JUDGMENT : DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN, J. 1. The appellant is the respondent in O.P. No. 382/2017 on the files of the learned Family Court, Pala. 2. The above Original Petition was filed by the respondent seeking partition and separate possession of the petition schedule property, asserting that she and the appellant were legally married and that the acquisition of the property was done at the time when the marriage subsisted. 3. The appellant, however, impelled a defence that he is not legally married to the respondent and that the certificate of marriage produced by the appellant is concocted. He contended that he is a Hindu and hence cannot marry under the Christian rites; thus rendering it inevitable that the version of marriage projected by the respondent is apocryphal. 4. The learned Family Court allowed the parties to trial, after framing two issues. The appellant got himself examined as DW1, but produced and marked no document in evidence on his side; while, the respondent was examined as PW1 and Exts.A1 to A8 documents were marked by her. 5. The learned Family Court considered the evidence on record, and held that the case of the appellant that his marriage with the respondent is ‘concocted’ cannot be believed or given approval and then proceeded to verify the merits of the claim of the respondent herein, to thus allow the Original Petition and order the partition of the petition schedule properties in two equal halves by metes and bounds and further declaring that the parties are entered into separate shares on the payment of the requisite court fee. 6. The appellant challenges the judgment of the learned Family Court on various grounds, but primarily that, in the absence of cogent material to establish that the parties are married, the Original Petition ought not to have been considered by the learned Family Court; and consequently, that it could not have decreed it. 7. We heard Sri. Sanil Jose - learned Counsel for the appellant and Sri. S.K. Saji - appearing for the respondent. 8. As we have said above, when we go through the records and evidence on file, it is ineluctable that the case of the respondent is that she is the legally wedded wife of the appellant and that the property in question was purchased by them jointly, through Ext.A1 sale deed of the year 1997. 8. As we have said above, when we go through the records and evidence on file, it is ineluctable that the case of the respondent is that she is the legally wedded wife of the appellant and that the property in question was purchased by them jointly, through Ext.A1 sale deed of the year 1997. She asserted while examined as PW-1, that the said document has unequivocal recital that she is the wife of the appellant; and that this is rendered beyond doubt because, RW-1 namely the appellant - also admitted in his deposition that the parties lived together from 1993 to 2004. 9. Interestingly, the appellant does not have a case that Ext.A2 document is not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the Salvation Army Church, or that Ext.A3 is not the extract of the Register of Marriage maintained by the said Church; that both these documents are “concocted” by the respondent. But, he led no evidence in substantiation of the same. Coupled with this, as RW-1, he conceded that he and the respondent were living together from 1993 to 2004; and we notice that the learned Family Court has thus concluded, relying upon Madan Mohan Singh and Others v. Rejni Kant and another, AIR 2010 SC 2933 and A. Dinohamy v. W.L. Balahamy, AIR 1927 PC 185 , that there is always a presumption of marriage, when such long cohabitation is pleaded and conceded. 10. The findings of the learned Family Court regarding the marriage of the parties, however, are not exclusively on the basis of Exts.A2 and A3, but it also verified Exts.A1 and A4 title documents, wherein, the respondent has been shown to be the wife of the appellant. Further, Ext.A5 is an application filed by the appellant before the Salvation Army and Ext.A6 is the letter written by the father of the respondent, both of which establish to a reasonable probability, that the parties were married and lived as husband and wife. 11. To take it forward, the respondent produced Ext.A7 - which is a copy of the order of the Judicial First Magistrate Court, Mavelikkara, in M.C. No. 8/2008, which was filed by her - wherein, after holding that she is the wife of the appellant, an amount of Rs. 11. To take it forward, the respondent produced Ext.A7 - which is a copy of the order of the Judicial First Magistrate Court, Mavelikkara, in M.C. No. 8/2008, which was filed by her - wherein, after holding that she is the wife of the appellant, an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- was ordered in her favour as compensation under Section 22 of the Domestic Violence Act, with the latter being also directed to pay monthly maintenance to her at the rate of Rs. 1500/- per month. Even though the appellant says that he appealed against this order before the Court of Sessions and had it set aside, he admits that the respondent has filed a Revision before this Court, which is still pending. 12. The evidence and documents on record, therefore, point to the unmistakable probability that the appellant and the wife were married, perhaps not under the relevant statute, but as per religious and conventional rites, as both of them had accepted and this cannot be now contested by the appellant when, he, as DW-1, admitted without equivocation that the parties lived together from 1993 to 2004. We cannot, therefore, find the holdings of the learned Family Court - that the parties were married and therefore, that the Original Petition is maintainable before it - to be in any manner in error. 13. Be that as it may, it is admitted that Ext.A1 is the document through which the parties acquired the property. It is perspicuously evident from it that the parties have been shown to be husband and wife and that they purchased it from its original owners, a certain Babu and Sobhana, on 24.02.1997, for valid consideration. When the said document has not been challenged and when it still holds the field, one fails to understand how the appellant can now maintain that the recitals therein ought not to be relied upon, or that he should be construed to be the exclusive owner of the property covered by it. 14. When we say thus, we are fully cognizant of the specific case of the appellant that the entire amount for the acquisition of the property was spent by him. 14. When we say thus, we are fully cognizant of the specific case of the appellant that the entire amount for the acquisition of the property was spent by him. However, we do not even require to consider this on its merits since, for one, the sale document remains in the joint name of the parties and for the second, there was not even an attempt by the appellant to impeach it in any manner. We, therefore, cannot find the conclusions entered by the learned Family Court to be perverse or contrary to law. 15. In the above circumstances, we are without doubt that this appeal is not worthy and is liable to be dismissed. 16. Consequently, this appeal is dismissed; however, taking into account the peculiar circumstances, as also the status of the parties, we make no order as to costs and direct them to suffer their respective costs.