J UDGMENT Heard Mr. A.R. Malhotra, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Joseph L. Renthlei, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. By way of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner is assailing the order dated 30.07.2019, whereby the services of the petitioner was relieved w.e.f. 31.07.2019. 3. The facts of the instant case are as follows:- The petitioner pursuant to an advertisement issued by the respondent i.e. the Institute of Chartered Financial Analyst of India University, Mizoram (hereinafter referred to as the “ICFAI University”), applied to the post of teacher. Thereafter the petitioner appeared in the interview held by the ICFAI University and after being selected the ICFAI University by letter dated 17.10.2008 informed the petitioner that he has been selected to the post of Faculty Associate. Pursuant to the aforesaid letter on 29.10.2008 the petitioner was appointed to the post of Faculty Associate on contract basis which was subsequently renewed on 18.05.2009. However, the ICFAI University by order dated 30.07.2019 terminated the employment contract of the petitioner by giving him 3(three) month’s salary (Basic Pay) in lieu of notice period. Aggrieved by the aforesaid termination, the petitioner filed the instant writ petition. 4. Pertinent that Mr. Joseph L. Renthlei, learned counsel appearing for the respondents at the outset of the hearing raised the issue of maintainability of the writ petition. 5. In view of the aforesaid objection raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents, this Court before adverting to the merits of the case, deems appropriate to first try the issue of maintainability of the writ petition. Accordingly, arguments were made as regards the issue of maintainability of the writ petition. 6. Mr. A. R. Malhotra, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the ICFAI University being established under Section 4(2) of the Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts of India University (Mizoram) Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the “University Act, 2006”) a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable against the said University as it is a statutory University and discharging function thereunder. In support of the aforesaid submission, he relies upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Federal Bank Ltd. Vs. Sagar Thomas and Others , reported in ( 2003) 10 SCC 733 . In support of the aforesaid submission, he relies upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Federal Bank Ltd. Vs. Sagar Thomas and Others , reported in ( 2003) 10 SCC 733 . He further submits that the writ Court is also invested with the power to declare invalid Act of a statutory body, if by doing the Act, the body has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by statute. In support of the aforesaid submission, he relies upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli and others Vs. Lakshmi Narain and Others , reported in (1976) 2 SCC 58 7. Per Contra, Mr. Joseph L. Renthlei, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, submits that ICFAI University is not a “State” or an “instrumentality of the State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable. In support of the aforesaid submission, he relies upon the decision of a Co-ordinate Bench of the High Court of Uttarakhand in the case of Arun Kumar Vs ICFAI University and others , reported in 2009 SCC OnLine Utt 620 . He further submits that the High Court of Uttarakhand in the aforesaid case has concluded that the ICFAI University though is being a creature of a statute, the same cannot be called a “State” or a “instrumentality of the State” within the meaning of Article 12 of Constitution of India as there is no “deep or pervasive control” of the state over this body. He further in his usual fairness submits that though the ICFAI University is not a State within Article 12 of the Constitution of India, however, if the action of the said University assailed in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is in the discharge of public function, the writ petition is maintainable. In support of the aforesaid submission, he relies upon the decision of a Co- ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Mukti Nath Gogoi Vs. The State of Assam and others , in WP(C) No. 5671/2018 . He further submits that the appointment of the petitioner in the instant case being under a contract, termination of the same is totally a private law remedy and hence, the writ petition is not maintainable. 8. The State of Assam and others , in WP(C) No. 5671/2018 . He further submits that the appointment of the petitioner in the instant case being under a contract, termination of the same is totally a private law remedy and hence, the writ petition is not maintainable. 8. I have given my prudent consideration to the arguments advanced by both the learned Counsel appearing for the contending parties, and have perused the material available on record. I have also considered the case laws cited at the bar. 9. The issue which falls for determination before this Court before entering into the merit of the matter is whether a writ can be issued against the ICFAI University for terminating the services of the petitioner. 10. It is admitted position that ICFAI University is established under a statute i.e. University Act, 2006. It is evident that the said University is a self financing body and has been clearly barred from making any demand for any grant in aid or any other financial assistance either from the State Government or from anybody or Corporation owned or controlled by the State Government. Therefore, there is absolutely no control on the ICFAI University by the State. It further appears that though his Excellency Governor of Mizoram is the visitor of this University under the University Act, 2006, the powers which have been given to the visitor under Section 11 and 12 of the said Act also cannot be called to be deep and pervasive. Section 5, 11 and 12 of the University Act, 2006, are extracted hereunder for ready reference: “University not to be entitled to financial assistance 5. The University shall be self-financing and shall neither make a demand nor shall be entitled to any grant in-aid or any other financial assistance from the State Government or any other body or corporation owned or controlled by the State Government. Officers of the University 11. The following shall be the officers of the University: (a) The Chancellor; (b) The Vice-Chancellor; (c) The Registrar; (d) The Finance Officer; and (e) Such otheroffices as may be declared by the Statutes to be officers of the University. The Visitor 12. (1) The Governor of Mizoram will be the Visitor of the University (2) The Visitor shall, when present, preside at the convocation of the University for conferring Degrees, Diplomas, Charters, Designations and Certificates. The Visitor 12. (1) The Governor of Mizoram will be the Visitor of the University (2) The Visitor shall, when present, preside at the convocation of the University for conferring Degrees, Diplomas, Charters, Designations and Certificates. (3) The Visitor shall have the following powers namely: (a) To call for any paper or information relating to the affairs of the University (b) On the basis of the information received by the Visitor, if he is satisfied that any order, proceeding, or decision taken by any authority of the University is not in conformity with the Act, Regulations, or Rules, he may issue such directions as he may deem fit in the interest of the University and the directions so issued shall be complied with by all concerned.” 11. It further appears that a Co-ordinate Bench of the High Court of Uttarakhand in the case of Arun Kumar (Supra) has already adjudicated as whether the ICFAI University can be said to be a “State” or “instrumentality of the State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, so as to maintain a writ petition against such University. Relevant portion of the said decision is extracted hereunder for ready reference: “To conclude, this Court is of the opinion that the University inspite of being a creature of a statute cannot be called a ‘State’ or an ‘instrumentality of the State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India as there is no ‘deep or pervasive control’ of the State over this body. The issue is decided accordingly.” 12. Though the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench in another High Court is not binding before this Court, however, the same is persuasive. Upon reading the said decision, I do not see any reasons as why I shall differ from the view taken by the said Co-ordinate Bench. However, it appears that the only issue which was before the High Court of Uttarakhand was whether the concerned institute is a “State” or an “instrumentality of the State” under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The High Court of Uttarakhand, accordingly, has held that the University though is established under a Statue, is not a “State” or an “instrumentality of the State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The High Court of Uttarakhand, accordingly, has held that the University though is established under a Statue, is not a “State” or an “instrumentality of the State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. However, the High Court of Uttarakhand in the said case did not examine whether the said University is discharging a public duty or not as the powers of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is wide enough and the words such as any person or authority used under Article 226 are not confined to statutory authorities and instrumentality of the state and they may cover any person or body performing public duty. 13. In the case Ramakrishna Mission and Another Vs. Kago Kunya and Others , reported in (2019) 16 SCC 303 , the Apex Court has held that a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can lie against a person if it is a statutory body or performs a public function or discharge a public or statutory duty. Paragraphs 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 34 and 35 of the aforesaid decision are extracted herein for ready reference: “17. The basic issue before this Court is whether the functions performed by the hospital are public functions, on the basis of which a writ of mandamus can lie under Article 226 of the Constitution. 18. The hospital is a branch of the Ramakrishna Mission and is subject to its control. The Mission was established by Swami Vivekanand, the foremost disciple of Shri Ramakrishna Paramhansa. Service to humanity is for the organisation co-equal with service to God as is reflected in the motto "Atmano Mokshartham Jagad Hitaya Cha". The main object of the Ramakrishna Mission is to impart knowledge in and promote the study of Vedanta and its principles propounded by Shri Ramakrishna Paramahansa and practically illustrated by his own life and of comparative theology in its widest form. Its objects include, inter alia to establish, maintain, carry on and assist schools, colleges, universities, research institutions, libraries, hospitals and take up development and general welfare activities for the benefit of the underprivileged/backward/tribal people of society without any discrimination. These activities are voluntary, charitable and non-profit making in nature. Its objects include, inter alia to establish, maintain, carry on and assist schools, colleges, universities, research institutions, libraries, hospitals and take up development and general welfare activities for the benefit of the underprivileged/backward/tribal people of society without any discrimination. These activities are voluntary, charitable and non-profit making in nature. The activities undertaken by the Mission, a non-profit entity are not closely related to those performed by the State in its sovereign capacity nor do they partake of the nature of a public duty. 19. The Governing Body of the Mission is constituted by members of the Board of Trustees of Ramakrishna Math and is vested with the power and authority to manage the organisation. The properties and funds of the Mission and its management vest in the Governing Body. Any person can become a member of the Mission if elected by the Governing Body. Members on roll form the quorum of the annual general meetings. The Managing Committee comprises of members appointed by the Governing Body for managing the affairs of the Mission. Under the Memorandum of Association and Rules and Regulations of the Mission, there is no governmental control in the functioning, administration and day to day management of the Mission. The conditions of service of the employees of the hospital are governed by service rules which are framed by the Mission without the intervention of any governmental body. 20. In coming to the conclusion that the appellants fell within the description of an authority under Article 226, the High Court placed a considerable degree of reliance on the judgment of a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Andi Mukta. Andi Mukta was a case where a public trust was running a college which was affiliated to Gujarat University, a body governed by the State legislation. The teachers of the University and all its affiliated colleges were governed, insofar as their pay scales were concerned, by the recommendations of the University Grants Commission. A dispute over pay scales raised by the association representing the teachers of the University had been the subject-matter of an award of the Chancellor, which was accepted by the government as well as by the University. The management of the college, in question, decided to close it down without prior approval. A dispute over pay scales raised by the association representing the teachers of the University had been the subject-matter of an award of the Chancellor, which was accepted by the government as well as by the University. The management of the college, in question, decided to close it down without prior approval. A writ petition was instituted before the High Court for the enforcement of the right of the teachers to receive their salaries and terminal benefits in accordance with the governing provisions. In that context, this Court dealt with the issue as to whether the management of the college was amenable to the writ jurisdiction. A number of circumstances weighed in the ultimate decision of this Court, including the following: 20.1. The trust was managing an affiliated college. 20.2. The college was in receipt of government aid. 20.3. The aid of the government played a major role in the control, management and work of the educational institution. 20.4. Aided institutions, in a similar manner as government institutions, discharge a public function of imparting education to students. 20.5. All aided institutions are governed by the rules and regulations of the affiliating University. 20.6. Their activities are closely supervised by the University. 20.7. Employment in such institutions is hence, not devoid of a public character and is governed by the decisions taken by the University which are binding on the management. 21. It was in the above circumstances that this Court came to the conclusion that the service conditions of the academic staff do not partake of a private character, but are governed by a right-duty relationship between the staff and the management. A breach of the duty, it was held, would be amenable to the remedy of a writ of mandamus. While the Court recognised that ‘the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting rights of people cannot be put into watertight compartments’, it laid down two exceptions where the remedy of mandamus would not be available: (SCC p. 698, para 15) ‘15. If the rights are purely of a private character no mandamus can issue. If the management of the college is purely a private body with no public duty mandamus will not lie. These are two exceptions to mandamus.’ 22. Following the decision in Andi Mukta, this Court has had the occasion to re-visit the underlying principles in successive decisions. If the rights are purely of a private character no mandamus can issue. If the management of the college is purely a private body with no public duty mandamus will not lie. These are two exceptions to mandamus.’ 22. Following the decision in Andi Mukta, this Court has had the occasion to re-visit the underlying principles in successive decisions. This has led to the evolution of principles to determine what constitutes a ‘public duty’ and ‘public function’ and whether the writ of mandamus would be available to an individual who seeks to enforce her right. 23. In VST Industries Ltd. v. Workers’ Unions, a two- Judge Bench of this Court held that a mere violation of the conditions of service will not provide a valid basis for the exercise of the writ jurisdiction under Article 226, in a situation where the activity does not have the features of a public duty. This Court noted: (SCC p. 305, para 7) ‘7. In de Smith, Woolf and Jowell’s Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 5th Edn., it is noticed that not all the activities of the private bodies are subject to private law e.g. the activities by private bodies may be governed by the standards of public law when its decisions are subject to duties conferred by statute or when, by virtue of the function it is performing or possibly its dominant position in the market, it is under an implied duty to act in the public interest…. After detailed discussion, the learned authors have summarised the position with the following propositions: (1) The test of whether a body is performing a public function, and is hence amenable to judicial review, may not depend upon the source of its power or whether the body is ostensibly a ‘public’ or a ‘private’ body. (2) The principles of judicial review prima facie govern the activities of bodies performing public functions. (3) ... In the following two situations judicial review will not normally be appropriate even though the body may be performing apublic function: (a) Where some other branch of the law more appropriately governs the dispute between the parties. In such a case, that branch of the law and its remedies should and normally will be applied: and (b) where there is a contract between the litigants. In such a case the express or implied terms of the agreement should normally govern the matter. In such a case, that branch of the law and its remedies should and normally will be applied: and (b) where there is a contract between the litigants. In such a case the express or implied terms of the agreement should normally govern the matter. This reflects the normal approach of English law, namely, that the terms of a contract will normally govern the transaction, or other relationship between the parties, rather thanthe general law. Thus, where a special method of resolving disputes (such as arbitration or resolution by private or domestic tribunals)has been agreed upon by the parties (expressly or by necessaryimplication), that regime, and not judicial review, will normallygovern the dispute." 24. In G. Bassi Reddy v. International Crops Research Institute, a twoJudge Bench of this Court dealt with whether the International Crop Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) which is a non-profit research and training centre, is amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226. The dispute concerned the termination of employees of ICRISAT. The Court held that only functions which are similar or closely related to those that are performed by the State in its sovereign capacity qualify as "public functions" or a "publicduty": (SCC p. 237, para 28) ‘28. A writ under Article 226 can lie against a ‘person’ if it is a statutory body or performs a public function or discharges a public or statutory duty…ICRISAT has not been set up by a statute nor are its activities statutorily controlled. Although, it is not easy to define what a public function or public duty is, it can reasonably be said that such functions are similar to or closely related to those performable by the State in its sovereign capacity. The primary activity of ICRISAT is to conduct research and training programmes in the sphere of agriculture purely on a voluntary basis. A service voluntarily undertaken cannot be said to be a public duty. Besides ICRISAT has a role which extends beyond the territorial boundaries of India and its activities are designed to benefit people from all over the world. The primary activity of ICRISAT is to conduct research and training programmes in the sphere of agriculture purely on a voluntary basis. A service voluntarily undertaken cannot be said to be a public duty. Besides ICRISAT has a role which extends beyond the territorial boundaries of India and its activities are designed to benefit people from all over the world. While the Indian public may be the beneficiary of the activities of the Institute, it certainly cannot be said that ICRISAT owes a duty to the Indian public to provide research and training facilities.’ Applying the above test, this Court upheld the decision of the High Court that the writ petition against ICRISAT was not maintainable. 25. A similar view was taken in Ramesh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, where a two-Judge Bench of this Court held that a private body can be held to be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 when it performs public functions which are normally expected to be performed by the State or its authorities. 26. In Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas, this Court analysed the earlier judgements of this Court and provided a classification of entities against whom a writ petition may be maintainable:(SCC p. 748, para 18) ‘18. From the decisions referred to above, the position that emerges is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be maintainable against (i) the State (Government); (ii) an authority; (iii) a statutory body; (iv) an instrumentality or agency of the State; (v) a company which is financed and owned by the State; (vi) a private body run substantially on State funding; (vii) a private body discharging public duty or positive obligation of public nature; and (viii) a person or a body under liability to discharge any function under any statute, to compel it to perform such a statutory function.’ 27. In Binny Ltd. v. V. Sadasivan, a two Judge Bench of this Court noted the distinction between public and private functions. It held thus: (SCCpp. 665-66, para 11) ‘11.... It is difficult to draw a line between public functions and private functions when they are being discharged by a purely private authority. In Binny Ltd. v. V. Sadasivan, a two Judge Bench of this Court noted the distinction between public and private functions. It held thus: (SCCpp. 665-66, para 11) ‘11.... It is difficult to draw a line between public functions and private functions when they are being discharged by a purely private authority. A body is performing a "public function" when it seeks to achieve some collective benefit for the public or a section of the public and is accepted by the public or that section of the public as having authority to do so. Bodies therefore exercise public functions when they intervene or participate in social or economic affairs in the public interest.’ 28. The Bench elucidated on the scope of mandamus: (SCC p. 673, para 29) ‘29.... However, the scope of mandamus is limited to enforcement of public duty. The scope of mandamus is determined by the nature of the duty to be enforced, rather than the identity of the authority against whom it is sought. If the private body is discharging a public function and the denial of any right is in connection with the public duty imposed on such body, the public law remedy can be enforced. The duty cast on the public body may be either statutory or otherwise and the source of such power is immaterial, but, nevertheless, there must be the public law element in such action….There cannot be any general definition of public authority or public action. The facts of each case decide the point.’ 29. More recently in K.K. Saksena v. International Commission on Irrigation & Drainage, another two-Judge Bench of this Court held that a writ would not lie to enforce purely private law rights. Consequently, even if a body is performing a public duty and is amenable to the exercise of writ jurisdiction, all its decisions would not be subject to judicial review. The Court held thus: (SCC p. 692, para 43) ‘43. What follows from a minute and careful reading of the aforesaid judgments of this Court is that if a person or authority is ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, admittedly a writ petition under Article 226 would lie against such a person or body. However, we may add that even in such cases writ would not lie to enforce private law rights. However, we may add that even in such cases writ would not lie to enforce private law rights. There are a catena of judgments on this aspect and it is not necessary to refer to those judgments as that is the basic principle of judicial review of an action under the administrative law. The reason is obvious. A private law is that part of a legal system which is a part of common law that involves relationships between individuals, such as law of contract or torts. Therefore, even if writ petition would be maintainable against an authority, which is ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution, before issuing any writ, particularly writ of mandamus, the court has to satisfy that action of such an authority, which is challenged, is in the domain of public law as distinguished from private law.’ 30. Thus, even if the body discharges a public function in a wider sense, there is no public law element involved in the enforcement of a private contract of service. ……. 34. Thus, contracts of a purely private nature would not be subject to writ jurisdiction merely by reason of the fact that they are structured by statutory provisions. The only exception to this principle arises in a situation where the contract of service is governed or regulated by a statutory provision. Hence, for instance, in K.K. Saksena this Court held that when an employee is a workman governed by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it constitutes an exception to the general principle that a contract of personal service is not capable of being specifically enforced or performed. 35. It is of relevance to note that the Act was enacted to provide for the regulation and registration of clinical establishments with a view to prescribe minimum standards of facilities and services. The Act, inter alia, stipulates conditions to be satisfied by clinical establishments for registration. However, the Act does not govern contracts of service entered into by the hospital with respect to its employees. These fall within the ambit of purely private contracts, against which writ jurisdiction cannot lie. The sanctity of this distinction must be preserved.” 14. Reading of the aforesaid, it is apparent that a private body can also be held to be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when it performs public functions. The sanctity of this distinction must be preserved.” 14. Reading of the aforesaid, it is apparent that a private body can also be held to be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when it performs public functions. In fact, the question is not whether such body is constituted under a statute or is a private body but what it is discharging. In other words, contracts of a purely private nature would not be amenable to writ jurisdiction merely by reason of the fact that such contract is executed by a statutory authority. Thus, in order to maintain a writ petition against public body or a statutory body as the case may be, it is imperative to show that the action assailed of such body is in discharge of their public duty. In other words, a writ would not lie to enforce purely private contract of service. 15. In light of the aforesaid, let me turn back to the facts of the present case. It is evident from the letters of employment dated 17.10.2008, 29.10.2008, and the review letter dated 18.05.2009 that the service of the petitioner was on the basis of a contract. Review letter dated 18.05.2009 is extracted hereunder for ready reference: “The Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts of India University, Mizoram Salem Veng, Chaitlang, Alzawt-706 012. Mizoram Phone: 0389-2344910/17 Ref. HR/Review/FM/09/102 May 18, 2009 Mr. Timothy Hnamte Emp No 12D25815 Faculty Associate Faculty of Management –Lunglei Dear Mr. Timothy Hnante, We are pleased to inform that based on your performance and as decided by the Management Committee your pay is revised as detailed in Annexure - A enclosed with effect from April 01, 2009 on the following terms and conditions: 1. You will be on contract appointment upto June 30, 2011. On expiry of the contract period, the same may be renewed on mutual consent. 2. PROBATION/CONFIRMATION: You will be on probation for a period of one year from the date of joining. The Management may, at its discretion, decide to extend or reduce the period of probation. Till the time you are intimated in writing regarding your confirmation, you shall continue to be on probation 3. TERMINATION OF SERVICE: a. Your contract will automatically come to an end on completion of the fixed term as per this offer of appointment, unless the Management decides to extend. Till the time you are intimated in writing regarding your confirmation, you shall continue to be on probation 3. TERMINATION OF SERVICE: a. Your contract will automatically come to an end on completion of the fixed term as per this offer of appointment, unless the Management decides to extend. b. You shall lose the lien on contract if you absent yourself without leave or remain absent for a period of 8 working days or more, beyond the period of leave originally granted. Thereby you shall be considered as having voluntarily terminated your employment without giving any notice. c. Your contract is liable to be terminated without any notice or remuneration in lieu thereof for your act/s of misconduct, loss of confidence, inefficiency, disloyalty or commission of an act involving moral turpitude. d. During the probation period, the contract of your appointment is liable to be terminated, without assigning any reasons, by giving one month notice on either side or payment of one month basic salary in lieu thereof. e. After confirmation of your probation, the contract can be terminated with prior notice on either side except for the reasons mentioned in this offer letter. This prior notice will be of three months or payment of three months basic salary in lieu thereof. In the event of your resignation the ICFAI and its affiliates may at its discretion, relieve you prior to completion of stipulated notice period, without any pay. 4. All other terms and conditions of your original contract appointment order No. Ref: Appt/HR/FM/1384/08, dated October 29, 2008 will remain the same. The Compensation package offered to you by the University should be kept strictly confidential. You are advised not to share information regarding the salary and benefits/amenitites with anyone. Please acknowledge the receipt of this letter by signing the duplicate copy and return to us. (V.S. Raju) Head-CHR” 16. Reading of the aforesaid terms and conditions of the review letter, it is apparent that the petitioner was appointed on contract basis for a specified period. Thus, the right of the petitioner to continue in the service is under the contract. It further appears that as per the said contract, the services of the petitioner were to be automatically terminated on completion of the fixed term unless the respondent extends the same. It further appears that the contract also provided termination clause. Thus, the right of the petitioner to continue in the service is under the contract. It further appears that as per the said contract, the services of the petitioner were to be automatically terminated on completion of the fixed term unless the respondent extends the same. It further appears that the contract also provided termination clause. It further appears that the contractual employment of the petitioner was terminated by letter dated 30.07.2019 in accordance with clause 3 (e) of the said review letter dated 18.05.2019. The termination letter dated 30.07.2019 is extracted hereunder for ready reference: “Ref: HR/Ter/IUMiz/19/005 July 30, 2019 To, Mr. Timothy Hnamte Emp No. 12L25815 Assistant Professor Faculty of Management Studies The ICFAI University, Mizoram Aizawl Dear Mr.Timothy Hnamte Sub: Termination of Employment Contract - Reg. Ref: Review letter vide Ref. No. HR/Review/FM/09/102, dt. 18.05.2009. 1. You have been appointed as Faculty Associate in ICFAI University, Mizoram, Aizawl on 29.10.2008. Later your contract has been renewed with revision of pay and designation from time to, time and you are working as Assistant Professor as on date. 2. However, due to operational reasons your services are no longer required for the University and therefore you are relieved of your duties in accordance with Clause 3 (e) of your Review letter vide Ref. No. HR/Review/FM/09/102, dt. 18.05.2009. 3. Accordingly, you will be paid three months salary (Basic pay) in lieu notice period. You will be relieved of your duties at the close of office hours on 31.07.2019. 4. You are advised to contact HR Department for settlement of your dues, if any, after obtaining a No- Objection Certificate from all concerned at the Accounts Department. 5. Please acknowledge receipt of this letter. Yours sincerely Manager Central HR Department” 17. Reading of the aforesaid impugned termination order dated 30.07.2019 it appears that the respondent has terminated the employment contract of the petitioner in terms of the termination clause of the contract. That being so, it is abundantly clear that the service of the petitioner was not governed or regulated by a statutory provision but under the contract. Therefore, the termination under challenge is purely private nature and the same is not governed or regulated by a statutory provision. Hence, the decision sought to be corrected or enforced in the present case in the considered opinion of this Court cannot be said to be in the discharge of public function. Therefore, the termination under challenge is purely private nature and the same is not governed or regulated by a statutory provision. Hence, the decision sought to be corrected or enforced in the present case in the considered opinion of this Court cannot be said to be in the discharge of public function. Thus, the challenge to the said termination is outside the ambit of public law. Hence, the writ jurisdiction shall not lie. 18. In view of the above, this Court is of the unhesitant view that this writ petition is not maintainable and hence, this Court is not going into the merits of the matter. 19. Resultantly, the writ petition stands dismissed. 20. It is needless to be clarified that this Court having confined itself only to the issue of maintainability as raised, the writ petitioner is at liberty to raise the issue on merit before the competent Court, if so desires, and in the event, a challenge to the impugned termination is made, the same shall be adjudicated by the competent Court in accordance with law. No order as to costs. JUDGE Comparing Assistant