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2025 DIGILAW 2417 (KER)

M. Kani, S/o. Manuel v. Kerala State Electricity Board Limited

2025-09-11

MOHAMMED NIAS C.P.

body2025
JUDGMENT : MOHAMMED NIAS C.P., J. W.P.(C) No.22476 of 2024 seeks the implementation of the order passed by the Kerala State Electricity Appellate Authority dated 30.01.2024. W.P.(C) No.43778 of 2024 is filed by the Electricity Board challenging the very same order of the Appellate Authority. The petitioner in W.P.(C) No.22476 of 2024 is described as the Consumer, and he is the second respondent in the writ petition filed by the Board. 2. On 08.03.2023, at about 11.45 am, there was an inspection in the premises of the Hotel owned by the second respondent, consumer, by the Anti Power Theft Squad. Following the inspection, it was alleged in the mahazar that the Consumer had indulged in an illegal abstraction of electricity by connecting a PVC wire from the incoming terminal of the Single-Phase Energy Meter, extending the supply for carrying out construction works on the eastern side of the Hotel, which resulted in an additional load of 7340W. Thus, it was alleged that the petitioner committed theft of electrical energy within the meaning of Section 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). 3. On 09.03.2023, the second respondent was served with a provisional assessment order showing a civil liability of Rs.2,66,119/-. The petitioner did not file any objections to the provisional order, but remitted the amount on 14.03.2023, admitting the allegation of theft. The second respondent also applied before the Assistant Engineer concerned, seeking permission to compound the offence on the assurance that he would not commit any such offence in future. This was made through Ext.P4 application. On receipt of Ext.P4, the Board imposed Rs 80,000/- as a compounding fee. The compounding application was allowed on condition that the petitioner clear the civil liability before effecting re-connection. The second respondent remitted the amount quantified as civil liability along with the compounding fee, and pursuant to the same, the electric connection was restored. 4. The second respondent then filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority on 26.04.2023. The appeal was allowed in favour of the Consumer, and the final assessment order dated 20.03.2023 was set aside along with a direction to refund the amount deposited along with interest as per regulation 158(17) of the Electricity Supply Code, 2014. This order is challenged by the Board while the consumer seeks implementation of the same. 5. The appeal was allowed in favour of the Consumer, and the final assessment order dated 20.03.2023 was set aside along with a direction to refund the amount deposited along with interest as per regulation 158(17) of the Electricity Supply Code, 2014. This order is challenged by the Board while the consumer seeks implementation of the same. 5. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Board submits that the appeal filed under Section 127 was not maintainable as the allegation was that of theft under Section 135. Since the appeal under Section 127 and Regulation 158 is confined to the proceedings under Section 126 of the Act, the Appellate Authority grossly erred in entertaining the appeal. True, the Officers of the Board never took such contention before the Appellate Authority about the maintainability of the appeal. However, on a reading of Sections 126 and 127, it is specifically clear that no appeal could have been filed except in the manner provided under Section 127, and the same is confined to a proceeding under Section 126. 6. In the instant case, from the stage of mahazar, the Board alleged that the petitioner had committed theft of electrical energy coming within the meaning of Section 135 of the Act. As per the procedure laid down in Chapter IX, the petitioner had applied for compounding under Section 152 of the Electricity Act, which was also allowed. That apart, Chapter IX deals with theft, unauthorised use and other irregularities. The proceedings against theft, unauthorised use and irregularities are stipulated from Regulation 148 onwards. Though the learned counsel for the consumer disputes the procedure adopted by the Board and contends that the allegation of theft itself is unfounded, he does not dispute the fact that he had compounded the offence and had paid off the civil liability fixed by the Board. Under such circumstances, the consumer cannot be permitted to contend that the allegation was not one made under Section 135 of the Act. 7. The learned counsel for the Consumer also argues that the authorised officer alone was entitled to prepare the mahazar, and in the instant case, the same was prepared by a Sub Engineer and therefore the mahazar itself is without any authority. 7. The learned counsel for the Consumer also argues that the authorised officer alone was entitled to prepare the mahazar, and in the instant case, the same was prepared by a Sub Engineer and therefore the mahazar itself is without any authority. The learned Senior Counsel points out that with respect to the notification issued as SRO No.703/2005, the officers above the rank of the Sub Engineer of Kerala State Electricity Board have been appointed to exercise powers under Sub section (2) of Section 135. In view of the above, the said contention that the authorised officer did not prepare the mahazar cannot be accepted and the same is only to be rejected. 8. The learned Senior Counsel also relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court Executive Engineer and Another v. Sri. Seetaram Rice Mill [2011 KHC 4978] to contend that the scheme of Sections 126 and 135 is distinct and different, and also for the proposition that only a final order of assessment passed under Section 126(3) is appealable under Section 127. Reliance is placed on Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. v. Appellate Authority and Another [2018 KHC 6105] to contend that both Sections 126 and 135 are independent in all respects and provide different kinds of liability and consequences. He also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Chief Engineer, Hydel Project and Others v. Ravinder Nath and Others [2008 KHC 4142] for the proposition that despite the Electricity Board not raising the question of jurisdiction, it cannot be taken as a consent or waiver or acquiescence and that jurisdiction cannot be conferred if the authority is otherwise incompetent to try the issue, in which case the determination by the body, which lacked authority, is a nullity and the doctrine of Coram Non Judice applies. He also relied on M.D.Bhoruka Textiles Limited v. M/s. Kashmiri Rice Industries [2009 KHC 4747] to contend that the appellate authority had no power to entertain an appeal in a case where the allegation was under Section 135 and proceedings were taken alleging theft and that since the appeal filed before the Appellate Authority under Section 127 was without jurisdiction as the Appellate Authority lacked the inherent authority to consider the appeal. 9. 9. The prosecution for theft of electricity is provided under regulation 159, while regulation 160 deals with the disconnection of the supply of electricity in the event of theft. The procedure for compounding of offence under Section 152 of the Act is dealt with under regulation 163. Annexure 22 is the model procedure for the assessment of energy in case of theft, which is issued in terms of regulation 160(7). The assessment formula for the calculation of the consumption due to theft of electricity is Units assessed = L x D x H x F. It also provides that the load factor in cases of direct theft for all categories is 100%. In the instant case, the calculation made while passing the provisional assessment and the final assessment is contrary to what is prescribed in Regulation 160, read with Annexure 22. Thus, by no stretch was the appeal filed under S.127 of the Act maintainable in a case alleging theft under S.135 of the Act. 10. Even as I hold that the appeal preferred by the consumer was not maintainable before the appellate authority in terms of Section 127 and Regulation 158, the assessment made while passing the provisional and the final orders is clearly wrong. The method prescribed under Annexure 22 ought to have been followed. That not having been done, the provisional and the final orders are liable to be set aside. In the result, the writ petitions are disposed of directing the third respondent in W.P.(C) No.22476 of 2024 to reconsider the question of computation in terms of Annexure 22 with notice to the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.22476 of 2024, who is also the second respondent in W.P.(C) No.43778 of 2024. A fresh computation as directed above shall be carried out within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.