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2025 DIGILAW 244 (GAU)

Food Corporation of India, Represented By Its Chairman-cum- Managing Director v. Mayur Dutta, Son of Shri Prafulla Chandra Dutta

2025-02-14

KAUSHIK GOSWAMI, VIJAY BISHNOI

body2025
JUDGMENT : Vijay Bishnoi, C.J. This intra-Court appeal is preferred against the judgment & order dated 19.12.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP(C) No.8305/2019, whereby the learned Single Judge, while allowing the writ petition, has set aside the Memorandum of Charges dated 27.09.2016 containing the statement of charges at Annexure-I and the statement of facts and allegations at Annexure-II and has also quashed and set aside the consequential orders, i.e. the order of dismissal dated 04.02.2019 and the appellate order dated 26.07.2019. While doing so, the learned Single Judge has kept it open for the appellant authorities to proceed against the respondent strictly in accordance with law. The learned Single Judge has further observed that the consequence of setting aside the order of dismissal of the respondent Mayur Dutta would be that he would be an employee of the Food Corporation of India (FCI) and has kept it open to the authorities of the FCI to decide as to what would be the status and entitlement of the respondent as an employee of the FCI during the intervening period, i.e. from the date of the order of dismissal and the date of setting aside of the dismissal order. The appellant authorities have been given 1(one) month’s time to pass a reasoned order in the matter from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the said judgment & order. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the respondent Mayur Dutta was appointed in the FCI as a Manager (Accounts) on 13.02.2012 and thereafter, was transferred to the FCI District Office at Banderdewa, where he joined on 03.02.2015 and continued up to 31.03.2016. Vide order dated 05.10.2016, he was placed under suspension with reference to a Memorandum of major penalty for the acts and commission, as provided in the Memorandum. He was served with a Memorandum of Charges dated 27.09.2016, whereby he was charged for certain acts, along with other officials. 3. After conclusion of the enquiry, the Disciplinary Authority, i.e. the Executive Director (North East), vide order dated 04.02.2019, has imposed a penalty of dismissal from service on the respondent along with forfeiture of the gratuity amount, which was ordinarily in the form of disqualification for future employment under the Corporation. 4. 3. After conclusion of the enquiry, the Disciplinary Authority, i.e. the Executive Director (North East), vide order dated 04.02.2019, has imposed a penalty of dismissal from service on the respondent along with forfeiture of the gratuity amount, which was ordinarily in the form of disqualification for future employment under the Corporation. 4. The respondent submitted an appeal before the Appellate Authority, i.e. the Managing Director of the FCI, however, the said appeal came to be rejected vide order dated 26.07.2019 and the respondent was informed that he can file a statutory review before the Reviewing Authority within 45(forty-five) days from the date of delivery of the order. 5. Being aggrieved with the penalty order dated 04.02.2019 and the order of rejection of his appeal dated 26.07.2019, the respondent approached the Writ Court, wherein the learned Single Judge has allowed the same vide the impugned judgment & order dated 19.12.2022 with certain directions and observations. Being aggrieved with the same, the appellants have preferred this writ appeal. 6. Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants has vehemently argued that the learned Single Judge has erred in coming to the conclusion that the charges framed against the respondent were vague and not specific. It is contended that a bare perusal of the Memorandum of Charge would reveal that the charges against the respondent, amongst others, are very specific and crystal clear and cannot be said to be ambiguous in any manner. It is contended that the learned Single Judge has ignored the fact that the respondent, while denying the charges in the written statement, did not raise any objection regarding the ambiguity in charges and, on the other hand, after fully understanding the purport of charges, filed his written statement of defence denying the same. It is contended that from the tone and tenor of the cross-examination of the witnesses of the respondent, it can very well be assumed that the respondent was completely aware of the charges which he was defending. The learned senior counsel has, therefore, argued that since the respondent, during the course of enquiry has, at no point of time, ever raised any objection regarding the non-clarity/ambiguity of the charges, the finding given by the learned Single Judge to the effect that the charges are not clear and specific is erroneous and, therefore, liable to be set aside. The learned senior counsel has, therefore, argued that since the respondent, during the course of enquiry has, at no point of time, ever raised any objection regarding the non-clarity/ambiguity of the charges, the finding given by the learned Single Judge to the effect that the charges are not clear and specific is erroneous and, therefore, liable to be set aside. It is further contended that even in the writ petition also, it has nowhere been claimed that the respondent was prejudiced on account of non- clarity of the charges. In the absence of any specific pleadings to this effect, the interference by the learned Single Judge in the punishment order is unwarranted. In support of the above contention, the learned senior counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in Bharat Singh & Ors. -Vs- State of Haryana & Ors. , reported in (1988) 4 SCC 534 and has argued that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that when a point, which is ostensibly a point of law, is required to be substantiated by facts, the party raising the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition and if the facts are not pleaded or the evidence is not annexed to the writ petition, the Court will not entertain the point. It is contended that in the present case also, the respondent has nowhere pleaded in the writ petition that the charges are not clear or are not specific and, therefore, he was prejudiced and, in the absence of specific pleadings to this effect, the learned Single Judge had no occasion to examine and decide the same simply on the basis of an argument raised on behalf of the respondent during the course of hearing. The learned senior counsel has further submitted that the learned Single Judge has erred in recording a finding to the effect that the list of documents and the list of witnesses are only in support of the statement of charges and are not a part of the charge-sheet. The learned senior counsel has further submitted that the learned Single Judge has erred in recording a finding to the effect that the list of documents and the list of witnesses are only in support of the statement of charges and are not a part of the charge-sheet. It is contended that the list of documents is very much part of the charge-sheet and if, from the list of documents a delinquent employee is able to know the exact nature of charges, it is erroneous to conclude that the same is not a part of charge-sheet. It is contended that the statement of charges; statement of fact and allegations; list of documents and list of witnesses are very much part of the charge-sheet and none of the above can be treated as not a part of the charge-sheet. The learned senior counsel for the appellants has further submitted that the only point pleaded in the writ petition is regarding the disproportionate punishment and not regarding non-clarity of charges. However, the learned Single Judge, without taking into consideration this aspect of the matter, has erred in recording a finding that the charges against the respondent were not specific and, therefore, the charge-sheet and the statement of allegations are liable to be set aside. The learned senior counsel for the appellant, while relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in State of A.P. & Ors. -Vs- Sree Rama Rao , reported in AIR 1963 SC 1723 has argued that if an enquiry is otherwise properly held, the High Court ought not interfere in the disciplinary proceedings while exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India . The learned senior counsel for the appellants has, therefore, argued that the impugned judgment & order passed by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable in the eye of law and, therefore, the same may be set aside. 7. Per contra, Mr. A.C. Borbora, learned senior counsel appearing for the sole respondent has vehemently opposed the writ appeal and has argued that the respondent has very much pleaded in the writ petition that the charges are not specific and clear and he is prejudiced on account of non-clarity of charges. Referring to Paragraph 39 of the writ petition, it is argued that it is specifically pleaded in the writ petition that the charges are absolutely vague, indefinite and baseless. Referring to Paragraph 39 of the writ petition, it is argued that it is specifically pleaded in the writ petition that the charges are absolutely vague, indefinite and baseless. Hence, the entire proceedings along with the consequential orders are liable to be quashed and set aside. The learned senior counsel has further submitted that even if it is assumed that the respondent has not raised any objection at any point of time during the course of enquiry regarding the non-clarity of charges but, then also, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the charges are not clear and specific, it can very well interfere and set aside the Memorandum of Charges. It is contended that the learned Single Judge, while analyzing in detail the charges, has given a specific finding that the charges against the respondent are not clear and specific and, therefore, the Memorandum of Charges cannot be sustained and the consequential dismissal order is also not liable to be sustained. It is argued that the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge is not liable to be interfered with. Hence, it is prayed that the writ appeal lacks merit and the same be dismissed. 8. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the material available on record. 9. From the scrutiny of the statement of charges, we find that the allegations contained in the Memorandum of Charges against the respondent pertain to certain transactions that took place in the year 2014-2015, when the respondent was posted as Manager (Accounts) in FCI from 03.02.2015 to 31.03.2016. The learned Single Judge has analyzed the charges levelled against the respondent in detail and has also taken into consideration the defence put forth by the respondent in response to those charges. The learned Single Judge has examined each and every charge in detail and has recorded the following finding in the impugned judgment & order:- “31. A reading of the statement of charges makes it discernible that the charges were divided into 13 articles and it pertains to certain transactions that took place in the year 2014-15, although in the later part of the statement of charges incidents pertaining to 2012 were also referred. A reading of the statement of charges makes it discernible that the charges were divided into 13 articles and it pertains to certain transactions that took place in the year 2014-15, although in the later part of the statement of charges incidents pertaining to 2012 were also referred. One of the facts referred to make out the charge against the petitioner is that certain payments were made as advance by signing a cash voucher by the concerned Dealing Assistant, Manager (A/Cs) and Area Manager during the year 2014-15 without mentioning the date in the voucher. The said Article is supported by the statement of facts and allegations which refers to certain instances of release of advance of various accounts by referring to letters dated 03.04.2012, 11.07.2012 and 07.12.2012 respectively, which were sanctioned by the Area Manager of the District Office at Banderdewa. 32. On one hand the statement of charges refers to advance being paid during the year 2014, where it is supported by the statement of facts and allegations that it refers to some advance being paid to some contractors as per letters of the year 2012 and that too which were sanctioned by the Area Manager of the District Office at Banderdewa. 33. Reading the Article, no specific charge is noticeable against the petitioner about his complicity in doing any of the acts referred in the Article. 34. Article II of the statement of charges is in respect of certain advance payments being made by the accounts division whereas the statement of facts and allegations in respect of Article II refers to certain advisory and CAG observation being made as regards the malpractice of making advance payments to some contractors and that such malpractices continued till a certain Area Manager was released from the District Office at Banderdewa. Article II also does not refer to any specific allegation or imputation against the writ petitioner. 35. Article II also does not refer to any specific allegation or imputation against the writ petitioner. 35. Article III refers to release of advance payment to contractors without any bills and after the release of the amounts, fictitious bills based on false work done certificates were put in place, whereas the statement of facts and allegations against the Article III refers to certain bills, the analysis of which, revealed that the total number of bags shown in the bills exceeded the total number of bags as per the MSA and therefore the bills were understood to be in excess over the actual work done. But the statement of facts and allegations merely provides that had the accounts division been vigilant and dedicated towards their respective duties and made the efforts to verify the bills and the documents, the difference between the total numbers of bags could have been detected. 36. The reply of the petitioner was that there was no circular or any accounts manual that was in circulation at that relevant point of time which required the accounts department to tally the information provided in the bills with that of the other records before any such bill can be passed and that it was the duty of the other departments through which the bills were processed to cross check the contents of the bills. 37. But what is noticeable is that the bills referred in the statement of facts and allegations corresponding to Article III are in respect of the depots at Deomali, Anini, Roing and Tezu and there is nothing on record to indicate that the matters related to such places were also handled by the District Office at Banderdewa. 38. Article IV in the statement of charges refers to certain restacking and refilling of bags in depots in Anini, Roing, Kharsangh, Deomali, Darporijo and Tezu and the statement of facts and allegations provides that the bills that were submitted refers to higher number of bags than in comparison to the total capacity of the depots. The reply of the petitioner to such allegation, is that the accounts department is not related with the restacking and refilling of bags. 39. The reply of the petitioner to such allegation, is that the accounts department is not related with the restacking and refilling of bags. 39. Article V refers to adapting of different methodology for bill payment but a reading of the statement of charges as well as the statement of facts and allegations do not indicate any specific charges being brought against the petitioner. 40. Similarly a reading of the charges in Articles VI to XIII also does not make it discernable that there had been any specific charge or allegation against the petitioner and that any such act on the part of the petitioner can be construed to be a misconduct. 41. From the point of view of the statement of charges and the statement of facts and allegations in Annexure I and Annexure II to the Memorandum of Charges dated 27.09.2016, a conclusion can be drawn that in respect of the petitioner Mayur Dutta, no specific charge or allegation is discernable, which if accepted in its face value, may lead to a conclusion that there is any misconduct against him. All that the charges and allegations reveal are that certain activities had taken place within the FCI in the district of Banderdewa, amongst others, where excessive bills were passed in respect of certain contractors, where again no specific information as regards the bill date and the nature of the excessive bills are discernable and such bills were also passed through the accounts department and therefore, the Manager (Accounts) would also be liable for not performing his duty in the required manner.” 10. The learned Single Judge has upheld the action of the FCI of initiating common disciplinary proceeding in respect of multiple employees but has refused to accept the argument of the FCI that though the statement of charges and the statement of facts and allegations are not so clear but from the list of documents included in the Memorandum, the delinquent employee was aware as to what are the exact charges against him. Interestingly, the counsel for the FCI before the learned Single Judge has made a candid admission that the statement of charges, the statement of facts and the allegations are vague to some extent and the same has been taken note of by the learned Single Judge in Paragraph 45 of the impugned judgment. 11. Interestingly, the counsel for the FCI before the learned Single Judge has made a candid admission that the statement of charges, the statement of facts and the allegations are vague to some extent and the same has been taken note of by the learned Single Judge in Paragraph 45 of the impugned judgment. 11. We may not agree with the conclusion of the learned Single Judge that the list of documents and the list of witnesses are only in support of the statement of charges and the statement of facts and allegations and hence cannot be treated as a part of charges or allegations. The list of documents contains special audit reports of FCI, Investigation Committee reports and are annexed with the Memorandum as Annexure-III but the appellants have failed to demonstrate that the said audit reports and Investigation Committee reports specified definite charges against the respondent. 12. It may be a fact that the respondent, at no point of time, has raised any issue regarding ambiguity of the charges but as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anant R. Kulkarni -Vs- Y.P. Education Society & Ors. reported in (2013) 6 SCC 515 , the judgment on which the learned Single Judge has also placed reliance, that even if the delinquent does not take the defence of, or make a protest that the charges are vague, that does not save the enquiry from being vitiated. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Transport Commissioner, Madras- 5 -Vs- A. Radha Krishna Moorthy , reported in (1995) 1 SCC 322 , the judgment on which the learned Single Judge has also placed reliance, has clearly held that it should be reflected from the charges that what part the delinquent play and what omissions and actions of the respondent amounts to misconduct. 13. As observed by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment and also observed by us, while scrutinizing the charges, it is seen that no specific role, action or omissions on the part of the respondent in making certain payments to a particular contractor and transporter has been clarified in the charge-sheet. 13. As observed by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment and also observed by us, while scrutinizing the charges, it is seen that no specific role, action or omissions on the part of the respondent in making certain payments to a particular contractor and transporter has been clarified in the charge-sheet. Apart from that, as observed earlier, there is candid admission on the part of the FCI that the statement of charges and the statement of facts and allegations may have been vague to some extent, we are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge has rightly interfered with in the matter and has not committed any illegality in passing the impugned judgment & order dated 19.12.2022 passed in WP(C) No.8305/2019. 14. In view of the above discussion, we do not find any merit in this writ appeal, the same is, therefore, dismissed.