. 13. While disallowing the discharge plea at the instance of accused Nos.6 and 7, the special court observed reasons for disallowing the discharge. It is also pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel that as per Annexure Y, as on 10.08.2005, the rate of royalty payable for the supply of sweetener grade limestone was revised from Rs.40/MT to Rs.45/MT with effect from 14.10.2004 due to the revision in royalty made by the government. It is also pointed out to buttress his point that the case advanced by the prosecution limiting the availability of limestone from M/s.Parveen Mines and Minerals at the rate of Rs.621/- per MT during March 2005 is baseless, and the prosecution suppressed the relevant documents in this regard so as to file final report attributing the offence committed by the accused, including the revision petitioners. 14. To be on the crux of the matter, the allegation of the prosecution is that, despite the availability of quality assured limestone at the rate of Rs.621/MT, a new contract was executed between M/s. Crescent Mines and Minerals and M/s. Malabar Cements Ltd. with the junction of the revision petitioners and others to supply limestone at the rate of Rs.689/MT. Accordingly, the purchase and the price difference coming to the tune of Rs.26,61,394/- is found as misappropriation by the accused persons, resulted in loss of the said amount to M/s. Malabar Cements Ltd. and gain to M/s. Crescent Mines and Minerals. It would appear at the outset that entering into an agreement for the purchase of limestone at the rate of Rs.689/MT, as against the existing rate of Rs. 621/MT, is excessive. On going through the purchase order under clause (3), it has been stated that the earlier supplier agreed to provide 1 MT limestone at the rate of Rs.621/-, inclusive of CST @ 4% against C Form, loading and transportation charges as per the break up price mentioned and it was also agreed that the price should be kept firm during the pendency of the contract. Further clause is that in case of any increase in statutory levies and in the price of diesel, the same would be considered by the company against documentary proof. If any increase is effected in the price of TAMIN Limestone the same would be considered by M/s. Malabar Cements Ltd also. This clause has been given much emphasis by the learned counsel for the revision petitioners to hold that, going by clause No.3 also, as on the date of agreement, in between M/s. Crescent Mines & Minerals and M/s. Malabar Cements Ltd. to get limestone at the rate of Rs.689/MT the price as per the earlier tender also would be Rs.689/MT or higher. Whereas the case of the prosecution, as zealously pointed out by the learned Public Prosecutor is that at any point of time prior to the present agreement, the price of limestone increased from Rs.621/MT to Rs.689/MT. In this connection, it has been submitted that as per the Modified Mining Plan (MMP) dated 18.03.2005, for mining limestone prepared by a Recognized Qualified Person (RQP) as per the application of M/s. Crescent Mines & Minerals which was duly approved by the Indian Bureau of Mines reveals that, during the period of agreement executed, recoverable limestone reserves available at the leased-out mines was only 4.67 Lakhs MTs which is against their claim of 14 Lakhs MTs and average monthly off take from the leased out mines is restricted to 1650 MTs only. Whereas as per the agreement, the quantity of limestone that can be extracted from the leased out mine was shown as above 10000 MTs per month. As per the MMP report the extraction of limestone can be made only for 5 years from 14.5.2005. As per the minutes, the total cost of limestone was decided based of total extraction per month as follows: 0-5000 MT/month - Rs.719.45, 5001-10000 MT/month Rs.664.32 & above 10000 MT/month - Rs.634.48 which is higher than the price of existing long-term Purchase Order with M/s. Parveen Mines & Minerals (Rs 621/- per Metric Ton). 15. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, when a new contract is entered, the raw materials could not be provided at a rate lower than the prevailing market rate. 15. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, when a new contract is entered, the raw materials could not be provided at a rate lower than the prevailing market rate. In fact, M/s. Crescent Mines & Minerals offered a lowest market rate prevailing and in the best interest of the company, the same was purchased by executing agreement with bonafide intent. On perusal of the comparison made, it could be gathered that at the time when 1 MT limestone was available at the rate of Rs.621/- a new agreement was executed with M/s. Cresent Mines & Minerals and M/s. Malabar Cements Ltd for the purchase of limestone at the rate of Rs.689.29/MT. If so, it cannot be held at this stage that the prosecution case not made out prima facie regarding loss amounting to Rs.26,61,394/- and thus the case warrants trial since this contention can only be addressed by the Special Court during the trial. Thus, the Special Court rightly negatived the discharge plea for the reasons extracted hereinabove, and therefore, the said order does not require any interference. The interim order of stay granted by this Court stands vacated. Accordingly, this revision petition fails and is dismissed. Registry is directed to forward a copy of this order to the special court forthwith.