JUDGMENT : A. BADHARUDEEN, J. The sole accused in C.C.No.8/2006 on the files of the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Thrissur, has filed this appeal challenging conviction and sentence imposed against him in the above case dated 30.09.2009. The State of Kerala representing the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau, is the respondent. 2. In this matter, the learned counsel who filed this appeal submitted on 30.6.2025 that despite having repeated correspondence, no response was received from the appellant, and accordingly, the vakalath of the appellant was relinquished. In view of the above, Adv.Sri.Adithya Narayanan K.G. is appointed as State Brief to argue the matter on merits. 3. Heard Adv.Sri.Adithya Narayanan K.G., the learned State Brief appearing for the appellant and the learned Public Prosecutor. Perused the judgment impugned and the relevant documents. 4. I shall refer the parties in this appeal as 'prosecution' and 'accused' for easy reference hereinafter. 5. The prosecution case herein is that, the accused, while working as Secretary of Alagappanagar Grama Panchayath, being a public servant, while on duty, demanded and accepted Rs.250/- from the complainant, who was examined as PW2, at about 1.00 p.m. on 18.08.2004. Accordingly, he was arrested red handedly. On this premise, the prosecution alleges that the accused committed offences punishable under Section 7 and Section 13 (1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, 'the PC Act, 1988' hereinafter). 6. Acting on the final report filed before the learned Special Judge, the learned Special Judge took cognizance for the said offences and tried the matter. During trial, PW1 to PW8 were examined, Exts.P1 to P17 and M.O1 to M.O6 were marked on the side of the prosecution. DW1 and DW2 were examined and Exts.X1 and X2 were marked on the side of the defence. 7. While assailing the conviction and sentence imposed on the accused, the learned State Brief argued that in this case, in order to prove the demand and acceptance of bribe by the accused at 1.00 p.m. on 18.08.2004, PW2, the complainant was examined. But, he turned hostile to the prosecution regarding the demand and acceptance. According to the learned State Brief, even though the Gazetted Officers who accompanied the trap team were examined as PW3 and PW4, their evidence in no way supported the demand of bribe by the accused. But, he turned hostile to the prosecution regarding the demand and acceptance. According to the learned State Brief, even though the Gazetted Officers who accompanied the trap team were examined as PW3 and PW4, their evidence in no way supported the demand of bribe by the accused. Thus it is argued by the learned State Brief that in the instant case the conviction and sentence imposed by the Special Court, finding the accused guilty for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 would not sustain and is liable to be reversed. 8. Disspelling this contention, the learned Public Prosecutor would submit that even though PW2 turned hostile to the prosecution, the evidence of PW3 and PW4 coupled with the evidence of PW5, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, who arranged the trap, demand of bribe of Rs.250/- by the accused from the complainant to be inferred. Thus from the circumstantial evidence the demand is proved as dealt in[ 2022 (7) KHC 647 : 2023 (1) KLD 1 : 2022 KHC OnLine 7280 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1724 : 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 1029 : AIR OnLine 2022 SC 1160 : 2023(1) KLT SN 28 : 2022 (6) KLT OnLine 1047 : AIR 2023 SC 330 ] , Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi). 9. In view of the rival submissions the points to be decided are: (i) Whether the Special Court went wrong in holding that the accused committed offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act, 1988? (ii) Whether the Special Court is justified in holding that the accused committed offence punishable under Section 13 (1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988? (iii) Whether it is necessary to interfere with the verdict under challenge? (iv) The order to be passed? Points (i) to (iv) 10. In this case the prosecution allegation is that the accused while working as Secretary of Alagappanagar Grama Panchayat, being a public servant, while on duty, demanded and accepted Rs.250/- as bribe from the complainant, who was examined as PW2, at about 1 p.m on 18.08.2004. This crime was registered by recording Ext.P2 statement at the instance of PW2 raising the said allegation. This crime was registered by recording Ext.P2 statement at the instance of PW2 raising the said allegation. During chief examination, even though PW2 identified his signature in the FIS marked as Ext.P2, he denied the contents of the statement that the accused demanded bribe for issuing ownership certificate to PW2. Thereupon he was cross examined with the permission of the court under Section 154 of the Evidence Act, by the learned legal advisor for Vigilance. During cross examination also nothing extracted to prove that the accused demanded Rs.250/- from PW2 as per the prosecution allegation and as per the FIS given by PW2. 11. Going through the evidence of PW3, who accompanied the trapping team, he deposed that on 18.08.2004 while he was working as Executive Engineer, Minor Irrigation Division, Chembukkavu, he reached the vigilance office and he found PW2 and PW4 (T.D.Thomaskutty) and the Dy.S.P there. Later he added that the accused demanded Rs.250/- as bribe from PW2 to issue ownership certificate and in this regard Ext.P2 complaint was lodged by PW2. According to him, at the time of recording Ext.P2, PW2 conceded that the recitals in the complaint were true. He deposed about entrustment of two Rs.100/- notes and one Rs.50/- note by PW2 to the Dy.S.P and putting of `M’ mark on its watermark after identifying the said notes as M.O1 series. He deposed about the Phenolphthalein test demonstration and smearing of Phenolphthalein powder on M.O1 series and putting the same in the pocket of PW2, and the direction given by the Dy.S.P to PW2 to hand over M.O1 series to the accused if he would demand the same. PW3 supported Ext.P9 mahazar pertaining to this aspect. According to him, thereafter trap team including PW4 along with PW2 reached the office of the 2 nd accused and the Dy.S.P had given instruction to give signal if the accused would accept the bribe. Thereafter after 15 minutes, signal was given and they reached the room of the accused and found the accused and PW2 there. The accused was sitting on his chair. According to him, when the Dy.S.P asked the accused where was the money, the accused deposed that the same was in the left pocket of his shirt. PW3 deposed about the testing of the hands of the vigilance team by using Sodium Carbonate solution and no colour change on the same. The accused was sitting on his chair. According to him, when the Dy.S.P asked the accused where was the money, the accused deposed that the same was in the left pocket of his shirt. PW3 deposed about the testing of the hands of the vigilance team by using Sodium Carbonate solution and no colour change on the same. According to him, M.O3 is the said solution. Later PW4 recovered notes from the pocket of the accused (M.O1 series) and when his fingers were dipped in Sodium Carbonate solution, the solution showed pink colour change and the solution was marked as M.O4. When the shirt worn by the accused was dipped in Sodium Carbonate solution, the same also turned pink. Anyhow PW3 did not witness demand and acceptance of M.O1 series by the accused. 12. PW4 examined in this case is T.D.Thomaskutty, who was also present before the Dy.S.P office at the time when Ext.P2 complaint was lodged by PW2 and he also supported the evidence of PW3 regarding pre trap and post trap proceedings. In the previous statement of PW2, he had given statement that when he reached along with the trap team at the office of the accused at the time of occurrence, he had given statement that he placed the money on the table in front of the accused and during cross examination, PW2 denied the same and the same got marked as Ext.P4. 13. PW5 examined in this case is the Dy.S.P, Thrissur, during the relevant period, ie., 2004. According to him, at about 8.15 hours on 17.08.2004, PW2 reached the vigilance office and given Ext.P2 complaint, upon which he registered FIR as Crime No.3/2004 under Section 7 of the PC Act, 1988 and Ext.P2(b) is the FIR so registered. He deposed about the presence of gazetted officers, who were examined as PW3 and PW4 during pre and post trap proceedings. He also deposed about the demonstration of Phenolphthalein test and entrustment of M.O1 series by PW2 and in turn return of the same to PW2 after smearing Phenolphthalein powder. According to PW5, on getting signal when he himself along with the vigilance team entered into the room of the accused and asked about money, he replied that Haridas (PW2) had given Rs.250/- towards tax and he put the same in his box. According to PW5, on getting signal when he himself along with the vigilance team entered into the room of the accused and asked about money, he replied that Haridas (PW2) had given Rs.250/- towards tax and he put the same in his box. He also deposed about demonstration of Phenolphthalein test of the officials as well as the accused. According to him, when the hands of the vigilance team dipped in Sodium Carbonate solution, there was no colour change, but when the right hand fingers of the accused were dipped in Sodium Carbonate solution the same showed pink colour change and the same is M.O3. He deposed about the recovery of Ext.P7 file containing the application of the accused, Ext.P11 attendance register, tapal distribution register, movement register marked as Ext.P12. He also deposed about the arrest of the accused and the arrest memo pertaining to the same as Ext.P14. During cross examination, lodging of Ext.P2 complaint by PW2 against the accused was denied and further reading of Ext.P2 by PW2 also was denied by the learned counsel for the accused. 14. It is relevant to refer a 5 Bench decision of the Apex Court in[ AIR 2023 SC 330 ] , Neeraj Dutta Vs State , where the Apex Court considered when the demand and acceptance under Section 7 of the P.C Act, 1988 to be said to be proved along with ingredients for the offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 and in paragraph 68 it has been held as under : "68. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised as under: (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13 (1)(d) (i) and (ii) of the Act. (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence. (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind: (i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. (ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Section 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13 (1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13 (1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13 (1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act. (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands. (f) In the event the complainant turns 'hostile', or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant. (g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13 (1) (d) and (ii) of the Act. (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in point (e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.” 15. Thus the twin ingredients to be proved to substantiate offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the P.C Act, 1988 are `demand and acceptance of illegal gratification or bribe by a public servant’. Thus the twin ingredients to be proved to substantiate offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the P.C Act, 1988 are `demand and acceptance of illegal gratification or bribe by a public servant’. Regarding the mode of proof of demand of bribe, if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands. The mode of proof of demand and acceptance is either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant. Insofar as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. 16. Even though there is no direct evidence to prove demand and acceptance of bribe by the accused, as per the settled legal position discussed herein above, demand of bribe by the accused could not be gathered from the circumstances available from the evidence brought in, where even the complainant turned hostile to the prosecution. 17. 16. Even though there is no direct evidence to prove demand and acceptance of bribe by the accused, as per the settled legal position discussed herein above, demand of bribe by the accused could not be gathered from the circumstances available from the evidence brought in, where even the complainant turned hostile to the prosecution. 17. Applying the ratio in Neeraj Dutta’ s case (supra), in paragraph 70, the Apex Court held that in the absence of evidence of the complainant (direct/primary, oral/documentary evidence) it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under S.7 and S.13(1)(d) read with S.13(2) of the Act based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution. Thus the law is clear on the point that either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence is necessary to draw the presumption under Section 20 of the P.C Act in the matter of demand and acceptance of bribe by the accused. In the decision reported in[ 2025 KHC OnLine 6430 : 2025 KHC 6430 : 2025 (3) KHC SN 27 : 2025 INSC 618 : 2025 KLT OnLine 1862 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1013] , Aman Bhatia v. State (GNCT of Delhi), also, in paragraph 64 the Apex Court held that, Insofar as the presumption under S.20 of the PC Act is concerned, such presumption is drawn only qua the offence under S.7 and S.11 respectively and not qua the offence under S.13(1)(d) of the PC Act. The presumption is contingent upon the proof of acceptance of illegal gratification to the effect that the gratification was demanded and accepted as a motive or reward as contemplated under S.7 of the PC Act. Such proof of acceptance can follow only when the demand is proved. 18. Similarly, in another decision of the Apex Court reported in[2025 KHC OnLine 6519 : 2025 KHC 6519 : 2025(4) KHC SN 8 : 2025 INSC 736 : 2025 KLT OnLine 1969 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1175], State by Lokayuktha Police, Davanagere v. C.B.Nagaraj , also the Apex Court affirmed the same ratio. 19. 18. Similarly, in another decision of the Apex Court reported in[2025 KHC OnLine 6519 : 2025 KHC 6519 : 2025(4) KHC SN 8 : 2025 INSC 736 : 2025 KLT OnLine 1969 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1175], State by Lokayuktha Police, Davanagere v. C.B.Nagaraj , also the Apex Court affirmed the same ratio. 19. In the instant case since the sole witness, the complainant, who was examined as PW2 by the prosecution to prove the demand of Rs.250/- from PW2 by the complainant at 1 p.m on 18.08.2004 did not support the prosecution and the other circumstances also in no way support the demand, one of the essential ingredients to prove the offences. In such view of the matter, it could be found that the Special Court went wrong in holding that the prosecution succeeded in proving the offences alleged against the accused/appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Holding so, the conviction and sentence under challenge would require interference. In the result, this appeal succeeds and the verdict under challenge is set aside. Accordingly the Appeal is allowed. The appellant is acquitted for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 and he is set at liberty. His bail bond stands cancelled.