JUDGMENT : EASWARAN S., J. The 6 th defendant in O.S.No.12/2016, a suit for partition, has come up in this appeal challenging the concurrent findings rendered by the Munsiff’s Court, Chengannur, as affirmed by the Sub Court, Chengannur, in A.S.No.8/2020, by judgment dated 15.09.2021. 2. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal are as follows: 2.1. The 1 st respondent – plaintiff instituted O.S.No.12/2016 before the Munsiff’s Court, Chengannur, seeking partition of the 23 Ares situated in Resurvey No.163/19 of Ennakkad Village, Chengannur Taluk. According to the plaintiff, the property was purchased in the name of the 1 st defendant, who is the father, and his wife Janamma by Sale Deed No.1863/1962. At the time of execution of the sale deed, the plaintiff was a minor and was beneficiary of the sale. Subsequently, without the consent of the plaintiff, defendants 1 to 5 and their mother assigned their right of the plaint schedule property in favour of the 6 th defendant by executing Settlement Deed Nos.141/2011 and 321/2013. The said settlement deeds are not binding on the plaintiff as his right to a 1/7 th share over the plaint schedule property cannot be denied. 2.2. The defendants 2, 3 and 6 contested the suit contending that the property was purchased out of the funds generated from the family property of their mother, Janamma. Though after the execution of the sale deed only three children were born to Janamma and her husband and since the parties are governed by the Travancore Ezhava Act (Regulation 111 of 1100), the subsequently born children are also entitled for equal share in the property. Still further, it was contended that since the parties themselves treated this property as a joint family property, the other sharers who are born subsequent to the execution of the Sale Deed No.1863/1962 had righty released their respective shares in favour of the 6 th defendant. Therefore, though the claim for partition was not resisted in toto, as regards the claim of 1/7 th share by the plaintiff, it was contended that the plaintiff has only 1/10 th share. 2.3. On behalf of the plaintiff, Exts.A1 and A2 documents were marked and PW1 was examined and on behalf of the defendants, Exts.B1 to B7 documents were marked and DW1 was examined. 2.3. On behalf of the plaintiff, Exts.A1 and A2 documents were marked and PW1 was examined and on behalf of the defendants, Exts.B1 to B7 documents were marked and DW1 was examined. The Trial Court, on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, came to the conclusion that the claim of the 6 th defendant that the plaint schedule property is a joint family property and that it was purchased out of the nucleus generated out of the assets of late Janamma was not proved and accordingly, proceeded to decree the suit by passing a preliminary decree for partition of the plaint schedule property with the plaintiff taking 1/7 th share and the 6 th defendant taking 6/7 th share, in view of the settlement executed by the mother and other children, who were the parties to the said sale deed. As regards the settlement deed executed by the children who were born after 1962, the Trial Court held that the settlement deed is of no consequence since they were not having any right over the plaint schedule property. 2.4. Aggrieved, the 6 th defendant preferred A.S.No.8/2020 before the Sub Court, Chengannur. Before the First Appellate Court, it was contended that since the other three children were born prior to the introduction of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975, they were also entitled for the share in the family property and therefore, the settlement deed executed by them is valid and the preliminary decree passed by the Trial Court requires to be modified. The First Appellate Court, on reappreciation of the evidence, held that the 6 th defendant/appellant herein has not proved that the plaint schedule property is a joint family property which was purchased out of the nucleus generated out of the properties held by late Janamma. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and hence, the present second appeal. 3. Heard, Sri.P.Thomas Geeverghese – learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Sri.K.Rajesh Kannan – learned counsel appearing for the additional respondents 8 to 10. 4. Sri.P.Thomas Geeverghese - learned counsel appearing for the appellant, contended that the courts below erred egregiously in not appreciating the true purport of Section 32 of the Travancore Ezhava Act . Going by the said provision, there is a presumption regarding the jointness in a family, when the principles of Makkathayam are being followed. 4. Sri.P.Thomas Geeverghese - learned counsel appearing for the appellant, contended that the courts below erred egregiously in not appreciating the true purport of Section 32 of the Travancore Ezhava Act . Going by the said provision, there is a presumption regarding the jointness in a family, when the principles of Makkathayam are being followed. The plaintiff will get only 1/10 th share, especially since the other three children were also entitled for shares and that the mother had treated the property as a joint family property and that is the reason why they executed the settlement deed in favour of the 6 th defendant. In support of his contention, he relied on the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Mathew v. Kunjika Bharathi [ 1967 KHC 102 ] . The learned counsel by placing reliance on the commentaries of the Hindu Law by Sir Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla, 21st Edition, asserted before this Court that there is a presumption regarding the joint family and that, it is for the plaintiff to prove that the property is not a joint family property. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the presumption is stronger in the case of brothers and when it is established or admitted that the family possessed some joint property, which from its nature and relative value may have formed the nucleus from which the property in question may have been acquired, the presumption arises that it was a joint family property and that the burden shifts to the party claiming self-acquisition to establish the affirmative. 5. Per contra, Sri.K.Rajesh Kannan – learned counsel appearing for additional respondents 8 to 10, would support the findings rendered by the courts below and contend that the concurrent finding of facts in the law rendered by the courts below, does not call for any interference in exercise of the powers of this Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure , 1908. He further submitted that, though there is a pleading in the written statement by the 6 th defendant that the plaint schedule property is a joint family property, no evidence was adduced by him to show that the property was purchased by the family funds generated from his mother’s family property. He further submitted that, though there is a pleading in the written statement by the 6 th defendant that the plaint schedule property is a joint family property, no evidence was adduced by him to show that the property was purchased by the family funds generated from his mother’s family property. Mere presumption as regards the joint family will not enure to the benefit of the 6 th defendant to prove the jointness in respect of the property. 6. I have considered the rival submissions raised across the Bar and have perused the judgments rendered by the courts below. 7. The learned Counsel for the appellant would submit that on the basis of his argument, a case for admission is made out inasmuch as substantial questions of law arise for consideration touching upon the applicability of Section 32 of the Travancore Ezhava Act , 1100. On a consideration of the rival submissions raised across the Bar, this Court is of the considered view that no substantial question of law arises for consideration for the following reasons: a]. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant with reference to the provisions of the Travancore Ezhava Act must fail at its inception. The Travancore Ezhava Act is a regulation framed by the erstwhile Princely State of Travancore to regulate the matters relating to marriage, succession, family management and partition among the Ezhavas. The Travancore Ezhava Act was promulgated on 13.04.1925. Section 4(11) defines the “Makkathayam Property”, which reads as under: “4. The Travancore Ezhava Act is a regulation framed by the erstwhile Princely State of Travancore to regulate the matters relating to marriage, succession, family management and partition among the Ezhavas. The Travancore Ezhava Act was promulgated on 13.04.1925. Section 4(11) defines the “Makkathayam Property”, which reads as under: “4. In this Regulation, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context:- xxx (11)“ Makkathayam Property ” is property obtained from the husband or father by the wife or child or both of them, by gift, inheritance or bequest.” Section 32 of the Act speaks about the devolution of the Makkathayam Property, which reads as under: “Except where a contrary intention is expressed in the instrument of gift or bequest, if any, Makkathayam property acquired after the date of the passing of this Regulation shall be liable to be divided among the wife and each of the children in equal shares: Provided that, in the partition of Makkathayam property, the issue how-low-so-ever of a deceased child shall be entitled to only such shares as the child itself, if alive, would have taken.” On a combined reading of Sections 4(11) and 32, it becomes explicitly clear that the entitlement of the children to be born towards the Makkathayam Property is available only if the property is inherited as an ancestral property forming a separate tavazhi as such or for that matter the property is derived by the wife from her husband, or father, or child, or by both of them, by gift, inheritance or bequest. In the present case, it is indisputable that, the property in question was purchased by Ext.A1 Sale Deed in the year 1962 by the husband, wife and three children. Of course, the three children including the 1 st defendant and the 6 th defendant were minors at that point of time. However, the point to be considered is whether acquisition of property by the sale deed will enure to the benefit of the children to be born. Read as may, this Court could not find any provision under the Travancore Ezhava Act which would enable the 6 th defendant to sustain the plea that , the property acquired by a sale deed would also have to be treated in par with the property inherited or gifted or obtained by bequest. Read as may, this Court could not find any provision under the Travancore Ezhava Act which would enable the 6 th defendant to sustain the plea that , the property acquired by a sale deed would also have to be treated in par with the property inherited or gifted or obtained by bequest. The plaintiff in his suit had claimed separate possession of his share derived by virtue of the sale deed. No doubt the husband, wife and three children at the time of the acquisition of the plaint schedule property would constitute a joint family. Perhaps, it may be possible to hold that property as such in their hands constituted a joint family property. But to hold that, the children who were born after the said acquisition would also be entitled to the benefit of the property, there should be a clear indication under the statute. In the absence of the same, it is not possible for this Court to hold otherwise. b] That apart, the appellant could have succeeded in his endeavor to prove that the plaint schedule property was held jointly among the family members and that there was a conscious act of blending. However, in order to sustain such a plea, it was incumbent upon the 6 th defendant to prove that after the birth of the three children subsequent to the execution of the sale deed, the parties treated the property as joint in nature. Unfortunately, the quality of evidence adduced by the 6 th defendant is insufficient to hold that the parties treated the plaint schedule property as joint in nature. c]. The contention of the appellant, that the mother and other sharers, who were parties to the sale deed along with the subsequently born children, had executed release deed in his favour and it is a strong indication as regards jointness of the property, cannot be accepted for multiple reasons. As rightly found by the courts below, the subsequent settlement deeds executed by the children who were not born at the time of execution of the sale deed, are of no consequence, especially when they derived no right, title and interest over the plaint schedule property covered by the sale deed executed in the year 1962. As stated above, to sustain the plea of blending, the quality of evidence adduced by the appellant is insufficient. d]. As stated above, to sustain the plea of blending, the quality of evidence adduced by the appellant is insufficient. d]. The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the appellant to the decision of the Full Bench is of no avail. The issue decided by the Full Bench in Mathew (supra) was whether the provisions of Section 22 of the Travancore Nayar Act has to be treated in parity with Section 32 of the Travancore Ezhava Act . It was held that the legislature had intended to treat the provisions under the Travancore Nayar Act to be different from the Travancore Ezhava Act . The Full Bench of this Court held that it is not possible to hold that in the case of a gift deed, the children who were born subsequently to the execution will not get the benefit of the bequest. To apply the aforesaid principle to the facts of the case, there must be specific provisions under the Travancore Ezhava Act 1100, enabling the 6 th defendant to contend that the Legislature had intended to treat the acquisition of the property by virtue of sale deed also in par with the property obtained by inheritance, gift or bequest. e] If the argument of the learned counsel is accepted, this Court will be re-writing the statute itself. Legislature in its wisdom did not deem it appropriate to include the property derived by sale deed within the ambit of Section 32 of the Travancore Ezhava Act , 1100. The preamble of the Act read with the definition clause of ‘Makkathayam property’ leaves no room for doubt that a property derived by a sale deed will not come under its purview. Read as may, this Court could not find any indication in the statute to hold otherwise. It now settled law that, it is impermissible for the court to infer casus omissus under a statute and supply words and rewrite the legislation. {See Union of India Vs Rajiv Kumar (2003) 6 SCC 516 ) } Therefore, this Court is not persuaded to apply the principles laid down by the Full Bench in Mathew (supra) to the facts of the case. {See Union of India Vs Rajiv Kumar (2003) 6 SCC 516 ) } Therefore, this Court is not persuaded to apply the principles laid down by the Full Bench in Mathew (supra) to the facts of the case. Resultantly, this Court holds that the courts below were right in holding that the plaintiff has 1/7 th share and the 6 th defendant by virtue of the settlement deed executed by the parties to the sale deed derived 6/7 th share over the plaint schedule property. Accordingly, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. Parties are directed to suffer their respective costs. .