JUDGMENT : K. SUJANA, J. Challenging the judgment and decree dated 17.09.2003 passed in O.S.No.21 of 1996 by the learned II Additional District Judge, Karimnagar, the present Appeal Suit is filed. 2. The brief facts of the case are that O.S.No.21 of 1996 is filed by the plaintiff seeking a decree for specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 03.07.1993, along with the recovery of possession of the plaint schedule house. As per the plaintiff, defendant No.1 entered into a sale agreement with him for a consideration of Rs.2,10,000/-, out of which Rs.1,10,000/- was paid as part consideration. The remaining Rs.1,00,000/- was to be paid by 03.04.1994, upon which the sale deed was to be executed. The plaintiff alleges that despite being ready and willing to perform their obligations under the contract and offering the balance amount, defendant No.1 failed to execute the sale deed. Instead, defendant No.1 proceeded to sell the property to defendant No.2. Defendant No.2, however, denies the claim of the plaintiff and asserts that they had an earlier agreement of sale with defendant No.1 dated 27.03.1993, pursuant to which possession of the property was delivered. 3. Basing on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed six issues and on behalf of the plaintiffs i.e., PWs.1 to 3 were examined and Ex.A1 to A8 are marked. DWs.1 to 3 are examined and Exs.B1 to B7 were marked on behalf of the defendants. 4. After examining the evidence, the trial Court, vide order dated 17.09.2003, allowed the suit observing that the agreement of sale dated 03.07.1993, was valid, true, and binding on the parties. Furthermore, the plaintiff was found to have been consistently ready and willing to fulfill his contractual obligations. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the appellant/defendant No.2 filed the present appeal suit. 5. Heard Sri P. Prabhakar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant as well as Sri V. Ravi Kiran Rao, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri V. Rohit, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the impugned judgment and decree of the trial Court is contrary to law and the facts of the case. He contended that the trial Court erred in not considering the fact that the appellant had been in possession of the suit schedule property. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the impugned judgment and decree of the trial Court is contrary to law and the facts of the case. He contended that the trial Court erred in not considering the fact that the appellant had been in possession of the suit schedule property. Furthermore, the trial Court ought to have noted that respondent No.2 had executed a registered sale deed in favor of the appellant on 29.12.1993, and respondent No.1 was not competent to execute the agreement dated 03.07.1993 in favor of respondent No.1. He argued that the trial Court failed to observe that respondent No.1 was incapacitated from executing a registered sale deed in favor of respondent No.1, as respondent No.1 had already executed a registered sale deed in favor of the appellant. He further contended that the suit was barred by limitation and that the trial Court erred in marking Ex.A1, an unregistered agreement of sale, while refusing to mark the agreement of sale dated 27.03.1993, executed by respondent No.1 in favor of the appellant. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the trial Court failed to appreciate that respondent No.2 had secured the execution of a registered sale deed in favor of the appellant, and that the plaint schedule property did not include a description of the RCC building and that respondent No.3 had become an inheritor and left Karimnagar approximately one and a half years ago, and was not a tenant in the suit schedule house. It was also contended that respondent No.1 filed Ex.A8, which consists of income tax returns, but the part sale consideration allegedly paid by respondent No.1 was not reflected in those income tax returns. The counsel contended that the trial Court wrongly marked Ex.A1 and based its findings on the same while refusing to consider the agreement of sale dated 27.03.1993, executed by respondent No.1 in favor of the appellant. He argued that the suit was misconceived, as the relief sought by the plaintiff could not be granted since a registered sale deed had already been executed by respondent No.1 in favor of respondent No.2. 8. He argued that the suit was misconceived, as the relief sought by the plaintiff could not be granted since a registered sale deed had already been executed by respondent No.1 in favor of respondent No.2. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that during the pendency of this appeal, the appellant filed I.A.No.1 of 2023 under Order XLI Rule 27 to present the agreement of sale dated 27.03.1993 as evidence, arguing that the trial Court wrongly rejected the document on the ground that it was not registered, although it evidenced delivery of possession in favor of the appellant. The learned counsel contended that when an insufficiently stamped document comes before a public authority, it must be impounded. However, the trial Court failed to follow the proper procedure for payment of stamp duty to the document, despite the appellant’s attempts to rectify the alleged deficiency in stamp duty. Therefore, the counsel prayed that the Court allow this appeal suit and set aside the judgment of the trial Court. 9. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ameer Minhaj v. Dierdre Elizabeth (Wright) Issar and others , [(2018) 7 Supreme Court Cases 639] , S. Kaladevi v. V.R.Somasundaram and Others, (2010) 5 Supreme Court Cases 401 , Avinash Kumar Chauhan v. Vijay Krishna Mishra, (2009) 2 Supreme Court Cases 532 , Omprakash v. Laxminarayan & Ors, Civil Appeal No.9032 of 2013 , Shyamsundar Radheshyam Agrawal & Anr v. Pushpabai Nilkanth Patil and Others , [2024 LawSuit (SC) 854] and Sanjay Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand , [(2022) 7 Supreme Court Cases 247] 10. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that the reliance on the agreement of sale dated 27.03.1993 by the appellant is baseless. Although the appellant asserts that the trial Court refused to mark the document because it was unregistered, the appellant did not take appropriate steps to challenge this action before this Court by filing a Civil Revision Petition. Even during the appeal process initiated in the year 2003, the appellant did not file the document as additional evidence until 06.06.2023, a delay of approximately 21 years. Such a significant delay without adequate explanation makes the present application wholly indefensible and liable to be dismissed. Even during the appeal process initiated in the year 2003, the appellant did not file the document as additional evidence until 06.06.2023, a delay of approximately 21 years. Such a significant delay without adequate explanation makes the present application wholly indefensible and liable to be dismissed. He further contended that Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, provides an exception for using unregistered documents as evidence of a contract in suits for specific performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, or as evidence of collateral transactions not requiring a registered instrument. However, this benefit applies only to the party filing the suit for specific performance, not to a defendant attempting to introduce such evidence. 11. Learned counsel for the respondents argued that the registered sale deed dated 29.12.1993 i.e., Ex.B.1 filed by the appellant makes no reference to the alleged agreement of sale dated 27.03.1993, indicating that the agreement was fabricated to unjustly claim rights over the suit property. The trial Court correctly evaluated the oral and documentary evidence, including Ex.B.1, before decreeing the suit in favor of the Plaintiff. He further contended that the contention of the appellant that the agreement of sale dated 27.03.1993 should now be marked as evidence after such an extended period is unacceptable. The application under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC fails to meet the requirements for admitting additional evidence, and the document itself appears to have been concocted to undermine the rights of the respondents over the property. Therefore, he prayed the Court to dismiss the appeal suit. 12. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Syed Yousuf Ali v. Mohd. Yousuf and Others , [ 2016 (3) ALD 235 ] , R. Hemalatha v. Kashthuri , [(2023) 10 Supreme Court Cases 725] , and Lekhraj Bansal v. State of Rajasthan and Another, (2014) 15 Supreme Court Cases 686. 13. Now the points for consideration are: i. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for execution of agreement of sale under Ex.A1? ii. Whether the plaintiff is ready and willing his part of contract? iii. Whether defendant No.2 is actual owner of the suit schedule property? 14. 13. Now the points for consideration are: i. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for execution of agreement of sale under Ex.A1? ii. Whether the plaintiff is ready and willing his part of contract? iii. Whether defendant No.2 is actual owner of the suit schedule property? 14. In light of the submissions made by both learned counsel and a perusal of the material available on record, it appears that the suit was filed by the plaintiff for specific performance of an agreement of sale under Ex.A1. The plaintiff contends that defendant No.1 executed an agreement of sale dated 03.07.1993 in his favor, agreeing to sell the suit schedule property. The plaintiff claims to have paid an advance amount of Rs.1,00,000/- and was required to pay the remaining sale consideration within ten months. However, the plaintiff came to know that defendant No.1 was attempting to sell the same property to defendant No.2, the plaintiff approached defendant No.2 and informed him of his prior agreement of sale. Despite this, defendant No.1 proceeded with the sale transaction in favor of defendant No.2. Consequently, the plaintiff issued a legal notice cautioning defendant No.2 before the execution of the registered sale deed under Ex.A1. While this notice was served on defendant No.2 prior to registration, it was served on defendant No.1 only the following day. 15. Further, both parties claim that the agreement of sale held by the other party is a collusive agreement. However, while defendant No.1 was fully aware of the agreement of sale made by him, he has not contested the case. Instead, the appellant has assumed the burden of defendant No.1 in denying the plaint averments. Although the appellant may not have personal knowledge of the agreement of sale between the plaintiff and defendant No.1, he has denied every averment in the plaint as false, which itself suggests that he has aligned with the stance of defendant No.1 in the written statement. 16. Additionally, the appellant failed to establish that he is a bona fide purchaser who, after conducting proper inquiries, entered into the contract with defendant No.1 and obtained a registered sale deed. The record indicates a lack of bona fides on the part of the appellant. 16. Additionally, the appellant failed to establish that he is a bona fide purchaser who, after conducting proper inquiries, entered into the contract with defendant No.1 and obtained a registered sale deed. The record indicates a lack of bona fides on the part of the appellant. Although he denied being informed by the plaintiff about the prior agreement of sale, he admitted during cross-examination that he received notice from the plaintiff, which was issued to both defendant No.1 and defendant No.2. In the notice addressed to defendant No.2, the plaintiff explicitly cautioned against entering into an agreement of sale with defendant No.1. Despite receiving this notice before executing the registered sale deed, the appellant neither sought clarification from the plaintiff nor issued any response. Instead, he hurriedly proceeded with the registration of the property, disregarding the plaintiff’s prior claim. 17. Further, a suit for specific performance is a discretionary relief that necessitates evaluating the conduct of the parties. The plaintiff had put the appellant on notice before the registration of the property and had warned defendant Nos.1 and 2 that an agreement of sale already existed between him and defendant No.1. Despite this, the appellant proceeded with the transaction without due diligence, further undermining his claim of being a bona fide purchaser. 18. Furthermore, the agreement of sale dated 27.03.1993, executed by respondent No.1 in favor of the appellant, did not require compulsory registration as per the law at that time since the amendment to the Registration Act, which mandated registration, came into effect in the year 1999. As seen from the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, it is observed that unregistered documents can be used as evidence in suits for specific performance under Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908. However, an unregistered document cannot affect immovable property, confer power, or be used as evidence unless registered, except for collateral purposes or to establish a contract in specific performance suits. The principles laid down in various cases, including K.B. Saha & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Development Consultant Ltd. , [ (2008) 8 SCC 564 ] and Ameer Minhaj (supra), reaffirm that while unregistered documents are inadmissible to prove property transfers, they can establish possession or other collateral matters. 18. The appellant, however, failed to take necessary legal steps to challenge the trial court’s refusal to mark this agreement as evidence. 18. The appellant, however, failed to take necessary legal steps to challenge the trial court’s refusal to mark this agreement as evidence. No revision petition was filed against the decision of the trial court, nor did the appellant seek to have the document admitted into evidence during the trial proceedings. The belated attempt by the appellant, after nearly 20 years, to present the document as additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code, is without a reasonable explanation and cannot be condoned. Additionally, the failure of the appellant to file an application requesting the Court for payment of deficit stamp duty when it was presented to a public authority further weakens his position. 19. As per Section 49 of the Registration Act, unregistered documents affecting immovable property are generally inadmissible, except for collateral purposes or specific performance suits. Additionally, Section 35 of the Stamp Act prohibits acting upon insufficiently stamped documents for any purpose, including collateral purposes, even if both parties consent. Mere marking of documents for convenience does not equate to admitting them as evidence. The judicial mind must be applied to decide admissibility. Moreover, under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, parties cannot produce additional evidence in appellate Courts unless specific conditions are met, such as when evidence was wrongly refused by the trial court or could not be produced earlier despite due diligence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court reaffirmed that non-compliance with these requirements renders documents inadmissible in evidence. 20. Additionally, Avinash Kumar Chauhan v. Vijay Krishna Mishra , [ (2009) 2 SCC 532 ] emphasizes the authority of the court to impound documents under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, if adequate stamp duty is not paid. Furthermore, Sanjay Kumar Singh (supra) highlights that even if additional evidence is permitted under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, it must be proven before the reference court to be considered. Overall, unregistered documents may be admitted as evidence for limited purposes, but they cannot transfer property rights or titles. In the present case, on the date of the alleged agreement of sale, i.e., 27.03.1993, registration was not compulsory for an agreement of sale, as the amendment came into force only in the year 1999. The trial Court erred in observing that it was a compulsorily registrable document. 21. In the present case, on the date of the alleged agreement of sale, i.e., 27.03.1993, registration was not compulsory for an agreement of sale, as the amendment came into force only in the year 1999. The trial Court erred in observing that it was a compulsorily registrable document. 21. Furthermore, although the above-mentioned document was not marked, no steps were taken by the appellant to mark it during the course of the trial. Additionally, the present petition has been filed under Order XLI Rule 27 of the CPC, 20 years after the appeal was filed, demonstrating a lack of due diligence and laches on the part of the appellant. 22. Be that as it may, even if the Court considers this application, the document only establishes that the appellant’s agreement predates the plaintiff’s agreement. However, this alone is insufficient to strengthen the appellant’s case, as he is not a bona fide purchaser and was aware of the plaintiff’s agreement of sale before entering into the registered sale deed with Defendant No. 1. Therefore, even if the document is considered, it does not affect the outcome of the suit. As such, the I.A. is liable to be dismissed. 23. Therefore, even if the document in question is marked as evidence, it would serve no fruitful purpose in deciding the lis. As such, there is no merit in the appeal, nor in I.A.No.1 of 2023 to receive the documents. 24. In view thereof, I.A.No.1 of 2023 is dismissed. Consequently, the Appeal Suit is also dismissed, confirming the judgment and decree dated 17.09.2003 passed in O.S.No.21 of 1996 by the learned II Additional District Judge, Karimnagar. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.