JUDGMENT : MURALI PURUSHOTHAMAN, J. These original petitions are filed against the common order dated 17.08.2022 in I.A. No.1 of 2022 in O.P.(Electricity) Nos.45 of 2005 and 99 of 2006 passed by the Court of the Additional District Judge – II, Kalpetta. 2. The petitioner is the owner of 0.6680 hectors landed property comprised in Re. Sy No.403 of 2011 of Kaniyambatta Village, Vythiri Taluk, Wayanad District. In November 2003 and April 2005, the Kerala State Electricity Board (the KSEB) drew 33 K.V. electric line through the property of the petitioner for which various fruit bearing and yielding trees were cut and the land was injuriously affected. Since the compensation paid by the KSEB was inadequate, the petitioner filed O.P.(Ele) No.45 of 2005 seeking enhanced compensation of Rs.5,64,320/- for the trees cut and removed in November 2003 and O.P.(Ele) No.99 of 2006 seeking enhanced compensation of Rs.1,13,353/- for the trees cut and removed in April 2005, before the District Court, Kalpetta. Both the original petitions were tried jointly and the learned District Judge, by Ext. P2 common order, granted enhanced compensation of Rs.21,408/- in O.P.(Ele) No.45 of 2005 and Rs.988/- in O.P(Ele) No.99 of 2006. 3. Dissatisfied by the quantum of compensation awarded by the learned District Judge in Ext. P2 order, the petitioner preferred C.R.P. Nos. 533 and 534 of 2012 before this Court. By Ext. P3 order dated 05.08.2021, this Court found that the manner in which the compensation towards the value of the trees cut was fixed in Ext. P2 is not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Airports Authority of India v . Satyagopal Roy [ (2002) 3 SCC 527 ]. Accordingly, the revision petitions were allowed and the original petitions were remitted to the learned District Judge for fresh consideration based on the principle of injurious affection and to fix the compensation for the trees cut, following the procedure prescribed in Airports Authority of India (supra) and KSEB v Livisha and Others [ (2007) 6 SCC 792 ]. The learned District Judge was directed to take steps to dispose of the matter within six months after affording an opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence. 4. The petitioner filed Ext. The learned District Judge was directed to take steps to dispose of the matter within six months after affording an opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence. 4. The petitioner filed Ext. P4 application (in both cases) dated 21.05.2022 for amendment of the original petitions (Electricity), seeking to delete and substitute the figures relating to the trees, yield, compensation etc., and to insert certain paragraphs and prayer. The amendments sought are in relation to the yield, diminution value of the property, value for jurisdictional purpose and also the rate of compensation originally pleaded. The petitioner now seeks enhanced compensation of Rs. 9,18,66,157/- with 12% interest in O.P. (Ele) No.45 of 2005 in place of the earlier claim of Rs.5,64,320/- and Rs.1,29,68,383/- with 12% interest in O.P.(Ele) No.99 of 2006 in place of the earlier claim of Rs.1,13,353/-. 5. The KSEB filed Ext. P5 counter statement to Ext. P4 application. It is contended that Ext. P4 application is highly belated and if the amendment is permitted, it would virtually enable the petitioner to claim an enhanced compensation at the rate of 133% in O.P.(Ele) No.45 of 2005 and 125% in O.P.(Ele) No.99 of 2006. 6. In the meanwhile, the petitioner filed application for extension of time stipulated in Ext. P3 order and the same was allowed by this Court as per Ext. P6 order dated 31.05.2022, granting a further period of six months to dispose of the original petitions. 7.The learned District Judge considered Ext. P4 application for amendment and dismissed the same by Ext. P7 common order dated 17.08.2022. Ext. P7 is impugned in these original petitions. 8. The learned District Judge found that the petitioner has already made necessary pleadings in relation to the yield, injurious affection, the diminution in land value, solatium etc in the original petitions. It was observed that the proposed amendment has been sought for to claim the compensation in an enhanced manner by recalculating the amount of compensation in par with the present potentiality of the property. Though the petitioner can adduce further evidence in support of the pleadings already made by him, he cannot be permitted to adduce such evidence in derogation of the original pleadings made by him. Though the petitioner can adduce further evidence in support of the pleadings already made by him, he cannot be permitted to adduce such evidence in derogation of the original pleadings made by him. The learned District Judge also observed that the trial of the cases has already commenced and the petitioner did not succeed in establishing that despite exercise of due diligence he was precluded from incorporating the pleadings sought to be introduced. The Court held that the amendment sought for having reference to the present market scenario of the property cannot be permitted. The learned District Judge also found that if leave for amendment is granted, the same would be prejudicial to the case of the respondent as well. 9. It is contended by the petitioner that amendment proposed in Ext. P4 application is inevitable for the purpose of complete and effective adjudication of the real controversy involved in the cases. It is also contended that while considering the application for amendment, the Court ventured into the merits of the claim therein put forwarded by the petitioner. The learned District Judge failed to consider the purpose of remand as per Ext. P3 order of this Court. It is further contended that the proposed amendment would not cause prejudice to the respondent. As regards the finding that the amendment application is hit by the bar under proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), it is contended that when Ext. P2 order has been set aside by this Court by Ext. P3 and the matter is remanded for fresh consideration, the prohibition under the proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC will not apply. 10. Heard Sri. George Poonthottam, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and Sri. B. Premod, the learned Standing Counsel for the KSEB. 11. Sri. George Poonthottam would refer to Ext. P4 application and submits that, the amendment sought for, if allowed, will not change the character of the original petitions. He further submits that the amendment is necessary for determining the real controversy in the original petitions. It is contended that, after Ext. P2 order was set aside by this Court and the original petitions were remanded for fresh consideration, the trial has not commenced and, therefore, the prohibition under the proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC is not attracted. It is contended that, after Ext. P2 order was set aside by this Court and the original petitions were remanded for fresh consideration, the trial has not commenced and, therefore, the prohibition under the proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC is not attracted. He further submits that no prejudice will be caused to the respondent by allowing the amendment. 12. Sri.Premod, on the other hand, would contend that Ext. P4 application for amendment has been preferred 17 years after the filing of the original petitions. He contends that such belated applications cannot be considered. Sri.Premod further contends that, in Ext. P3, there is no open remand and the original petitions were remitted to the District Court to consider the claim for compensation based on the principle of injurious affection and to fix the compensation for the trees cut, following the procedure prescribed in Airports Authority of India and Livisha (supra). According to Sri. Premod, the amendment sought for is beyond the scope and extent of the remand. He contends that by the amendment proposed, the character of the original petition is sought to be changed in its entirety. He refers to the proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC and submits that Ext. P4 application has been filed after the commencement of the trial and bar under the proviso is attracted. 13. Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC reads as follows: “17) Amendment of Pleadings-The court may at any stage of the pleadings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such a manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties: Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial.” Order 6 Rule 17 permits amendment of pleadings at any stage of the proceedings, but the proviso bars such amendments after commencement of trial, unless the Court is satisfied that despite due diligence the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. When an application for amendment of pleadings is filed after the commencement of trial, whether or not the opposite party has raised any specific objection, the Court must, before allowing the application, satisfy itself that the applicant, despite due diligence, could not have filed the application at an earlier stage. The Court's jurisdiction to allow an application for amendment of pleadings is taken away unless the conditions precedent for it are satisfied. The learned District Judge has proceeded on the basis that the trial of the cases has already commenced and the petitioner was not able to fulfill the said precondition. Has the trial commenced in these cases? To consider this question, the nature of the remand order is to be examined. The operative portion of Ext. P3 order reads thus: “For the aforementioned reasons, the civil revision petitions are allowed by setting aside the impugned orders. The original petitions are remanded to the District Court, Wayanad for fresh consideration. The court below is directed to consider the claim for compensation based on the principle of injurious affection and to fix the compensation for the trees cut, following the procedure prescribed in Airport Authority of India and Livisha (supra). The parties shall be afforded opportunity for adducing evidence. The parties shall co-operate with the court and the court below shall take earnest efforts to dispose of the cases within six months of receipt of a copy of this judgment.” Ext. P2 order of the District Court was set aside. The original petitions were remanded to the District Court, for fresh consideration. The District Court was directed to consider the claim for compensation based on the principle of injurious affection and to fix the compensation for the trees cut, following the procedure prescribed in Airport Authority of India and Livisha (supra). This Court also ordered that the parties shall be afforded opportunity for adducing evidence. Ext. P3 order opens the field for the District Court to consider the matter afresh and is an open remand. In the impugned order, the learned District Judge has noted that the petitioner has adduced his evidence in the earlier stage of trial and on remand, the trial in the cases has been reopened and parties are permitted to adduce further evidence. Has the trial commenced in these cases after the remand? 14. This Court, in Sasidharan v . Sudarsanan (2020 SCC OnLine Ker. Has the trial commenced in these cases after the remand? 14. This Court, in Sasidharan v . Sudarsanan (2020 SCC OnLine Ker. 4540), considered the question as to when does the trial in a suit commences, and after a survey of the decisions in Kailash v. Nanhku [2005 KHC 697: AIR 2005 SC 2441 : 2005 (2) KLT 623 : 2005 (4) SCC 480 ], Baldev Singh v. Manohar Singh [2006 KHC 1060: AIR 2006 SC 2832 : 2006 (6) SCC 498 : 2006 (3) KLT 953 : 2006 (3) KLJ 842 ], Ajendraprasadji N. Pande v. Swami Keshavprakeshdasji [2007 KHC 3171: AIR 2007 SC 806 : JT 2007 (1) SC 579: 2006 (12) SCC 1 ], Vidyabai v. Padmalatha [2009 (1) KHC 560: AIR 2009 SC 1433 : 2009 (1) KLT SN 13: 2009 (2) SCC 409 ], Sushil Kumar Jain v. Manoj Kumar (2009 KHC 4428: AIR 2009 SC 2544 : 2009 (2) KLT SN 81: 2009 (14) SCC 38 ] and Mohinder Kumar Mehra v. Roop Rani Mehra (2017 KHC 6849: AIR 2017 SC 5822 : 2018 (2) SCC 132 ), held as follows: “23. Thus, on a close analysis of the decisions referred to above, the following conclusion is inevitable. When understood in the context of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code, the trial in a suit commences on the date on which the affidavit in lieu of examination in chief of a party or his witness is filed for the purpose of recording evidence. The bar under the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code would be attracted to an application for amendment of pleadings filed after that date.” 15. In Salim P.M. v . Vasudevan Namboothiri and others [ 2021 (5) KHC 740 :2021 (6) KLT SN 28], this Court considered the question when the trial of a suit commences and laid down the following parameters: “(a) Trial commences when the first witness in the case was examined in chief directly by the Court. (b) In a case chief affidavit is filed in lieu of chief examination, trial commences when the witness who filed chief affidavit in lieu of chief examination offers himself for cross examination by the other side at the witness box and when the cross examination begins. (b) In a case chief affidavit is filed in lieu of chief examination, trial commences when the witness who filed chief affidavit in lieu of chief examination offers himself for cross examination by the other side at the witness box and when the cross examination begins. (c) Trial commences in a case when the plaintiff is not adducing any oral evidence, the date on which the plaintiff or his counsel either tenders the documents in evidence following the procedure or the date on which the plaintiff or his counsel submits that no oral or documentary evidence to be adduced on the part of the plaintiff. (d) All other steps prior to stages (a) to (c) to be treated as proceedings preliminary to commencement of trial.” 16. The learned District Judge held that Ext. P4 application of the petitioner for amendment is hit by the proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC. The learned District Judge held that on remand, the trial in the cases has been reopened. That does not mean that trial of the cases has commenced after the remand. The bar under the proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 is attracted only if the application for amendment is filed after the commencement of trial and the party fails to satisfy the Court that, despite due diligence, the issue could not have been raised before the commencement of trial. From the impugned order, it is not clear as to the stage at which the amendment application has been filed. There is no material before this Court to ascertain whether the application for amendment of original petitions was filed after the commencement of trial or stage preliminary to the commencement of trial. Therefore, Ext.P4 application needs reconsideration by the learned District Judge on this aspect in the light of the decisions referred above. Ext. P7 order is set aside and Ext. P4 application (in both cases) is remanded to the trial court for fresh consideration and disposal. The trial court shall consider all relevant contentions raised by both parties, along with all factors that are to be taken into account while dealing with an application for amendment of pleadings and dispose of Ext. P4 application in accordance with law, within a period of one month from the date of production of a certified copy of this judgment. The trial court shall consider all relevant contentions raised by both parties, along with all factors that are to be taken into account while dealing with an application for amendment of pleadings and dispose of Ext. P4 application in accordance with law, within a period of one month from the date of production of a certified copy of this judgment. The learned District Judge shall take earnest efforts to dispose of the original petitions within five months thereafter in the light of the directions in Ext. P3 order. The original petitions (civil) are disposed of.