JUDGMENT : ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY, J. Heard the parties. 2. This Writ Petition has been filed with a prayer to quash the order dated 29.07.2016 passed in connection with Forest Revision Case No.107 of 2012 by the Revisional Authority-cum-Principal Secretary Forest, Environment and Climate Change Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi under the Indian Forest Act . 3. The brief of the case is that the JCB machine belonging to the petitioner was seized by the forest officers on the allegation of dozering of forest land and BF Case no.11 of 2011 was registered. Confiscation case no.05 of 2011 was also started by the Forest Officer/DFO, Bokaro and the said JCB Machine belonging to the petitioner was ordered to be confiscated. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the Authorised Officer, the petitioner filed Confiscation Appeal Case No.26 of 2011 before the Appellate Authority-cum-Collector-cum-Deputy Commissioner, Bokaro wherein vide order dated 20.03.2012, the appeal was allowed and the order passed by the Authorized Officer in Confiscation Case No.05 of 2011 was set aside. Though, as per Section 52 (B) of the Indian Forest Act Bihar Amendment (1) which reads as under:- 52.B. Petition for revision before Secretary Forest and Environ-ment Department, Government of Bihar, against the order of the Appellate Authority.- (1) Any party to the appeal, aggrieved by final order or by order of consequential nature passed by the Appellate Authority, may within thirty days of the order sought to be impugned, submit a petition for revision to the Secretary, Forest and Environment Department, Government of Bihar. Explanation. In computing the period of thirty days under this sub- section, the time requisite for obtaining certified copy of order of Appellate Authority shall be excluded. (2) The Secretary, Forest and Environment Department, Government of Bihar may confirm, reverse or modify any final order of consequential nature passed by the Appellate Authority. (3) Copies of the order passed in revision shall be sent to the Appellate Authority and to the Authorised officer for compliance or for passing such further order or for taking such further action as may be directed by such Court. (3) Copies of the order passed in revision shall be sent to the Appellate Authority and to the Authorised officer for compliance or for passing such further order or for taking such further action as may be directed by such Court. (4) For entertaining hearing and deciding a revision under this section, the Secretary, Forest and Environment Department, Government of Bihar shall as far may be, exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure as exercised and followed while entertaining, hearing and deciding a revision under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974). (5) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974) the order passed under this section shall be final and shall not be called in question before the Court. the time period for which a Revision Petition was to be filed is 30 days from the date of the order but the revision was filed only on 25.05.2012 as is evident from the copy of the certified copy of the order sheet which has been annexed as annexure-6(c), but the same was allowed vide order dated 29.07.2016 by the respondent no.2; ignoring the fact that the revision application was filed beyond the period of 30 days and that the maintainability of the revision was objected to by the petitioner specifically by filing the petition dated 18.12.2012, in Para-3 of which specifically this plea was taken that the revision application cannot be entertained beyond the period of 30 days. The copy of said petition has been annexed as Annexure-4. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the judgment of a co- ordinate bench of this Court in the case of Dhaneshwar Sao vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors . The copy of said petition has been annexed as Annexure-4. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the judgment of a co- ordinate bench of this Court in the case of Dhaneshwar Sao vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors . reported in [2010 (1) East Cr C 378 (Jhr)] wherein it was held by the co-ordinate bench relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Sakuru vs. Tanaji reported in AIR 1985 SC 1279 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held that the provision of the Limitation Act , 1963 apply only to proceedings in “Courts” and not to appeals or applications before bodies other than Courts such as quasi-judicial Tribunals or Executive Authorities, notwithstanding the fact that such bodies or authorities may be vested with certain specified powers conferred on Courts under the Codes of Civil or Criminal Procedure by observing thus in para-10 & 11 of the judgement and went on to hold that:- 10. Xxxxx “After hearing both sides we have unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that there is no substance in this appeal and that the view taken by the Division Bench in Venkaiah's case is perfectly correct and sound. It is well settled by the decisions of this Court in Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli, (1970) 1 SCR 51 : AIR 1969 SC 1335 . Niryananda M. Joshi v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, 1970) 1 SCR 396: ( AIR 1970 SC 209 ) and Sushila Devi v. Ramanandan Prasad, (1976) 2 SCR 845 : AIR 1976 SC 177 that the provisions of the Limitation Act , 1963 apply only to proceedings in "Courts" and not to appeals or applications before bodies other than Courts such as quasi-judicial Tribunals or executive authorities, notwithstanding the fact that such bodies or authorities may be vested with certain specified powers conferred on Courts under the Codes of Civil or Criminal Procedure. The Collector before whom the appeal was preferred by the appellant herein under Section 90 of the Act not being a Court, the Limitation Act , as such, had no applicability to the proceedings before him. But even in such a situation the relevant special statute may contain an express provision conferring on the Appellate Authority, such as the Collector. The Collector before whom the appeal was preferred by the appellant herein under Section 90 of the Act not being a Court, the Limitation Act , as such, had no applicability to the proceedings before him. But even in such a situation the relevant special statute may contain an express provision conferring on the Appellate Authority, such as the Collector. the power to extend the prescribed period of limitation on sufficient cause being shown by laying down that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall be applicable to such proceed- ings. Hence it becomes necessary to examine whether the Act contains any such provision entitling the Collector to invoke the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay in the filing of the appeal. The only provision relied on by the appellant in this connection is Section 93 of the Act which, as it stood at the relevant time, was in the following terms: "93, Limitation-Every appeal and every application for revision under this Act shall be filed within sixty days from the date of the order against which the appeal or application is filed and the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act , 1908 shall apply for the purpose of the computation of the said period." On a plain reading of the section it is absolutely clear that its effect is only to render applicable to the proceedings before the Collector, the provisions of the Limitation Act relating to computation of the period of limitation. The provisions relating to computation of the period of limitation are contained in Sections 12 to 24 included in Part III of the Limitation Act , 1963. Section 5 is not a provision dealing with computation of the period of limitation. It is only after the process of computation is completed and it is found that an appeal or application has been filed after the expiry of the prescribed period that the question of extension of the period under Section 5 can arise. We are, therefore. in complete agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench of the High Court in Venkaiah's case that Section 93 of the Act did not have the effect of rendering the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act , 1963 applicable to the proceedings before the Collector." 11. Thus. We are, therefore. in complete agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench of the High Court in Venkaiah's case that Section 93 of the Act did not have the effect of rendering the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act , 1963 applicable to the proceedings before the Collector." 11. Thus. I do find that in absence of any specific provision under the Forest Act (Bihar Amendment) empowering the Forest Secretary to condone the delay, the Secretary, Forest and Environment Department, does not have any power to condone the delay and as such, the impugned order dated 1.4.2009 under which Revision Case No. 41 of 2008 has been admitted after condoning the delay is certainly without jurisdiction and hence, it is set aside. Since JCB Machine has already been released by this Court during the pendency, no order needs to be passed in this regard. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner next relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Prakash H. Jain vs. Marie Fernandes (Ms) reported in (2003) 8 SCC 431 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held that the competent authority under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act cannot be said to be “court” for any and every purpose and that too for availing of or exercising powers under the Limitation Act , 1963 and therein it was also observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that there is no such thing as any inherent power of Court to condone delay in filing proceedings before a court/authority concerned, unless the law warrants and permits it, since it has a tendency to alter the rights accrued to one or the other party under the statute concerned, hence, it is submitted that the prayer as prayed for, in this writ petition, be allowed. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the State vehemently opposes the prayer of the petitioner and submits that the petitioner is not entitled to the relief prayed for and this writ petition, being without any merit, be dismissed. 7. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the State vehemently opposes the prayer of the petitioner and submits that the petitioner is not entitled to the relief prayed for and this writ petition, being without any merit, be dismissed. 7. Having heard the rival submissions made at the Bar and after carefully going through the materials available in the record, it is pertinent to mention here that the undisputed fact remains that the Deputy Commissioner-cum- District Magistrate, Bokaro has passed the order in Confiscation Appeal no.26 of 2011 dated 20.03.2012, that before the Respondent No.2, the Revision Petition was filed on 25.05.2012, the undisputed facts remains that on 18.12.2012, the writ petitioner filed a petition challenging the maintainability of the revision application inter alia on the ground that the same has been filed beyond the period of 30 days from the date of the order impugned before the Respondent No.2-Revisional Authority. No express order has been passed by the Revisional Authority being the Respondent No.2 for condonation of delay. 8. As already indicated above, it is a settled principle of law that the revision cannot be filed beyond the period of 30 days from the date of order impugned and Section 5 of the Limitation Act ,1963, is not applicable to proceeding before the Principal Secretary-cum-Revisional Authority under Indian Forest Act , because such an authority is not a Court, therefore, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the Revisional Authority being the Respondent No.2 has committed a grave illegality by entertaining the Forest Revision Case no.107 of 2012 beyond a period of 30 days from the date of the order impugned and passing the final order in the said Forest Revision Case No.107 of 2012 on 29.07.2016, ignoring the petition dated 18.12.2012 filed in the said Forest Revision Case no.107 of 2012 by the petitioner contending therein that such a revision is not maintainable, having been filed beyond the period of 30 days from the date of the order, impugned before the Revisional Authority. Hence, the said order dated 29.07.2016 passed in Forest Revision Case no.107 of 2012 is not sustainable in law. Accordingly, the same is quashed and set aside. 9. This writ petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent only.