JUDGMENT : JOHNSON JOHN, J. This appeal by the complainant is against the acquittal of the accused for the offence under Section 420 IPC . 2. As per the complaint, on 07.01.2002, the accused approached the complainant at his residence and asked to lend him a sum of Rs.90,000/- for his urgent necessity and as such, the accused received Rs.90,000/- from the complainant and issued a cheque dated 08.01.2002 for Rs. 90,000/-. It is alleged that while issuing the said cheque, the accused dishonestly induced the complainant to believe that the amount is borrowed for the business in connection with the mill and that the cheque is issued by him as the proprietor of the mill. It is stated that believing the version of the accused, the complainant accepted the cheque and subsequently, when he presented the cheque for collection, the same was dishonoured for the reason ‘funds insufficient and account is individual and not in favour of the firm’. 3. Thereafter, the complainant issued notice dated 28.01.2002 to the accused and in spite of receipt of notice, the accused failed to pay the cheque amount to the complainant. It is further alleged in the complaint that the accused issued the cheque with the knowledge that the cheque was not drawn on an account maintained by the firm and he made the complainant to believe that the cheque is that of the firm Kanhirathinkal Oil and Flour Mills with the deliberate intention of cheating the complainant. 4. Before the trial court, PWs 1 to 4 were examined and Exhibits P1 to P7 were marked from the side of the complainant and from the side of the accused, DW1 examined. 5. After considering the oral and documentary evidence on record and hearing both sides, the trial court found that the complainant has not succeeded in proving any dishonest inducement at the initial stage of the transaction and that the complainant has not succeeded in proving the offence under Section 420 IPC against the accused and hence, the accused was acquitted. 6. Heard Sri. Salim Kumar, the learned counsel for the appellant, Sri. C.P. Peethambaran, the learned counsel for the accused/first respondent and Sri. Alex M. Thombra, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor appearing for the second respondent. 7. 6. Heard Sri. Salim Kumar, the learned counsel for the appellant, Sri. C.P. Peethambaran, the learned counsel for the accused/first respondent and Sri. Alex M. Thombra, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor appearing for the second respondent. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that at the time of borrowing the amount, the accused misrepresented that he is the proprietor of Kanhirathinkal Oil and Flour Mills and that the cheque is issued in his capacity as the proprietor of the said mill and therefore, from the evidence of PWs 1 to 4, the trial court ought to have found that the accused had the intention of cheating the complainant from the very beginning and that the complainant has proved all the ingredients of Section 420 IPC against the accused. 8. The learned counsel for the accused/1 st respondent argued that the averments in the complaint and Exhibit P5, copy of the lawyer notice dated 28.01.2002, would clearly show that the alleged payment of money by the complainant to the accused prior to the issuance of the cheque was not on the basis of the alleged inducement that the cheque is drawn on an account in the name of the firm Kanhirathinkal Oil and Flour Mills. 9. In this connection, it is pertinent to note that in paragraph 2 of the complaint, it is stated as follows: “On 07.01.2002 the accused approached the complainant at his residence at Kolichal at about 3 PM and asked to lend him a sum of Rs.90,000/- for his urgent necessity. As such the accused received the sum of Rs.90,000/- from the complainant in the presence of witnesses and for discharging the said liablity the accused issued a cheque dated 8.1.2002 for Rs.90,000/- (Rupees ninty thousand only) bearing number 540693 drawn on the North Malabar Gramin Bank, Padiyotchal Branch in favour of the complainant.” 10. In paragraph 3 of the complaint, it is stated as follows: “It is submitted that the accused has issued the cheque knowingly that the aforesaid cheque was not drawn to the firm and thereby he dishonestly made believe the complainant that the cheque is belonged to his firm called “Kanhirathinkal Oil & Four Mills’, P.O. Cherupuzha; and knowing further that the cheque is belonged to his personal account and there was no sufficient fund in his account with the bank to honour the requirements of the cheque.” 11. The complainant when examined as PW1 deposed that the accused is known to him for the last 15 years and that the accused borrowed Rs.90,000/- from him on 07.01.2002 for his urgent necessity. According to PW1, the accused informed him that he brought a cheque belonging to the account of the mill and that the amount can be withdrawn from the Bank on 08.01.2002. 12. Exhibit P3, cheque dishonour memo, shows that the cheque was dishonoured for two reasons: (i) funds insufficient; and (ii) account is individual not in favour of the firm. PWs 2 and 3 are the witnesses examined by the complainant to prove the transaction. The evidence of PWs 2 and 3 shows that they were present when the accused borrowed Rs.90,000/- from the complainant and issued Exhibit P1 cheque. The evidence of PWs 2 and 3 in chief examination itself shows that only from the complainant, they came to know that the accused cheated the complainant. 13. PW4 is the General Manager of the District Industrial Centre, Kannur. Even though PW4 is examined to prove the name and identity of the proprietor of Kanhirathinkal Oil and Flour Mills, his evidence in this regard is vague to the core. PW4 stated that in the application seeking registration of the firm Kanhirathinkal Oil and Flour Mills, the name of the proprietor is shown as Dolesey Sebastian. According to PW4, Exhibit P7 is the true extract of the permit issued and as per Exhibit P7, the firm is in the name of Adey Sebastian for the period from 29.11.1999 to 2.12.2004. He would say that the firm was transferred in favour of one Joby Joseph on 15.03.2005 and prior to the said period, the firm was in the name of Lucy Sebastian. In spite of the serious contradiction in the evidence of PW4 regarding the name of the proprietor of the firm, no attempt is seen made by the respective counsel who appeared for the complainant and the accused before the trial court to clarify the position and therefore, I find that the evidence of PW4 cannot be relied upon to arrive at a conclusion regarding the identity of the proprietor of the firm Kanhirathinkal Oil and Flour Mills during the relevant period. 14. 14. It is well settled that the ingredients to be established for a conviction under Section 420 IPC and Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 are fundamentally different. The offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC arises only when the accused dishonestly induces the complainant to deliver any property and therefore, the intention to deceive from the very beginning is the gist of the offence of cheating and a mere failure to keep a promise subsequently cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution for cheating. The difference between a mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of the alleged incident. 15. In Prof. Vijayasarathy v. Sudha Seetharam, 2019 (1) KLT OnLine 3038 (SC), the Honourable Supreme Court has culled out the ingredients to constitute the offence under Sections 415 and 420 IPC as under: “14. Section 415 of the Penal Code reads thus: “Section 415. Cheating .- Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”.” The ingredients to constitute an offence of cheating are as follows: i) there should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving him; ii) (a) the person so induced should be intentionally induced to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or (b) the person so induced should be intentionally induced to do or to omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and iii) in cases covered by (ii) (b) above, the act or omission should be one which caused or is likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced in body, mind, reputation or property. A fraudulent or dishonest inducement is an essential ingredient of the offence. A person who dishonestly induces another person to deliver any property is liable for the offence of cheating. 15. A fraudulent or dishonest inducement is an essential ingredient of the offence. A person who dishonestly induces another person to deliver any property is liable for the offence of cheating. 15. Section 420 of the Penal Code reads thus: “ Section 420 . Cheating and dishonestly inducing deliver of property.- Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable to being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” The ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 420 are as follows: i) A person must commit the offence of cheating under Section 415; and ii) The person cheated must be dishonestly induced to (a) deliver property to any person; or (b) make, alter or destroy valuable security or anything signed or sealed and capable of being converted into valuable security. Cheating is an essential ingredient for an act to constitute an offence under Section 420 .” 16. In this case, the averments in the complaint, the evidence of PWs 1 to 3 and Exhibit P5 notice would clearly show that the case of the complainant is that the accused issued the cheque in discharge of the debt and in the absence of any specific allegation or evidence to show that the accused induced the complainant to advance the loan because of the misrepresentation in connection with the firm or the cheque, it cannot be held that the complainant has succeeded in proving the ingredients of the offence under Section 420 IPC as against the accused. 17. The learned counsel for the first respondent/accused also argued that the appellate court cannot reverse a judgment of acquittal only because another view is possible. In K. Prakashan v. P.K. Surendran [ (2008) 1 SCC 258 ], the Honourable Supreme Court held that it is now trite that if two views are possible, the appellate court shall not reverse a judgment of acquittal only because another view is possible to be taken. In Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) v. State of Maharashtra [( 2010) 13 SCC 657], it is held thus: “ 39. In Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) v. State of Maharashtra [( 2010) 13 SCC 657], it is held thus: “ 39. Every accused is presumed to be innocent unless his guilt is proved. The presumption of innocence is a human right. Subject to the statutory exceptions, the said principle forms the basis of criminal jurisprudence in India. The nature of the offence, its seriousness and gravity has to be taken into consideration. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused, and further, that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference with the decision of the trial court in a casual or cavalier manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for such interference.” 18. On a careful re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, I find no reason to disagree with the finding of the trial court that the complainant has not succeeded in establishing any fraudulent or dishonest intention on the part of the accused at the time of borrowing the money and the allegations in connection with the subsequent issuance of the cheque and its dishonour are not sufficient to establish the ingredients of the offence under Section 420 IPC against the accused and therefore, I find that this appeal is liable to be dismissed. In the result, this appeal is dismissed.